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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is addressed to analysts of talk in social scenes. Its principal aim is to 
develop a framework for systematically investigating third person interpretations 
of what communicates and what is communicated in the data products of 
everyday verbal exchange. The programme of research that is designed to meet 
this aim is based on analytic and descriptive techniques adopted from a wide 
range of disciplines concerned with the study of verbal communication, and 
particularly those associated with the work of John Gumperz (1982a; 1982b). By 
focussing on the nature of third person descriptions of what goes on and who is 
involved in various tape recorded products of talk, the research seeks to explore 
the nature of members' interpretive resources for recovering and warranting 
communicative norms that are not normally verbalised as'talk is in progress. 
The investigative method developed for this purpose provides professional 
observers with an empirical means of citing evidence in support of their own 
analytic claims about what participants are doing in talk. It also provides an 
enabling device for generating and testing hypotheses about the communicative 
salience of different sociolinguistic factors, much as Gumperz (1982a) suggests. 
On the basis of the work presented, it is argued that whatever the disciplinary 
motivation of the analyst or the sociolinguistic contexts in which talk occurs third 
person interpretive methods offer a powerful descriptive tool. The research 
potential of this tool is evaluated in terms of its utility for not only investigating 
the interpretive resources of different individuals within a specific culture, but 
also for developing culturally sensitive theories of communicative language use in 
general. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH AIMS AND ORIENTATION 
1.0 Introduction 
This thesis is principally concerned with the study of interpersonal 
communication as manifest in the language used by speakers and hearers in 
everyday verbal exchange. In particular, it explores the methodological and 
theoretical contribution of an interpretive sociolinguistic approach to analysing 
such exchanges based on systematic investigation of ordinary members' 
descriptions about what is communicated and what communicates when language 
is used in this way. 
The research approach developed for this purpose makes use of analytic and 
descriptive techniques derived from a variety of disciplines that have studied 
communicative activity in naturally occurring talk, and particularly those 
pioneered by John Gumperz (1981; 1982a; 1982b; 1984; 1992), wherein participant 
and non-participant observation of speech events is used to facilitate a closer 
understanding of how linguistic and social knowledge interact in discourse 
interpretation. In order to account for what has gone on from the participants' 
point of view, Gumperz develops a general theory of 'conversational inferencing', 
that is, "the situated or context bound process of interpretation, by means of which 
participants in an exchange assess others' intentions, and on which they base their 
responses" (Gumperz, 1982a: 153). 
1 
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Gumperz's achievement is to demonstrate that something of this knowledge is 
recoverable post hoc, and can afford significant insights into communicative 
processes that are not normally verbalised by participants in the course of 
conversational exchange. To the extent that these processes are shared, that is, 
related to the values, norms and concerns of others, they become what Sacks 
(1984) terms 'observables'. In other words, participants in various different kinds 
of talk may be supposed to know what is going on communicatively and this 
knowledge, in turn, may be presumed to influence and be displayed in how they 
participate in what has gone on. 
While Gumperz and others have demonstrated that "one can deal with 
discourse from the point of view of the participants caught, as it were, in the act; 
that is to say, one can treat discourse as a process" (Widdowson, 1979: 72), it is also 
possible to "deal with instances of discourse from the point of view of the third 
person analyst: that is to say, one can treat discourse in detachment from its 
instantiation, after the event, as a product" (Widdowson, 1979: 71). 
It is this third person perspective that is of central concern in this thesis, where 
the research presented is an attempt to devise an analytical instrument for 
empirically investigating the interpretive capacities of ordinary members to deal 
with, make statements about, and categorise communicative events (or more 
strictly their products), previously unseen. 
1.1 The Problem 
Analysis of this perspective requires a methodology that is significantly different 
from other linguistic and sociolinguistic traditions which seek to investigate 
everyday language use, since the latter have tended to focus on structural 
accomplishments and/or the quantification of relations among specified linguistic 
and speaker variables. Because these traditions bear an indirect relationship to 
3 
what speakers actually know, Gumperz suggests that we need an approach that 
deals directly with issues arising from the ability of speakers to interact. 
The methodology which he develops for this purpose is based on participant 
descriptions of actual verbal encounters. The descriptions in question are then 
used to generate hypotheses about the kinds of assumption participants must have 
made in order to provide the descriptions in the first place. Consequently, when 
participants proffer descriptions of verbal exchange, Gumperz suggests that they 
tend to do so by "mentioning some item of content, or by referring to what people 
were getting at or what they were trying to do" (1982a: 157). 
This claim is never documented or substantiated in anything other than an ad 
hoc way, however, nor is it tested across and within individual speakers with other 
interactional experience, namely, those who are untrained observers with either 
participant or non-participant status. Given the difficulties involved, Gumperz is 
hardly to be taken to task for failing to develop and extend the analytic framework 
he presents along these particular lines of inquiry. Hence, the opportunity to 
develop this framework is taken up here, on the basis that interpretive capacity 
(the ability to employ processes of inference resulting from social presuppositions 
and discourse conventions) is not exclusive to focussed and ratified addressees. 
It is clear from the burgeoning research that has become available to date that 
the study of verbal communication can be understood at many different levels of 
analysis. Consequently, while this thesis makes use of analytic and descriptive 
techniques from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, it does so with a specific aim in 
mind. The aim is to advance the study of third person interpretation as a 
complementary, but largely unexplored, mode of analysis for the would-be- 
investigator of verbal communication, especially with regard to the warranting of 
4 
interactional behaviour. It is taken as axiomatic that this behaviour is 'goal- 
oriented'. 
I suggest that research of the kind presented in this thesis is not only an 
important first step in generating and testing hypotheses about verbal 
communication in something of the ways that Gumperz and others have 
suggested, but also that when properly documented can become an important tool 
for warranting claims about participant goals. By attending closely to what 
ordinary members have to say about such goals, analysts can avoid the charge of 
warping facts to suit their theories. Where the analysis of everyday verbal 
exchange is concerned, it is surely better that theories are derived to suit the facts. 
The problem for would-be-analysts, however, is one of "correct interpretation, " 
because analysts cannot have recourse to all the knowledge that participants share 
(Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 350-351). It is the challenge of addressing this problem 
that is confronted here. 
1.2 The Agenda 
A number of general bases for warranting inferences about communicative goals 
are identified by Craig (1986). From the present perspective, the most important of 
these are the use of speaker 'self-reports'. I propose that self-reports should be of 
service to analysts of talk on the basis that at best they provide a kind of 'litmus 
test of interpretation' to use Tannen's (1984) phrase, or more cautiously stated, can 
indicate something interesting about speakers' goal-orientation as Craig (1986) 
suggests. 
The research context for pursuing this work is established in Chapter 2, where 
the major concepts and distinctions that scholars have used to characterise verbal 
communication are introduced. A review of the wide range of disciplines that 
have contributed to how the communicative process may be viewed is also 
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presented in this chapter. Further to this review, the need for an integrated and 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of verbal communication is suggested. 
However, while a single overall framework of concepts and analytic procedures of 
the kind mooted by Gumperz (1982a) seems desirable, the extent to which it can 
be realised in practice remains challenging and elusive, and indeed lies well 
beyond the bounds of the present research. 
The case for exploring the interpretive capacities of third persons is made in 
Chapter 3. This chapter also addresses the question of how these capacities can be 
investigated in the light of collected post hoc reports about participant 
communicative behaviour. Since the importance of methodology for findings has 
been stressed by sociolinguists such as Lesley Milroy (see especially Milroy, 1987), 
various procedural issues are aired in order to prepare the ground for the 
particular approach that is taken; these include the difficulties of recording and 
transcribing (fragments of) naturally occurring speech activities. However, what is 
of particular interest in the present work is the question of how different analytic 
modes affect or impinge upon interpretive practice. 
In order to explore this question, a continuum is established that seeks to 
define the nature of deictic relations linking different kinds of 'interpreter' with 
communicative activities that take place not only within, but also outside the 
participation framework. At its periphery, this continuum identifies two types of 
third person judge ('participants' and 'non-participants') who can be used as 
informants in the post hoc interpretation of tape-recorded fragments of talk. These 
judges may be expert analysts or lay members. Fairclough (1989) argues that the 
interpretive capacities of third persons are derived from a combination of 'what is 
in the text', and 'what is in the individual'. My interest is principally, but not 
exclusively, in the kind of members' resources that lay individuals bring to post hoc 
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interpretation. It is these resources that I seek to investigate in the empirical work 
which is presented in the chapters which follow. 
Chapter 4 establishes an analytic framework for the investigation of lay, third 
person perspectives. This framework has three major components: 
(i) the creation of situations and texts to provide speech activities for judges to 
listen to; 
(ii) the selection of the judges themselves; 
(iii) a means of eliciting judges' interpretive accounts of selected activity 
fragments. 
Though her work is undertaken from a largely psychological perspective, the 
most systematic attempt of which I am aware to investigate verbal communication 
using such a framework is Kreckel (1981). Making use of family interactions 
recorded during a BBC documentary, Kreckel seeks to determine how participant 
family members and outside observers interpret the 'message content' of the 
exchanges that she uses as stimulus data. The descriptive comments elicited from 
judges in controlled experimental work is used as evidence that third persons 
have metapragmatic abilities. 
My own investigative mode is based on a variation of this approach. The 
method that I employed is essentially what has become known as the 'playback 
approach' where tape-recordings are subject to post hoc interpretation by different 
kinds of observer (cf. Labov and Fanshel, 1977; Gumperz 1982a; Tannen, 1984). 
Issues affecting the selection of stimulus material to be used in playback, and also 
how one might provide appropriate judges are also discussed towards the end of 
the chapter. 
In Chapter 5, the playback approach is used in three different studies of post 
hoc interpretation. The first study functions as a pilot exercise in which two 
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participant and sixteen non-participant observers listened to a five minute 
fragment of verbal exchange. Unlike related research, judges were not given 
specific interpretive tasks, but rather asked for any general comments that they 
might like to provide about the extract. The results of this work yielded 2786 
words of comment. 
The second study is based on work with eight outside observers who were 
asked to listen to a range of different fragments of talk, taken from different 
speech events; as opposed to the single episode that was used for the pilot study. 
Six fragments were used in all. My idea here was to try and determine whether 
similar kinds of comment would be elicited with respect to different types of 
stimulus material. I also limited the real-time length of each fragment in order to 
restrict the amount of information that judges would have to process, and also to 
determine what effect that this would have, if any, on what judges would have to 
say. Despite delimiting the fragments in this way, the study yielded 4309 words of 
comment. 
Finally in the third study, one pair of participant judges and seven self- 
selected pairs of non-participant judges were used to listen to yet another range of 
six fragments. The fragments were selected from the published corpus of Crystal 
and Davy (1975) because of (a) their superior auditory quality compared to my 
own stimulus material, (b) the relative unlikelihood that non-participant judges 
would be able to recognise the participants, and (c) the fact that they are 
accompanied by an analytic commentary which I could use for purposes of 
comparison. Judges participated in the study in pairs in order to diminish the 
effects of observer presence, and also as a means of eliciting comments in 
something of a more natural way (Burleson, 1986). A total of 7587 words of 
commentary were collected using this method. 
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The interpretive repertoires elicited in each of the three studies are subject to 
detailed analysis in Chapters 6,7,8 and 9. The comments themselves are used as 
basis not only for demonstrating the capacity of ordinary members to act as 
'inference-making machines' (Sacks, 1984), but also as a means of examining the 
interpretive resources and/or tacit assumptions upon which such capacity 
appears to be depend. Interest in the research findings thus centres upon the 
discussion of communicative issues rather than vernacular behaviour. The 
repertoires demonstrate the ability of naive native informants to report on what is 
accomplished by context-dependent speech in much the same way as Kreckel 
(1981) suggests. 
A coding instrument is devised to account for the different kinds of 
interpretive repertoires that were collected in Chapter 6. The 'response data', as I 
refer to it, is analysed by a three stage process that involves: 
(i) describing the vocabularies that judges used; 
(ii) codifying the information that is provided in the process; 
(iii) modelling the interpretive resources that this information implies. 
Subsequent analysis identifies three major domains of response. These domains 
are based on a modified version of Hymes's (1972; 1974) ethnographic schema for 
analysing communicative events, and include descriptions that characterise the 
stimulus fragments in terms of what I refer to as: 
(i) textual responses; 
(ii) contextual responses; and 
(iii) supratextual responses. 
Textual responses are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. These responses 
provide information about the encoding of surface linguistic forms. A small but 
significant descriptive repertoire was identified from these responses. It is 
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suggested that this repertoire reveals judges' ability to observe and utilise aural 
linguistic cues in order to describe what utterances have been produced, in what 
way, and at what time, by the participants in question. I was able to compare the 
vocabularies used by judges for this purpose with that of professional analysts. 
The most important cue, or at least the one that judges seemed to refer to the most, 
was 'prosody'. 
Gumperz (1982a: 170) suggests that by examining the interplay of surface 
features with evaluations of what has gone on in talk, we can gather strong 
evidence for the signalling of communicative goals. This evidence was sought in 
Chapters 8 and 9. 
Chapter 8 considers the nature of contextual responses. These responses 
provide information about 'situational' characteristics of the stimulus fragments, 
including 'the scene' and 'participants'. It is argued that this type of response 
provides evidence not only of judges' ability to recover situation from text, but 
also to attribute information of various kinds to participants, even where 
interlocutors were neither recognised nor known. Street and Capella (1985) argue 
that perceptual and evaluative constructs of the kind that judges provided about 
contextual matters are likely to influence participant goals, but this link is not 
explored here. Descriptions of goal-oriented behaviour in its own right are tackled 
in Chapter 9. 
The most productive domain was in the area of supratextual responses. 
Supratextual responses are those which describe or refer to what is going in the 
fragments in terms of communicative endeavour. Judges' evaluations are 
categorised into two major types: 
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(i) evaluations of the type of activity or genre that is said to have taken place as a 
result of the communicative products that have been created by 
participants; 
(ii) evaluations of the type of praxis that is said to be going as a result of the 
process of what it is participants are said to accomplish, or try to 
accomplish as communicators. 
The vocabularies involved in these evaluations provide evidence that third 
persons must have highly developed models of the kinds of thing that speakers 
can say, that is, they possess metalinguistic and metapragmatic abilities. Further 
examination of these abilities reveals that judges can assign their own interpretive 
categories to the description of what is achieved in some fragment of discourse. 
What is remarkable about the categories is that they were elicited without 
attempting to direct judges' listening behaviour to an identifiable focus of 
attention. It is shown that while judges make use of the same or similar types of 
category in their descriptive interpretations, these do not necessarily involve the 
same tokens. 
The issue of interpretive multiplexity is considered in Chapter 10 where 
different types of interpretation are compared, across and between different 
judges, in order to explore their social and linguistic bases. The stimulus data used 
for this purpose is taken from Crystal and Davy (1975). An important motivation 
for using this data is the fact that it is accompanied by an interpretive commentary 
that focuses on particular linguistic cues, and especially prosodic effects. 
Discussion is based on comparisons of the interpretation of these effects by Crystal 
and Davy and by lay judges. 
Chapter 11 provides a synopsis of general findings and conclusions. By way of 
prospective, the utility of third person interpretations is evaluated in terms of its 
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possible applications for investigating communicative asynchronies in listening 
behaviour, especially in cross-cultural discourse. 
CHAPTER 2 
COMMUNICATION IN EVERYDAY VERBAL EXCHANGE 
2.0 The Research Context 
The study of interpersonal communication belongs to the study of language use, 
and as such includes the activities of which speaking and listening are part. When 
these activities are used interactively, that is, across and between and between 
persons, it is widely recognised that they involve the creation of a phenomenon 
that constitutes one of the most human things that human beings do; they talk to 
one another. Bach and Harnish, for instance, note: 
There is nothing people do more often, in more ways, than talk to one 
another. For most people nothing is easier. Sometimes we have to struggle to 
find the right words or to get them out, sometimes we must pause to discern 
or decipher what someone else says, but on the whole we speak fluently and 
understand others effortlessly. (Bach and Harnish, 1977: xiii) 
Presumably, it is this pervasiveness of talk in everyday life that makes it such an 
important subject of study for scholars from wide-ranging disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary backgrounds. But despite its ubiquity, some of the very same 
qualities that make talk an important topic for research also make it a difficult, if 
not perplexing, topic for analysis (cf. Stubbs (1983), especially Chapters 1,2, and 
11; Schif f rin, 1988) . 
A major problem for analysts is in delimiting the object of inquiry. The 
phenomenon of 'talk' can be, and is often, referred to as 'conversation', 'discourse', 
'spoken interaction', or 'verbal exchange' by scholars. Indeed, such terms are often 
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used interchangeably which can be confusing since they are not always clearly 
defined. Labov and Fanshel propose that: 
One might attempt to distinguish among these terms, using one or the other 
to include more or less of the use of language in social life: greetings, lectures, 
service exchanges, broadcasts and so forth. Yet all three terms refer to the 
everyday situation in which two or more people address each other for a 
period of time, communicating something about themselves and their 
experience in the process. (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 1) 
A fundamental distinction which addresses this problem is made by Levinson 
(1983: 318), who seeks to characterise the term 'conversation' in a more technical 
way. Thus he distinguishes between the unit 'a conversation', on the one hand and 
'conversational activity' on the other. The former is characterisable in terms of 
'overall organisations' that enable analysts to distinguish between different kinds 
or units of talk. While the latter is characterisable in terms of 'local organisations' 
that are intrinsic to the structure of interactional sequences, and in particular the 
turn-taking system. 
In an attempt to avoid ambiguity, the term 'talk' and its cognates are 
subsequently used here in a neutral sense to refer to conversational activity, on the 
grounds that this activity includes the use(s) of language in natural or 
spontaneously occurring social contexts (see McGregor (1984) and Wilson (1989) 
for a discussion of the problems of defining the term 'conversation' in its technical 
senses). When talk is created in such contexts by two or more individuals, it is 
taken as axiomatic that they are communicating. Thus, talk is understood here as 
'speech activity' in the sense adopted by Gumperz who states that "a speech 
activity is a set of social relationships enacted about a set of schemata in relation to 
some communicative goal" (Gumperz, 1982a: 166). 
The study of communication in everyday language use, and particularly in 
respect of these relations, appears to have intensified over the last two decades or 
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so, to that the extent that a distinctive and increasingly rich literature has appeared 
claiming disciplinary status in its own right. At the heart of this interest are two 
fundamental questions. As posed by Sperber and Wilson (1986: 1), these are: "first, 
what is communicated, and second, how is communication is achieved" when 
language is used in verbal exchange? 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introductory discussion of these 
questions by reviewing essential contributions from linguistics and other 
disciplines which have had impact on how the communicative process is viewed. 
Analysis of this process has been the subject of disciplinary and cross-disciplinary 
interest that is both diffuse and vast. Some of these perspectives are represented in 
the papers collected by van Dijk (1985), though his four volume, Handbook of 
Discourse Analysis, is perhaps not as comprehensive as the title suggests. Volume 1, 
Disciplines of Discourse, is arguably the most useful from a survey point of view, 
and covers work from at least ten different disciplinary perspectives. Something of 
these perspectives are cited here not only to provide a sense of the major contexts 
in which studies of verbal communication have emerged, but also as a description 
of the kinds of research agenda where the present work is largely not to be found. 
The orientations are predominantly from: 
(1) Anthropology/Ethnography-and involve studies of language use as 
displayed in the daily life of particular speech communities; the forms of 
speech events; the rules of appropriate selection of speakers, the 
interrelations of speaker, addressee, topic, channel and setting (Gumperz 
and Hymes, 1972; Hymes, 1972,1974; Bauman and Sherzer, 1975; Saville- 
Troike, 1982; Duranti, 1988); 
(2) Artificial intelligence-which seeks to develop computer models of 
discourse; story-understanding programs; and models of memory in 
language understanding, based on the idea that cognition is computation 
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(Winograd, 1972; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Power, 1979; Schank and 
Burstein, 1985; Grosz, 1986; Winograd and Flores, 1987); 
(3) Linguistics-and which focus on the structural properties of verbal 
communication; textual coherence; sequential organisation in speech 
production and comprehension; narrative analysis with the aim of 
delimiting units such as episodes or events; the functions of language use; 
analysis of markers in conversational discourse (van Dijk, 1972,1977; 
Coulthard, 1977; Coulthard and Montgomery, 1981; Edmonson, 1981; 
Halliday, 1978; Brown and Yule, 1983; Stubbs, 1983; Taylor and Cameron, 
1987; Bublitz, 1988; Schiffrin, 1987,1988); 
(4) Philosophy/Pragmatics-with their concerns about speech acts, meaning, 
truth, and reference (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969,1979,1983,1992; Grice, 1975, 
1989; Lyons, 1977; Bach and Harnish, 1979; Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983; 
Blakemore, 1988,1992); 
(5) Psychology-and which are either experimental and work on aspects of 
verbal behaviour such as speech dysfluencies, turn-taking, and back- 
channel cues; or work from the assumption that communication is 
something that can be mentally represented in terms of human knowledge 
structures (Goldman-Eisler, 1967,1978; Duncan, 1972,1974; Freedle, 1977; 
Clark, 1978; Clark and Carlson, 1982; Clark, 1985,1992; Bower and Cirilo, 
1985; Sperber and Wilson, 1986); 
(6) Social psychology-concerned with speech style and social evaluation; 
psychological and interactional dimensions of communicative 
development; interpersonal accommodation; attribution theory; 
communicative accommodation theory (Giles and Powesland, 1975; Giles 
and St Clair, 1979,1985; Fraser and Scherer, 1982; Hewson, 1982; 1984; 
Robinson, 1985; Scherer and Giles, 1979; Giles and Robinson, 1990; 
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Coupland and Giles, 1988; Giles and Coupland 1991; Coupland, Coupland 
and Giles, 1991); 
(7) Sociology-and which focus on structures of social action such as turn- 
taking, openings and closings, repairs; the dynamics of social relationships; 
dramatalogical models that take into account the social theories held by 
actors and investigators (Garfinkel, 1967; Sudnow, 1972; Sacks, Schegloff 
and Jefferson, 1974; Goffman, 1974,1981; Corsaro, 1981; Atkinson and 
Heritage, 1984; Button and Lee, 1987); 
(8) Speech communication-which emanates mainly from work undertaken in 
the U. S. A. in the 1960's, and tends to study verbal and non-verbal 
interaction in a very general or (practical) skills-oriented way (Adler, 
Rosenfeld and Towne, 1989; Galvin, Prescott and Huseman, 1992; Mohan, 
McGregor and Strano, 1992); 
(9) Communication science-involving theoretical and empirical work that is 
characterised by various conceptual, epistemological, and metatheoretical 
assumptions about the nature of communicative phenomena, particularly 
message effects (Berger and Chafee, 1987; Bradac, 1989; Hopper, 1989). 
Research has also evolved across and within a number of the traditions listed 
above, and it is this interdisciplinary perspective that provides the academic 
context for the present work. The need for an interdisciplinary and integrated 
approach to the study of communication has been increasingly recognised by 
scholars from different backgrounds, including Labov and Fanshel (1977); 
Gumperz (1982a; 1982b); Coupland and Giles (1988), Giles and Coupland (1991); 
Roger and Bull (1989); Sperber and Wilson (1987); and Schiffrin (1994). Despite the 
burgeoning literature in response to this need, however, no agreed or unified 
theory of verbal communication has yet emerged. As Gumperz notes: "We are still 
far from a general theory of verbal communication which integrates what we 
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know about grammar, culture and interactive conventions into a single overall 
framework of concepts and analytic procedures" (Gumperz, 1982a: 4). 
Whether such a theory is possible or even desirable remains to be seen. But 
what has emerged in the interim is a series of different, though often overlapping, 
issues relating to the kind of interactional process that verbal communication 
involves. As a result of this intersection of interests, and in the words of Schiffrin, 
"readers. . . may find themselves unexpectedly confronted by terms, concepts, and 
perspectives borrowed from a home turf which is different from their own" 
(Schiffrin, 1987: 2). The admixture of approaches can be daunting since it reflects a 
vast array of theoretical commitments and methodological assumptions arising 
from differently conceived analytic ends. Burke (1986: 217) summarises the 
situation in apposite terms: 
Explaining human communication in all its complexity is a formidable 
theoretical task. The sheer complexity of the phenomenon has the potential to 
overwhelm or immobilize scholars. 
From the bounty of research currently available, what is patently clear is that 
the study of verbal communication can be understood at many different levels of 
analysis. Notwithstanding the difficulties that investigators in this area face, Burke 
offers sound advice in terms of devising a tenable research strategy: 
Because one cannot explain everything at once, a sensible course of action, 
in the face of such complexity, is to focus on a limited problem and forge 
ahead with any methods that will allow one to develop explanations of such 
smaller problems or individual processes. (Burke, 1986: 217-218) 
While this thesis makes use of analytic and descriptive techniques that stem 
from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, it does so with the specific aim of 
developing what has become a quietly insistent (though rather slow to emerge) 
theme in the study of verbal communication. The theme is that there has been 
relative neglect of participant perspectives in the study of everyday speech 
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activities; where such perspectives arise from the ability of human beings to 
interact (Kreckel, 1981; Grimshaw, 1982; Gumperz, 1982a; 1982b; Tannen, 1984). In 
order to study this ability, Gumperz suggests that a radically different approach to 
analysis is required. The "speaker-oriented approach to conversation", as he 
describes it, "focuses directly on the strategies that govern the actor's use of 
lexical, grammatical, sociolinguistic and other knowledge in the production and 
interpretation of messages in context" (Gumperz, 1982a: 35). 
Systematic investigation of these strategies is called for here in order to 
develop Gumperz's work, and hence provide an evidential base for warranting 
the analytic claim that is the heart of this thesis, namely, that 'participant goals' are 
a primary organising feature for the actors concerned. Since these goals tend not 
be verbalised as talk is in progress, the researcher must develop an analytic 
instrument for recovering the kinds of linguistic and social knowledge that 
participants rely on in interpreting what went on. The instrument proposed is 
based on experimentally derived (post hoc) interpretations of verbal 
communication, where these involve third person accounts of who is involved and 
what is going on in selected passages of discourse. 
The question of how to account for the co-occurrence (or otherwise) of 
participant judgements in the interpretation of discourse is challenging enough as 
Gumperz has demonstrated. A further challenge for the present work is to analyse 
the process and results of third person interpretation as an end in itself. Rather 
than being viewed as an alternative to other modes of analysis, I suggest that third 
person interpretation can usefully complement other traditions that have studied 
verbal exchange, and indeed provides an integral tool for the would-be- 
investigator. Kreckel (1981) is unequivocal about such an approach, and maintains 
that one of the main objectives of any study of face-to-face interaction ought to be 
the conceptualisation of the interaction by outside observers and the participants 
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themselves. I labour the point because, like Stubbs, I think it is evident from the 
proliferation of investigative methods and models that "no single level of analysis 
will ever be able to say all there is about a conversation" (Stubbs, 1983: 175). 
This short overview is not designed to cover all approaches to the study of 
verbal communication, nor all the research undertaken by the orientations or 
traditions that have been listed. Its purpose, rather, is to try to provide a sense of 
the intersecting contexts in which the present work is located. In order to facilitate 
discussion of these contexts, I want to explore three conceptual areas that are 
central to the research aims and orientation stated in at the outset. The areas 
involve: 
(1) the concept of communication itself; 
(2) the nature of communication as an interactional process; and 
(3) the concept of communicative goals. 
Discussion of each of these areas occupies the remainder of this chapter, and 
serves to introduce my attempts to demonstrate how third person interpretive 
capacity can enhance our understanding of everyday communicative practice as 
goal-directed activity. The methodological and theoretical issues that arise from 
trying to operationalise a programme of research for this purpose will be 
addressed in Chapter 3. 
2.1 Interpersonal Communication 
Although largely taken for granted by ordinary language users, the concept of 
human communication has been the subject of much scholarly conjecture and 
discussion. Among the questions that scholars have attempted to address are the 
issues of what communication is, how humans beings communicate with one 
another, and what is communicated between them in the process. Lyons, for 
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example, notes that the words 'communicate' and 'communication' are used in a 
wide range of contexts in their everyday, pre-theoretical sense: "We talk as readily 
of the communication of feelings, moods and attitudes as we do of factual 
information" (Lyons, 1977: 32). Indeed, it seems that ordinary speaker-hearers 
simply assume that the purpose of language is to serve as a communicative 
mechanism or vehicle. Kreckel (1981), for example, argues: 
That communication via speech is possible and regularly occurs is regarded 
by most 'lay members' of a society as a truism. They take it for granted that 
they are able to understand what they are listening to and get across what 
they want to. (Kreckel, 1981: 3) 
Kreckel's observation seems to be supported by the large stock of metaphors (see 
Reddy, 1979) that are used in an everyday sense to express the notion that in the 
process of using language something is being communicated. 
The relationship between everyday language use and communication is, of 
course, widely assumed by professional scholars. Compare, for example, the 
following linguistic perspectives. Lyons (1977a: 638) states that: "There is much in 
the structure of languages that can be explained on the assumption that they have 
been developed for communication in face-to-face interaction". Bach and Harnish 
(1979: 3) suggest: "Generally, the reason people say what they say when they say it 
is to communicate something to those they are addressing". And Schiffrin (1987) 
argues that language is not only communicative, but is also designed for 
communication. She writes: "I assume that communication occurs when a sender 
either gives, or gives off, information" (Schiffrin, 1987: 5-6). In this sense, Schiffrin 
also argues that the language of everyday verbal exchange is always 
communicative, "either because it is directed toward a recipient (immediate or 
eventual), because it is intended to be so directed, and/or because it is attended 
by 
a recipient" (Schiffrin, 1987: 6). 
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The idea that 'language is communicative' is taken as axiomatic in the present 
work, but necessitates conceptual exploration because definitions of 
communication vary in accordance with different research agendas and 
disciplinary concerns. For example, communication has been defined in different 
literatures as: 
(1) the ordered transfer of messages (Cairns and Cairns, 1976); 
(2) the sharing of information, ideas or attitudes between or among people 
(Lyons, 1977a); 
(3) the reciprocal creation of meaning (Bach and Harnish, 1979); and 
(4) social behaviour that helps people relate to each other (Gumperz, 1982a). 
Canale (1983: 3-4), on the other hand, suggests that 'communication' has the 
following characteristics: 
(a) is a form of social interaction, and is therefore normally acquired and 
used in social interaction; 
(b) involves a high degree of unpredictability and creativity in form and 
message; 
(c) takes place in discourse and sociocultural contexts which provide 
constraints on appropriate language use and also clues as to correct 
interpretations of utterances; 
(d) is carried out under limiting psychological conditions and other 
conditions such as memory constraints, fatigue and distractions; 
(e) always has a purpose (for example to establish social relations, to 
persuade, or to promise); 
(f) involves authentic, as opposed to textbook-contrived language; 
(g) is judged as successful or not on the basis of actual outcomes. 
While not wishing to challenge the efficacy of such characteristics in principle, 
they clearly do not help to explain how communication is achieved in practice. 
Difficulty arises when attempts are made to define interpersonal communication 
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in any singular way, because the concept is so amorphous and diverse. 
Subsequently, it may be neither possible nor desirable to try to do so. The issue of 
how communication works, however, is intuitively more productive, since 
attempts to define the concept can usefully focus on the process rather than the 
product of what is achieved. 
2.2 The Communicative Process 
The process of communicating has been described under the rubric of two basic 
paradigms (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Akmajian et al., 1990; Rost, 1990): 
(1) an information-processing paradigm-in which communication is seen as a 
potentially perfect encoding-decoding process involving the attempts of 
interlocutors to transmit and reconstruct messages; and 
(2) an inferential paradigm-which holds that communication is a 
fundamentally collaborative process involving the attempts of interlocutors 
to produce and interpret disparate kinds of evidence. 
Both paradigms, and their theoretical ramifications, are discussed more fully 
below. 
2.2.1 Communication as Information-Processing 
Perhaps the most common and popular conception of verbal communication has 
been to view speaker-listener exchange as a process involving the encoding and 
decoding of information that conveys some kind of message. While Bach and 
Harnish (1979), Sperber and Wilson (1986), and Akmajian et al. (1990) all provide 
summary accounts of the information processing approach, it is worth reiterating 
here if only in brief. 
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Information-processing theory is rooted in the rationalist tradition of 
communication, as espoused for example by Locke (1691). A much-cited model of 
the theory in its modem form is that proposed by Shannon and Weaver (1949). 
The central idea of this model is that the linguistic exchange of information is 
provided for by language which serves as a 'conduit for ideas', where what is 
being communicated are thoughts of various different kinds. Cairns and Cairns 
state for instance: 
A has in mind some sort of message (or idea), and he wishes B to form in his 
head the same message. This message is transformed ultimately into a series 
of neural impulses that are sent to the muscles responsible for the actual 
production of speech, which follows immediately... The listener, B, must 
decode A's message by converting the sounds into a semantic representation. 
(Cairns and Cairns, 1976: 17-18) 
A more technical exposition of this idea is presented by Katz as quoted in 
Akmajian et al. (1990: 300-301): 
The speaker, for reasons that are linguistically irrelevant, chooses some 
message he wants to convey to his listeners: some thought he wants them to 
receive or command he wants to give them or some question he wants to ask. 
This message is encoded in the form of a phonetic representation of an 
utterance by means of the system of linguistic rules with which the speaker is 
equipped. This encoding then becomes a signal to the speaker's articulatory 
organs, and he vocalizes an utterance of the appropriate phonetic shape. This, 
in turn, is picked up by the hearer's auditory organs. The speech sounds that 
stimulate these organs are then converted into a neural signal from which a 
phonetic representation equivalent to the one into which the speaker encoded 
his message is obtained. This representation is decoded into a representation 
of the same message that the speaker originally chose to convey by the 
hearer's equivalent system of linguistic rules. Hence, because the hearer 
employs the same system of rules to decode that the speaker employs to 
encode, an instance of successful linguistic communication occurs. 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), this conception of verbal communication 
has tended to influence the nature of theories about how communication is 
achieved since the time of Aristotle. Consequently, they refer to such theories 
under the rubric of a single model which they call the 'code model' of 
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communication. "According to the code model, communication is achieved by 
encoding and decoding messages" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 2). 
The code model accounts for certain common sense features of talk-exchanges, 
and predicts that communication is successful when hearers decode the same 
messages as speakers. On the other hand, it also predicts that communication 
breaks down if the decoded message is different from the encoded message. A 
'code', as Sperber and Wilson use the term, 
is a system which pairs messages with signals, enabling two information- 
processing devices (organisms or machines) to communicate. A message is a 
representation internal to the communicating devices. A signal is a 
modification of the external environment which can be produced by one 
device, and recognised by the other. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 3-4) 
If we apply this model to verbal communication the coding devices possess 
linguistic abilities, where these are central thought processes. Thus linguistic 
communication is achieved by encoding thoughts in sounds. The encoder becomes 
the speaker and the decoder the hearer. 
What the code model provides is an explanation of how communication is 
possible at all-it requires a sender 'speaker' and a receiver 'hearer'. It also 
provides a working hypothesis for answering three fundamental questions about 
the nature of communicative interchange as Rost (1990: 3) suggests. These 
questions and the answers that they assume are: 
(1) What is the content of verbal communication? 
(Answer: information. ) 
(2) Where does this content (i. e. information) reside? 
(Answer : in the words the speaker uses. ) 
(3) How is understanding of the content achieved? 
(Answer: by the listener comprehending the words the speaker uses. ) 
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The answers provided here are rather simplistic, especially in terms of the role 
listeners play in creating understandings, and the code model has been attacked 
accordingly (see, for example, the criticisms levied by Bach and Harnish, 1979; 
Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Akmajian et al., 1990; Rost, 1990). The model assumes, 
for instance, that communication is an isomorphic match of messages and/or 
meanings However, isomorphism implies a highly idealised form of 
communication. In particular, it fails to recognise the complexity of interactional 
processes, and the principles of contextual appropriateness, that are inherent in 
successful communication. Naturally occurring language is often ambiguous and 
senders and receivers have to do communicative work beyond what is actually 
said to achieve their interactional ends. The difficulty for the code model in this 
regard perhaps stems from the etymology of the concept of 'communication' itself, 
which as (Kreckel, 1981: 20) points out comes from two different roots. The roots 
are: 
(1) communicare-a one-way process of transmitting information; and 
(2) communion-a two-way process of sharing information. 
If we apply the senses of these roots to essentially code-based definitions of 
communication, such as that offered by Lyons (1977), then something of their 
inadequacy is demonstrable. Lyons defines communication as: "The intentional 
transmission of information by means of some established signalling-system" 
(Lyons, 1977: 32). The problem with this definition is neatly summarised by 
Kreckel who points out that "not everything that is available or transmitted. is 
taken up, and not everything that is taken up is shared" (Kreckel, 1981: 20). In 
other words, successful communication has to depend on the contingent 
satisfaction of enforceable conditions on particular occasions of use. The code 
model seems to ignore the kinds of interactional responses that interlocutors must 
jointly produce if they are to make communicative sense of what others say, if 
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only for the purpose of deciding what it is that might be said next. Clearly, verbal 
communication involves something more than just 'information-processing', and 
for this reason a rather different paradigm is needed to account for the 
complexities of conversational exchange. 
2.2.2 Communication as an Inferential Process 
The alternative paradigm that has emerged to meet this need is based on work 
that has been largely developed in philosophy and cognitive science. It has 
culminated, most recently, in the development of relevance theory as expounded 
in the writings of Sperber and Wilson (1982; 1986), and in essence, holds that 
'communication' is a collaborative process which is based on two complementary 
concepts. These are: 
(a) ostension - the signal that a speaker has something to communicate; 
(b) inference - the contextualisation of those signals by an addressee. 
Communication occurs because interlocutors actively seek to make connections 
that are cognitively 'relevant'. This process is described by Sperber and Wilson as 
follows: "The communicator produces a stimulus which it makes it mutually 
manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means 
of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a certain set of 
assumptions" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 63). In other words, 'ostensive-inferential 
communication' is achieved "by producing and interpreting evidence" (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1986: 2). In referring to information processed in the course of 
communication, the term 'manifestness' is preferred to 'knowledge', since Sperber 
and Wilson argue that people 'construct' rather than 'receive' knowledge. The 
notion of 'manifestness' also provides for the fact that differing assumptions are 
manifest to varying degrees, hence allowing for the phenomenon of multiple, or at 
least ambivalent, interpretation. 
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In the relevance model, then, communication is viewed as a special kind of 
'intention' to be recognised by recipients (cf. Bach and Harnish (1979: xvii), who 
note "linguistic communication essentially involves the speaker's having a special 
sort of intention (an intention that the hearer make a certain sort of inference) and 
the hearer's actually making that inference"). What participants do is 
systematically related to their intents by: 
(a) making use of their ability to weigh up particular ends, and 
(b) choosing the one that satisfies the most desired goal. 
As Blakemore explains, the basic idea seems to be that in processing information, 
"people generally aim to bring about the greatest improvement to their overall 
representation of the world for the least cost in processing. That is, they try to 
balance costs and rewards" (Blakemore, 1988: 238). Hence in seeking to make 
sense of talk, hearers aim to integrate new information with old by establishing 
what is considered to be relevant: "Every act of ostensive communication 
communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986: 158). 
The search for relevance is something that is considered to constrain all 
communication, and as such serves to restrict the number of inferences that can be 
drawn from an utterance. It is taken to apply without exception and thus put 
forward as a model that overcomes many of the shortcomings associated with 
present theories of utterance interpretation. In particular, it is offered as a more 
satisfactory account than Gricean theory, in which the idea of communication is 
viewed as a set of norms that have their basis in human rationality. Grice writes: 
Our talk exchanges ... are characteristically, to some 
degree at least, co- 
operative efforts; and each participant recognises in them, to some extent, a 
common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted 
direction. . . We might then 
formulate a rough general principle which 
participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your 
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conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. (Grice, 1989: 26) 
The Gricean concept of communication is really quite straightforward. It suggests 
that in communicating speakers aim to meet certain general standards. Addressees 
(hearers), then, interpret what is said to them with these standards in mind. 
The Cooperative-Principle, as Grice (1975) refers to this procedure, is too well 
known to require detailed explication at this juncture. Briefly, its concern is to 
explore the role of particular conversational contributions in the form of a set of 
interactional maxims underlying the co-operative use of language. Four basic 
maxims are proposed. These are the maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation and 
Manner, which specify what interlocutors have to do in order to converse in a 
maximally efficient, rational and co-operative way; they should speak sincerely, 
relevantly and clearly, while providing sufficient information. The maxims, as 
with Grice's work in general, have been the subject of extensive discussion (cf. 
Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Blakemore, 1992). They 
provide a device to explain the way speakers may communicate more than they 
what they actually say. When a maxim is broken deliberately (or 'flouted' in 
Grice's terms), what is said carries an implicature that requires special inferential 
work on the part of the addressee. Grice calls this work 'conversational 
implicature', which he distinguishes from 'conventional implicature', on the basis 
that the latter is associated with the meanings of particular words by linguistic 
convention. The notion of 'implicature' is perhaps Grice's most important 
contribution to the development of an inferential approach for the study of 
interpersonal communication, because he demonstrates that there has to be more 
to the communicative process than the decoding of messages. It is a process that 
involves cooperative effort; effort that is required to bridge the gap between what 
is said and what is meant . 
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However, Grice's work falls short of providing a universal theory which is the 
starting point in the search for implicatures. It has also been criticised for its failure 
to explain how the process of implicature progresses in situated discourse, and 
indeed what criteria are used by participants for assessing that a maxim has been 
flouted. It is something of these limitations that Sperber and Wilson (1986) have 
sought to respond to. 
By focussing on the maxim of Relation, Sperber and Wilson have shown the 
insights of Grice's work have far wider ramifications than most Gricean accounts 
suggest. They argue that the key to an explanation of human communication lies 
in the notion of relevance. This is a notion that is grounded in a general theory of 
human cognition, where it is important to stress that relevance is a property of 
propositions rather than utterances. Relevance is the relation between propositions 
as they stored in memory; the aim being to characterise a property of mental 
processes. Consequently, many of the issues Sperber and Wilson raise are 
concerned with matters of cognitive psychology. Herein lies both the strength and 
weakness of their approach. Its strength lies in its potential for explaining how 
communication is achieved in general, and in this regard it has won recognition as 
an elegant and powerful analytic tool (see, for example, Blakemore, 1988; 1992). Its 
weakness, on the other hand, is its apparent disregard of discourse structure and 
the influence of social factors that play such an important role in the 
communicative process, as scholars, over the last twenty years or so, have 
demonstrated. Gumperz, for instance, states: 
Communication is a social activity requiring the coordinated efforts of two 
or more individuals. Mere talk to produce sentences, no matter how well 
formed or elegant the outcome, does not by itself constitute communication. 
Only when a move has elicited a response can we say communication is 
taking place. (Gumperz, 1982a: 1) 
Gumperz goes on to argue that in order to create and sustain interactional 
involvement, interlocutors require knowledge and abilities that go beyond 
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grammatical competence. Study of this involvement must therefore take into 
account linguistic and sociocultural knowledge that is used in the ongoing process 
of interpretation in talk. The degree to which these (sociolinguistic) factors can be 
accounted for within the framework offered by Sperber and Wilson has not yet 
been explored, although I am of the opinion that the theory has the potential to 
accommodate them. The potential emanates from the view that is taken of verbal 
communication as a process of 'understanding'. 
In the course of producing ostensive acts, interlocutors provide two layers of 
information as Rost explains: 
First, there is the information which has been pointed out; second, there is 
the information that the first layer of information has been pointed out. For 
example, if you and I are sitting together in a room and I know that you know 
that you like snow and I know that it is just beginning to snow outside and I 
open the curtains so that you can see the snow falling for yourself, I have 
performed an ostensive act of communication by the opening the curtain. 
(Rost, 1990: 3) 
Understanding this act of ostension involves understanding not only this first 
layer of information (i. e. that it is snowing now) but also the second (i. e that I 
wanted you to see it at that moment). It is finding the link or relevance between 
these two layers of information, by inferencing, that enables interlocutors to make 
sense of communicative acts. What is vital, however, as Rost goes on to point out 
is that: 
the relevant link that you find to make sense of the communicative act need 
not be the only relevant link you could find, nor need it be the link that I had 
hoped you would find. You can achieve an acceptable understanding without 
knowing exactly what I intended. (Rost, 1990: 4) 
This statement applies to both verbal and non-verbal communication. Thus unlike 
the information processing model of communication, which tends to focus on the 
importance of what speakers have said, the onus of responsibility for 
interpretation is recognised by the relevance model to be listener or hearer 
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specific. Speaker-based production models of communication are not necessarily 
applicable to how addressees actually interpret the production of a particular 
form. As Jakobson and Waugh, 1979: 95), put it: "We speak in order to be heard 
and need to be heard in order to be understood". 
Listeners must have highly developed models of the kinds of things that 
speakers can say. However, interpretive or recipiency-based approaches to the 
study of verbal communication have only recently begun to emerge; despite 
Hymes remarks of over 25 years ago to the effect that neglect of the 'hearer-reader' 
was ending (see, for example, Kreckel, 1981; McGregor, 1986b; McGregor and 
White, 1986; Coupland and Giles, 1988; Coupland, Henwood, Coupland and Giles, 
1990; McGregor and White, 1990; Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 1991; Giles and 
Coupland, 1991; Rost, 1990). Parker-Rhodes neatly summarises why this neglect 
has arisen. He notes: "Ours is a speakers' civilization and our linguistics has 
accordingly concerned itself almost solely with the speaker's problems ... The 
skilful speaker wins praise; the skilful listener, despite the mystery of his 
achievement is ignored" (Parker-Rhodes, 1978: xiii). While the ramifications of a 
listener-oriented approach are yet to be fully explored, an obvious implication of 
using relevance theory is that it establishes the centrality of the listeners role in 
verbal communication. By implication this role constrains the inferences that can 
be drawn from a speaker's act. Relevance theory also has the advantage of 
allowing for communicative ambiguity and breakdown (cf. the information- 
processing model). Since there is no procedure for ensuring mutually acceptable 
and unambiguous understanding between interlocutors, successful ostensive- 
inferential communication cannot be guaranteed. Consequently, interlocutors 
have to do communicative work to achieve their interactional ends. 
This thesis seeks to provide an analytic tool for the empirical investigation of 
such ends in naturally occurring discourse, by focussing on the inferential 
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concerns of ordinary participant and non-participant members. But what are these 
concerns, and how can they be recovered and warranted from the communicative 
process that has been described in this section? It is these questions that I will 
address next. 
2.3 Communication and Participant Goals 
Having established, on the basis of relevance theory, that verbal communication is 
most usefully conceived as an inferential process, I want to move on to consider 
the implications of using this theory as a basis for exploring the nature of speech 
activities, with particular reference to the study of participant goals. What is being 
called for here is not a theory of goals as such, but rather a theory of how goals can 
be recovered from situated interpretation in something of the way in which John 
Gumperz suggests. Although methodologically challenging, the human ability to 
understand what has been communicated in various products of connected 
discourse is investigable because in any discourse setting, participants have 
varying listener roles as I have argued elsewhere (see, McGregor (1986b), and 
Section 3.2.1 for further details). My immediate interest, then, lies in the role of 
ordinary listeners in a special analytic sense, where this involves their capacity to 
understand instances of spoken interaction in the third person, and especially with 
respect to evaluating how language is used by actual participants. The relevance 
model suggests that participants listen to talk for a purpose, and that it is this 
purpose that drives the understanding process. While third person interpretations 
of talk cannot share this purpose by definition, I will argue that they can sefve to 
warrant inferences about participant goals, albeit on the basis of indirect evidence. 
The present state of thought about goals in discourse is both complex and 
diffuse, and it may be helpful to review some of the major problems that research 
in this area faces before proceeding further. A dense, but useful essay on the 
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subject is provided by Craig (1986), and the discussion which follows is largely 
based on some important conceptual distinctions that he makes. 
2.3.1 Some Goal-Related Distinctions 
The concept of 'goal' pervades many of the literatures that I referred to at the 
outset of this chapter. And work in them (including linguistic studies of discourse, 
speech act theory, pragmatics, conversation analysis, social psychology, 
attribution theory, cognitive science, (speech) communication science, and studies 
of strategic communicative choices in contexts such as negotiation, compliance- 
gaining, and interpersonal relationship development) rests heavily on the 
assumption that verbal communication is purposive or goal-directed (Craig, 1986). 
In the absence of a more radical approach, I think this assumption must be 
taken as axiomatic; if only because a practical discipline of communication to 
which the concept of goal would not be central is difficult to imagine. However, 
this is not to suggest that the concept should be adopted uncritically, for reasons 
that Craig (1986) expounds. These include difficulties in pragmatic orientation, 
and the terms in which theory and research are couched. Yet despite the 
importance of the concept and its widespread use, no fully adequate account of 
goals has yet emerged, as Craig points out. 
In order to evaluate the various attempts that have been made to evidence 
relationships between features of discourse and certain goals toward which the 
discourse is supposed to be directed, Craig moots four conceptual distinctions that 
are intrinsic to current thinking about the nature of communicative goals. The 
distinctions are between: 
(1) functional and intentional goals; 
(2) positive and dialectic goals; 
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(3) formal and strategic goals; 
(4) the possible bases for drawing the inference that a given discourse is 
directed towards a certain goal. 
Before considering each of these in detail, it may be useful to acknowledge 
another important distinction. This is the distinction Hymes (1972) makes between 
societal goals and individual goals. Hymes noted that the purpose of 
communicative events from a community standpoint need not be identical to 
those engaged in it. I intend to maintain this distinction here by considering the 
concept of goals from the perspective of the actor's interpretations and 
understandings of their own doings, rather than from the standpoint of the 
sociocultural system in which actors operate. This distinction has perhaps been 
most salient in sociological terms, where the study of the system's purposes as 
opposed to the purposes of the individual is couched in terms of institutional 
influence and effect, as opposed to the social actions of the individuals who live 
and work in them as Duranti reports: 
Whereas (British) functionalist anthropologists tended to pay more attention 
to the system's reasons for a given cultural phenomenon... contemporary 
linguists, philosophers of language, and cognitive scientists have tended to 
couch their discussion of goal-oriented behavior in terms of the individual's 
goals, or, rather, his alleged intentions. (Duranti, 1985: 204) 
Where the latter approach is concerned, however, quite different methodological 
orientations are involved, and this has led to the kind of conceptual and 
terminological confusion that is the focus of Craig's (1987) essay. 
Craig notes, for instance, that 'goal' is are often used coterminously with 
words such as 'end', 'intention', 'purpose', 'plan' and 'strategy'. These terms are 
not only used interchangeably across and within particular disciplines, but also 
tend to be ill-defined; if in fact they are defined at all. Conceptual problems arise 
because quite distinct terminologies are sometimes mixed with unfortunate 
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consequences. The mixing of intentionalistic (action-theoretic) and functionalistic 
(cognitive) terminology is taken as a case in point, since the vocabularies involved 
are derived from different traditions about the nature of goals. One is by way of 
the classification of actions or speech acts, deriving from the work of the 
philosophers J. L. Austin and J. Searle. The other comes from the computational 
modelling of language understanding developed through cognitive science (cf. for 
example, Schank and Abelson (1977); Schank and Burstein, 1985). 
According to Austin, three kinds of 'act' are performed in speaking a 
language: 
(i) acts of saying something with a certain sense or reference - locutionary acts; 
(ii) acts in saying something by virtue of the performance of the locution - 
illocutionary acts; 
(iii) acts by saying something as an effect or result of what has been said - 
perlocutionary acts. 
Searle brought systematicity to Austin's ideas by offering definitions of the 
conditions that are required to be present if a given speech act was to be effectively 
performed. This is not the place to discuss or review this work in any kind of 
detail, since there is a huge primary and secondary literature that deals with 
speech act theory in its own right (see p. 15 above), but merely to acknowledge the 
importance of the notion for subsequent research that sought to explore how 
understanding is achieved by the use of utterances geared towards performing 
acts of communication. While it has long been recognised that much remains to be 
done in order to transform speech act theory so that it can be moved from its 
intuitive and deductive roots to applications in studies of naturally occurring talk, 
substantial contributions towards this end are provided in the studies advanced 
by Labov and Fanshel (1977), Kreckel (1981) and Gumperz (1982a; 1982), of which 
more in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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From an 'intentionalistic' point of view then, speakers are modelled as 
consciously intending to bring about a certain state of affairs by means of 
discourse. According to the 'functionalist' perspective, on the other hand, 
discourse is best described from the standpoint of an external observer in terms of 
expected or predictable outcomes. These outcomes are determined by the 
speaker's cognitive representation of the situation. Clearly, it requires care to 
avoid equivocating between these two senses of what it might be to refer to the 
'goals' of a speaker. 
The distinction between 'intent' and 'function' raises the further issue of the 
relationship, if any, between 'goal-consciousness' and 'goal-seeking behaviour'. 
But how evident or salient is this distinction in situated interpretation? Craig 
(1986: 261) notes that even though it may true as Searle (1983) claims, that a person 
can always answer the question, 'What are you doing now? ', speakers accounts of 
their goals are often vague and inarticulate; or can sometimes be shown to be 
demonstrably wrong from a functional point of view; or may even be completely 
denied, since the existence of specific goals may not relevant to the discourse in 
question. The extent to which participants are aware of their goals in interpersonal 
communication, and their capacity to either consciously, or unconsciously, invoke 
them for whatever communicative reason is also the subject of discussion in 
Schiffrin (1987, Chapter 1). But can goals be characterised in view of the diffuse, 
ambiguous states of consciousness in which speakers may often act? Goal- 
awareness is probably a matter of degree, and not an issue that can be researched 
in any conclusive way. Consequently, Schiffrin tends to sidestep the issue by 
concluding that "communication occurs when a sender either gives, or gives off, 
information" (Schiffrin, 1987: 5-6). She assumes that language is always 
communicative and indeed that it is designed to reflect its communicative base. 
But she does not tackle the question of how we can recover what is 'given' or 
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'given off' between speakers themselves, or how this information relates to 
speakers' goals. 
In order to make sense of the claim that discourse is goal-directed, Craig (1986) 
suggests that a second distinction has to be made; this is the distinction between 
'positive and dialectic goals'. This distinction, Craig explains, "addresses not the 
relation of goals to consciousness but rather that of goals to behavior" (Craig, 1986: 
262). Positive goals are defined by Craig as those that are involved in the causal 
process of producing behaviour. These are essentially of the kind that are found in 
computer-driven models of discourse, or in the sort of situations in which goals 
are considered to be relatively easy to identify. The concept of goal in this sense is 
exemplified in Leech's (1983) means-ends analysis of interpersonal 
communication, where "the term goal is used in the neutral Artificial Intelligence 
sense of 'a state which regulates the behaviour of the individual' in such a way as 
to facilitate a given outcome" (Leech, 1983: 40). Craig argues that this concept of 
'goal' is oversimplified, and that goals can have a looser relation to behaviour. 
Where this 'looser relation' exists, goals may be thought of 'dialectically', that is, 
they refer to principles or properties such as positivism, honesty, happiness, 
success and so on. These kind of goals do not necessarily control behaviour to 
which they refer directly, although they may influence the discourse in indirect 
and complex ways. While they are different in kind, positive and dialectic goals 
also seem to overlap with intentional and functional goals. Craig explains: 
According to Searle's (1983) analysis of intentionality, intentions are causally 
% 
relate to actions and would thus count as positive goals in my terms; so 
positive goals can be interpreted intentionally. Dialectical goals can also 
be 
reduced to functional descriptions as, for example, in Schank and Abelson's 
(1977) theory of discourse understanding in which 'themes', which in my 
terms could be thought of as dialectical goals of a sort, perform certain 
functions. The two distinctions are correlated, however. In order to speak 
coherently of intentions as causes, one must translate positive behavior into 
the language of action, which is essentially dialectical... And the functional 
description of a dialectical goal essentially reduces it to positive terms. (Craig, 
1986: 263) 
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The correlation of these concepts is obviously extremely complex, and is further 
obscured by the problem of conceptualising multiple goals in discourse. Craig 
discusses this issue in detail, and concludes that goals are ideas that emerge from 
the interaction of ideas and continue to be involved in psychological processes 
apart from the production of behaviour (1986: 265). What seems to be at the heart 
of Craig's exposition here is the need for further inquiry, and this is expressed in 
his concern to weigh the implications of interactions among dialectical goals for 
the interpretation of goals in discourse in general. However, he does not address 
the issue of how such inquiry might be conducted. 
Perhaps the most important of Craig's dichotomies, from my own perspective, 
is that between 'formal' and 'strategic' goals. He writes: "A formal interpretation 
of goals is implied by the view that conversation is essentially a matter of 
following conventional patterns or rules" (Craig, 1986: 266). In contrast, a strategic 
interpretation assumes: 
that the conversationists behave strategically in pursuit of their individual 
goals, and that whatever structure conversation may have emerges from this 
process. Rules and standard patterns are not simply followed but are used as 
resources to accomplish goals. Rules may be broken, transformed, or used in 
nonobvious ways. Or if rules are followed strictly, as in a sport or game, they 
may be only a constitutive framework in which non-rule-governed options 
are played out. 
This distinction is recognised in various different models of the communicative 
process, but the interdependency of form and strategy is often unclear. Like 
Fairclough (1989), Craig raises the example of speech act theory which tends to 
focus on the nature of individual goals in discourse as opposed to how these are 
cooperatively managed. Grice and others have argued that cooperation is the 
fundamental purpose of communication, but speakers also engage in discourse for 
their own individual purposes. Furthermore the goals of interlocutors can be 
antagonistic and/or diametrically opposed, as Levinson asserts: "Conversation is 
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not a structural product in the same way that a sentence is-it is rather the 
outcome of the interaction of two or more independent, goal-directed individuals, 
with often divergent interests" (Levinson, 1983: 294, my italics). Does the 
cooperative structure of communication derive from individual pragmatic 
necessity then? 
Whether cooperative or individualistic motives are more basic is a moot point. 
Presumably, as Craig argues, formal/ conventional goals can be strategic, while 
individual goals emanate from a social matrix that is constituted of conventions. 
Fairclough makes a similar point. He argues: 
Of course, people do act strategically in certain circumstances and use 
conventions rather than simply following them; but in other circumstances 
they simply do not follow them, and what one needs is a theory of social 
action-social practice-which accounts for the determining effect of 
conventions and the strategic creativity of individuals, without reducing to 
one or the other. (Fairclough, 1989: 9-10) 
A theory of the kind sought by Fairclough has in fact been advanced by Jürgen 
Habermas (1979; 1984). 
Drawing on research in linguistics, the philosophy of language, and cognitive 
developmental psychology, Habermas seeks to develop a concept of 
communicative rationality which is not tied in any way to the subjective and 
individualistic premises of modern social and political theory. This concept serves 
to integrate a two-tiered characterisation of social action involving what he refers 
to as the 'lifeworld' and 'system' paradigms. As I understand it, what Habermas is 
driving at here is the fact that the communicative actions of different individuals 
are socially coordinated. These actions are essentially purposive, and have two 
fundamental orientations based on the model of Weber's action theory. The 
orientations lead to the coordination of action through the interest positions of 
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individual interlocutors, on the one hand ('strategic actions'), and through the 
search for normative agreement ('communicative action') on the other. 
Strategic action refers to influence which may take different forms depending 
on the context and motives of particular participants. Strategic actions are oriented 
towards communicative 'success'. In order to succeed communicatively, 
individuals select means that seem to them appropriate in any given situation, 
where 'success' is defined as: "The appearance of the world of a desired state, 
which can, in a given situation, be causally produced through goal-oriented action 
or omission" (Habermas, 1984: 285). Success is presumably in the interests of all 
participants in talk. It is not viewed by Habermas as merely egocentric, but as an 
end that can be achieved by the reciprocal influencing of others, either by overt 
means (open strategic actions), or covertly by conscious, or unconscious deceit 
(latent strategic action). 
In contrast to strategic actions, where participants are primarily oriented to 
their own individual successes, communicative actions are oriented towards 
reaching understanding through interpretive, and consensual accomplishments. 
Participant interlocutors are taken to pursue their individual goals under the 
condition that they can harmonise their plans of action on the basis of rationally 
motivated assent, where reaching understanding is considered to be a process of 
reaching agreement. Consensual action ensures that the participants retain a 
cooperative attitude. 
This line of reasoning, and in particular the distinction that Habermas makes 
between strategic and communicative actions, seems highly plausible. However, it 
remains theoretical, since it is neither operationalised, nor tested in relationship to 
the analysis of a particular discourse. And this is the problem with theoretically- 
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driven claims about the purposiveness or goal-directedness of verbal exchange in 
general, because the nature of such claims will always be unavoidably indirect. 
In short, the question of how we are able to reconstruct other agents goals 
from their actions is an extremely thorny one as Schiffrin suggests: "The fact that 
inferences about what is causing a particular phenomenon have to be made 
through observation of its outcome is one reason why conversation is a difficult 
topic for linguistic analysis" (Schiffrin, 1988: 251). This is a crucial issue for 
investigators, since what it involves is a higher level of (analytic) inferencing; that 
is, the situated interpretive work of the participants must itself be subject to a 
process of interpretation, in order to try to glean what has 'taken place. Since this 
process must take place outside of the participation framework, there are 
considerable ramifications for the construction of interpretive theories as I now 
wish to explore. 
2.3.2 Warranting Inferences about Goals 
Given that the notion of 'goal' is an abstract, relational concept, at least as defined 
in terms of the distinctions discussed in this section, a central issue is the 
relationship between analytic theories about the goal-directedness of discourse 
and the data to which they pertain. A further issue is the relationship of the 
investigator to each of these in turn (Milroy, 1987). The nature of this relationship 
is dependent on the chosen method of research, and the types of evidence that can 
be assembled in support of particular claims (see Chapter 3). The question that 
needs to be considered in terms of these relationships tends not to be directly 
addressed by analysts of talk (though cf. Labov and Fanshel, 1977, and Wootton, 
1989). It is this: "On what basis can a researcher warrant the assertion that a 
speaker is pursuing a specific goal? " (Craig, 1968: 268). Given the range of 
methodologies involved, Craig undertakes the very constructive exercise of 
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isolating and distinguishing the various patterns of inference that may be involved 
in making interpretive claims about discourse. Four general bases for warranting 
inferences about goals are identified by Craig (1986: 268ff. ). These are: 
(1) inference based on the conventional appropriateness of the goal in the 
situation; 
(2) inference based on the functional relationship between the discourse and 
the goal; 
(3) inference based on the orientation of the discourse to a particular focus of 
attention; 
(4) inference based on self-report of the speaker. 
For inferences of the first type, it is suggested that speakers must pursue goals 
that are dictated by the situation. According to the conventions of first meetings 
between individuals, for example, asking questions may be construed as 
purposive or goal-directed behaviour, where the purpose is to seek out particular 
information about one's interlocutor(s). Another example of this inference pattern 
is found in highly situated types of discourse, where the type of interaction that 
ensues is contextually (pre) determined. The law court provides a case in point, as 
the work of Goodrich (1990) exemplifies. 
Among other legally formulated instances of courtroom interaction, Goodrich 
considers the practice of plea bargaining in the initial stages of criminal trials. This 
practice does not concern either the events, or the perceived wrong at issue, but 
rather is used to establish the legal statement of charge to which the defendant 
must answer either 'guilty' or 'not guilty'. Notice how the following exchanges are 
goal-directed in this regard, and what happens when the relevance of the 
statement of charge procedure is challenged by the accused (Goodrich, 1990: 23): 
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Case 1 
Clerk: Do you plead guilty or not guilty? 
Defendant: Well, yes and no. 
Clerk: Do you plead guilty or not guilty? 
Defendant: Yes-I was guilty of trespassing-and no-I wasn't intending to 
steal. 
Clerk: So you plead not guilty? 
Defendant: That's not what I said. 
Clerk: Not guilty. 
Despite the attempts at explanation offered by the defendant, a plea of 'not guilty' 
is entered. The legal 'goal' in this particular instance is not in fact achieved by the 
clerk, since he fails to elicit the required form of utterance from the defendant. 
Ultimately, a plea is established, but it is established in the words of the clerk. 
In another case that Goodrich cites, the defendant is concerned to avoid stating 
the required form of words, because of "a legally ulterior purpose to the 
discourse" (Goodrich, 1990: 23). Again the purpose seems to be one of committing 
the defendant to a ritual of legal recognition. The double bind following the 
magistrate's urging to 'say what you want to say' is worth noting, since it is clearly 
not intended as an invitation offering complete freedom of expression. Little room 
is left for interpretive licence, or manoeuvre, as the magistrate's final imperative 
suggests (Goodrich, 1990: 23-24): 
Case 2 
Clerk: Do you plead guilty or not guilty? 
Defendant: Yes I did it. I said I did it. 
Clerk: Do you plead guilty or not guilty? 
Defendant: Yes I did it. I just want to get out of here ... 
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Magistrate: Do you plead guilty or not guilty? 
Defendant: Yes, I did it. 
Magistrate: No. I'm asking whether you plead guilty or not guilty. You 
must use either the words 'not guilty' or 'guilty'. 
Defendant: (looking towards probation officer) She said, 'Say guilty'. 
Magistrate: No. You must say what you want to say. 
Defendant: Yes, I'll say what you like. I did it. 
Magistrate: No. You must use the language of the court. 
Clerk: Not guilty. 
In both these instances, then, what is going on seems to be related to a broader, 
functional goal; the goal being that the defendants will formally recognise and 
submit to the arena of trial. 
Craig notes that a variation of this type of inference is to be found in research 
where the investigator explicitly instructs speakers to seek certain goals, in the 
manner of getting acquainted, or assembling a set of parts correctly for instance 
(cf. Burke, 1986). This kind of study is of course dependent on establishing 
whether the speakers are actually following the instructions as required. The value 
of experimental work of this and other kinds involving the analysis of verbal 
exchange is debated in Roger and Bull (1989), and given more detailed 
consideration in Chapter 3. 
The second kind of inferencing for warranting goals in verbal communication 
is based on the analytic claim that: "A goal is being pursued if a functional 
relationship can be established between the putative goal and some formal 
element of the discourse" (Craig, 1986: 269). The assumption here is that in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, a speaker who says things having a functional 
relationship to certain outcomes is in fact seeking those outcomes. An example of 
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this type of inference is presented Burke (1986) who argues that some of the 
apprentices in her study used 'transformed repeats', that is, they repeated 
instructions which they had been given in a more technical vocabulary as a way of 
demonstrating their expertise. In the following exchange, the apprentice (A) 
provides a technical label for a component, when the term in question has not 
been supplied by the expert (E). 
38 E: And attach the pink thing so it covers the hole in the middle. 
39 A: Got it. One-way valve. We're all set. (Burke, 1986: 214) 
Burke notes that the technical ascription here suggests considerable knowledge 
concerning the task. The repeat thus serves to 'upgrade' the description offered by 
the expert, with the strategic function of signalling that the instructions as stated 
are quite sufficient and do not require further, and by implication unnecessary, 
detail. 
Craig cites Brown and Levinson's (1978/1987) work on politeness strategies as 
a variation of the functional relationship type of inference. He writes: 
Here one argues that an utterance exemplifies a particular strategy, not on 
the basis of what the utterance actually meant on a particular occasion of use, 
but rather on the basis that it could have a certain meaning and effect, given 
certain assumptions about context and intention. In other words one can 
imagine a context in which the utterance might function in a particular way. 
(Craig, 1986: 270) 
A full account of the politeness model is unnecessary, since it has been widely 
cited, tested and criticised in the decade or so since it originally appeared. The 
following summary is offered simply to illustrate Craig's point about warranting. 
Politeness theory is based on Goffman's notion of 'face' (the public image 
every person wants to claim, and supposedly wants to maintain) and Grice's 
model of communication as a maximally efficient means of exchanging 
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information. Analysis of these notions depends on the linguistic unit of a 'speech 
act', where this is conceived in relation to the function or action performed by a 
particular utterance (after the manner of Searle). In uttering the words, "Can you 
shut the window? ", for instance, a speaker performs a request, where this is likely 
to be perceived as more polite, and certainly less confrontational and abrasive, 
than the command, "Shut the window". Requests threaten a recipient's desire not 
be imposed upon (negative face); in other words imposition is minimised by the 
implication of 'appreciation' ("What a nice person you would be if you were to 
respond by actually closing the window, and hence meeting my request"). On the 
other hand, the use of language strategies that attend directly to people's needs to 
be appreciated and approved of serve the function of indicating positive politeness 
in locutions such as ("What a superb essay, now that just shows how able you 
really are") and so on. 
Tracy suggests that politeness theory provides "a rich and linguistically 
elaborated sense of how two very general identity concerns are displayed", but 
that it fails to "give an adequate picture of the complexity of identity issues that 
motivate communicative behavior" (Tracy, 1990: 213). These concerns and/or 
issues are not of immediate interest to the present line of research. But Brown and 
Levinson's appraisal of the functional relational inferences that they make 
(although they do not explicitly use this label) are worthy of comment. They write: 
"Our account... basically suggests that understanding is a matter of reconstructing 
speakers' communicative intentions, and that this is done by running a logic of 
practical reasoning 'backwards' as it were" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 8). Brown 
and Levinson recognise a problem with this approach due to the fact that "no 
logical system... offers any way of going from conclusions back to premises", 
because they are not symmetrical systems (op. cit.: 8). They conclude as a result 
that: "Even if we had a perfected system of means-ends reasoning, it would 
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remain a conceptual mystery how we are able to reconstruct other agents' 
intentions from their actions.. . Yet that we do so, or attempt to do so, is hardly 
open to question" (op. cit.: 8). 
This statement appears to recognise not only the inferential nature of the 
communicative process, but also the difficulties of exploring it in practice. The 
emphasis, however, is very much towards a speaker-oriented model of 
communication, as is made clear in their use of the term 'strategy', "in which 
people can be seen to be doing something before doing, or in order to do, 
something else" (op. cit.: 8). Investigation of the routine use of 'strategy', in this 
sense, is at the heart of conversation analytic research. But' work in CA is based on 
a different method for warranting evidence about the use of such routines, since it 
focuses on the interactional properties of what people are doing in talk. These 
properties are examined by detailed analyses of the conventionalised or 
institutionalised features which are continually organising verbal exchange, and 
where what is going on is viewed as social action. 
This approach brings us to the third of Craig's inferential patterns for 
warranting inferences about goals, that is, inference based on the orientation of the 
discourse to an identifiable focus of attention. Speakers' use of 'repetition' and 
'emphasis' is cited as an example of this type, where the goal is to draw attention 
to the referential content or manner of what has been said. Another example is the 
provision of extra information beyond what is required to answer questions in 
initial interactions, hence breaking Grice's maxim of 'quality'. The goal here-is 
presumably to give information that is thought to be of salience over and above 
that which is required to meet the maxim in question. 
A variation of the 'focus-of-attention-inference' uses evidence of 
conversational phenomena such as self-correction and repair as an indication of 
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goal-seeking behaviour. If one makes an effort to repair disagreements, or 
misunderstandings, then presumably this is an indication of purposively trying to 
establish or reach agreement. It is this kind of warranting that I suggest underpins 
the investigative methods of conversation analytic research. Conversation analysts 
were among the first to provide systematic evidence for the cooperative nature of 
conversational processes. These are identifiable not only by dint of their focus, but 
also by their reproducibility. Wootton notes that there are two ways in which 
analysis can be concerned with reproducibility: 
The first relates to the capacity of other investigators to understand and 
replicate the procedures of analysis that have been employed. The second 
relates to the fact that members of society are continually organising their 
conduct so as to have it identifiable by others, and that in the course of this 
they rely on the capacity of the communication system to reproduce forms of 
conduct from which systematic inferences can be drawn by other parties 
involved. (Wootton, 1989: 239) 
This perspective is integral to the view of verbal communication that is taken in 
this thesis, since it is centred on what participants do. However, it does not 
account for the kinds of sociolinguistic knowledge upon which conversational 
cooperation is presumably based, nor does it explore the interpretive abilities of 
participants to recover and evaluate what is reproduced in talk in their own terms. 
This ability is researchable as Gumperz has demonstrated, but seems to be the 
object of some caution in terms of CA methodology. Wootton, for example, 
comments: 
Excavating the implicit analyses which parties in interaction make of each 
other's talk is then a technical task: one which, for example, though it does not 
preclude consulting with people about what they think are they are doing, has 
to be grounded in close exploration, analysis and documentation from the 
behavioural details of the exchange in question. (Wootton, 1990: 254) 
I want to argue that such consultation should be considered as both integral and 
complementary to detailed technical analysis of verbal communication, as I 
indicated at the outset of this chapter. It is this line of argument that brings me to 
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the fourth and final of Craig's bases for warranting inferences about goals in 
discourse, and that is the use of speaker self-reports. 
Craig argues that self-reports should not be overlooked as a source of data for 
warranting inferences about goals, although he is rather circumspect about their 
status and utility. He gives two major reasons for caution, both of which are 
concerned with the issue of accuracy. These involve individual presumptions 
about the general 'social desirability' of goals, on the one hand, and the extent of 
individual 'awareness' about goals on the other. As far as desirability is 
concerned, Craig suggests that people will often deny that they have goals to 
pursue, either because these are conventionally frowned upon, or because they 
have predictable connotations or expectations. On the other hand, people may be 
unaware of their goals, or have inaccurate beliefs about their patterns of 
behaviour. Nonetheless, Craig concludes that: 
self-reports, like all sources of information concerning goals, are fallible: 
They provide only indirect evidence and require interpretation. The fact, for 
example, that speakers think they should or should not have certain goals 
does not necessarily mean that they actually behave accordingly, but it still 
might indicate something interesting about their goal-orientation. (Craig, 
1986: 271) 
I propose to follow the spirit of Craig's comments by reiterating that self reports 
can and should prove of great service to analysts of talk in ways that I intend to 
demonstrate in the empirical work presented in the remainder of this thesis. 
However, by and large the nature of such reports have never been explored in 
anything other than an ad hoc way, despite what we might learn from analysis and 
documentation of what participants think that they are doing. 
This exploration becomes possible if what speakers have to say about the goals 
they are pursuing (or not pursuing as the case may be) is taken seriously. In this 
regard, presumably what ordinary speakers have to say about their 
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communicative activities has to be as at least as interesting as theoretical 
introspection. I am not suggesting that the views of theorists do not have a place, 
they obviously do. After all, it seems pointless not to assume that discourse is in 
some sense and to some degree intentionally directed towards goals as Craig 
(1986: 272) argues. But if academic disciplines can influence our view of what goes 
on in communication (it is widely assumed that communicative competence can 
be improved, for example), then surely we should be aware of the consequences 
for ordinary language users and actual language use? Warranting inferences about 
goals from a lay point of view may just serve to keep our analytic claims in 
perspective in this regard, and in my opinion offers a challenging but productive 
methodological tool for investigating everyday communicative practices. 
This tool may prove to have wider significance if extended and applied to 
research focussing on communicative asynchronies in verbal exchange due to 
individual and sociocultural differences in inferencing behaviour. Something of 
these differences, especially in inter-ethnic discourse, have in fact been 
investigated by Gumperz and others within an interactional sociolinguistic 
framework (Gumperz, 1982a; 1982b, and Chapter 8), but this approach has been 
heavily criticised by Singh and Lele (1989) on the grounds of cultural and 
ideological distortion. Although the empirical studies presented in the following 
chapters are not of this type, I feel that criticisms of the kind levied by Singh and 
Lele could be reified by taking a listener-oriented approach, warranted on the 
basis of (third person) speaker-reports. If the work to be reported here is any 
gauge, such reports would surely indicate interesting, if not salient, information 
about communicative goals across and within not only different speakers, but also 
different cultures and different languages. 
Fasold suggests that "sociolinguistics only exists as a field of study because 
there are choices in using language" (Fasold, 1984: 180). An interactional 
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sociolinguistic approach must not only be sensitive to the nature of these choices, 
but also to how different participants realise and perceive what they do in them in 
communicative terms. In Chapter 3, I explore how this approach may be 
developed by considering the concept of third person metalinguistic ability or 
capacity, in relation to the recovery and warranting of goals from the products of 
situated (discourse) interpretation. 
2.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the nature of interpersonal 
communication in verbal exchange, and to present a variety of concepts and 
distinctions needed to characterise communicative activities. A wide range of 
disciplines has been called on for this task, demonstrating that the study of verbal 
communication is not only extremely complex, but also has been broached from 
quite different theoretical perspectives. Notwithstanding the variety of approaches 
and many difficulties involved in its description, it would seem that everyday 
verbal communication can be usefully characterised in two major ways. First, as 
an inferential process requiring the efforts of two or more individuals in varying 
participant and addressee roles, and second, as action-oriented behaviour that is 
purposively organised by interlocutors with a view to achieving particular 
communicative ends. 
This process is dependent upon interactional knowledge that is not only 
cognitively relevant as Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest, but is also . 
sociolinguistically based. As Gumperz and others have shown, verbal exchange 
occurs in social situations, between participants bearing social relationships, and 
having certain communicative goals. Since sociolinguistics "has not generally 
adopted the interactional, relational and constitutive perspective" needed to 
reflect either the complexity or multidimensionality of verbal communication, 
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Coupland, Coupland and Giles (1991: 25) argue that "it will be helpful to have a 
model that recognizes how linguistic variables intersect with speakers' and 
listeners' attitudes, goals and strategies, and with the outcomes of interaction". I 
can only endorse this sentiment, and consequently seek to contribute towards such 
a model by investigating the repertoire of interpretive possibilities for warranting 
claims about such 'attitudes, goals, strategies and outcomes' on the basis of 
various third person perspectives. The studies which such an approach involves 
assumes that ordinary members have interpretive abilities (as of course do 
analysts) that can be applied beyond the participation framework. It is the 
challenge of investigating and modelling these abilities that is addressed in the 
following chapters. 
CHAPTER 3 
EVERYDAY KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERT OPINION 
3.0 Some Procedural Issues 
In order to undertake systematic investigation of what ordinary members have to 
say about inferential processes in verbal interaction, and the interpretive 
possibilities they raise, a number of procedural issues need to be addressed. These 
include the questions of how we can begin to collect, analyse and interpret 
something as familiar as everyday verbal exchange in a principled way and how 
inferential processes can be studied from a participant-oriented perspective. The 
design and utility of post hoc studies of third person interpretation in order to 
investigate such practices is presented in Chapter 4. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to consider the methodological and theoretical issues that these questions, 
and the studies which they anticipate, raise. 
The relationship between methods and theory is important because of its 
implications for analytic procedure and findings as Milroy (1987: Chapter 1) 
suggests. Although Milroy's remarks are largely oriented towards secular 
sociolinguistic studies of the kind pioneered by William Labov, they are most 
relevant for analysts of verbal communication because they offer a framework for 
considering different kinds of investigative process and hence interpretive 
procedures. Milroy suggests that "An account of method divorced from theory is 
not considered to be helpful, desirable or even possible" (1987: xi), and 
consequently identifies three major concepts that are intrinsic to "any conceivable 
descriptive linguistic activity". These are adapted from Kibrik (1977) as follows: 
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(1) The subject of investigation (the language or part of the language). 
(2) The object of investigation (written texts or tape-recorded data). 
(3) The product of investigation. This is the model of the subject of the 
investigation which is usually called the grammar. (Milroy, 1987: 3) 
The way in which these concepts are operationalised is determined by 
particular research strategies and/or analytic ends. Hence different approaches 
may be characterised in terms of "the relationship between the investigator, the 
subject of study and the object of study in the process of arriving at the final 
product (or model)" (Milroy, 1987: 3). Three possible models of the process by 
which an investigator arrives at a product are mooted. These are represented 
diagrammatically as follows (Milroy, 1987: 4): 
(a) Introspective method 
Model 
(of a fragment) 
of language 
Investigator 
(b) Analytic method 
Model 
(of a fragment) 
of language 
Investigator Data 
Language 
Language 
(c) Experimental method 
Model 
(of a fragment) 
of language 
Investigator 1, 
.j 
Informant Data 
Language 
(idiolect) 
FIGURE 3.1 
Modelling the Methods of Descriptive Linguistics 
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Since methodology clearly provides specific design and analytic procedures, this 
framework can be used to facilitate discussion of the type of approach that I seek 
to develop here. 
The first method is not appropriate for the investigative purposes of this 
thesis, since descriptions of verbal communication are necessarily based on a 
process of introspection and self-observation. This process does not require an 
object of investigation, and consequently a body of data is absent (Milroy, 1987: 3). 
Verbal communication is such a complex phenomenon that any attempt to 
undertake its study without reference to a body of data must be either highly 
generalised, or speculative, or simplistic. This is not to say that our intuitions 
about verbal exchange are unimportant, but rather that they cannot be empirically 
ratified without reference to actual occurrences of what has gone on in the course 
of their production. 
The second method will not be pursued here either. It offers a model that is 
very much of the type used in conventional discourse analysis (cf. Coulthard, 
1977; Coulthard and Montgomery, 1981; Edmonson, 1981; Hoey, 1983). A corpus 
of independently collected data is assembled and provides the means for 
generating descriptions of supra-sentential linguistic structure, for instance. The 
onus for interpreting the results of such descriptions is on the analyst, and the 
models which result will presumably be tied to particular disciplinary 
frameworks, or to strongly held theories about the nature of the data object 
involved. % 
A rather different analytic approach, of course, is undertaken by CA 
practitioners whose attempts to systematically describe naturally occurring 
language data are based on inductive methods that are taken to be autonomous 
and atheoretically motivated (Levinson, 1983; Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; 
Button 
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and Lee, 1987; Roger and Bull, 1989). This approach emerged as part of a reaction 
to inadequate and premature theorising in sociology (Heritage, 1989). By drawing 
attention to the tacit knowledge that interactional participants have of rules that 
regulate their everyday behaviour, CA has undoubtedly contributed much to the 
study of verbal exchange. However, its focus on the microanalysis of 
conversational organisation, or 'the sequential relevance' of action, has been at the 
expense of evidential work seeking to directly involve its agents. 
Neither the introspective, nor analytic methods therefore allow for participant 
interpretations of the kind which are mooted here. The third type of descriptive 
method, on the other hand, does allow for this work by taking into account 
information that may be provided by participants, and other outside observers, in 
the role of informant judges. Because situated interpretive processes involve 
interacting, the investigative product should draw its postulates from what 
participants, as well as analysts, know about interaction (cf. Gumperz, 1982a). A 
preliminary framework for investigating what ordinary members know in this 
regard is developed in this and subsequent chapters. 
The value of this framework is that it enables systematic investigation of 
members' interpretive resources. However, the use of informants in this way 
raises issues and problems of its own, and it these that I want to explore in the 
remainder of this chapter. The first of these concerns the data of verbal exchange, 
and the kind of record that can be produced from its instantiation. The second, 
concerns how to make use of such data for (analytic) interpretive purposes,, and 
the third appraises the potential of (informant) interpretations as a means of 
generating and testing hypotheses about the communicative salience of 
different 
types of interactional data along the lines Gumperz (1982a, 1982b) suggests. 
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This latter mode of interpretation is of principal interest, because it is intrinsic 
to my attempts to recover and warrant inferential processes that are otherwise 
unlikely to emerge as a topic of discussion for participants. But I will begin the 
discussion by considering the nature of tape-recorded data as an object of study in 
its own right. 
3.1 The Data of Verbal Exchange 
Descriptive linguistic activity which takes as its field of inquiry the study of 
language in use, as opposed to the study of language systems (the distinction is 
discussed in detail in Brown and Yule (1983: 20ff. ), and Milroy, 1987: Chapter 1), 
defines its subject matter in relationship to the great diversity of communicative 
contexts and resources available to human beings for engaging in verbal 
exchange. When taken as the object of study, the data products of such 
engagement pose something of a conundrum for investigators. As summarised by 
Stubbs, the conundrum is this: "What is the researcher to do when confronted 
with what has been called the 'bloomin', buzzin' confusion' of any normal social 
setting? " (Stubbs, 1983: 238). 
The lack of recognised and accepted procedures for collecting, analysing and 
interpreting the products of spontaneously occurring verbal exchange is not so 
much a reflection of analytic confusion, but rather the fact that there are many 
approaches to interactional analysis. Everyday verbal exchange is "a multifaceted 
and complex human activity" as Labov and Fanshel (1977: 349), and Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, have established. Yet, although one must simply accept that "no one 
technique could say very much of what could be said about a conversation" 
(Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 349), a principled approach is possible, and can help to 
minimise the kind of confusion to which Stubbs refers. 
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Labov and Fanshel propose a set of procedures for undertaking what they 
describe as 'comprehensive discourse analysis' (1977: Chapter 2). Their analysis 
delimits nine stages of procedure, and these can be summarised as follows: 
(1) Recording-the provision of a mechanical (audio) record of some exchange; 
audio-visual records are also highly recommended, though they exacerbate 
the observer's paradox, and increase the complexity of information to be 
analysed; 
(2) Editing-the preparation of a text, or transcript in terms of the words and 
other segmentable units taken from the recording; 
(3) Fields of discourse-the analysis of contextual styles; 
(4) Paralinguistic cues-the analysis of nonsegmentable units of text in terms 
of prosodic and paralinguistic phenomena; 
(5) Expansion-the formal extension of editing to provide more explicit details, 
e. g. identifying the referents of pronouns and pro-forms; 
(6) Propositions-the abstraction of implicit and explicit general statements 
from the expanded text, e. g. identifying recurrent themes that are 
communicated between participants, modes of argument etc. 
(7) Rules of discourse-the determination of rules for producing and 
interpreting speech acts, e. g. the rule for making requests; 
(8) Interaction-the determination of the actions that are being performed by 
speakers through their utterances; e. g. representations, requests, challenges; 
(9) Sequences-the analysis of the sequential connections that emanate from 
the nature of the speech acts involved; e. g. acknowledgements and 
responses. 
This schema provides Labov and Fanshel with a research tool to facilitate the 
investigation of selected episodes of verbal exchange as psychotherapy. The key 
element of the schema is 'interaction'; the process of determining the actions which 
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affect, alter, or maintain relations between interlocutors (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 
58ff. ). Labov and Fanshel go on to note that "crucial actions are not just such 
speech acts as requests and assertions, but rather challenges, defenses, and 
retreats, which have to do with the status of the participants, their rights and 
obligations, and their changing relationships in terms of social organization" 
(Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 58-59). 
Since they constitute the difference between 'what is said' and 'what is done', 
communicative actions, or rather chains of actions, are viewed as the pivotal 
construct in the analytic process. Labov and Fanshel explain: 
We have attempted to give specific form to this general distinction and to 
marshal all of the evidence at our disposal to support these chains of speech 
actions. Since the interactional statements are always the most abstract, the 
evidence is always indirect, but these statements provide an account of what 
the speakers are doing in verbal interaction and so approach the description 
of meaning in speech. (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 357-58) 
It is this kind of analytic mode that I think can be warranted by third person 
interpretation, where the notion of 'what is said' and 'what is done' in verbal 
exchange can be can be recovered post hoc by both participants and outside 
observers. But how can this mode be applied in practice? The following analytic 
tasks are mooted by way of preparing the ground for an answer to this question. 
They include the process of recording, transcribing, and reporting on speech 
activities in order to model what members know about verbal communication. 
3.1.1 Recording Speech Activities 
The question of how one selects a particular event or speech activity to record is 
usually dependent on the requirements of the project in hand, or the intended 
'product' of investigation. Notwithstanding the effects of Labov's 'observer's 
paradox', the difficulty of capturing the informal spontaneity of verbal exchange 
by some mechanical means, whether it be audio or audio-visual recordings, is well 
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documented. Crystal (1983), for example, argues that is virtually impossible to 
capture this spontaneity using a process of controlled intuitive reflection. 
However, a corpus-based approach is not without its difficulties either. Grimshaw 
(1982) notes that two central problems are the logistical demands of accomplishing 
'comprehensive discourse analysis' on the one hand, and working with data that 
are less than fully satisfactory on the other. He cites the following reasons as to 
why these problems should arise (Grimshaw, 1982: 15-16): 
(a) a paucity of texts of complete speech events, and of events involving more 
than two participants, and of events focussed on different topics and/or 
ends; 
(b) lack of an ethnographic grounding (or failure to provide it where it might 
be available) for those texts which are employed; 
(c) low quality of textual records generally, and particularly a scarcity of texts 
with multi-channel (i. e. film or video as well as aural) recordings. 
These factors are not to deny that we need many records of naturally occurring 
conversations, but rather to recognise the intrinsic difficulties of obtaining them 
for professional observation and analysis; no analysis can overcome flawed 
recordings for example. I shall argue that the need to supplement these records is 
paramount, especially with regard to using participant concerns as part of the 
warranting process. 
It is also important to recognise that different kinds of data may be at issue. 
Grimshaw, for instance, lists the following four possibilities (Grimshaw, 1974: 
421): 
(1) 'natural' speech (and other communicative behavior) observed in natural 
settings; 
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(2) 'natural' speech (and other communicative behavior) observed in contrived 
settings (which can become natural), viz., in gatherings convened by the 
[investigator] or in experimental groups, etc.; 
(3) elicited speech (and/or other communicative behavior) reported to 
[investigators] in response to direct inquiry; 
(4) historical and/or literary materials. 
Roger and Bull (1989) report that a major methodological issue in the study of 
interpersonal communication concerns the contexts in which the data are actually 
collected. They compare in this respect the different approaches taken by social 
psychologists and conversation analysts, where the former rely heavily on 
research techniques based on experimentation and quantification, and the latter 
on techniques based on naturally occurring situations. Roger and Bull explain that 
by using laboratory settings, social psychologists aim to exert as much control as 
possible over particular speaker variables that are considered as independent, for 
example, age, sex, ethnicity, personality and so on. The effects of these 
manipulations are then observed on dependent variables, such as rate of 
interruption, and the data are then subjected to statistical analysis. Conversation 
analysts, on the other hand, strive to employ naturally occurring conversations 
which can be systematically inspected for pattern. They are not interested in 
manipulating variables, and their analyses are consequently qualitative rather 
than quantitative in nature. 
Unfortunately, these differences in method have been perceived as 
dichotomous rather than complementary, which has led to considerable 
divisiveness between the two traditions. Roger and Bull cite the work of Heritage 
(1984), for instance, in which the latter argues that experimental work is contrived, 
since laboratory-based conversations are by nature artificial (Roger and Bull, 1989: 
67). Indeed, Heritage goes further than this to claim "that the problem of 
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experimenter effect is so serious that it is better to work with data derived only 
from naturally occurring situations" (op cit.: 67). This claim tends to be countered 
by investigators working in social psychology who suggest that conversation 
analytic work lacks any objective measure of control, thus resulting in difficulties 
at the stage of interpreting results. 
Because of these difficulties, Roger and Bull suggest a framework for 
comparing the two approaches (1989: 68-73). This framework is based on the 
interrelationship of three features that constrain the kinds of exchange product 
that might be collected. These are: 
(1) the selection of the participants; 
(2) the setting; 
(3) the reason for the exchange. 
Roger and Bull conclude that what distinguishes the experimental and 
naturalistic approaches is not so much selection of participants, or the nature of 
setting, but rather the reason as to why some exchange has taken place. What they 
do not appear to discuss is the kind of data that may very well be of the 
naturalistic type, but which is then subject to further manipulative work. What I 
am suggesting here is that there is a strong case to be made for making use of both 
these methodologies. Obviously, naturalistic data can be made the object of 
investigation in its own right as conversation analysis has demonstrated. 
However, it can also be used to elicit what might best be described as third person 
'interpretive' or 'observer' speech, that is, speech data that has been collected 
independently of the investigator's own observation. 
It is this type of data that I will ultimately be concerned with. Indeed, it seems 
to be this interpretive approach that Widdowson (1979) had in mind when 
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challenging ethnomethodological claims about the investigation of actual 
discourse processes. Widdowson writes: 
The ethnomethodologists seem to make claims that they are dealing with 
process, with the ongoing accomplishments of practical reasoning, but 
although they make inferences about process, they typically deal with 
products. There is no evidence, to my knowledge, that they have attempted to 
conduct experiments that might yield information about how the participants 
see the discourse at a particular point in its development and what controls 
their options at this point. (Widdowson, 1979: 70) 
While informant responses to data of various kinds have been the subject of 
interest for both sociolinguists and social psychologists, this interest has tended to 
concentrate on the study of language attitudes and interpersonal relations rather 
than the ongoing process of situated interpretation by participant interlocutors as 
they attempt to achieve their communicative ends. 
Assuming the collection of analytically satisfactory audio-recordings to begin 
the study of these ends (see 3.1.1), the next question is what to do with them by 
way of making a data object that can be inspected at leisure. 
3.1.2 Transcribing Speech Activities 
Most studies of verbal exchange are based on a textual record of either audio or 
audio-visual recordings that have been collected by the analyst. This record is 
usually produced as a result of repeatedly listening to the recordings as an aid to 
analysis. Both the product (the transcript) and the process (transcribing) may be 
used to identify and locate phenomena of investigative interest. The product will 
of course depend on the kinds of information and/or detail that the analyst 
chooses to provide. But in an important sense, whatever is provided necessarily 
embodies an initial classification and even theorising about the raw material 
(Abercrombie, 1954). 
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Moreover, recordings themselves cannot provide a complete account of 
speech activities. How much reality can a recording capture then? It is difficult to 
answer this question with any kind of certainty, and the same kind of uncertainty 
clearly faces the transcriber. How much reality can a transcription capture? One 
can only try to provide as much detail as one can, but even the most fastidious 
and patient of scholars is faced with the dilemma that Stubbs raises. He notes: 
Transcription is an enormously lengthy business, and in itself cuts down the 
amount of data that can be reasonably analysed... Transcription time varies 
enormously depending on the complexity of the recording, but it could take a 
minimum of 20 hours to transcribe such a discussion down to word level and 
hesitation phenomena, and correspondingly much longer to transcribe for 
intonation or phonetically. (Stubbs, 1983: 222) 
The issue of what to transcribe, how to transcribe it, and what makes a valid 
transcription, in the sense of how adequately it might represent the complexity of 
verbal communication, is a matter of some contention. It is also a matter that has 
been broached by different disciplines (see Roger and Bull, 1989, especially Section 
3). However, it is not an issue that I wish to pursue here, beyond noting that there 
are clearly substantial differences between the transcription procedures employed 
by the various exponents of these disciplines. Roger and Bull (1989: 148) suggest 
that these differences are not irreconcilable, since they reflect different levels of 
analysis which can be placed along a continuum, depending on the level of the 
detail that the analyst seeks to represent. This appraisal may well be the case, but I 
think a more telling point is made by Jefferson, who writes: 
I take it that when we talk about transcription we are talking about one way 
to pay attention to recordings of actually occurring events. While those of us 
who spend a lot of time making transcripts may be doing our best to get it 
right, what that might mean is utterly obscure and unstable. It depends a 
great deal on what we are paying attention to. It seems to me, then, that the 
issue is not transcription per se, but what it is we might want to transcribe, 
that is attend to. (Jefferson, 1985: 25) 
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The issue that looms in Jefferson's remarks from my perspective is this-is what it 
is that analysts might want to attend to in spontaneously occurring verbal 
interaction(s) likely to be shared by its participants, and/or other outside 
observers, and if not, what is it that the latter might attend to instead? I confront 
this issue next. 
3.2 Analytic Modes and Interpretive Practice 
Verbal exchange has been the subject of investigation from a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives as I intimated in Chapter 2. A key, but often unstated, 
element of procedure in many of these approaches is the nature of interpretive 
practices invoked by analysing observers as they move from data to theory, if and 
where data is employed as part of the modelling process. In this regard, 
researchers have tended to rely on one of two major means of deriving 
information about the interactive products of speaker-hearer exchange. These are 
the so-called 'top down' and 'bottom up' approaches to modelling communicative 
activity between participants in talk, and emanate from the applied reasoning of 
the researchers' particular discovery procedures (cf. the use of these terms in work 
involving the computational modelling of language understanding as discussed in 
Brown and Yule, 1983: 234ff. ). 
The interpretive practices that these different processing models involve are 
the subject of discussion in Corsaro (1981). He writes, 
As Cicourel has argued, top-down models generally involve references to 
higher order predicates that index constituent parts of the discourse such as 
general goals, beliefs, events, procedures etc., or general relationships which 
exist between speakers (i. e. superordinate-subordinate alignments). Bottom- 
up models, however, are characterized by a focus on lower levels of 
abstraction like syntactic structure, propositional content of syntactic strings, 
turn-taking procedures etc., with little reference given to status characteristics 
of participants or organization features of interactive settings. (Corsaro, 1981: 
24) 
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Cicourel's own approach to modelling is also elucidated by Corsaro who 
highlights the former's methodological and theoretical sensitivity to the complex 
and multifaceted nature of participant interactional processes on the one hand, 
and the equally complex issues relating to analytic interpretive procedures for 
investigating them on the other. This sensitivity, and the vast research potential of 
Cicourel's work, is manifest in his search to integrate the findings and utility of 
various discourse models within a single framework (see Corsaro's review, and 
Cicourel, 1980). 
At the core of this enterprise is the idea that participants manipulate multiple 
levels of information and more than one type of logical reasoning in the course of 
their interactional accomplishments. Consequently, great care must be taken by 
the analysing observer because the data of such accomplishments must necessarily 
be extracted from the organisational settings in which they are realised. Two 
major methodological difficulties arise in this regard: 
First, researchers relying only on extracted discourse materials must stay 
close to the interactive data. As a result there can be no explicit attempt to 
invoke higher level predicates which would identify the kinds of social 
interaction taking place, how this interaction reveals complex biographical 
conditions and interpersonal relations, and the way all of these elements 
reflect aspects of social structure or institutional constraints, beliefs, and 
practices. (Cicourel, n. d.: 26, in Corsaro, 1981: 28) 
What Cicourel seems to be suggesting is that data-driven analysis of extracted 
materials can distort the participants' sense of what is important for them within 
some speech event, by way of making explicit their motives and intentions, and 
individual or shared understandings of what is going on communicatively. 
A second problem occurs when researchers (either explicitly or tacitly) go 
beyond the discourse materials and present interpretations which are based on 
idealised or stereotypical notions of the social and psychological characteristics of 
participants. 
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When this kind of expansion occurs the problem is more one of 'reification' 
than mere distortion because the analysis takes on a more extensive, 
theoretical character which is not based on valid ethnographic observation of 
the participants and setting under study. (Corsaro, 1981: 28) 
The onus on the researcher in the face of these problems is considerable if they are, 
indeed, to account for "all decisions and interpretations in analysis which 
involved linking different types and levels of data" (Corsaro, 1981: 29) as Cicourel 
appears to require. Apart from adopting multi-level analysis procedures, 
researchers are also urged to provide appropriate background ethnographic data, 
including 'chronologies' which account for how such data were collected and used 
in the analysis of discourse materials. In terms of the analytic process itself, 
Cicourel stresses the importance of assumptions about the reasoning processes of 
interactional participants. He notes: "Forms of reasoning are viewed as central to 
the researcher's understanding of the way speakers and hearers presumably 
understand each other" (Cicourel, 1980: 101). These forms of reasoning are, 
however, assumed to be recoverable since they are deemed to "parallel the 
reasoning we employ as researchers in making sense of the speech acts we record 
and listen to in arriving at some form of analysis" (op. cit.: 101). 
This sense of parallelism appears to be shared by other investigators. Bublitz 
for example notes: "In principle, the analysing observer who is trying to 
understand is in a position not unlike that of the participating interlocutor. He too 
arrives at an understanding by means of interpretation, deduction and ascription" 
(Bublitz, 1988: 12). Bublitz is unequivocal about his role in the interpretive 
practices he pursues. He explains: 
In describing the pieces of conversation at issue here I also interpret them, 
i. e. I proceed from my understanding as post hoc participating observer, as 
it 
were, and provisionally assign speech act patterns and speaker attitudes, 
topics and topical action patterns, participant roles and coherence to the 
conversation as a whole and to separate parts. (Bublitz, 1988: 11) 
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Fairclough (1989: 166ff. ) also considers the position of analyst to be akin to that 
of the participants. His answer to the question, "How is the analyst to gain access 
to the discourse processes of production and interpretation, when these processes 
take place in people's heads and therefore cannot be observed in the same way as 
one might observe processes in the physical world? ", is to argue that the analyst 
must apply her own interpretive procedures "through her capacity to engage 
herself in the discourse process she is investigating". By drawing on their own 
interpretive resources to explain how participants operate in discourse, Fairclough 
argues that analysts must be sensitive to the procedures that they are in fact 
relying upon to do the analysis in question. 
These procedures are rarely made explicit by analysts, but presumably must 
be the consequence of both everyday and professional assumptions about 
discourse. The distinction is important, because it helps to identify the essential 
difference between expert and participant interpretation as Fairclough explains: 
"The analyst is doing the same as the participant interpreter, but unlike the 
participant interpreter the analyst is concerned to explicate what she is doing" 
(Fairclough, 1989: 167). If this is the case, there is no reason, of course, why 
participants should not take part in the analytic process as post hoc observers. 
Cicourel has long argued in favour of using participants in this way as part of the 
procedure he describes as 'indefinite triangulation'. This procedure requires that 
"researchers elicit multiple interpretations of discourse materials from participants 
and compare these data with their own (researchers') interpretations of the same 
and similar events" (Corsaro, 1981: 30). As Corsaro goes on to explain, this 
approach was put forward by Cicourel as an important enabling mechanism for 
researchers who, by dint of consulting participants, could "check the validity of 
their interpretations and possibly discover the reasoning ability of social actors" 
(op. cit.: 30). 
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In using participants and researchers alike, Cicourel maintains that they 
should be viewed as limited capacity processors of information (cf. Sack's notion 
of 'inference-making machines' of which more later in this chapter). But this 
argument also has important consequences for methodological practice: 
Cicourel argues that researchers and informants 'are constrained by their 
knowledge base and contingencies of using working and long-term memory 
under changing conditions of analysis and social interaction' (n. d.: 35). 
Cicourel suggests that researchers can avoid the inevitable reification which 
occurs when they insist on finding something inherently meaningful in 
everything said by discourse participants, if they treat the processing limits of 
social actors as problematic aspects of discourse analysis. (Corsaro, 1981: 30) 
The debate about analysts' versus users' models of language is constructively 
tackled by Stubbs (1986, Chapter 14). Although principally concerned with the 
relationship of linguistic theory to pedagogical practice, Stubbs's argument that 
the descriptions of professional analysts can be strengthened by taking into 
account everyday, lay perceptions of language use is widely applicable. 
Interestingly, Stubbs does not set such models in apposition but rather suggests 
that they can be mutually enlightening for research purposes, whether these are 
theoretically or practically oriented. I would strongly support this position on the 
grounds that analyst models are always likely to be artifactual to an extent 
because they are warped by professional training and the strength of theory (cf. 
Bradac et al., 1980). 
If we consider the process of 'triangulation', for example, as a method that 
"resuscitates intended meanings and interpretations allowing the researcher to 
elucidate the significance of the talk for the talkers" (Adelman, 1981: 7), then I 
suggest great care must taken. The substance of the work reported in Adelman is 
concerned with evaluating the interactional success of teacher-pupil exchanges. 
But the fact is that these evaluations are provided by post hoc inferential processes, 
and their significance is not widely explored. In order to begin such exploration, 
it 
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seems to me that some kind of interpretive framework is required which can 
accommodate the analytic work of professional investigators on the one hand, and 
the evaluations of non-trained members on the other. This framework needs to 
recognise the varying roles that individuals can adopt as 'listeners', whether in 
their capacity as actual participants, or analysts, or outside observers. Each of 
these roles can be viewed on a continuum of collaborative discourse as Rost (1990) 
suggests. This continuum is salient because it helps to define the nature of deictic 
relations that link different kinds of listeners with particular speech activities. 
3.2.1 Inferential Roles and Person Deixis 
Levinson points out that: 
Given the undoubted importance of deixis to philosophical, psychological 
and linguistic approaches to the analysis of language, there has been 
surprisingly little work of a descriptive nature in the area, with a consequent 
lack of adequate theories and frameworks of analysis. (Levinson, 1983: 61) 
Following Levinson's lead, I suggest that person deixis not only provides a means 
of categorising participant roles in the moment-by-moment process of taking turns 
at talk, but also offers a framework for the experimental study of post hoc 
interpretation by different kinds of listener. 
Within the participation framework, Levinson suggests the following deictic 
categories: 
the category first person is the grammaticalization of the speaker's reference 
to himself, second person the encoding of the speaker's reference to one or 
more addressees, and third person the encoding of reference to persons and 
entities which are neither speakers nor addressees of the utterance in 
question. (Levinson, 1983: 62) 
These categories need to be further refined, however, to differentiate between the 
interpretive work of ratified or non-ratified overhearer presence on the one hand, 
and those whose presence is unknown on the other. 
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The actual activity of talk requires the mutual presence (or at least contact 
between, in the case of telecommunications) of two or more individuals. This 
activity provides a set of positions for identifying present and participating 
parties, that is, individuals who take on the roles of speaker/hearers. The 
participation framework thus provides a context in which speaker/hearers are 
related to each other, because of their mutual presence and shared responsibility 
for talk. Importantly, it also provides a context in which the persons' concerned 
relate to what is produced, that is, to the talk itself (Schiffrin, 1987). 
From the present perspective, this framework has been most elegantly 
characterised by Bell (1984) in terms of the concept 'Audience Design', that is, 
where everyday language use "assumes that persons respond mainly to other 
persons, that speakers take most account of their hearers in designing their talk" 
(Bell, 1984: 159). Thus speaker/hearers who become primary participants at the 
moment of speech, do so in the first person, which distinguishes them in 
qualitative terms from all other interlocutors: "The first person's characteristics 
account for speech differences between persons" (Bell, 1984: 159). Bell's basic 
hypothesis is that 'speakers design their style for their audiences'. 
But this hypothesis concerns us here only in so far that it enables Bell to 
attribute differences within the speech of a single speaker to the presence and/or 
influence of other parties, that is, to second and third persons (cf. Goffman, 1981; 
Goodwin, 1981). Bell writes: 
We may distinguish and rank audience roles according to whether or not 
the persons are known, ratified, or addressed by the speaker ... The main 
character in the audience is the second person, the addressed. There may also 
be others, third persons, present but not directly addressed. Known and 
ratified interlocutors in the group, I term auditors. Third parties whom the 
speaker knows to be there, but who are not ratified participants, are 
overhearers. Other parties whose presence is unknown are eavesdroppers, 
whether intentionally or by chance. (Bell, 1984: 159) 
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The characterisation Bell offers provides a means for beginning to explore 
different kinds of listening behaviour, particularly where more than two parties 
are likely to contribute to some speech event (for example, as at a party, or in a 
seminar, or meeting). It also enables consideration of other non-speaking 
participants-the audiences 'out there', if you like, who undertake interpretive 
work in cinemas, theatres, and at home listening to the radio and watching 
television sets. The role of such individuals is traditionally seen as passive, but this 
is far from being the case as Bell is quick to recognise. As auditors, albeit in the 
marked kinds of setting being considered, they too become actively participant in 
the communicative process of selecting, interpreting and creating patterns of 
significance from the particular medium they have chosen to attend (see 
McGregor and White (1986); McGregor and White (1990), who extend this 
argument to include the inferential work of both listening and reading audiences, 
in respect of a wide variety of spoken and written texts). 
The inferential status of such non-speaking participants is broadly akin to that 
of persons who may or may not have been present at the speech activity in 
question, but whose motivation for attending to it is likely to be quite different. 
Within the participation framework, individuals presumably listen to talk because 
they expect to make use of it in some way; let us say for purposes of 
comprehension and recall. However, it is clear that in circumstances where we are 
'overhearers' or 'eavesdroppers', our motivation for listening must be different. 
The Shakespearian characters of Othello and lago provide an interesting case in 
point, where each seeks to glean information by deliberate eavesdropping for his 
own particular and quite distinctive ends. Placed in a position of listening to 'what 
is going on', or to 'what has gone on' in the talk of others, and seeking to make 
sense of it, requires inferential work of a different kind. 
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Precisely what this work involves is not much explored despite the 
ramifications it has for the analysis of the data products of verbal exchange. A key 
element in such work has to be what motivates our listening in the first place. 
Another key element is the nature of our relationship to the material in hand. Let 
us return to the role of the professional analyst and lay observer of talk in this 
regard because the deictic relationship of any outside party to the participants and 
their talk alike can only be indirect. Thus as Leech points out, it is a 'receiver' 
rather than 'addressee' that the analyst of pragmatic meaning, for example, 
undertakes his or her work: "The analyst of pragmatic meaning is best thought of 
as a receiver a proverbial 'fly on the wall' who tries to make sense of the context of 
discourse according to whatever contextual evidence is available" (Leech, 1983: 
13). The nature of this evidence is not always fully documented, though recall 
Labov and Fanshel's procedures for undertaking comprehensive discourse 
analysis which attempts to "bring together all the information we might have that 
will help in understanding the production, interpretation, and sequencing of the 
utterance in question" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 49). But, whatever the procedure 
adopted by the professional analyst I take it that her or his interest will be 
stimulated by a very different kind of audience design from that of the lay 
observer. I also take it that the interpretive resources of lay and professional 
observers are likely to be different in kind. 
These differences need to be recognised, because they are liable to affect the 
process of interpretation as it is applied from an observer's perspective. A 
schematic representation of different listener roles in discourse is presented in 
Figure 3.2. This figure is adapted from Rost (1990: 5), which in turn is an adapted 
version of a schema developed from earlier work of my own (McGregor, 1986a). 
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FIGURE 3.2 
A Schematic Representation of Listener Roles 
The diagram ascribes the following roles: 
(1) Participant-a person who is being spoken to directly and who has 
speaking rights equal to others involved in the discourse; 
(2) Addressee a person in a discourse who is being spoken to directly and 
who has limited rights to respond; 
(3) Auditor-a person in a discourse who is a member of an audience that is 
being addressed directly and who has very limited rights to respond and is 
not expected to respond; 
(4) Overhearer-a person who is not being addressed, but who is within 
earshot of the speaker, and has no rights or expectations to respond; 
(5) Judge-a person who is outside the participation framework at the time of 
listening, is not being addressed, but who seeks to respond to the (usually 
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tape-recorded) product of some discourse for designated, experimental 
purposes. Within this final category it is necessary to further distinguish 
between: 
(i) third person participant-judges -individuals who have actually participated in 
a recorded exchange, and then come to respond to it from outside the 
participation framework, and 
(ii) third person non-participant judges-individuals who have not participated in 
the exchange in question, and then come to respond to it from outside the 
participation framework. 
Both these latter categories can be further refined to distinguish between 
professional participant judges (as in the case of Grimshaw above), professional 
non-participant judges (as in the case of Bublitz) and both participant and non- 
participant lay judges. It is the inferential capacity of participant and non- 
participant lay judges that is of particular concern here. 
But what kinds of information do different interpreters derive from the same 
text? And what kinds of interpretive procedures are employed to derive this 
information? These questions launch the empirical work presented in the 
following chapters by means of higher level analysis of such descriptive 
vocabularies of selected texts that one might elicit from third person judges under 
quasi-experimental conditions. By working backwards from these vocabularies, I 
suggest that it ought to be possible to recover the nature of members' interpretive 
capacities, where these are derived from a combination of what Fairclough (1989: 
141) describes as being generated from (a) what is 'in' the text itself and (b) what is 
'in' the interpreter, in the sense of the members' resources which the latter brings 
to interpretation. 
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Like Fairclough, I will prefer the term 'resource' to 'knowledge' because of the 
restrictive, cognitive associations the latter term has. These resources are based on 
what Fairclough describes as "common-sense assumptions and expectations" (op 
cit.: 78) taken from the familiar everyday world that Harold Garfinkel made the 
object of ethnomethodological study. As Fairclough explains: "Such assumptions 
and expectations are implicit, backgrounded, taken for granted, not things that 
people are consciously aware of, rarely explicitly formulated or examined or 
questioned" (op cit.: 77). This is not to say that the assumptions and expectations 
of ordinary language users cannot be investigated. I believe they can in the form 
of the third person data that is considered in this thesis. But such investigation 
requires yet another level of 'interpretation', one in which the data base of 
interpretive responses is itself subject to inspection and interpretation for 
purposes of recovering members' resources, where these must have applied in 
some way in order to supply the information described in the context of the 
following chapters. 
3.2.2 Post Hoc Inferencing 
It is only within the last ten years or so that investigators of verbal communication 
have attempted to make use of participants and outside observers as an integral 
part of the interpretive analytic process (cf. Kreckel, 1981 and Gumperz, 1982a, 
1982b; Tannen, 1984), though Grimshaw's (1982: 37) suggestion that increasing 
numbers of investigators are employing such practices is perhaps a little over 
optimistic. Gumperz's work, for example, is based on the premise that 
focussed 
participants in various kinds of verbal exchange may be supposed to 
know what 
is going on in them. Moreover, he demonstrates that this knowledge is recoverable 
in a post hoc sense, by employing a set of discovery procedures for investigating 
the kinds of factors that influence and shape the communicative process. 
Gumperz argues that: 
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The analyst's task is to make an in-depth study of selected instances of 
verbal interaction, observe whether or not actors understand each other, elicit 
participants' interpretations of what goes on, and then (a) deduce the social 
assumptions that speakers must have made in order to act as they do, and (b) 
determine empirically how linguistic signs communicate in the interpretive 
process. (Gumperz, 1982: 36) 
Whilst Gumperz recognises that members' judgements may be elusive, he 
nonetheless demonstrates that close inspection of conversational exchange allied 
with descriptive inductive techniques can yield important results. These results 
are variously reported in Gumperz (1982a; 1982b) where small fragments of data 
are subject to the methods he describes. 
In citing the following encounter, for example, and requiring judges to explain 
what they thought the speaker was intending to convey, Gumperz was able to 
elicit a variety of interpretations. The encounter is reported thus (Gumperz, 1982a: 
30): 
Following an informal graduate seminar at a major university, a black 
student approached the instructor, who was about to leave the room 
accompanied by several other black and white students, and said: 
a. Could I talk to you for a minute? I'm gonna apply for a fellowship and I 
was wondering if I could get a recommendation? 
b. O. K. Come along to the office and tell me what you want to do. 
As the instructor and the rest of the group left the room, the black student 
said, turning his head ever so slightly to the other students: 
c. Ahma git me a gig! (Rough gloss: 'I'm going to get myself some support. ') 
The question Gumperz poses in respect of this data is: "How do we analyse such 
exchanges so as to account for both the linguistic and social knowledge 
participants rely on in interpreting what went on? " (op. cit.: 30). % 
Apart from descriptive linguistic information about the distinctive lexis, 
phonology and syntax, as the student changes from Standard English to Black 
English, Gumperz reports that judges treated the exercise as a call for: 
"interpretations of intent, rather than descriptions of referential meaning or 
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statements about conformance to norms of appropriateness" (op. cit.: 31). Four 
different groups of response to the extract were identified depending on the 
nature of their focus on the data. Thus, one group failed to understand, or did not 
recognise the lapse in dialect. Another evaluated the switch from Standard 
English to Black English Vernacular as a statement rejecting white academic 
values. A third perceived some kind of conversational strategy intimating 
network identity with other Black students in the group. Whilst the fourth offered 
explanations of intent, along the lines of 'Black game playing in a White 
dominated environment'. 
Further consideration of these evaluations enables Gumperz to identify the 
kinds of knowledge and assumptions that judges must have drawn from in order 
to offer the information they do. The crux of his analysis involves showing how 
different features of discourse (Gumperz calls them 'contextualization 
conventions' or 'contextualization cues') contribute to participants' interpretations 
of each others' motives and intentions in order to maintain conversational 
involvement; where 'intent' is defined in the special sense of: "the socially 
recognised communicative intent that is implied in particular kinds of social 
activities signalled in discourse" (Gumperz, 1982b: 17). In putting forward this 
sociolinguistic approach to discourse analysis, Gumperz argues that the guiding 
principle is to discover what is necessary for the maintenance of conversational 
cooperation: "Conversational cooperation is commonly understood to refer to the 
assumptions that conversationalists must make about each others' contributions 
and to the conversational principles on which they rely" (Gumperz, 1982b: 17). To 
this end, three types of analysis are applied to different fragments of data. These 
are (Gumperz, 1982b: 19): 
(1) language usage-an examination of participants' actual verbal practices 
and patterns of speech; 
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(2) inferencing-the interactive mechanisms negotiated by participants to 
derive interpretations, and monitor communicative success; 
(3) evaluations-the determination of reflexive formulations by participants for 
appraising what has been constituted as talk is in progress. 
This analytic process and the kinds of information it seeks to model are only ever 
treated by Gumperz in an ad hoc way, however. 
Compare in this respect, the detailing of pragmatic inferences in the following 
constructed data example presented in Levinson (1983: 48): 
(1) A: So can you please come over here again right now 
(2) B: Well, I have to go to Edinburgh today sir 
(3) A: Hmm. How about this Thursday? 
Levinson offers six facts that can be inferred from the data including "facts about 
the spatial, temporal and social relationships between the participants, and their 
requisite beliefs and intentions in undertaking certain verbal exchanges" 
(Levinson, 1983: 49). This information is presumably generated not only by what 
is in the text, but also by the logical processes that Levinson must have employed 
to derive them. Levinson suggests, in fact, that the inferences he makes are 
systematic, in the sense that "they are decodable by different interpreters in the 
same way" (op. cit.: 49). This claim seems to me to be problematic, given the likely 
difference between the kind of inferential work that Gumperz describes and the 
professionally motivated inferencing of Levinson. However, it seems reasonable 
to assume that other individuals from the same speech community should possess 
inferential abilities of the kind Gumperz puts forward. This ability would seem to 
be linked to the capacity of human beings to describe or make sense of anything at 
all as de Beaugrande (1980: 30) argues: "The question of how people know what is 
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going on is a special case of the question of how people know what is going on in 
a text at all" (de Beaugrande, 1980: 30). 
The kind of interpretive capacity suggested by de Beaugrande was first 
recognised in any explicit sense in a brilliant series of lectures given by the late 
Harvey Sacks (1967-72), whose ideas about talk are characterised by their 
emphasis on practical reasoning and social cognition. Sack's work presupposes 
the use of interpretive procedures that are learned by individuals as a general 
phenomenon, the mechanisms of which are displayed in even the smallest and 
most fleeting fragments of verbal exchange. To the extent that these mechanisms 
are shared, that is related to the values, norms and concerns of others, they 
become what Sacks terms 'observables'. Thus individuals "can deal with and 
categorize and make statements about communicative events previously unseen"; 
they can act as inference-making machines (Sacks, 1985). It is the capacity of 
different individuals to act as inference-making machines that I believe can help 
facilitate analyses of the kind Gumperz puts forward. 
3.2.3 Studying Inferential Capacity 
Apart from the interactional sociolinguistic research that Gumperz and others 
have launched, and as far as I am aware, the only systematic and empirically 
based work that has made the inferential capacity of ordinary members its object 
of investigation is that of Kreckel (1981). Using data from The Family, a televised 
documentary about life in a British urban environment, Kreckel sets out to 
investigate how members of the family talk to one another in order to achieve 
their communicative ends. Two questions are at the heart of this enterprise: 
(1) How do speakers transmit messages in natural discourse?; 
(2) What are the physical properties of these messages? 
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In developing a theoretical framework to address these questions, Kreckel 
demonstrates that family members know a great deal about one another, and use 
this knowledge in everyday communication. In order to study what it is that they 
know, she sets out to explore the idea that various degrees of conceptual 
convergence operate in different kinds of interaction. This sense of convergence is 
related to how participants perceive the interaction emotionally with respect to 
expectations about the achievement of mutual understanding, and their likely 
tolerance of frustration if these expectations are not met. The difference between 
the speech activities of family members and relative strangers in this regard leads 
Kreckel to hypothesise that: 
the better that people know each other, the more they expect complete 
understanding... and the greater the frustration if the interaction does not live 
up to it. Conversely, the less people know each other, the lower the level of 
expectation and the higher the tolerance of frustration. (Kreckel, 1981: 40) 
Kreckel is not only interested in the psychology of interpersonal familiarity, but 
also in how communicants interpret their own interactions. Do participants share 
the same view of what has been achieved or understood through verbal 
communication, or do they have quite different views? 
The empirical research that is undertaken to explore the extent of conceptual 
convergence in verbal exchange, and its impact on the understanding achieved by 
different interlocutors, is based on the analytic procedure of drawing inferences 
from observable utterances. In this regard, she proposes that there will be a 
difference in the status of professional as opposed to lay interpretations of 
communicative acts. Hence she suggests: 
(i) that only linguists and philosophers of a certain persuasion will approach 
verbal interaction from a metasemantic perspective; 
(ii) that naive native speakers can be expected to possess metapragmatic 
abilities; 
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(iii) that they will produce metapragmatic categories when describing what is 
achieved by speech; 
(iv) that participants in the interaction and outside observers will make use of 
the same type of categories, but not necessarily of the same tokens. 
(Kreckel, 1981: 131) 
These hypotheses are investigated by a four way analysis which is based on: 
(a) establishing that tone units are the units of speech that naive, native 
speakers associate with interactional messages; 
(b) exploring how such units are geared towards performing acts of 
communication; 
(c) demonstrating that in order to interpret tone units in terms of these acts 
naive, native speakers have to make use of metalinguistic abilities; 
(d) developing a coding instrument for representing these abilities as expressed 
by a catalogue of descriptive terms or categories used by naive, native 
speaker to interpret selected tone units in terms of what is done with 
speech. 
'Metapragmatic' categories stand for the communicative concepts conveyed 
by specific tone units, and as a result of Kreckel's work, 210 of these categories 
were generated (see, for example, the tokens listed in Appendix J which were 
identified in Study V of her research). The scheme which Kreckel puts forward for 
representing these categories is formulated on the principle that 'etic' and 'emic' 
coding schemes are of limited value to the research worker who is interested in 
specifying the kinds of communicative act, or acts which may be employed by 
speaker-hearers in the course of verbal exchange. Kreckel offers instead the notion 
of 'ethnomic classification': "In contrast to etic categories ethnomic ones are 
derived from naive, native speakers; in contrast to emic categories they are not 
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confined to speakers whose communication is based on one specific system" 
(Kreckel, 1981: 142-143). 
Thus while the etic point of view studies communicative behaviour from 
outside a particular system, and the emic from within the system, Kreckel argues 
that ethnomic categories are of more relevance to analysts of verbal exchange 
because they are: "The condensate of the sub-code specific repertoires of the naive, 
native speakers from whom they have been elicited" (Kreckel, 1981: 143). What 
Kreckel is suggesting here is that analysts can explore the naive native speaker's 
ability to name the messages that are communicated in speech activities by 
ethnographic research into the nature of their listening behaviour as post hoc 
observers. This ability presumably stems from interactionally developed, 
metalinguistic capacity, where this pertains to the kinds of report that different 
individuals are able to provide about what is accomplished by context-dependent 
speech (Kreckel, 1981: 129). In short, Kreckel's work demonstrates that listeners 
must have a highly developed model of the kinds of things that speakers can say. 
Something of the character of this model may be expected to depend on the 
metalinguistic repertoire available within a given language or speech community, 
though the actual metalinguistic performance of participant and outside observers 
may be hampered, first, by lack of awareness of what is achieved through the 
highly conventionalised medium of speech, and second, by the impact of 
extralinguistic knowledge about the construction of specific events. However, the 
nature of such repertoires tends to be little explored in linguistic study, and-it is 
this hiatus that is of central concern here. 
The need to investigate the interpretive repertoires of naive native listeners, 
without attempting to pre-empt or prejudge what kinds of information they might 
provide, is I believe analytically paramount. But as Labov and Fanshel (1977), 
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amongst others, have recognised there is a critical methodological issue that 
attends any attempt to model the communicative properties of verbal exchange. 
The issue is that: "Working with real conversations of real speakers poses a 
profound and perhaps insoluble problem for the external observer, and we may 
refer to this as the 'problem of correct interpretation"' (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 
350). 
3.3 The Problem of Interpretation 
The problem of interpretation arises because the perceived significance and/or 
communicative effects of verbal exchange can only be studied as an emergent 
phenomenon. This phenomenon is explicitly specifiable retrospectively, and then 
only by way of simplifying procedures that may well distort the participants' 
experience (Dore and McDermott, 1982: 386). In other words, it is impossible to 
determine exactly what it is that participants understand in the moment-by 
moment sequencing of verbal exchange. This issue is confronted in the remainder 
of this section. 
The concept of 'understanding' is arguably at the very core of how forms of 
language are used in interpersonal communication as I intimated in Chapter 2. As 
such, it raises a number of fundamental questions, many of which underlie 
linguistic inquiry in general, as Rost (1990) suggests. These questions are: 
To what extent can we say that the interlocutors of any interaction 
understand each other? To what extent do they 'comprehend' through the 
words that an interlocutor uses and to what extent do they 'interpret' ideas 
that are related to the words that an interlocutor uses? Is understanding a 
mental phenomenon recoverable through probing the mind of the hearer or is 
it a social phenomenon recoverable through examination of subsequent 
behaviour by the listener? (Rost, 1990: 1) 
It is the latter part of Rost's final question that is the most obviously pertinent to 
the work of this thesis because of its focus not only on the nature of content in 
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language, but also on the nature of interlocutor roles in verbal interaction. The 
issue of 'understanding', in the sense that there has been 'subsequent behaviour 
by the listener', becomes empirically researchable for the very reason that it is 
manifest in how individual interlocutors make sense of what has been said. But 
accounting for the nature of this behaviour is not as straightforward as one might 
imagine, because of 'the problem of interpretation'. At least two major difficulties 
confront the analyst in this regard. These are the questions of 'What is salient? ' 
and 'What is idiosyncratic? ' in post hoc interpretation. 
3.3.1 What is Salient? 
First, and to the best of my knowledge, it is impossible to determine exactly what 
a listener understands in the sequential process of taking turns at talk. Unlike the 
grammarian who can "view a sentence as an enduring structure to be scanned at 
leisure", the listener "is exposed to an utterance just once and is "forced to register 
its ingredients in just the temporal sequence in which it reaches him" (Hockett 
1986: 50). Not only that but the listener "cannot know for sure part way through 
an utterance just what is going to be said next; he can at most have an array of 
expectations derived from earlier experience (that is from his knowledge of the 
language) and from what has been said so far this time" (op. cit: 50). Given that 
the interpretive strategies of focussed addressees are context-specific, analysts 
surely cannot know for certain what has been of particular communicative 
salience for the participants. What analysts can do, however, is to pursue either or 
both of the following lines of inquiry: 
One can on the one hand, deal with instances of discourse from the point of 
view of the third person analyst; that is to say, one can deal with discourse 
from the point of view of the participants caught, as it were, in the act, that is 
to say as a process. (Widdowson, 1979: 70-71) 
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Whatever the method of inquiry, however, we simply must accept that the 
problem of correct interpretation can never be resolved entirely because, as 
analysts, we "can never hope to have all the knowledge that the participants 
shared among themselves" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 351; my emphasis). As 
Widdowson (1979: 70) neatly puts it "what the analyst observes is not necessarily 
what the participant experiences". The question thus arises as to how we can 
overcome this difficulty for analytic method without falsifying or simplifying the 
complexity of processes that everyday talk involves. 
In order to offer any assessment of what is going on, that goes beyond his or 
her own subjective platform, I suggest that the analyst must accommodate 
participant perspectives. However, a second difficulty arises in attempts to 
ascertain what type of communicative activity has taken place from the purview 
of participant interlocutors, and thence to delimit the necessary forms of 
knowledge that their talk implies. Put another way, how do analysts know that 
their interpretation of a text is not idiosyncratic? 
3.3.2 What is Idiosyncratic? 
The difficulty here is due to the fact that there appears to be many levels of 
contextual frames that affect the interpretation of participant motives and intent. 
Can analysts unequivocally state what some speaker has 'meant' or prescribe the 
communicative effect of what has been said from the actual listeners point of 
view? The answer to this question would seem to be a guarded 'no', since among 
other issues analysts must confront the established asymmetry between utterance 
production and utterance comprehension (see also Tannen's (1984: 37ff. ) 
discussion of 'accountability in interpretation', of which more below). 
Straight (1976; 1982; 1986), for instance argues that any processually neutral 
account of language knowledge is problematic. It is problematic because research 
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from various disciplines (Straight cites work in semantics, syntax, phonology 
historical and developmental linguistics, sociolinguistics, and neurolinguistics) 
indicates that the kinds of information processed by the comprehension 
mechanism are qualitatively different from those produced by the production 
mechanism. These differences suggest that there may be a gap in the 
communicative interface between 'intention' and 'effect'. 
Something of this gap has been explored in the context of Grice's work on 
conversational implicature (Grice, 1968). By making the distinction between 'what 
is said' and 'what is implicated', Grice was able to demonstrate that 'intention' is a 
dynamically manipulable variable. As a consequence of examining the processes 
involved in the interpretation of different types of utterance, Grice raised the 
particular problem of how listeners assign implicatures to what is said on some 
given occasion of utterance. These implicatures may be considered as indirectly 
conveyed 'understandings'; they provide the difference between locutionary 
content and illocutionary force. 
Work on the underlying meaning of conversation put forward by Grice and 
others clearly recognises that listeners take into account the essentially reflexive 
nature of 'intention'. Bach and Harnish, for example, note that "the intended effect 
of an act of communication is not just any effect produced by means of the 
recognition of the intention to produce an effect, it is the recognition of that effect" 
(Bach and Harnish, 1979: 15, my italics). However, it must surely be the case that 
something more complex than this is going on in verbal exchange, because we 
cannot really recover 'intention' except through the nature of some reply and 
response to it (cf. Goffman, 1976). Subsequently, analysts need to account not only 
for the performance and recognition of various acts of speech, but also for 
circumstances in which different meanings are imputed. Distortion and 
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simplification are inevitable if unanimity is assumed between utterance and 
interpretation as Goffman (1976) recognises. He notes: 
(If speakers and hearers were to file a report on what they assumed to be the 
full meaning of an extended utterance, these glosses would differ, at least in 
detail). Indeed, one routinely presumes on a mutual understanding that 
doesn't quite exist. (Goffman, 1976: 261) 
The reasons why this mutual understanding does not quite exist are 
presumably also related to the individual and social differences that occur within 
contexts that help to determine the nature of verbal communication. Lesley Milroy 
(1984), for example, cites various instances of 'miscommunication' which arise due 
to syntactic, contextual and inferential disparities that may exist between speakers 
from different dialect backgrounds. In order to avoid such disparities, individuals 
must do communicative work to inform themselves of what they are jointly doing. 
However, "the momentary and often fragmentary understandings which people 
must share in order to organize their concerted behavior" (Dore and McDermott, 
1982: 386) are not entities that exist in either time or space. They are the result of 
what Dore and McDermott refer to as "working consensuses". 
The problem for the analyst is how to assess the kinds of consensus that has 
been reached (if any) as talk is actually in progress. Goffman summarises this 
dilemma as follows: "How individuals arrive at an effective interpretation on all 
those occasions when the stream of experience makes this easy and instantaneous 
is not much explored, this exploration being rather difficult to take from a sitting 
position" (Goffman, 1976: 278). In other words, the question facing the analyst is: 
How can one ascertain 'what is going on' in the talk of others, such that one can 
provide evidence for one's claims? 
Labov and Fanshel's comprehensive discourse analysis suggests that an 
approximate solution to the problem of interpretation can be offered by 
developing strategies that take into account as much of the available evidence as 
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possible. But the extent we can formalise such strategies, or indeed fulfil the kind 
of research programme Labov and Fanshel envisage, is not only subject to the 
kinds of constraints discussed thus far, it is also subject to the deeper, 
metatheoretical question that I raised at the outset of this chapter, that is: "Whose 
model (of a fragment) of language our investigations represent-those of the 
analyst or those of the participants? " 
Although the accuracy, relevance and use of participant reports in helping to 
analyse conversational data has attracted criticism on conceptual grounds (see, for 
example, Goodwin, 1981: 33ff. ), I want to emphasise the positive aspects of such 
an approach without minimising the inherent difficulties it involves. Thus 
criticisms of the kind levied by Goodwin and others are countered here on the 
grounds that: 
(1) analysts miss essential knowledge about verbal exchange by ignoring lay 
interpretations; 
(2) lay interpretations are entirely legitimate, though they may differ from 
those of professional analysts (cf. Tannen, 1984; Bublitz, 1988); 
(3) lay interpretations can be investigated directly in ways Gumperz (1982a) 
and Kreckel (1981) and Tannen (1984) have suggested; 
(4) lay interpretations ought to be investigated systematically because I 
presume that if a linguistic phenomenon is spoken about by native 
language users, it merits professional concern. 
Tannen (1984: 37) addresses the potential objection "How do you know this is 
what is really going on? " with respect to her analysis of 'talk among 
friends' by 
offering three replies. The first suggests that we must accept interpretive 
multiplexity. She writes: 
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I do not offer mine as THE explanation of what is going on. It is simply one 
explanation, an account of certain aspects of a mass of components in the 
interaction. (Tannen, 1984: 37) 
The second is to suggest that "interpretation is not fished out of the air". A set of 
procedures is offered by way of 'providing evidence for, rather than 'proofs of', 
what has gone on. These procedures include: 
(i) evidence in the form of recurrent patterns of interactional phenomena; 
(ii) evidence in the form of participant behaviour, for example, 
'misunderstanding' or 'impatience'; 
(iii) evidence in the form of 'playbacks' to elicit the independent reactions of the 
participants. 
And finally the third, and what Tannen suggests is "the most significant reply", is 
what she terms 'the ah ha factor'. However, this reply puzzles me a little, since it 
seems to deny the first premise of interpretive multiplexity. Tannen writes: 
If my interpretation is correct, then readers, on hearing my explication, will 
exclaim within their heads, 'Aha! ' (Tannen, 1984: 38) 
I am less convinced by this third procedure than with the first two, but wish to 
make special note of the interpretive evidence that can be provided by the 
technique of 'playback'. Apart from eliciting the independent reactions of 
participants, Tannen also uses this technique with outside observers. These are 
individuals who did not take part in the interaction in question, but who "listened 
to segments of the tape and commented on their reactions and the reasons for 
them" (Tannen, 1984: 38). My own work is based on a more systematic explöration 
of interpretive reactions of precisely this kind. 
Quite apart from the kinds of interesting information that it might yield, I 
suggest that interpretations derived by playback can provide researchers with an 
important source of evidence as they move from data to theory, and hence help to 
91 
strengthen analytic claims. Perhaps it is simply a matter of having a little more 
faith in the abilities of lay judges. Kreckel (1981: 258), for example, reports that the 
performance of untrained outside observers in recognising and coding tone units 
to form communicative acts can be rated as 'highly satisfactory'. I am not 
suggesting that lay interpretations are likely to be any more 'correct', since I 
assume that individual and social differences in interpretation are to be expected. 
Indeed, Grimshaw (1982) acknowledges a striking lack of success in fully 
understanding the episode of verbal interaction he presents for analysis both in 
his roles as objective analyst and retrospective participant. 
What I am suggesting is that the methodology of post hoc observation can be 
useful in providing a source of preliminary data about verbal interaction as 
Coupland, Coupland and Giles (1991: 38 ff) also seem to suggest, since this 
approach helps to facilitate the initial formulation of conceptual categories for 
analysis, for example. What one must be cautious about, however, is the strength 
of analytic claims that are derived on the basis of such observations, as Coupland, 
Coupland, Coupland and Giles readily acknowledge. They note: "The method 
does not allow for any degree of generalization; nor do we have the basis to claim 
here that the interactional strategies we identify and interpret are unique to 
intergenerational contexts" (Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 1991: 38). This is not 
to say that the adequacy of analytic claims is in doubt, but rather that they can be 
checked against other kinds of interpretation. It is something of this motivation 
that I guess underpins Grimshaw's call to extend our analyses, and therefore our 
understanding, of verbal exchange by means of "more adequate cognitive and 
cultural models of participants' knowledge and practices" (Grimshaw, 1982: 38). 
From my own perspective, two fundamental questions are prompted by this 
suggestion. These are: 
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(1) How can we begin to provide such models?; 
(2) What can they contribute to our understanding of the speech 
communication process? 
It is these questions that motivate the empirical research presented in the 
following chapters, but in order to answer them a rather different approach to 
analysing verbal communication is required. 
At the heart of this approach are the everyday resources that underpin third 
person interpretive practices. These are resources that enable (non) participants to: 
(a) perceive and interpret particular constellations of cues in reacting to the 
situated discourse of others, and (b) evaluate the discourse from a communicative 
point of view as individuals pursue their own, and/or conjoint, interactional ends. 
It is crucial to remember, however, that whatever method of inquiry is adopted, 
the problem of interpretation remains; or as Coupland, Coupland and Giles most 
appositely state, "there are no final or authoritative or final accounts of 
communication data" (Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 1991: 39). 
3.4 Conclusion: The Need for `Fresh Data' 
As long ago as 1964, Hymes argued that in ethnographies of communication, there 
was a "need for fresh kinds of data, a need to discern patterns proper to speech 
activities, and that such an approach could not take linguistic form or a given code 
or speech itself as a frame of reference, but must investigate communicative habits 
as a whole" (Hymes, 1964: 2-3; my emphases). It is with this need in mind that I 
have chosen to research the value of third person interpretive data as part of the 
exploration of everyday communicative practices. 
By close examination of what participant and non-participant listener judges 
have say about verbal exchange, I hope to demonstrate the potential rewards of 
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this kind of data as an investigative tool for complementing and supporting other 
kinds of interactional analysis. While Gumperz (1982a, 1982b) has focussed on the 
importance of contextualisation conventions for recovering what speakers are 
doing in talk, this work could benefit from wider and more systematic 
investigation with reference to third person perspectives. 
Because of the interpretive possibilities they raise, these perspectives are likely 
to be no less complex in nature than the inferential processes which are used to 
create interactional products in the first place. This is not to argue that what third 
person interpreters have to say will necessarily match their experience as actual 
speaker-hearers, but merely to point out that the process of interpretation can be 
the object of empirical research; albeit from what has been understood outside the 
participation framework. The detailed methods and findings of this research are 
presented in the chapters which follow. 
CHAPTER 4 
INVESTIGATING THIRD PERSON PERSPECTIVES 
4.0 Empirical Orientation 
From an analytic point of view, a first approach to the data of everyday verbal 
exchange usually focuses on the description of interactional phenomena that are 
revealed by different types of microanalysis drawn from observational and/or 
experimental studies, and which have been recorded by various overt and covert 
means using a variety of sorts of equipment. After undertaking a series of 
comparisons and contrasts regarding how such phenomena are manifest, analysts 
often document some claim about the general properties of the data in question. In 
the previous two chapters, I have established that a crucial element of this process 
is how arguments are actually assembled (cf. the methodological possibilities 
outlined in Section 3.0). I have also established the problems and limitations 
associated with attempts to warrant claims about features of talk on the basis of 
indirect evidence. A number of taxing questions face the analyst in this regard, 
including those raised by Jacobs (1986). Jacobs asks: 
How ... could an analyst's subjective 
intuitions about an example of discourse 
ever hope to serve as empirical evidence for some general property of 
language? How do we objectively verify the existence of the features the 
analyst claims to see in the examples? And how can we be sure that anyone 
else shares these intuitions? (Jacobs, 1986: 149) 
These are questions that are not always confronted by analysts of talk. Indeed, 
the methodological and theoretical axioms that presuppose particular warrants 
about conversational data are often taken for granted. As a result, I suggest that 
general techniques for dealing with conversational material need to be developed 
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in a more principled way. Empirical claims about language use and structure 
really require systematic sampling and observation of actual linguistic behaviour. 
In this regard, analysts of talk can learn from practices long established in 
secular sociolinguistic research, where issues of data collection, fieldwork strategy, 
and analysis are the subject of methodological and theoretical concern (see, for 
example, Milroy (1987), and Chapter 3 of this thesis). While appreciating the need 
for a more systematic approach, the present work seeks something of a different 
direction in attempting to unravel the intricacies of verbal interaction. The focus 
here is on communicative issues rather than the nature of vernacular language 
behaviour, and particularly the contribution of ordinary members in helping to 
delimit what these issues might involve. By exploring the interpretive resources of 
third person informants, I hope to demonstrate that it is possible to provide other 
kinds of evidence for warranting interactional goals. Presumably, the best analysts 
can do is to assemble as much and as many types of evidence about the nature of 
these goals as they can. The investigation of third person perspectives is an 
attempt to devise an analytic instrument for precisely this purpose. 
4.1 Providing Evidence from Transcriptions 
The work of Harvey Sacks, and subsequent scholarship in the conversation 
analytic tradition, has demonstrated that much important evidence about 
participant goals can be gleaned from what is observable in the properties of 
(recorded) interactional products. These products are then employed for the 
purpose of doing 'transcription', where this term can refer to "an activity, to the 
tools of that activity and to the result of that activity" (Kelly and Local, 1989: 197). 
Kelly and Local limit the use of the term 'transcription' to the activity itself. The 
terms 'notation', and 'record' or 'analysis', are used to describe the tools and 
results of the transcription process. This terminology will be adopted here. 
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The dominant paradigm informing most current research on naturally 
occurring conversation views interpersonal communication as a complex form of 
rule governed behaviour (see Chapter 2). A considerable amount of this research 
has been devoted to identifying and formulating rules through which two or more 
people take turns at talk, and particularly the work stemming from Sacks, 
Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) which has become known as Conversation Analysis, 
or 'CA' as I shall refer to it from now on. 
CA analyses stem from exemplars emanating from the activity of 
transcription, and from the visual records that are produced as a consequence of 
applying this activity to selected data fragments. Inductive proof of what 
participants are doing is provided with respect to identifiable details that can be 
verified by other investigators. Thus as Hopper explains: "If a feature [of verbal 
exchange] is audible (or visible) in recordings, it is likely to have been available to 
participants" (Hopper, 1989: 59). The proof of the pudding is in what participants 
have produced as it were. 
However, this kind of analytic approach places a methodological restriction on 
the kinds of claim that can be made about what participants may be said to be 
doing for reasons that were introduced in the previous chapter. This restriction 
involves three main issues. First, the action has already occurred, and can 
therefore only be studied as an emergent phenomenon. Second, descriptions of 
this action are restricted to details of what is captured by the process of recording. 
Hopper (1989: 59) notes that "Recordings are at best incomplete copies of actual 
talk", but nonetheless "seem relatively rich and replayable representations of 
many speech details". And third what can be represented (by way of a record) is 
subject to the limitations of what is displayed therein, and its subsequent 
representation in written form. 
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While CA practitioners espouse textual empiricism in their analyses, these are 
subject to all the vagaries of trying to capture in writing what has been achieved 
by the activities of speaking and listening. In part CA practitioners, or indeed 
practitioners of any other persuasion, are at the mercy of their notational systems. 
The act of transcription is not always given the consideration it might (cf. Kelly 
and Local, 1989), though it clearly has important ramifications for the status of 
analytic claims, especially where these involve interpretations of what the 
participants are judged to be doing in communicative terms. However, Hopper 
(1989) points out that the textual empiricism of the CA practitioner involves a 
methodical restriction rather than an epistemological claim. It is not being claimed, 
for example, that "everything important about 'context' is invariably displayed in 
talk; nor a claim that every actor in every scene perceives everything that gets 
displayed on recordings" (Hopper, 1989: 59). Given this limitation, it would 
appear that the more instances of particular phenomenon that are collected, and 
hence fragments containing those instances, the stronger the case becomes for 
empirically verifying the kinds of convention or activity involved. Evidence of the 
observable in talk is provided by the data itself. By working in this way, CA has 
clearly yielded a great deal of information about the shared design principles that 
people use and orientate to in their communicative dealings with each other. But I 
wonder how communicatively salient these principles are for the interlocutors 
themselves, especially in the light of their goals? 
This question is largely avoided by CA practitioners, since they maintain a 
strict atheoreticism in respect of the data products that are studied. Hopper, 
for 
example, suggests that: "Mostly, analysts listen for nothing, returning repeatedly 
to recordings, and to writing descriptions of speakers' accomplishments. 
Repeated 
listening is the daily of work analysis. The rest of analysis hinges on skills 
developed in repeated listenings" (Hopper, 1989: 59). Repeated 
listening may well 
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be the work of daily analysis, but it is worth remembering that actual listeners 
only get one opportunity to process what is said to them (see Section 3.3.1). Their 
achievement is all the more remarkable for that. 
Since it is widely accepted that verbal communication is an inferential process 
(see Section 2.2.2) , it seems unlikely that ordinary members will 'listen for 
nothing', in the manner Hopper suggests for the conversation analyst. In his work 
on conversational inferencing, Gumperz (1982a: 31) in fact reports that: "All 
judges treated our inquiries as calling for interpretations of intent". Although 
unmotivated listening has interesting ramifications for interactional practice, I 
would be very surprised if individuals were discovered to listen to others in an 
interpretively neutral way. Indeed, CA glosses in respect of particular 
transcriptional details often seem to be based on singularly individual 
interpretations (see, for example, discussion of the applications of CA methods in 
Taylor and Cameron, 1987: Chapter 6). 
I suggest that the tendency of analysts to try to withdraw from involvement 
with their data, to try and create some kind of analytic distance, is not only 
extremely difficult, but also comes at the cost of understanding something of its 
richness and complexity (cf. the approach of Bublitz (1988) who proceeds as a post 
hoc participating observer). As Widdowson (1979: 71) remarks: 
The analyst is inclined to move from process to product, and then to convert 
procedures inferred from the product into rules of use and then, wherever 
possible into rules of usage. There is a comfortable sense of security to be 
found in the specification of precise invariant rules and we shall never feel 
really at our ease until we can express all behaviour as knowledge within a 
unitary theory of linguistic description; until all the creative procedures of 
human beings are expressed in terms of exact rules. But one sometimes 
wonders whether this sense of security is worth the price that one might 
be 
paying for it. 
In view of Widdowson's comments, the work for which this chapter prepares 
is 
pursued in anticipation of some risk taking. There is a risk 
in consulting naive, 
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native speakers about their goals because of the possible errors in self-reporting 
(see Section 3.3) There is also a risk in assuming that informants cast in the role of 
judges will be inclined to report on anything at all. 
It is my contention, however, that if what is observable is amenable to post hoc 
interpretation by analysts, then something of these properties must be amenable to 
all speakers of a language. But what kinds of feature might prove of interest or 
salience to the non-professionally motivated listener? This question is 
researchable. It becomes researchable because people regularly talk to one another 
about what has transpired in their daily interactions. They talk about what has 
been said. They talk about what has been understood, and also of course about 
what has been miscommunicated or misunderstood (see Grimshaw, 1980a; 
Humphreys-Jones, 1986a, 1986b; Varonis and Gass, 1985). Indeed, explaining why 
someone acted or behaved in a particular way would appear to be one of the most 
ubiquitous of conversational topics as attribution theorists have argued (see, for 
example, Hewstone, 1983a; 1983b; Burleson, 1986). 
Given this apparent willingness to comment on the nature of everyday speech 
activities, the aim of this chapter is to lay the empirical foundations for exploring 
what analysis might gain from different post hoc interpretations of talk, as opposed 
to interpretations of transcriptions of talk. But how can this work be undertaken, 
and what procedures should inform the task? 
4.2 Developing a Research Procedure 
Post hoc interpretations are derived from quasi-experimental work involving 
participant and outside observers in the role of third person judges. This work 
essentially involves three tasks. These are: 
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(1) to create situations and texts in order to provide data objects for 
investigation, and for use in playback; 
(2) to select informants for use as judges; 
(3) to devise a means for eliciting interpretive accounts or reports. 
The studies I have in mind as a result of employing this procedure are not 
guided by the activity of transcription, notation, and analysis for its own sake, in 
the manner of other discourse and conversation analytic traditions. Rather, they 
are guided by an orientation which is defined by ordinary members in 
relationship to the accomplishments of ordinary members, where such 
accomplishments as are achieved become the subject of post hoc interpretation. 
In order to prepare for the empirical approach that is being mooted here, a 
number of basic methodological issues need to be confronted. These include 
decisions about what to record in the way of speech events and how the 
recordings that are anticipated are to be accomplished. Since the cooperation of 
participants is assumed as an intrinsic part of the research, design, the question of 
how recordings can be achieved without either exacerbating the observer's 
paradox or distorting personal relations between the analyst and potential 
informants also need to be considered. These issues are tackled in the following 
sections. 
4.2.1 Creating Situations and Texts 
Something of the general issues that are involved in collecting, recording and 
transcribing everyday verbal exchange have already been introduced (Section 3.1). 
In this section, I want to consider the particular criteria that determine how 
situations and texts are selected for use in the study of post hoc interpretation in its 
own right. 
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CA argues that the best recordings are not those made in carefully controlled 
circumstances, but those made upon the stage of everyday life. The difficulty of 
collecting real data in real situations is well documented in secular sociolinguistic 
studies as well as in the large number of textbooks and articles on the structure 
and uses of verbal exchange published in the last twenty years or so (see Section 
2.0). Many analysts have made a virtue of constraint, however, and concentrate on 
interaction between strangers, especially between students who do not know each 
other. 
Roger and Bull (1989: 5), for example, point out that social psychological 
research on interpersonal communication is frequently conducted in a laboratory 
setting, while CA uses any situation as a source of data, with the probable 
exception of the social psychology laboratory. A survey of the data of verbal 
exchange employed by various disciplines, including CA, is revealing, since the 
following commonly cited contexts are used as sources of 'conversational' 
exchange: job interviews, telephone calls, joke and story telling episodes, teacher- 
pupil exchanges, and a range of reported and recorded psychiatric, 
psychotherapeutic and psychological investigative activities. 
Since the range of talk per se is so great, a comprehensive study of the many 
different activity types that are created by verbal exchange is simply 
impracticable. The question of how much data is required for researching such 
activities is a moot issue. Bublitz (1988) argues that a borderline has to be drawn 
between what is to be observed and what is to be ignored, as in any analytic 
scientific work. He writes: "The essential task is to draw the line so that the 
remaining amount of data available is sufficiently extensive to serve the purpose 
of the analyst" (Bublitz, 1988: 11). Where the purpose of the analysis is to account 
for the occurrence or lack of occurrence of particular communicative conventions 
or features, presumably the more data that is collected the better. 
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Bublitz makes use of the Svartik/Quirk corpus of spoken English discourse, 
which must be one of the most extensive held on record (Svartik and Quirk, 1980). 
The material comprises of thirty four conversational extracts, each of at least 5,000 
running words, and is based on the files of the Survey of English Usage. Bublitz's 
own research is concerned with descriptions of twenty eight of these extracts, 
providing him with a corpus of some 140,000 words. The data represented in this 
corpus consists of: 
spontaneous, reciprocal, informal and, for the most part, surreptitiously 
recorded face-to-face conversations on topics of general interest among two to 
four adult (twenty to sixty years old) British speakers, educated to university 
level, who are usually on an intimate or equal footing with each other. 
(Bublitz, 1988: 8) 
Printed orthographic records of these conversations are available in book form, 
and are accompanied by varying details of prosodic analysis. These analyses are 
further modified by Bublitz in order to "make the extracts reproduced... easier to 
read" (1989: 10). It is these records that provide the bases of Bublitz's interpretive, 
analytic work (of which more in Chapters 7-9). 
In contrast to this corpus based approach, other analysts have chosen single 
episodes, and even fragments within those episodes, as a research site for 
examining the details of recorded verbal behaviour. The microanalytic procedures 
developed by Labov and Fanshel (1977), for example, are used to analyse the first 
fifteen minutes of a psychotherapeutic interview. This interview is the twenty fifth 
in a series of other similar sessions, but was the first to be tape recorded. 
Following the preparation of an appropriate textual record (Labov and Fanshel, 
1977: 40ff. ), the analysis explores the goals and techniques of therapy through a 
close examination of the linguistic forms used by patient and therapist in the 
chosen segment. Like the Svartvik/Quirk material there is no visual record of the 
session. However, Labov and Fanshel claim there is little doubt that "an extension 
of our approach with video tape or film will have valuable results, but the 
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problem of presenting it and interpreting the rich visual field has not yet been 
resolved to anyone's satisfaction" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 7). 
Yet, even when the data is limited to audio-recordings only, the problem of 
just how exhaustive analysis can be arises (cf. the comments of Bublitz above). 
Labov and Fanshel comment: "If we are to be accountable to the events of the 
therapeutic session, or even to 15 minutes of that session, we will be faced with an 
extraordinary amount of detail and the problem of making that information 
accessible and intelligible to the reader" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 27). 
In an attempt to address this problem, Grimshaw (1981) takes a 
multidisciplinary approach. The Multiple Analysis Project (MAP) as he calls it 
engages an unspecified number of anthropologists, linguists, psychologists and 
sociologists to apply their own specialist analytic skills to a segment of data taken 
from the defence of a doctoral dissertation. The defence was chosen because of its 
"salience for participants, and the density of interaction" (Grimshaw, 1981: 46). 
Analysis is undertaken along the lines of Labov and Fanshel. It is based on a ten 
minute stretch of the defence, selected from about one hour of an audio-visual 
recording of the proceedings; the proceedings themselves lasted two hours in 
total. Results of the analysis are variously reported in Grimshaw (1980a; 1980b; 
1981; 1983). 
A rather different use of audio-visual recordings is made by Coupland, 
Coupland and Giles (1991). This work studies the ways in which individuals 
introduce and formulate age-identifying statements. It also explores the 
consequences of realising such statements across and within intergenerational 
discourse. In order to try and capture such statements, a corpus is assembled by 
essentially experimental means. The corpus consists of: "40 videotaped 
interactions where pairs of volunteer subjects, woman aged 70-87 and 30-40 years 
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took part in first acquaintance conversations" (Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 
1991: 57). After participants were recruited, they were given a simple verbal 
instruction. The instruction was 'to converse with people of different ages'. The 
speakers, who had never previously met were then asked "to get to know one 
another" (Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 1991: 57). The pairs were then left alone 
and videotaped, with their knowledge, for eight minutes. Following this session, 
recording was continued for a further two minutes, but participants were unaware 
that filming was still taking place. In this way some 400 minutes of audio-visual 
data was collected. 
The advantage of Coupland et al. 's approach is that it enables instances of the 
phenomenon to be studied to be recorded in sufficient quantity to make analysis 
worthwhile. Analytic interest in this case is in how age and health identities are 
formulated and negotiated. The method of data collection also enables the analyst 
to control speaker variables which may be of salience for the research. Age is an 
obvious factor, but gender, ethnicity and socio-economic background could be 
equally well made constants for purposes of investigation. Critics, on the other 
hand, might claim that what this kind of approach gains in experimental rigour, it 
looses in spontaneity reciprocity, and informality. While the only effective way to 
meet these criteria would seem to be surreptitious recording, a practice that is 
largely condemned nowadays on ethical grounds, there is a much larger issue here 
than perhaps analysts of talk have been willing to confront (see also Section 8.6.1). 
The issue involves the role of participants in playback situations, especially where 
this involves microanalysis. 
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4.2.2 Using Participants as Informants 
Labov and Fanshel (1977) illustrate the difficulties raised by involving participants 
in microanalysis in the following incident which emerged in the course of their 
research. 
One student submitted to us a half-hour tape recording of a dinner party 
with two couples present, including her and her husband. According to her 
recollection, there would be nothing in this conversation that would prevent it 
being used as an example for analysis in a seminar. After two hours' 
discussion, she was horrified at the aggressive mechanisms revealed, and she 
insisted that all copies be withdrawn immediately and destroyed. (Labov and 
Fanshel, 1977: 353) 
The paradox here is that it is presumably only with the aid of such data that the 
analyst can begin to unravel the mysteries of everyday verbal communication with 
reference to a wide range of naturally occurring speech activities. However, on the 
basis of the example that is cited, it would appear to be extremely difficult to 
record such data and then gain the consent of the participants to have it used as an 
object for detailed analytic scrutiny. Although she sought prior permission to tape- 
record a group of friends during a Thanksgiving dinner, Tannen (1984: 32) reports 
that there was a degree of reticence about the event being recorded at all by at 
least one of the participants. Tannen notes: 
By capturing the speech of this interaction on tape, I irrevocably altered the 
experience for those who participated. By asking them to listen to the 
interaction after the fact, I confronted them with images of themselves, which 
like it or not have remained with them. (Tannen, 1984: 34) 
Clearly enormous care has to be taken in order that personal feelings and piivacy 
are not only protected, but also respected. 
Kreckel (1981), on the other hand, was able to utilise a more publicly 
accessible form of data. She admits to "considerable fortune" (Kreckel, 1981: 96) in 
having obtained: 
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1. access to the entire filmed everyday interaction of one family, recorded over 
a period of four months; 
2. the consent of the family members for using these recordings; 
3. the cooperation of the family members in interpreting their own interaction 
and in defining the communicative concepts they used for this 
interpretation; 
4. the cooperation of outside observers in interpreting the same family 
interaction by using the same procedure as the family members. 
Kreckel explains that before recording took place a film team lived with the 
family for two months in order to familiarise themselves with its members, and to 
familiarise the family in turn with the equipment that would be used. 16mm 
colour film was used without artificial lighting and family members' permission 
was gained for using everything filmed except interactions and personal 
behaviour involving the most intimate activities. In this way, many hundred hours 
of excellent quality of material was gathered. Part of this material was used for the 
cinema-verity-type documentary, The Family, and broadcast on BBC television. 
It is not the nature of this material as such that is of interest here, but rather 
what Kreckel did with it that I want to consider. Kreckel's main aim is to 
investigate how speakers transmit messages in natural discourse, and then to 
explore the physical properties of these messages. To this end, she seeks to 
establish the conceptual and expressive units which are assumed to be associated 
with interactional messages, and analyse their linguistic properties. Tone units are 
established as the units of speech that naive, native speakers associate with such 
messages, through a series of experimental studies. Further studies explore the 
interpretive abilities of listener judges and the categories they use when 
interpreting tone units in terms of what is accomplished by different interlocutors. 
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Finally, a coding instrument is developed that fits these abilities, based on the 
categories that have been generated. 
The research is accomplished by asking the participants in the interaction (i. e. 
the family members of the BBC documentary) to interpret their own interaction, 
and by comparing these interpretations with those of outside observers. In fact, 
Kreckel seems to have made relatively little use of the large number of hours of 
filmed interactions between family members for this experimental purpose. The 
reasons for this are largely practical as should become apparent in the discussion 
which follows. While Kreckel does not address these practical considerations 
directly, they have considerable bearing on the kind of (experimental) empirical 
research that is conducted; and not least on the potential role that non-trained, 
third person judges can play in helping to interpret the communicative content of 
different data episodes from their own perspective. 
Kreckel presents the findings from ten studies in all. This work is based on 
three sources of data extracted from the main body of the documentary 
recordings. These include: 
(1) An extract involving an argument between two participants - Marian, the 
eldest daughter of the family and Tom, her fiance. 
Kreckel describes the record of this argument as follows: 
The transcribed extract preserved all the ungrammaticalness, 
hesitations, false starts of natural speech and used punctuations 
according to orthographic conventions. (Kreckel, 1981: 107) 
Speaker changes were omitted from the extract, and this provided a final textual 
record of some 1693 words in length (Kreckel, 1981: 108). 
(2) A series of six extracts involving two different types of material. 
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These involve three extracts in which family members were interviewed by the 
film director, and three extracts from arguments between family members. 
Kreckel explains that these extracts were chosen at random amongst a wide 
range of alternatives. In fact, they stem from different periods of filming, some 
near the end and some near the middle of recording. Records of the extracts 
concerned were made, and these provide a total of 811 words of text (Kreckel, 
1981: 115-116). 
(3) A meal time conversation involving three members of the family - the 
mother, father and eldest son. 
Kreckel provides the following details: 
The topic centred around the question of whether one should give a 
key to the house to the next door neighbour so that she could enter in 
emergency cases ... The recording was subsequently transcribed 
by the 
mother who, thus, ensured its accuracy. The extract to be interpreted 
was a continuous piece of verbal interaction, segmented into 168 tone 
units. (Kreckel, 1981: 154) 
The research conducted with reference to these three data sources involves the 
use of different types of stimulus material, which Kreckel presented to groups of 
different informants including family members, and various outside observers 
chosen from the subject pool of the Department of Experimental Psychology, 
University of Oxford. The material included: 
(i) written material only (in the form of transcribed records); 
(ii) written material plus audio-tape; 
(iii) written material plus video-tape. 
Informants were then required to undertake specific interpretive tasks with 
respect to this material as follows. 
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4.2.3 Eliciting Interpretive Accounts 
In the first of Kreckel's studies, twelve subjects were drawn from the subject pool. 
The individuals involved ranged from 25-56 years of age, were of both sexes and 
had different educational backgrounds (Kreckel, 1981: 107). Subjects were then 
split into groups of four and each group was required to work with a different 
type of stimulus material. The groups received the same type-written instructions. 
The instructions were: 
In this experiment you will be asked to detect the number of messages 
communicated in a dialogue between two persons ... That is, after having read (listened to, watched) the whole episode and, thus, having familiarized 
yourself with the material, I would like you to indicate on the transcript all the 
messages you can detect by means of a slash. (Kreckel, 1981: 108) 
In other studies, different sets of subjects were required to segment extracts into 
tone units (Study 3); to detect the messages communicated in the extracts with the 
aid of Roget's Thesaurus (Studies 5 and 6); and to assign labels from a list of 
metapragmatic categories to tone units (Studies 7,8,9), and so on. 
From Study 7 onwards, the sessions were conducted with an experimenter 
who took notes. The sessions were also tape-recorded, and subjects were 
encouraged to 'expand on the categories they provided' (Kreckel, 1981: 153). 
Labov and Fanshel's (1977) 'playback approach', where David Fanshel and the 
therapist reviewed recordings of patient interviews, and then report on the nature 
of their professional deliberations is worth comparing in terms of this procedure, 
as is the work of Tannen (1984) with the friends and outside observers who. 
listened to her dinner party discourse. 
As a consequence of giving family members the opportunity to comment 
further, Kreckel collected a number of interpretive remarks pertaining to her 
experimental material. Examples of the type of comments that emerged are given 
below. These result from 'feedback' given by three family members in response to 
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listening to 11 tone units of dialogue between Margaret (the mother) and Tom (the 
fiance of her daughter, Marian). The comments include statements such as the 
following (Kreckel, 1981: 236): 
Margaret 
It certainly sounds to me that I am trying to push him [=Tom] into 
something, he is backing off which is understandable now ... The whole conversation sounds like me saying to him, you had better 
marry her and that's it ... I am really demanding him that he does 
marry her. In actual fact he is rejecting the whole idea in the end ... You see what he is doing in a way is, he is, telling me to mind my 
own business, really. 
Marian 
I could imagine Mother standing there and saying "I know she 
wants to", it's still the same urging and insisting. She knows that I 
wanted to be married before I moved into that flat, so she's really 
trying to put that across. Seems mother is fishing for an argument. 
She's going to tell him, she knows for a fact that she's right, she's 
just down right telling him ... Tom seems to wave it off, you know. He's trying to push Mother away, he doesn't want to talk about 
the subject, and in the end he thinks the only way is to say "that's 
it". 
Gary 
In different ways Mother's still saying the same thing "you've got 
to marry her" or "you're going to marry her, in different ways the 
point is always made, you see, but Tom doesn't want to know. 
"She expects to be married", it's an order, I think ... "I tell you she does" it's not forceful, I think, it is just a repeat because she knows 
Tom's not saying what she wants him to say, she wants him to 
come out, come out and commit himself ... 
"With me talking about 
it anyway", what in fact he is saying, he's saying "I've not had any 
say in the matter, because you and Marian are telling me what to 
do, and I'm not going to stand for it", because "me" was 
emphasized ... 
And then "they've a flat to let, haven't they", in 
other words, "it's a challenge, but I am open to compromise". He 
is open for negotiation. 
Notice the descriptive vocabularies that are being used in these commentaries. For 
instance: 
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Margaret 
I am trying to push him [=Tom] into something 
he is backing off 
I am really demanding him that he does marry her 
he is rejecting the whole idea in the end 
he is telling me to mind my own business 
Marian 
it's still the same urging and insisting 
she's really trying to put that across 
mother is fishing for an argument 
she's just down right telling him 
Tom seems to wave it off 
He's trying to push Mother away 
he doesn't want to talk about the subject 
Gary 
Mother's still saying the same thing 
Tom doesn't want to know 
"She expects to be married", it's an order 
Tom's not saying what she wants him to say 
she wants him to come out, come out and commit himself 
in other words, "it's a challenge, but I am open to compromise" 
He is open for negotiation 
These vocabularies provide clear evidence of third person interpretive capacity. 
They are also provide evidence that verbal communication is perceived by judges 
as a collaborative, inferential process, that is, the participants are apparently 
adjudged as having something to communicate as speakers, and can contextualise 
or respond to what is communicated as addressees, as the following examples 
suggest. 
Margaret 
I am trying to push him [=Tom] into something 
he is backing off 
I am really demanding him that he does marry her 
he is rejecting the whole idea in the end 
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Marian 
Mother is fishing for an argument 
she's just down right telling him 
Tom seems to wave it off 
He's trying to push Mother away 
Gary 
Mother's saying the same thing 
Tom doesn't want to know 
she wants him to come out, come out and commit himself 
He is open for negotiation 
In other words, the process of situated interpretation is being described by these 
observers post hoc. This process appears to be taken as purposive, or goal-directed 
(cf. judges' comments in Chapter 9). Compare the verbal phrases or verbal 
instruments (Grimshaw, 1981) that appear in the descriptive statements. 
Margaret 
trying to push him [=Tom] into something 
demanding him that he does marry her 
rejecting the whole idea in the end 
Marian 
insisting 
trying to put [that] across 
fishing for an argument 
trying to push Mother away 
Gary 
not saying what she wants him to say 
wants [him] to come out 
I want to explore the extent to which other non-trained observers might provide 
similar kinds of comments and/or information in respect of different speech 
activities. I also want to compare the kind of communicative strategies that are 
reported in this third person sense, since they appear to be intrinsic to the 
interactional process. 
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By analysing the descriptive repertoires used to describe these strategies, and 
particularly the verbal labels that seem to characterise them, I hope to provide 
empirical evidence for warranting participant goals (cf. the battery of interactional 
terms established by Labov and Fanshel (1977: 60-61) on the basis of work by 
Bales in 1950). It is precisely the sorts of general comment that Kreckel's 
informants provided that I am interested in exploring as a data resource in their 
own right. However, I want to devise a methodology for eliciting such comments 
without attempting to direct, pre-judge, or pre-empt what it is in some stretch of 
discourse that non-trained, native informants might find of communicative 
significance. It was with this aim in mind that the following investigative 
framework, and subsequent set of studies, was devised. 
4.3 Investigative Framework 
The investigative mode which I am about to describe is a variation of the 
'playback' technique employed by Labov and Fanshel (1977); Gumperz (1982a); 
Kreckel (1981) and Tannen (1984). Essentially playback involves: 
(1) making a series of tape recordings, and obtaining participants' permission 
for their use; 
(2) replaying the recordings to the participants, and other outside observers in 
the presence of an investigator, with the aim of inquiring into their 
evaluation of what has taken place; 
(3) noting and/or tape recording the evaluations for subsequent inspection and 
analytic use. 
Something of this procedure is applied by Labov and Fanshel in their work on 
psychotherapeutic interviews. Following (permitted) tape recording of the 
interviews, the tapes were replayed in the presence of a researcher (in this case 
David Fanshel), and the therapist. The therapist was encouraged to respond 
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critically, and questions of any nature that arose would be discussed at the 
appropriate juncture; at which point, of course, the tape recorder would be 
switched off. The therapist would then comment further by elaborating on the 
significance for the patient of what was taking place, introducing material based 
on the patient's personal history, and utilising this material in order to aid the 
interpretation of what was transpiring in the interview. Critical evaluation of the 
therapeutic process could then take place, and this would presumably help to 
inform future professional work with the patient in question (Labov and Fanshel, 
1977: 4). 
My interest in this procedure is not to evaluate its professional merit, but 
rather to explore its potential for investigating the significance, for ordinary 
members, of everyday communicative practice. I take it that the method can be 
applied to any type of recorded speech activity by the way. Since I did not have a 
specific type of speech activity in mind (cf. Labov and Fanshel (1977); and 
Coupland, Coupland and Giles (1991) for instance), I evolved a fieldwork strategy 
that would enable me to record a range of communicative events, and hopefully 
maintain access to the participants who had created them. The rationale for this 
strategy was formulated in the spirit of Erving Goffman's practice of trying to 
record happenings between persons regardless of how uninteresting and picayune 
these events seemed to be. Goffman assumes that all interaction between persons 
takes place in accordance with certain patterns, and hence, with certain 
expectations. Thus, in his terms, there is no prima facie reason to think that one 
event is a better or worse expression of this patterning than any other. I can but 
endorse this sentiment. 
However, the one difficulty that had to be confronted in recording the 
episodes of verbal exchange was the problem of obtaining data samples that 
would not be contaminated by analyst's presence. The issue 
here does not concern 
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how one might contribute to the problem of the observer's paradox in seeking to 
obtain the vernacular, but rather being conscious of the need not to contribute to 
the organising behaviour that was to be examined. Goodwin (1981: 43) explains 
the difficulty as follows: 
Analytically distinct from the behavior of the observer, is the observer as an 
addressee of the participants. People act differently towards different types of 
other, and this will have consequences on their production of talk. The 
implications for an investigator are obvious. If the investigator is the 
addressee of the party he is observing, as in the case of interviews, what he 
will generally obtain are samples of how these different individuals talk to an 
academic stranger - rather than how they talk to each other. 
In assembling a corpus of speech activities, the research agenda of this thesis is to 
make use of collected data episodes, not so much as a corporate body of material 
for technical description, but rather as a textual resource, or stimulus for 
investigating the listening behaviour of (non-) participant judges, and thence 
attempting to model this behaviour in terms of the interactional knowledge and 
practices that it presumably implies. The first element of this agenda is to consider 
the kinds of textual resource that I made use of for this purpose. 
4.3.1 Textual Resources 
The following criteria were applied, as far as practically possible, in order to 
prepare a body of text that would prove suitable for experimental use: 
(1) the data had to be spontaneous, in the sense of being unplanned; 
(2) it had to occur without the intervention of the analyst; 
(3) ethnographic detail had to be available; 
(4) a range of participants, and events focussed on different topics had to be 
involved; 
(5) good quality recordings have to be made for playback purposes, within the 
limitations of a situation over which the analyst had no control. 
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The medium of recording the data was restricted to tape as opposed to video 
records in order to try and restrict the amount of detail that judges would have to 
confront (c. f. the comments of Labov and Fanshel in Section 4.2.1 above). 
The recordings were made in the same location over a period of one week in 
order to provide a manageable corpus (cf. the nature of other corpora discussed in 
Section 4.2.1 above). A single environment was chosen for the following reasons: 
(1) to try and control the amount of relevant detail which might influence the 
interaction; 
(2) to try and facilitate a reasonable quality of recording; 
(3) to maintain access to the participants for purposes of further research. 
Recordings were made using a Uher 4000 Report Ic tape recorder which was 
set up in a university office. It was not unusual to have audio equipment in this 
office, hence the recorder with microphone attached were placed in a central and 
clearly visible position. The usual occupant of the office agreed to act as operator 
of the machine and to turn it on whenever he remembered to do so. In this way a 
number of different interactions were collected. These mainly involved the 
operator interacting with anyone who visited the office. If visitors enquired about 
the recorder they were told it has either been switched on or off as the case may 
be. If they did not wish for recording to take place the machine was unplugged. 
The interactions that were recorded provided material of both a personal and 
professional nature covering many different topics. 
There is also an ethical issue here of course. The research required participants 
and outside observers to offer their post hoc comments on the exchanges. 
Consequently, I did not want to affect or influence what they might say prior to 
listening to the recordings. Visitors were therefore invited to erase the material if 
they so wished, and depending on their response were then further invited to act 
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as (participant) judges. In this way, some twenty one hours of continuous talk 
were collected, with permission granted to use the material for further research. 
My absence from the scene proved problematic in a number of different 
respects. Since I was absent I was not able to obtain accurate details about the 
situation and participants. These details had to be gleaned from the operator of the 
machine. Neither was I able to control the quality of the recordings; many of 
which turned out to be so poor that they were unusable (see, for example, judges' 
comments in Section 5.2.4). Part of the reason for this was the use of a single 
microphone. Without the use of individual lavalier microphones, there is a 
considerable problem in attempting to record verbally reticent, quiet or unclear 
speakers as I discovered; the advantages of using lavalier microphones are 
discussed in some detail by Goodwin (1981). Other factors affecting the quality of 
recordings included various sources of internal and external noise. For example, 
the noise of a kettle being boiled; coffee and tea making activities; the constant 
hum of the strip light located immediately above the microphone; people passing 
in the corridor outside the office, especially when the door was left open; and 
traffic noise from the street located below the office window. For something of a 
more technologically sophisticated approach to data collection, Bull and Roger 
(1989: 10-12) describe the advantages of a using a purpose-built social psychology 
laboratory. 
While all visitors were informed that taping had taken place prior to leaving 
the office, the machine was turned on and off at the discretion of the operator. This 
not only meant that a number of interactions were incomplete, but also that the 
types of exchange that were recorded were limited by his decisions of when to 
record. Although many people visited the office in question, much of the 
data 
involved the operator in discussion with others. Since it was his office, he often 
turned out to be the dominant speaker. Furthermore, I did not 
know any of the 
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participants in many of the interactions. Hence it proved virtually impossible to 
consistently distinguish between speech varieties in order to identify individual 
speakers. It was also impossible to recover who was addressing whom, because of 
absence of visual information, and also the frequency of overlapping sequences 
involving more than two speakers. Audio-visual recordings would partially help 
in resolving these difficulties, but in the circumstances all multi-party discourses 
were eliminated from the corpus. 
Using the criteria of audibility and the number of participants involved, the 
corpus was reduced to seven hours of continuous conversation involving two 
party exchanges only. It was largely, but not exclusively, because of its quality, 
that this data was supplemented by the published recordings of Crystal and Davy 
(1975). These recordings comprise fifteen extracts totalling some forty minutes of 
talk. The recordings were made in circumstances that are described by Crystal 
(1983). Briefly, friends of the author were invited to his house for a social occasion, 
but with a specific request to help participate in an 'experiment' on accents. The 
room in which the recordings were made was prepared with centrally placed 
visible microphones, apparently attached to a visible tape recorder. In reality, 
Crystal explains, the microphones were linked to a mixer and recorder in an 
adjacent room. On arrival, the informants were given an experimental task to do, 
for example, reciting the alphabet. Once this task was completed, the tape recorder 
was "ostentatiously switched off, and the microphone pushed back somewhat, but 
left directly in front of the participants" (Crystal, 1983: 154). In fact, the hidden 
recorder was permanently on. In this way many good quality recordings of were 
obtained in the context of a normal domestic environment. Crystal and Davy note 
that: 
The salient points about this material which differentiate it from most of the 
recorded conversations that are commercially available are twofold: (a) it 
spontaneously produced utterance, no scripts or other written cues being 
involved in its production; (b) it is representative of a range of colloquial 
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usage which avoids the formal levels of discussion or debate, concentrating 
instead on the kind of language that is naturally used between people of 
similar social standing when talking about topics of common interest on 
informal, friendly occasions. (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 12) 
Since Crystal and Davy were participants in the exchange, they were able to 
provide contextual information which is briefly outlined at the beginning of each 
extract. Nine of the fifteen extracts that are published are in fact reported as 
involving speakers who were unaware of being recorded. These are extracts 1,4,7, 
8,9,11,12,13 and 15. The collection as a whole forms part of the Survey of English 
Usage material that Bublitz (1988) used for his research. 
Each extract is published as a written record using the conventions of ordinary 
English orthography, and is accompanied by an analysis of the main prosodic 
features used by the speakers; these include variations in pitch, loudness, speed, 
and rhythm, as well as paralinguistic effects. The record is further analysed into 
tone units, within which words containing nuclear syllables are capitalised; the 
pitch movement of syllables is also marked (see Crystal and Davy (1975: 15-18), 
and Crystal, 1969). Similar records were produced for the seven hours of material 
that I had collected, of which more shortly. 
Another important criterion for selecting the Crystal and Davy material was 
the fact that their textual records were accompanied by what they describe as "a 
commentary, which deals with points of pronunciation, syntax, lexis and usage 
which might cause temporary difficulties of interpretation as one listens to the 
conversation" (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 13). I should point out that the corpus is 
intended for non-native students of English who wish to improve their 
conversational skills. Thus where Crystal and Davy consider it appropriate, 
students referring to the text are advised of important prosodic effects that require 
elucidation in order to clarify what is being signalled. In commenting on these 
effects, Crystal and Davy incorporate important decisions about those utterances 
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or stretches of utterance that led them to interpret the data in a particular way. I 
anticipated that these decisions would provide a useful gauge against which non- 
trained judges interpretations of the extracts could be compared. Thus apart from 
what judges might have to say about the extracts in general, two further research 
questions seemed to present themselves. These were: 
(1) Would judges focus on the same utterance or stretches of utterance as 
Crystal and Davy?; 
(2) Would their interpretations match those of the Crystal and Davy in any 
way? 
Before addressing these questions, however, a general research strategy had to be 
devised for eliciting interpretive accounts from both participants and outside 
observers. This strategy is described in the following section. 
4.3.2 Stimulus Material and Design 
In conjunction with producing written records of the material, I followed a 
procedure derived from CA practice and listened to the seven hours of 'office 
tape' material many times. I also listened repeatedly to the fifteen audio-recorded 
episodes that had been produced by Crystal and Davy. In the process, I made 
notes concerning: 
(1) the auditory quality and general intelligibility of the recordings; 
(2) episodes that seemed worthy of note; 
(3) particular features or interactional phenomena that might bear further 
inspection and/or analysis; 
(4) any raw conceptual categories that might help to characterise individual 
communicative strategies and/or their outcomes. 
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This exercise produced a huge, and ultimately overwhelming amount of 
information that clearly required more circumspect treatment. Since I wanted to 
make use of the material for post hoc evaluation by other third person listeners, 
two crucial issues had to be confronted. These were: 
(1) how to predict what would constitute acceptable or productive stimulus 
material for participant and outside observers to listen to; 
(2) how much of this material, by way of 'chunks' they could be reasonably 
asked to listen to for the purposes of conducting the kind of post hoc 
interpretive work I had in mind. 
It is perhaps worth recalling the attempts of other scholars to delimit data 
episodes for work of this kind. Labov and Fanshel (1977), for example, apply their 
comprehensive discourse analysis to fifteen minutes of interview data. They note 
that "An immediate problem is to locate units manageable enough to be subject to 
analysis" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 38). However, the question of units and 
unitising in verbal exchange is rather fraught. Should the analyst work on 
'episodes', 'fragments', 'segments', or complete 'events'? And what are the 
boundaries of these entities? Labov and Fanshel comment: "In the study of 
conversation, some attention has been given to finding units to be coded... but 
most of the systems analysts pay much more attention to the categories than to the 
units to which these categories apply" (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 38). Some fifteen 
years later, I think this statement still holds true. There is simply no magic formula 
for dividing conversational data into discrete analytic blocks (but compare the 
'time base' and 'event base' procedures described by Collett, 1989). Labov and 
Fanshel analyse their data into constituent parts they describe as 'episodes'. These 
are defined as "radical shifts in the overt topic or reference of the conversation" 
(1977: 38). Whether such 'episodes' are communicatively salient for the 
participants is not explored. 
L 
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Other analysts simply provide selected data passages, often without context, 
to exemplify their theoretical axioms (cf. Gumperz, 1982a; 1982b). Single 
utterances or pairs of utterances are utilised in the same way. Kreckel's (1981) 
experimental work is conducted on the basis of tone units. The problem in all of 
this is what units and how much data should be chosen for interpretive research? 
Working on the material as a professional analyst is one thing, asking others to 
listen to say fifteen seconds, fifteen minutes or even fifteen hours of tape recorded 
data quite another. One simply cannot predict the optimal, real-time-length 
suitability of data extracts in advance. The issue of 'How much data? ' one might 
work on is broached by Stubbs (1983). Stubbs is pragmatic enough to recognise the 
difficulty and simply concedes that "Different amounts of data such as audio- 
recordings or notes, are needed for different purposes" (Stubbs, 1983: 223). 
Where participant and outside observations of naturally occurring talk are 
sought, as in the case of the present study, there seem to be a number of attendant 
dangers. By providing too much material, one risks overtaxing memory and 
inducing informant fatigue. On the other hand, if the material is too slight, then 
judges may have little or nothing to say at all. As far as I am aware there is no 
accepted method for minimising these dangers; one simply has to experiment. 
The exploratory studies which I describe in detail in Chapter 5 seek to 
determine the extent to which different individuals might infer different kinds of 
information from different kinds of pre-selected, tape-recordings of verbal 
exchange. This information may involve who is involved in the recordings, and in 
what relations. It may involve accounts of what is going on, in terms of the 
qualities, dispositions and motives of the individuals concerned. I am not 
suggesting that third persons will always infer such information, nor that they will 
be necessarily interested in talking about it. What I am suggesting 
is that the 
processes of inferring information about the interactional 
behaviour of others are 
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investigable as a result of third person interpretations. Third persons must utilise 
inferencing in order to make sense of recorded conversations, and a set of 
interpretive procedures or strategies must be available to them in order to 
organise the material they have listened to. 
4.3.3 The Subjects 
In order to illuminate and document what is of communicative significance in the 
talk of others from different third person perspectives, the research design 
obviously requires the cooperation of individuals willing to act as judges. 
Participant judges in effect select themselves, by dint of their involvement in 
creating the recorded products of their own interactional behaviour (cf. Kreckel's 
family members); that is, of course, if they are available and willing to act as post 
hoc interpreters Outside observers, on the other hand, must be selected on the 
basis of other criteria. Bales (1950) used trained observers in applying his 
Interaction Process Analysis to the study of small group interactions. Grimshaw 
(1981) used trained analysts and teams of analysts from different disciplinary 
backgrounds in his Multiple Analysis Project. But the normal practice seems to be to 
make use of non-trained, student subjects. Much of the work undertaken in the 
Social Psychology laboratory, for example, and which involves the study of 
different kinds of listener judgements, is conducted using student subjects (cf. the 
plethora of language attitude studies presented in Giles and Powesland, (1975); 
Scherer and Giles, (1979; ) Ryan and Giles, (1982) and elsewhere; and Giles and 
Sassoon, (1983) for a specific example). Kreckel's (1981) non-participant observers 
were drawn from the subject pool of the Department of Experimental Psychology, 
University of Oxford which is presumably largely student based. Students are 
readily available, represent different socio-economic and educational 
backgrounds, and cover a wide range of ages. But what qualities make a good 
judge, and how are they to be approached? 
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During his recent solo tour of New Zealand, actor and popular media 
personality Peter Ustinov was interviewed on national television. Apart from the 
usual biographical interrogation, Ustinov was asked to name the quality or 
qualities that he thought made 'a good conversationalist'. Without the slightest 
pause or hesitation, he answered 'being a good listener'. This answer might seem a 
little puzzling, especially given Ustinov's widely recognised talent as a raconteur. 
Perhaps one might have expected instead a myriad of other desirable qualities - 
'the ability to communicate ideas clearly', 'oral fluency', 'eloquence of expression', 
'personal warmth and directness', 'an extensive vocabulary', 'a sense of humour', 
'the avoidance of cliches', 'having something to say' and so on. But no, Ustinov 
did not select any of these speaker attributes. He chose, rather, to focus on the 
attribute of remaining silent; that mysterious skill that is the provenance of the 
largely unsung hero(ine) of conversational exchange - the listener. 
The contribution that listeners make to conversation in this regard is not 
always appreciated or made explicit as I argued in Chapter 2. However, 
communicative success is clearly dependent upon the interpretive resources and 
capacity of the silent raconteur. Any property of the words that are produced is a 
product of interactional effort, where participants must engage in the activities of 
both speaking and listening in order to determine what to say next. Presumably, a 
good conversationalist is sensitive to the dual roles involved in these activities and 
can balance her or his contribution according to need. 
But if there is an art of 'good speaking', then what is the art of 'good listening'? 
Unfortunately, Ustinov's reply gave nothing away. This is not to say that he chose 
to be deliberately opaque, or enigmatic. Rather, one wonders the kinds of attribute 
he had in mind. The problem here of course is how to begin to investigate such 
attributes whilst conversation is actually in progress? Though speakers might 
occasionally enquire if their interlocutors or audiences are actually listening 
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(school classrooms and theatre settings spring most readily to mind), I aver that 
one seldom attempts to discover whether one's addresses are being good listeners. 
Indeed, continued questioning about receivership would presumably lead to 
communicative breakdown. Yet if 'good listening' is at the heart of 'good 
conversation', or any other type of speech event for that matter, then surely we 
must be able to specify the qualities it might involve? 
One way to address this question is to simply consult other listeners. Another 
is to consider the nature and extent of reciprocal actions in verbal exchange, that 
is, where these are determined by post hoc evaluation of listener replies and 
responses. As far as consulting other listeners is concerned, I approached ten 
different people in and around my own work environment. Individuals were 
approached at random, and given the context of Ustinov's interview remarks. 
They were then asked - "What qualities do you associate with being a good 
listener? " The resulting responses were elicited, and are presented simply in the 
order in which they occurred. In the interests of equality, I can report that five of 
those concerned were women and five men. The responses were: 
(1) Non-verbal qualities. The ability to convey interest. Affirm what others say, 
even when you don't agree. 
(2) Appearing interested. Eye contact. 
(3) Tricky. The gaps. Listening to the process that is not there. 
(4) Tuning in to the same wavelength and paying genuine attention both to the 
verbal and non-verbal. Picking up the agenda. Eye contact. 
(5) Understanding what somebody says. Understanding more than the words. 
Anticipating responses. 
(6) 1 don't know. Attentiveness to what someone is saying which is coupled to 
eye contact and things. 
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(7) Eye and body language suggesting openness to conversation. 
Acknowledging what is said with uhms and ahs and whatever. Looking for 
what the speaker is signalling. 
(8) Bit hard to say. Personality. Interest in others. Wanting to learn. 
(9) Concentration, patience, understanding. 
(10) The ability to respond sympathetically to what someone is saying. The 
ability to give good feedback in such a way as to accurately represent what 
the other person has said. Not talking too much. 
Despite the ad hoc nature of the questioning and the very small number of 
people interviewed, there does seem to be a reasonable degree of unanimity in the 
comments that were offered. Three attributes in particular appear to be of 
significance. These include: 
(1) Paying attention to S(peakers); 
(2) Signalling interest in S; 
(3) Trying for agreement/ understanding with S. 
All three of these attributes seem to require very positive motivation. Listeners, by 
these terms at least, are required to be actively 'attentive', 'cooperative' and 
'supportive'. Interestingly, these attributes are much in line with the speaker 
strategies delimited by Brown and Levinson (1987) to express politeness by appeal 
to 'positive face'; that is, appeal to our need as human beings to be liked and 
admired by others. Positive face in this regard is used in contrast with 'negative 
face'; namely, the need not to be imposed upon by others. Briefly, positive 
politeness strategies involve three broad mechanisms. The mechanisms are (a) to 
claim 'common ground' with H(earers), (b) to convey that S and H are 
'cooperators', and (c) for S to fulfil H's interests, wants or needs as a consequence. 
While Brown and Levinson are able to cite examples of these strategies in terms of 
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actual language use, it is theoretically and methodologically challenging to 
consider if there are concomitant strategies for listeners, and this is where the 
second of our research possibilities (post hoc evaluation) can help. However, the 
question of what qualities are likely to make a good judge remains. 
The process of selecting, interpreting and creating patterns of significance 
from the disparate signals listeners receive in talk is clearly an extremely complex 
business. Paradoxically, one can only gain some idea of this complexity when 
listeners become speakers, that is, by consideration of their replies and responses. 
In turn, it is only possible to discover the interpretive capacity of third person 
judges by inviting them to make their interpretations public. Since one cannot 
predict in advance what judges are going to say, and my interests were qualitative 
rather than quantitative, I did not attempt to sample likely informants in any way. 
Individuals were simply approached on an ad hoc basis and at random (cf. the 
sampling techniques of secular sociolinguistics as reported in Milroy, 1987: 
Chapter 2). The one constraining factor regarding the selection of judges was 
availability. Consequently, I restricted my approaches to individuals to those 
within my immediate working environment. The non-participant observers that 
took part in the studies, shortly to be described in full, are mostly students as a 
result. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has outlined a procedure for investigating the listening behaviour of 
untrained third person judges. The aim of this work is twofold. First, it seeks to 
elicit and use the verbal accounts of third persons in order to illuminate and 
document what may be of significance in everyday verbal exchange, from the 
perspective of ordinary members. Second, it seeks to explain how the actions that 
speakers perform on each other communicatively can be recovered and warranted 
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with reference to the interpretive substance of the vocabularies that were 
provided. 
Judges were asked to listen to a variety of stimulus material in order to derive 
these vocabularies. Partially due to the limitations of the data I had collected, 
including my lack of control over the recording process, this material was 
supplemented by the recordings made by Crystal and Davy (1975). The studies 
that were undertaken in relation to this data attempted to elicit the widest possible 
range of comments by giving instructions that tried not to pre-empt or pre-judge 
what it was that judges might listen for. Three different studies were conducted 
along these lines, and details of (i) the materials and design, (ii) the subjects, (iii) 
the procedures, and (iv) the results and findings from this work are presented in 
the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 5 
EXPLORATORY STUDIES OF POST HOC INTERPRETATION 
5.0 Introducing the Studies 
This chapter reports on the studies and resulting data which was used to 
investigate the interpretive behaviour of different third person judges. The third 
persons in question were participant and non-participant judges who were asked 
to listen to and comment on selected tape-recorded fragments of verbal exchange 
taken from the office-recordings, and from those of Crystal and Davy (1975) as 
described in the previous chapter. Three different studies are discussed. Since little 
systematic work of this nature has been undertaken to date, each subsequent 
study is modified in the light of the one which precedes it. In other words, the 
studies are exploratory. What the studies have in common is that they are all 
based on a variation of the 'playback approach' used in the research of Labov and 
Fanshel (1977), Kreckel (1981), Gumperz (1982a, 1982b), and Tannen (1984), which 
I introduced earlier (Section 3.2.2; Section 4.2.2). 
5.1 The Playback Approach 
The playback approach provides a method for facilitating the interpretive analysis 
of tape recorded data fragments, where the research is undertaken by post hoc 
listening in the third person. In the case of Labov and Fanshel's research, a single 
data fragment is taken as the object of investigation. The fragment comprises of 
the first fifteen minutes of a psychotherapeutic interview between a professional 
therapist and a patient who is being treated for anorexia nervosa. Apart from 
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detailed linguistic analysis of what had taken place, the interview was replayed in 
the presence of the therapist who conducted the session, with a view to inquiring 
into her evaluation of what had taken place. Hence the therapist was encouraged 
to comment on and/or discuss what seemed to be transpiring in the session as an 
aid to illuminating the theoretical basis of her professional behaviour, and of 
course her client's responses. 
Kreckel (1981), on the other hand, uses the playback approach to investigate 
how participant and outside observers can help identify and label the 
communicative messages that speakers transmit in naturally occurring discourse. 
Various small fragments of discourse are selected for this purpose, and then 
played to the individuals concerned under experimental conditions. The results of 
this work serve to demonstrate the interpretive or metalinguistic capacity of 
ordinary members, and how this relates to the linguistic properties of everyday 
language use in general. 
Interpretive methods of study based on the playback approach are, of course, 
a feature of the research pioneered by Gumperz (1982a; 1982b). Again various 
fragments of verbal exchange are pre-selected by the analyst, and then examined 
post hoc from a variety of evaluative perspectives. An important form of evaluation 
is derived from the responses of judges to recorded sequences of talk that they 
have been asked to listened to. The responses are obtained by playing back part of 
a sequence and eliciting judges' comments (Gumperz, 1982b: 19). 
A variation of this approach is developed by Tannen (1984) as discussed in 
Chapter 3.3. Tannen's work is based largely on records of conversations in which 
she was a participant (sometimes her students were participants), and on 
playbacks in which conversational participants are asked to comment on the 
replay of recordings of conversation they were in. In other words, the analysis 
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comes from the analyst-as-participant, and from the analysis of interpretations by 
other participants about what is going on. It is something of this approach that I 
want to utilise in the studies presented in this chapter. 
The method itself is relatively straightforward in so far as it seeks to elicit third 
person interpretations with respect to pre-selected audio or audio-visual 
recordings. Hewstone (1983: 241) refers to such comments and materials as 
'response language' and 'stimulus language' respectively. Putting the method into 
practice is a little more difficult than it may first seem, however. 
As far as the stimulus language is concerned, difficulties arise in trying to 
determine the kinds of material that might prove suitable for experimental use as I 
suggested in the previous chapter. A major problem is that it is impossible to 
predict what different individuals might find of interest in the products of their 
own and others' verbal interactions. In choosing the stimulus material for the 
present research, I therefore decided to make use of my own analytic experience 
by selecting fragments that I had marked as worthy of note during the 
transcription process. 
In order to generate response language, the fragments were played back in the 
presence of participant and non-participant judges with a view to eliciting as wide 
a range of comments or responses about them as informants were willing to 
supply under post hoc conditions. A free-response format was designed for this 
purpose. This format was preferred to using a priori response scales (cf. attribution 
experiments of the kind reported by Hewstone, 1983), because I did not want to 
control the nature of the response language, as far as this was possible. 
Consequently, in order to avoid directing or influencing the listening behaviour of 
the judges who agreed to participate in the experiments, the instructions given 
were deliberately formulated in general terms. The aim of this procedure was to 
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try and establish a corpus of response language which would become an object of 
study in its own right. While this procedure was more or less successful, as far as 
my particular aims were concerned, it produced a very amorphous kind of data 
which created concomitant difficulties for analysis. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, three different exploratory studies were 
devised Each study is detailed below in terms of: 
(1) the stimulus material played to the judges; 
(2) the individuals who acted as judges; 
(3) the experimental design and procedure; 
(4) the results and findings of the research. 
In order to facilitate analysis of what judges actually said about the fragment, 
their comments were reproduced in the form of a transcribed record. It is this 
record that is used for more detailed exploration of the kinds of interpretive 
accounts that emerged from the research. These accounts are then subject to higher 
level analyses in an attempt to model the tacit assumptions and inferential 
processes upon which they might be based. The analyses in question are presented 
in Chapters 6-9 following. 
5.2 Study 1 
The first study, which functioned as a pilot study but which is also reported here, 
involved the use of a single fragment of continuous talk taken from an exchange 
between two men. The exchange lasted approximately an hour and a half in all, 
and the playback approach was used to try and determine what, if anything, 
individual participant and non-participant observers would have to say about it. A 
record of the fragment is presented in Appendix A. The study was conducted as 
follows. 
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5.2.1 Stimulus Material 
The fragment was selected by following the precedent of Pittenger, Hockett and 
Danehy (1960) who limit their analysis to the first five minutes of a psychiatric 
interview. The First Five Minutes was the first major study to attempt the direct 
observation of film or tape recording, and to provide detailed analysis of 
participant interactional behaviour as a result. Pittenger et al. explain their reasons 
for selecting their material as follows: 
We thought it might be more revealing and interesting - and perhaps easier 
- to examine the opening gambits of people who had never met before than 
try to understand some comparably brief episode deep in the middle of an 
extensive course of therapy, when the participants have already established a 
host of special conventions and mutual understandings. (Pittenger et al. 1960: 
6-7) 
By selecting the first five minutes of the longest exchange that I recorded, I 
attempted to apply similar criteria. The exchange took place in the office where the 
recordings were made. It involves two male interlocutors who had arranged to 
meet on a Saturday morning, and hence outside of normal office hours. The 
participants had met before, but had not talked in face-to-face interaction for over 
a year. Both were both in full employment as teachers from different sectors of the 
post-secondary and tertiary education spheres. There was at least a ten year age 
difference between the pair, and they had some previous contact when the 
younger of the two had attended university as a student. The ensuing exchange, 
and in particular the first five minutes, seemed to provide suitable material for the 
pilot study for a number of reasons. These were: % 
(1) the fragment seemed relatively self-contained as an opening gambit; 
(2) it had not yet developed the kind of mutual understandings and 
subsequent complexity that Pittenger et al. were keen to avoid; 
(3) the participants were willing to make the material available 
for post hoc 
inspection by themselves and outside observers. 
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The record of the fragment presented in Appendix A is based on the 
orthographic conventions of Standard English. It does not attempt to use the kind 
of notation developed by conversation analysts because my interest is not in the 
sequential organisation of the talk, but rather in the nature of its perceived 
communicative content. Hence no attempt has been made to represent 
overlapping or simultaneous speech, for example. The speakers are simply named 
in order of speaking, A, B etc., and at a change of speaker the record uses a new 
letter. A phonetic transcription is not used either, since vernacular styles of 
speaking are not the object of analysis, and in any case, only trained phoneticians 
would be able to deal with such data. 
Instead, the record is presented as a series of speaker contributions in the form 
of tone units after the manner of Kreckel (1981). Two hundred and twenty tone 
units were identified from a running total of some 1075 words. These units are 
established following the conventions of Crystal and Davy (1969; 1975). Detailed 
prosodic analysis of a particular utterance or stretches of utterance realised in the 
course of the fragment is presented in the main text only as required for purposes 
of exemplification and discussion. 
5.2.2 Judges 
The judges were the participants themselves, and sixteen outside observers who I 
had approached at random. The outside observers, or non-participant judges, 
were all university students from different educational and socio-economic 
backgrounds in the 18-25 age range. None of this group had undergone any 
linguistic training, and were registered for a variety of degree subjects. The 
number of judges was chosen on an ad hoc basis dependent on the availability of 
individuals willing to participate in the research. A total of eleven women and five 
men agreed to act as judges. Non-participant judges were allocated a number 
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according to the order in which they listened to the fragment, and this number 
along with their sex is indicated in the following table. 
TABLE 5.1 
Subjects Used in Study 1 
Judge Sex 
A male 
B male 
1 female 
2 male 
3 female 
4 female 
5 female 
6 male 
7 female 
8 female 
9 male 
10 female 
11 female 
12 female 
13 female 
14 female 
15 male 
16 male 
Each judge was invited to participate in a short research exercise that would 
involve them having to listen to an unspecified fragment of verbal exchange at a 
time that was mutually convenient. With the exception of Study 3 (see 5.4.2 
below), participant judges were asked to listen to the fragments as soon as 
practically possible after the recordings had been made. 
5.2.3 Procedure 
The research was conducted in a room that contained a desk, two chairs and a tape 
recorder. Judges were invited to this room on an individual basis. Individuals 
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were accompanied by myself, and were seated at the desk in front of the tape 
recorder. In order to facilitate a free-response format, judges were informed in 
advance of listening to the material that while I could not specify what I wanted 
them to listen for, any comments they made in respect of the fragment would be 
welcome and then noted for the purposes of my research. Judges were then given 
the following verbal instructions: 
I am going to play you a short extract of talk which I have tape-recorded. At 
the end of the recording, I will switch the machine off. If you have any 
comments to make about the extract I would like to note them. 
If more explicit instructions were required, I explained that I would not be offering 
feedback, since I did not want to prejudice the outcome of the research. Despite 
this disclaimer, a number of judges insisted that I try to explain more fully what 
was required of them. Questions of the following kind arose: 
Judge 1 
what do you want me to tell you about it then 
judge 2 
do you mean I'm supposed to tell you 
where they come from or what 
Judge 7 
am I supposed to comment on their accents 
or in the way they say things 
Judge 16 
I'm not sure what you want me to listen for 
what exactly are you interested in finding out 
My answer to these questions was to point out once again the need not to 
prejudice the outcome of the experiment by providing information whose 
significance I could not predict in advance. Judges were further assured that any 
comments they made would be of interest. Each judge was also given a sheet of 
paper and invited to make notes if they wished. The audio-recording of the 
fragment was then played to the participant and non-participant judges 
in turn 
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and comments invited. When comments were offered before the end of the 
fragment, the machine was switched off. All comments were noted and the 
machine was then switched on again. 
Judges were invited to listen to the recording for a second time. Whenever 
appropriate, they were invited to try and elaborate on why they had made 
particular comments. Sometimes this information was supplied spontaneously, 
but when necessary I attempted to prompt further comment by asking questions 
such as: "How did you know it was x? ", and/or, "What was it about the fragment 
that made you say y? ". While this ploy was not always successful, any more 
comments provided were again noted. With the exception of judge 15 (see p. 142 
and pp. 145-146 below), the procedure took between approximately half to three 
quarters of an hour per informant. 
Using the notes that I had taken and notes made by the judges, I was able to 
construct a verbatim record of judges' responses to the instructions. This record is 
presented in the form of a written account of the various verbal remarks that were 
produced as a result of listening to the fragment (participants commentaries are 
presented in Appendix B, and non-participant commentaries in Appendix Q. For 
ease of reference, the record is produced as a sequence of descriptive statements in 
ordinary English spelling. 
Preliminary inspection of the accounts reveals that judges responded 
differently to the instructions they were given in the sense in which some 
individuals offered many more comments than others. The comments also reveal 
the use of a wide range of interpretive repertoires or vocabularies. While different 
tokens make up these vocabularies, it is remarkable how many of them provide 
similar types of information. In order to investigate these similarities further, an 
analytic instrument was devised. The instrument had to be flexible enough to 
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account for the diversity of repertoires, rigorous enough to allow subsequent 
comparisons between the judges who used them, and detailed enough to examine 
any findings with respect to the kinds of interpretive work they might encode. 
Given the variables involved, and in order to meet these requirements, it was 
necessary to use a computer to process the transcribed accounts. 
The MacIntosh Hypercard Program proved well suited for this task as it 
incorporates sophisticated text editing and graph generating capabilities. Data 
processing was undertaken in three stages. First, the number of words in each 
commentary was calculated, and the totals compared across judges. Second, word 
lists were generated to establish the frequency and type/taken ratios of individual 
words. Third, concordances of selected words were produced, and their 
occurrences compared across and within the comments provided by each judge. 
Results and discussion emanating from the first stage of processing are considered 
in the next section. An analytic framework emanating from the processing 
undertaken in stages two and three is presented in Chapter 6. 
5.2.4 Results and Discussion 
The experiment yielded some 2786 words of commentary across the eighteen 
judges who took part in the study. A breakdown of the number of words per 
judge, given in the order in which individuals listened to the fragment, is 
presented in Table 5.2. The sex of each judge is indicated in brackets. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Words Per Judge in Study 1 
Judges Words 
Participant A (male) 165 
Participant B (male) 366 
Jud e1 (female) 102 
Jud e2 (male) 188 
Jud e3 (female) 133 
Jud e4 (female) 196 
Jud e5 (female) 102 
Jud e6 (male) 275 
Jud e7 (female) 73 
Jud e8 (female) 118 
Jud e9 (male) 197 
Jud e 10 (female) 99 
Jud e 11 (female) 122 
Jud e 12 (female) 134 
Jud e 13 (female) 104 
Jud e 14 (female) 163 
Jud e 15 (male) 11 
Jud e 16 (male) 238 
Total 2786 
The table shows that there were marked differences of response, ranging from the 
366 words of commentary given by Participant B to the 11 words given by non- 
participant, judge 15. When compared to other non-participants, the discrepancy 
between judge 15 and the others is still striking. There is a difference of 264 words 
between judge 15 and the non-participant judge who said the most, Judge 6 (275 
words), for instance. Apart from my own observations, some clues as to why the 
responses might vary quantitatively across judges in this way are provided in the 
context of the comments that were given. Two main factors seem to 
be of salience 
here. These include: 
(1) the data and setting used to conduct the studies, and 
(2) the personal characteristics of those who acted as 
judges. 
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1. The data and setting 
As far as the situation is concerned, a number of comments suggest that judges 
responses may have been constrained by the auditory quality of the stimulus data 
in a significant number of cases. Despite my apparent care in having chosen the 
fragment, difficulties relating to audition were in fact reported by both 
participants, and ten of the sixteen non-participant judges. Problems seem to have 
arisen because of the interference of various kinds of non-linguistic noise on the 
one hand, and variations in loudness and speaker dsyfluencies on the other. 
Six of the non-participant judges were apparently distracted enough by these 
problems to make them the subject of their opening remarks. Compare, for 
example, the comments of judges 1,8,10,11 and 12 below. 
Judge 1 
the kettle noise makes things a bit difficult 
Judge 8 
the background noise of the kettle 
covered a great deal of the conversation 
Judge 10 
the noise is disturbing 
it's a buzzing noise and it gets worse 
Judge 11 
there is a noise problem 
it's probably an electric drill or cement mixer 
Judge 12 
there is a lot of noise 
Problems with 'noise' were also raised by Judges 4,5,6,14 and 16. 
The noise is 
variously attributed to 'a kettle' (Judges 4,14 and 16); 
'a bad tape' and 'fuzz' 
(Judge 5); and 'a kind of hum' (Judge 6). 
Judge 4 
there is a kettle noise 
which made things difficult to 
hear 
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Judge 5 
it's a bad tape 
fuzz seems to obscure most of what they are saying 
Judge 6 
there is a lot of surface noise 
a kind of hum 
Judge 14 
the kettle boiling makes it difficult to follow 
Judge 16 
the kettle boiling didn't help any 
Both participants commented on the noise too, and were able to identify its source 
as follows: 
Participant A 
the kettle sound makes it difficult to recover 
what was said on tape 
Participant B 
the kettle noise is pretty bad 
and you can hear the constant hum of the strip light 
On the other hand, judges 2 and 16 attributed something of their difficulties to the 
nature of the recording set-up, and the speech style of one of the participants. 
They said: 
Judge 2 
a lot of it was mumbly 
one of them was sitting much nearer the tape-recorder 
Judge 16 
the one who was nearest the microphone 
knew he was being recorded 
he distinguished his words more, 
the other seemed to jumble his words 
I couldn't tell what he was saying 
till he thought about it 
Presumably, any non-laboratory setting is subject to the sorts of difficulty 
referred to in many of these comments. While no attempt was made to doctor the 
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recordings, the quality of the record is clearly of considerable importance in 
undertaking experimental work of the kind reported here. Indeed, one of the main 
reasons for choosing the Crystal and Davy material used in Study 3 was because 
of its superior auditory quality. It is possible that my failure to spot the problem 
with my own pilot data was due to my being over-familiar with the material, as I 
had listened to the fragment a great many times for both record making and 
analytic purposes. 
My role as an observer may have also constrained what was said, especially as 
I took pains to provide as little feedback as possible. What feedback I did provide 
was restricted to backchannel and non-verbal cues of encouragement. Though the 
situation was obviously contrived, I attempted not cast myself in the role of an 
interviewer as such. It is possible, however, that my own personal characteristics 
and perhaps perceived asymmetries in status may have had their own 
unpredictable effects. A more telling issue might be that of gender, since a 
different result may have emerged had I used a female observer with the female 
judges (cf. the use of female as opposed to male interviewers in social dialect 
studies of the kind undertaken by Holmes, Bell and Boyce (1991) for example). 
Nevertheless, of all the judges, it was a man (Judge 15) who seemed to be the 
most reticent of the informants. Despite my attempts to ensure that he did not feel 
inhibited in any way, this judge provided only eleven words of commentary. He, 
in turn, assured me that he was perfectly comfortable and that his comments were 
as expansive as he considered necessary. His relative lack of comments compared 
to those of the other judges could be attributed to the experimental situation, in 
which informants in general often report a sense of being tested in some way, or 
perhaps to some personality trait. Human beings can and do refuse to perform in 
all manner of interactional situations, and the comments of judge 15 must be 
accepted accordingly, however minimal they might seem. That Participant B had 
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the most to say is perhaps predictable, since he was the normal occupant of the 
office in which the recordings were made, and the operator of the tape-recorder 
used to collect the data. In his own words, and in an important sense, he did have 
"more knowledge available". Notice, however, that much of his commentary is 
taken up with explaining what the situation had involved for him. 
While judges had the choice of whether to attend or not to attend to the 
exchange in question, I suggest that what they said must be a reflection, at least in 
part, of their listening behaviour. This behaviour may reflect not only aspects of an 
individual's interest in the stimulus material, but also a longer term sense of 
his/her interests as a conversational participant. The fact that the fragment 
involved two men, as opposed to say two women, could have affected the nature 
of judges' remarks, as could the nature of the subject matter. While it is difficult to 
generalise on the basis of such a small sample, it does not seem unreasonable to 
suppose, for instance, that women judges might have had more to say had the 
fragment involved women participants instead of men, even if the purpose of the 
talk was similar. Holmes (1987) suggests that in the course of talk, some 
differences in interpretation are due to predispositions the listener may have 
towards certain kinds of people and certain kinds of conversational topic. Thus 
some listeners may be predisposed to respond to transactional rather than 
interpersonal information in a speaker's contribution, while others may ignore 
transactional content and respond only to the interpersonal. Something of these 
predispositions seems to be evident in the judgemental responses of third persons, 
and it is this issue that brings me to the second major consideration in attempting 
to account for the quantitative differences across the commentaries, that is, the 
potential effect that individual variables such as age, ethnicity, sex and socio- 
economic background might have had on what judges said. 
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2. Types of judge 
Although speaker variables are of considerable theoretical importance in secular 
sociolinguistic research as Milroy (1987: 97) argues, I did not attempt to apply 
controlled sampling procedures in the process of contacting informants. Like 
Kreckel (1981), my interest in the first instance was in the nature of judges' 
interpretive comments rather than in the personal characteristics of individual 
informants. 
Kreckel simply gives a very broad description of her informants. For example: 
"The twelve subjects were drawn from the subject pool of the Department of 
Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford. They ranged from 25 to 26 years, 
were of both sexes and had different educational backgrounds" (Kreckel, 1981: 
107). Nevertheless, speaker variables are presumably extremely important in 
interpretive studies of the kind attempted here, since they are intrinsic to our 
interactional experience. On the basis of the responses that were elicited, two 
speaker variables seem worthy of note. The first is sex of speaker, and the second 
social network links. 
While the experiment was not conducted with a view to comparing the 
responses in terms of sex differences, the number of comments offered by the 
female as opposed to male judges is worth noting, especially since the men 
produced considerably more words on average per commentary, even taking into 
account the relatively low number produced by Judge 15. Where the number of 
words are averaged across the non-participants only (Table 5.3), judges produced 
on average 141 words of commentary. Where the average is taken across male 
judges as opposed to female judges, the mean increases to 182 words per judge 
for 
men, and decreases to 122 words for women. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Average Number of Words for Non-Participants 
Male Female Male & Female 
Combined 
Number of Words 909 1346 2255 
Number of judges 5 11 16 
Average Number of 
Words per judge 
182 122 141 
The distribution of comments in descending order of number (Table 5.4) 
shows that male judges are predominant in terms of the greatest number of words 
provided. Indeed, five of the seven males who participated in the experiment 
offered comments involving 192 words or more. The anomaly is judge 15, but it 
appears that he is a special case in relation to the rest of the sample. 
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Table 5.4 
Words Per Judge in Descending Order of Number 
Judge Sex Words 
Participant B male 366 
Jude 6 male 275 
Jude 16 male 238 
Jude 9 male 197 
Jude 4 female 196 
Jude 2 male 192 
Participant A male 165 
Jude 14 female 163 
judge 12 female 134 
Jude 3 female 133 
Jude 11 female 122 
Jude 8 female 118 
Jude 13 female 104 
Jude 1 female 102 
Jude 5 female 102 
Jude 10 female 99 
Jude 7 female 73 
Jude 15 male 11 
Total 2786 
In order to establish whether differences in the male and female results are 
statistically significant, a t-test was calculated using StatsView-15. The results of 
this test are presented in Table 5.5, where it is shown that there is a significant 
effect of . 
0293. While the sociolinguistic differences in men and women's use of 
language is well established (Coates, 1986; Coates and Cameron, 1988), differences 
in listening behaviour across the sexes is yet to be systematically explored; but see 
Anderson (1986), Holmes (1987), and Tannen (1991) for examples of research in 
this area. ) 
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TABLE 5.5 
Unpaired t-Test for Study 1 
X1: Sex Y1: Words 
DF Unpaired t value Prob. (2-tail) 
16 -2.394 . 0293 
Group Count Mean Std Dev. Std Error 
Female 11 122.364 33.898 10.221 
Male 7 205.714 109.16 41.259 
The other major factor that may have affected judges' comments are the nature 
of an individual's personal network links since it is clear from the comments that 
different kinds of judge can be distinguished according to their knowledge of who 
took part in the exchange. The opening remarks of both participants are significant 
because they appear to place constraints on what they were willing to say in a post 
hoc context. Compare: 
Participant A 
what I have to say is bound to be biased 
because I took part in the exchange 
Participant B 
fact number one is that what I have to say is probably confusing 
since I can remember the situation 
I've got more information available 
and my knowledge of the situation determines 
what I have to say about it 
This type of information clearly distinguishes participants judges from non 
participants. However, rather than deal with participant responses separately (in 
fact participants sometimes seem to say much the same kind of thing as non- 
participants), I will deal with any differences that emerge as they arise. 
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While both participants provided information about the situation, they 
provided quite different details about what it involved for them. Compare the 
following comments: 
Participant A 
I was conscious of the situation 
we were not meeting as mates 
it was very much a student supervisor chat 
Participant B 
it was a Saturday morning 
nothing happened in terms of seeing this bloke 
it's all preliminary crap 
the function of the talk is one simple introduction 
to the physical characteristics of space 
While non-participant judges also commented on the situation in terms of 
locale and type of interaction, these comments were often inaccurate. A full 
discussion of such comments is presented in Chapter 8. However, seven non- 
participants indicated that they recognised at least one of the participants by 
naming him. Where the participants were not named, I presume this was because 
they were not recognised. I further presume that where the participants were 
recognised, non-participant judges would have access to information of a different 
kind from those who did not recognise one or either of the participants. I suggest, 
therefore, that speaker recognition is an important factor for distinguishing 
between different kinds of judge. The relevant distinctions are presented in Figure 
5.1. 
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Third Person Judges 
Interactions 
(in which one is 
a participant) 
Not recognising any 
of the participants 
Interactions 
(in which one is not 
a participant) 
Recognising one of 
the participants 
FIGURE 5.1 
Types of Judge 
Recognising both 
participants 
While non-participant judges cannot share the same knowledge of what went 
on as the participants, they do have access to their own members' resources 
resulting from real, stereotypical or imagined interactional experience. It is the 
nature of this experience, as rendered in the commentaries, that I want to try and 
model in the present work. However, this is a task for future chapters. For the 
moment it is enough to report that apart from indicating who was involved and 
what the exchange was like, little information was provided by individuals about 
the process of third person interpretation. 
Although the participants indicated that their comments would be 'biased' 
and 'confusing', they tend not to elaborate on why this should be the case. Of the 
non-participant judges, only one was to comment on the post hoc nature of the 
exercise. She said: 
Judge 5 
I missed half the content 
listening to the general flow of conversation 
PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL 
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5.3 Study 2 
The second study was constructed with two aims in mind: 
(1) to determine if the same procedure used in the pilot study would elicit the 
same or similar responses from a different set of judges; 
(2) to establish whether different stimulus material would result in different 
types of response. 
Different individuals were therefore approached, and asked to listen to and 
comment on a variety of different fragments that were selected from the office 
tape-recordings. The study was conducted in the same environment and under the 
same conditions reported in Study 1. 
5.3.1 Stimulus Material 
Rather than limit the second study to another single fragment of some exchange, I 
wanted to compare judge's comments across a series of fragments taken from 
different exchanges. But this aim raises two immediate methodological questions: 
(1) How much material judges might be expected to listen to? (cf. Study 1); 
(2) How many fragments should this material should involve? 
Given the range of responses to the fragment used in the pilot study, there did 
not seem to be any objective way of measuring the suitability of the stimulus 
material for this kind of interpretive use. Other analysts simply seem to work on 
an ad hoc basis. Kreckel (1981: 115), for example, reports that following her own 
pilot work she chose her stimulus material "at random amongst a wide range of 
alternatives". While there was also a degree of random selection in the choices I 
made, I tried to ensure that the fragments would be coherent enough to facilitate 
explanations of what judges thought might be going on communicatively. I also 
chose to restrict the real time length of each fragment to no more than one minute 
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of continuous verbal exchange. This decision was taken to enable judges to make 
comparisons between the fragments, if they so wished, without inducing fatigue 
or overtaxing memory. Though her aims were somewhat different, Kreckel (1981) 
also used relatively short sequences of dialogue (between 12 and 46 tone units) for 
her studies. By restricting the number of tone units that her judges were required 
to listen to, Kreckel was presumably able to restrict the amount of information that 
her informants would have to process in order to make the judgements they did. I 
was correspondingly interested in exploring what constraints, if any, smaller 
segments of stimulus material would place on what judges had to say. Would a 
reduced number of tone units result in a reduction of the number of comments 
judges were prepared to make, or would they affect the types of interpretive 
information they might be either willing or able to provide? 
In order to try and answer this question, six different fragments of talk were 
selected from the corpus of recordings I had collected. All the fragments were 
dialogues involving one speaker, Participant B from Study 1, talking on different 
occasions with six different interlocutors. Each fragment was extracted from 
different periods of the recordings, some near the beginning, some near the 
middle and some near the end of the exchanges involved. I tried to ensure that the 
fragments were as noise free as possible to minimise problems with audition. The 
fragments that were selected for experimental use ranged from 45 to 81 tone units 
of continuous verbal exchange. A written record of each the six fragments is 
presented in Appendix D, following the conventions adopted in the pilot study. 
The brief ethnographic details which follow were supplied by the participant who 
features in all the fragments. 
The first fragment consists of 61 tone units. It involves a male university 
teacher and a female undergraduate student, and is taken 
from roughly mid-way 
through an exchange that lasted about forty five minutes 
in total. The exchange 
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was the result of a pre-arranged meeting prior to the end of term and the onset of 
final year examinations. 
Fragment two involves the same male participant talking with a male 
colleague and close friend. The exchange took place early in the morning and prior 
to their playing squash together. It is taken from the closing section of a 
conversation that lasted more than an hour, and consists of 63 tone units. 
The third fragment is taken from near the beginning of a much shorter 
exchange lasting no more than ten minutes. The participants are the male 
occupant of the office and an elderly, male porter who was doing his late night 
rounds. It consists of 45 tone units. 
Fragment four is from the closing 65 tone units used in the pilot study material 
(see 5.2.1). The sound quality in this fragment is rather better than in the material 
that precedes it. 
In fragment five, the participants are once again colleagues and friends. The 
visitor to the office on this occasion is a different individual from the one involved 
in fragment two, but is also male. His visit is casual and social rather than pre- 
arranged, and the exchange of 30 tone units is close to the beginning of his call. 
The exchange lasted for about twenty five minutes in all. 
Finally, fragment six is taken from an exchange of about an hour. The purpose 
of the exchange was described as 'phatic'. It involves the usual occupant of the 
office and a male acquaintance who is a postdoctoral research fellow 
from another 
university department. The latter is also a regular visitor to Paris, 
because of the 
nature of his research. The fragment occurs some fifteen minutes 
into the exchange 
and at 71 tone units was the largest of the series. 
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5.3.2 Judges 
Eight judges participated in the second study. They were all outside observers, 
since information about the communicative situation was provided by the 
participant who had made the recordings. All judges were approached in the same 
way as the individuals who took part in the pilot study. The judges were aged 
between 21-42 years and came from a variety of educational and socio-economic 
backgrounds. None of the judges had any linguistic training, but three of the 
judges were colleagues of Participant B. The other five were students from 
different sectors of the University. Two women and six men agreed to act as 
judges. Each judge was allocated a number as in Study 1. This number along with 
their sex is presented in Table 5.6. 
TABLE 5.6 
Judges in Study 2 
Judge Sex 
1 female 
2 male 
3 male 
4 male 
5 male 
6 male 
7 female 
8 male 
5.3.3 Procedure 
Because the playback procedure used in Study 1 seemed to be successful, the same 
experimental format was adopted; though, of course, judges were asked to 
listen 
to and comment on a variety of recorded fragments on this occasion. 
Judges were 
again consulted on an individual basis, and I acted as the participant observer who 
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conducted the research. I also attempted to invoke the same free-response format, 
and judges were given similar verbal instructions. The instructions were: 
I am going to play you six extracts of talk which I have tape-recorded. At the 
end of the each extract, I will switch the machine off. If you have any 
comments you wish to make about the extracts I would like to note them. 
Keeping to the practice employed in the first study, I responded to any 
questions about these instructions by pointing out the need not to prejudice the 
outcome of the research. Each of the fragments was then played in turn, and all 
comments recorded in writing. Records of the comments for all judges across all 
six fragments are presented in Appendix E. 
5.3.4 Results and Discussion 
The experiment yielded a total of 4309 words, and these were processed using the 
Hypercard program. Quantitative and qualitative differences in the responses 
were noted much as in the pilot study. The total number of words provided for 
each fragment is presented in Table 5.7. 
TABLE 5.7 
Words Per Fragment in Study 2 
Fragment 
Number 
Number of 
Words 
1 1322 
2 647 
3 650 
4 846 
5 491 
6 353 
Total 4309 
156 
Although the first fragment attracted by far the most comments, my guess is 
this is because it was first in the series when judges' interest levels might be 
expected to be high. Individuals appeared to become less interested as the study 
progressed, which may account for the steady decline in the number of comments 
offered. One judge commented after the playback sequence that: 
Judge 7 
by about fragment four 
I had simply had enough 
She also reported that she found the fragments up to this point "kind of boring". 
In fact, the number of words she provides peaks at Fragment 4 and then drops 
sharply for Fragment 5 (see table 5.9). 
Fragment 4 attracts the second largest number of comments overall. It is 
difficult to know why this should be, since the trend appears to be for numbers to 
decline as the study progresses. Fragments 2 and 3, for instance both yielded 
approximately half the number of comments provided in the case of Fragment 1 
(647 and 650 respectively). By Fragment 6, the number drops to 353 words. The 
exception to this pattern is Fragment 4 at 846 words. The distribution of comments 
for individual judges across the six fragments is presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. 
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TABLE 5.8 
Words Per Judge in Study 2. 
Judge 
Fragment Number 
123456 Total 
Jude 1 (female) 346 178 103 92 106 11 836 
Jude 2 (male) 251 38 63 108 36 45 541 
Jude 3 (male) 86 89 69 58 27 28 357 
Jude 4 (male) 123 26 117 52 40 33 391 
Jude 5 (male) 24 9 30 108 128 21 320 
Jude 6 (male) 276 125 145 209 79 71 905 
Jude 7 (female) 97 97 78 139 27 74 512 
Jude 8 (male) 119 85 45 80 48 70 447 
Total Words 4309 
TABLE 5.9 
Average Number of Words in Study 2 
Male Female Male & Female 
Combined 
Number of Words 2876 1433 4309 
Number of judges 6 2 8 
Average Number of 
Words per judge 
479 716 539 
At 905 for all extracts, it was a man (Judge 6) who produced the most comments. 
Of all the judges used up to this point, this judge seemed to be most comfortable 
and enthusiastic of the non-participant informants. I suggest his responses may 
have been influenced by the nature of his professional training, since he worked in 
the field of assessing and rehabilitating adolescents who had been committed by 
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the justice system to a closed Borstal Unit. Judge 1 also contributed a relatively 
large number of comments compared to the others in the sample. She was an 
undergraduate student with no previous linguistic training, and also the youngest 
judge in the sample. Notice that the number of comments that she offers drops 
sharply for Fragment 6. She claimed not to be able to hear the fragment properly, 
and consequently stated that she had "nothing to say". While I tried to encourage 
further comment, this was not readily forthcoming and I concluded the 
experiment forthwith. I think perhaps there was element of fatigue in this last 
response, since up to this point she had approached the study with considerable 
enthusiasm. One might compare, for instance, the very detailed nature of her 
comments about Fragment 1. 
ANOVA analyses of the responses in terms of the number of words offered 
per fragment (Table 5.10) shows that there is a highly significant difference (. 0069) 
between judges. This result suggests that the choice of stimulus material is very 
important, since judges presumably have more to say about those fragments that 
have captured their interest or attention in some way. I presume that the locus of 
interest for some individual may be motivated by either positive or negative 
evaluations of a particular recording or recordings. 
However, there appears to be no significant difference (. 1478) in this study 
regarding the incidence of judges' comments and sex. Since only two women took 
part, this result may be skewed due to the size of the sample involved. 
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TABLE 5.10 
ANOVA Analysis of Study 2 
Anova table for a 2-factor Analysis of Variance on Yl : Words 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-test P value 
Sex (A) 1 8145.062 8145.062 2.188 . 1478 
Fragment (B) 5 71305.062 14261.013 3.831 . 0069 
AB 5 9401.562 1880.312 . 505 . 7704 
Error 36 134027.5 3722.986 
There were no missing cells found 
AB Incidence Table on Y1: Words 
Fragment One Two Three Four Five Six Totals 
Female 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
221.5 137.5 90.5 115.5 66.5 42.5 112.333 
Male 
6 6 6 6 6 6 36 
146.5 62 78.167 102.5 59.667 44.667 82.25 
8 8 8 8 8 8 48 Total 
165.25 80.875 81.25 105.75 61.375 44.125 89.771 
5.3.5 Conclusions Drawn from Study 2 
While judges listened to a different number of tone units in each of two studies 
that have been presented (220 units in Study 1, and 378 units in Study 2), the 
number of comments that were produced by eight judges across six fragments was 
substantially more than that produced by sixteen judges for one fragment. I 
presume this is because judges always had a new context to work on with each of 
the six fragments in turn. With less tone units to listen to in each fragment they 
were also perhaps more likely to remember particular details of the 
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communicative behaviour involved. Although it was possible that judges would 
make comparisons between the fragments in the sample, few comments of this 
type seemed to arise. By presenting judges with smaller fragments, a much more 
specific and detailed kind of interpretive work was elicited. This work appears to 
focus on the nature of inferentially based, communicative processes rather than 
contextual or situational determinants. It seems plausible to assume that the more 
talk judges have available, the more likely it is that they are able to create a context 
from what they hear. Conversely, the less context that is provided the more judges 
are likely to focus on the communicative content of what was said (see Chapters 8 
and 9). 
Unlike Study 1, comments about the auditory quality of the recordings are 
rare. Although judges were again provided with minimal feedback, this aspect of 
the research still seemed to be problematic. I found it increasingly difficult to 
avoid discussion with the judges as the study progressed. Consequently, in order 
to minimise my influence as analytic observer, I decided to change the research 
procedure by using pairs of judges. This strategy seemed to me to be less artificial, 
in the sense in which it is not unusual for human beings to talk to others about 
talk. I also felt it was important to change the stimulus material, since one speaker 
was involved in all the fragments and may have become the focus of judges' 
attention as a result. The issue of speaker recognition could also have affected 
judges' attentional strategies, and certainly seemed to affect what judges actually 
said. 
S 
It was for something of the above reasons that I designed a third study. This 
study was based on the published audio-tape recordings provided by Crystal and 
Davy (1975), and details of the work involved are considered next. 
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5.4 Study 3 
In order to provide a basis for comparison, a further six fragments of talk were 
chosen as stimulus material. The fragments were selected from the published 
corpus of Crystal and Davy (1975) because of the high auditory quality of the 
recordings; the fact that there was little chance that the speakers would be 
recognised; and the fact that the recordings are accompanied by an analytic 
commentary of the kind reported in Chapter 4. The fragments were played to 
pairs of judges, rather than individuals, to help minimise the effects of observer 
presence. 
5.4.1 Stimulus Material 
The stimulus material consisted of six fragments taken from the Crystal and Davy 
extracts. Fragments were selected on the basis of the commentaries provided by 
C&D in the notes accompanying each of the episodes they present, especially 
where these involved interpretive remarks relating to prosodic aspects of the 
exchanges. The fragments consisted of 222 tone units in total. Details of the 
communicative situation are provided for each of the fifteen episodes that make 
up the C&D corpus. These are briefly summarised for each of the chosen 
fragments as follows. Orthographic records of the fragments are presented in 
Appendix F. 
The first fragment I chose is taken from the last 40 units of what C&D describe 
as a long conversation between two men (Participants B and C) and one of the 
authors, (Participant A) who were all around 40 years of age (Crystal and Davy, 
1975: 19) The three had apparently been friends for many years. B and C had been 
invited to As house for drinks and were unaware that they were being recorded. 
The situation is described as being very relaxed. B is an accountant from Ireland, 
but has lived in Berkshire for some years. C is a primary school teacher whose 
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accent is predominantly Yorkshire. The episode as presented by C&D occurs about 
an hour after the start of the conversation. 
The second and third fragments are taken from the end of a half-hour 
conversation which involves four people (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 39-40). They are 
two women in their thirties (Participants A and C) and their husbands (C and D) 
who have just entered the room in which the women have been talking. A and C 
are from Liverpool and B and D from the Midlands. They have all lived in the 
South of England for some years and are described as displaying degrees of 
regional pronunciation. A and B are housewives, although B also does some 
primary school teaching. C and D are university teachers. The couples are well 
acquainted and since the wives have not seen each other for some time, they have 
been catching up on news. A has been telling B about her family's summer 
holiday, when they went to stay on a farm. Fragment 2 is taken from the first 45 
tone units of this conversation, and Fragment 3, which consists of 26 tone units, 
from mid-way through it. 
The fourth and fifth fragments come from an episode that was recorded 
during an informal supper party at the house of Participants B and C who are 
husband and wife (Crystal and Davy (1975: 56); 1975: 75). The participants are in 
fact different from those who produced the previous fragment, but I have kept to 
the alphabet initials used by Crystal and Davy to avoid confusion with references 
published in their book. In Fragment 4, Participants A and D are the invited guests 
and are also husband and wife. The episode is a part of pre-supper conversation. 
A is from South Wales but has lived in England for many years; B and C are from 
the North of England. The two couples have been friends for years but have not 
got together for a few months. A is in the middle of a long explanation of how she 
came to have mice in her house. The fragment consists of 36 tone units. In 
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Fragment 5, B had begun to tell a story about how her children believed in Santa 
Claus and fairies and in general. This fragment also consists of 36 tone units. 
Finally, Fragment 6 is taken from the same material used for Fragment 1. The 
topic is football and occurs just before the beginning of that fragment. It consists of 
35 tone units. 
5.4.2 Judges 
The fragments were played to eight different pairs of judges. These included one 
pair of participant judges who were a married couple (B and D in Fragments 2 and 
3), and seven pairs of non-participant judges. Although it was nearly twenty years 
after the Crystal and Davy material was published, I was fortunate enough to 
make contact with two speakers who had participated in a number of the 
exchanges. The couple in question were keen to participate in the study, and 
offered to listen to the fragments and tape-record their comments in line with 
instructions that I provided. They preferred to do this at home, in their own time, 
and without my presence. A written record of their comments is presented as 
Appendix G. Further discussion of the nature and status of these comments is 
presented in 5.4.4 below. 
Six of the non-participant pairs were university students aged between 
eighteen and twenty four from different educational and socio-economic 
backgrounds. The pairs were constituted by approaching individuals on an ad hoc 
basis and requesting their participation in the research. Where individuals 
agreed 
to participate, they were further requested to bring a friend or person of their own 
choosing to help them with the task. The remaining pair were a married couple 
aged 27 and 28 (Pair 5). The were employed as a Public Health Engineer and a 
Social Worker respectively. Table 5.11 gives details of the pairings in terms of 
gender. 
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TABLE 5.11 
Judges in Study 3 
Pair Number Sex of Judge A Sex of Judge B 
Participants 
Female Male 
Non-Particip ants 
Pair 1 Female Female 
Pair 2 Male Female 
Pair 3 Female Female 
Pair 4 Female Female 
Pair 5 Male Female 
Pair 6 Male Male 
Pair 7 Male Male 
A total of sixteen judges took part in the research. 
Though working within a different paradigm, the use of pairings in post hoc 
research of this type is also suggested by Burleson (1986). The idea emerges in the 
course of his discussion of the ways in which one might investigate impression 
formation processes. Burleson explains that within this paradigm subjects are 
provided with several passages of information describing a character who engages 
in seemingly inconsistent acts. The example he cites is an individual who ridicules 
a peer's examination performance in front of a newcomer. In order to explain what 
might have motivated this behaviour, subjects are asked to write an impression of 
the character explaining why that person acted as he or she did. Burleson goes on 
to moot the idea that pairs could be instructed to talk about why the character 
acted as he or she did and decide between themselves on a motivation for the 
character's act. By tape-recording and transcribing the resulting discussion, 
Burleson argues it would be possible to supply data for the examination of 
publically manifested attribution processes in something of a more natural way, 
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since one of the most common activities human beings engage in is talking about 
why others act as they do (Burleson, 1986: 81). 
5.4.3 Procedure 
The procedure that is described by Burleson is fairly close to the kind of 
judgemental work that I have been attempting to explore and therefore merits 
some comment. While my subjects were not directly asked to give their 
impressions of the data they listened to, nor to provide written comments as such, 
their responses could be broadly described as attributive. I surmised that the use 
of pairs might not only help to minimise the effect of observer presence, but also 
would serve to generate something of a more spontaneous appraisal of the 
stimulus material. Sociolinguists such as Labov (1966) and Milroy (1980) have of 
course been long aware of this difficulty in their attempts to elicit and record 
vernacular speech. 
Since it would be difficult to keep a record of two sets of comments, the 
experimental procedure was modified in a number of ways. The pairs of non- 
participant judges were invited to the same room that the previous studies were 
conducted in and invited to occupy the two chairs sitting in front of the tape- 
recorder ready to playback the stimulus material. They were shown how to use 
the machine, since I explained that as far as possible they would be left alone to 
undertake the task that was required of them, namely, to listen to and comment on 
the six recorded fragments. Permission to record their comments was sought, and 
to this end a second tape-recorder was placed in the room. The pairs were 
instructed to switch this on at the end of each fragment and prior to making any 
comments. They were given the same instructions as in the previous two studies 
and following any questions about what was required were left to their own 
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devices. While the same mode was used with the two participant judges, they 
undertook to complete the study in their own home as I noted above. 
A transcribed record, in ordinary orthography, was produced for each pair of 
comments. The comments of the non-participant judges are presented in 
Appendix H. Permission to use the comments for purposes of the present research 
was given in all cases. 
5.4.4 Results and Discussion 
Given the number of comments that were generated by this study, in relationship 
to the least number of tone units, the use of pairs of judges has to be rated as 
highly successful. The participant judges produced 2536 words of comment across 
the six fragments, and the non-participant judges a total of 5051 words, giving an 
overall total of 7587 words (see Table 5.12). 
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TABLE 5.12 
Number of Words for all Fragments in Study 3 
Judges Words 
Participant 1 1226 
Participant 2 1310 
Total Words for 
Participants 2536 
Pair 1 448 
Pair 2 680 
Pair 3 618 
Pair 4 622 
Pair 5 626 
Pair 6 708 
Pair 7 1349 
Total Words for 
Pairs 5051 
Overall Total 7587 
The participant judges produced the greatest number of comments by a 
considerable margin, presumably because, like judge 2 in the pilot study, they 
simply had more information available. The male judge from this pairing also had 
professional analytic interest in the material since he had helped to collect and 
publish the corpus. It is not my intention to use these comments in order to make 
rigorous analytic comparisons, since a great deal of time had elapsed between the 
recordings as the informants themselves note. If participant responses are to be of 
analytic use in ascertaining what has gone on in an exchange, in line with the kind 
of work undertaken by Gumperz (1982a) or Tannen (1984) for example, then they 
clearly have to be elicited as soon after the exchange as practicable (cf. the 
comments of the participants in Study 1). 
168 
The following example is perhaps rather extreme, but demonstrates the kind 
of difficulty that can arise, since one of the judges fails to recognise even her own 
voice. 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
B 
well 
do you remember recording that 
A 
I don't 
B 
don't you 
well you could recognise yourself on it couldn't you 
A 
was that me 
B 
yeah 
A 
that was I was talking about the pig 
B 
yes 
no no 
the one saying most about the pig was Holly 
A 
oh 
B 
about the children's reaction to the pigs 
you were in the background 
B 
in the foreground really 
I was in the background 
you subsequently tell the tale about the pig 
that the kids from Wynchmore Hill went to see um 
where they were they fed him with bits of carrot 
all the kids gave him bits of carrot 
do you 
A 
yeah yeah 
B 
remember that 
A 
mm 
yes yes 
I do 
but what oh 
I didn't remember that at all 
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A's expressed difficulty in recalling where the event took place and who was 
involved in fact surfaces on more than one occasion. Rost (1990) comments on this 
issue in his discussion of potential sources of distortion that should be taken into 
account in different interpretive contexts. He notes: 
Tasks that require responses during the text listening may provide 
constraints on the listener different from those that require responses after text 
listening. Responses after listening are subject to intervening conditions that 
affect memory for detail, whereas responses while listening are subject to 
conditions of time pressure that may affect one's ability to reflect upon the 
meaning carried by the overall text. Both conditions constrain the listener's 
response. (Rost, 1990: 125) 
However, the responses also include interpretations of communicative 
behaviour that are not unlike those provided by the non-participant judge 
pairings, and I have included them in my analysis accordingly. Compare the 
following comments provided with regard to Study 1, Extract 1, for instance: 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Participant A 
the one guy 
in spite of the other one 
was trying to comment factually on the game 
and the other one 
was expressing his reactions to overcrowding 
and so on 
Participant B 
that's right 
the sea of bodies 
and the hordes of children 
whereas the other one 
was describing the size of the opening 
Pair 1 
was it in a pub somewhere 
cos it sounded like just after the match 
an they were having a drink or two 
you mean because they sounded so garbled 
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Pair 3 
it seems to be some discussion of a match 
yeah 
one guy is talking about gates 
and the other guy is talking about a sea of bodies 
mm 
when they talk about Chelsea and Leeds 
he didn't seem so pleased about it 
Pair 5 
they're both commenting on the same thing 
and they're both wanting their word in 
do you know what I mean James 
mm 
Pair 6 
it sounded like two friends 
who were chatting over a football match 
both knowing what the others opinions are 
so there is no need to communicate just talk 
a lot of it is not so much words as uhm blab blah blah 
sort of sounds 
Pair 7 
the subject that they were talking about is exciting 
but I don't think they were excited themselves 
they are trying to create an atmosphere of excitement 
it's quite repetitive 
especially the guy 
who was trying to hog the conversation 
Notice also the interactive nature of these responses. In the two previous 
studies, I had tried to avoid entering into any kind of dialogue with the judges in 
order that any information provided would be based on their perceptions of what 
was going on rather than mine. The pairing technique allows for a much more 
spontaneous kind of data to emerge. It also demonstrates that individuals are not 
always in agreement about what they have observed or inferred from the stimulus 
material. 
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Of the non-participants, Pair 7 provided a substantially larger portion of 
comments than the other judges. This pair described themselves as acquaintances 
rather than close friends, and this is perhaps reflected in the nature of their 
comments which tend to verge on the argumentative throughout their discussion. 
As in the two previous studies, different individuals again responded to the 
fragments with varying degrees of verbosity. The distribution of comments in 
terms of the number of words produced by non-participant judges is presented in 
Table 5.13. 
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TABLE 5.13 
Number of Words Per Judge in Study 3 
Judge 
Fragment Number 
123456 Total 
Participant 1 
(female) 152 310 285 160 192 127 1226 
Participant 2 
(male) 211 336 208 190 177 188 1310 
Judge A from 
Pair Number: 
Pair 1 (female) 38 19 51 72 18 21 219 
Pair 2 (female) 57 80 68 67 21 50 343 
Pair 3 (female) 82 99 1 37 10 38 267 
Pair 4 (female) 68 32 49 86 78 26 339 
Pair 5 (female) 74 46 88 95 59 23 385 
Pair 6 (male) 53 58 29 25 76 62 303 
Pair 7 (male) 59 105 97 63 15 210 549 
Judge B from 
Pair Number: 
Pair 1 (female) 32 52 47 27 36 35 229 
Pair 2 (male) 57 39 51 69 44 77 337 
Pair 3 (female) 95 84 50 48 47 27 351 
Pair 4 (female) 49 71 10 76 24 53 283 
Pair 5 (male) 59 72 27 31 25 27 241 
Pair 6 (male) 105 47 60 61 23 109 405 
Pair 7 (male) 126 217 126 75 29 227 800 
ANOVA analyses of the non-participant responses are presented in Table 5.14. 
As in Study 2, the results show that there is a significant (. 046), though not as 
marked, effect across the sample in terms of the number of words used to describe 
the different fragments. As in Study 1, but unlike Study 2, there is a high 1e"Zel of 
significance (. 0058) in terms of sex. This pattern would seem to confirm that the 
results of the second study are probably distorted, because of the size and 
distribution of the sexes in the sample, and also with males producing 
significantly more comments. Given the level of significance indicated by the 
ANOVA results, I think future work with third person judges could well 
benefit 
173 
from controlled sampling with regard to sex of speaker. The distribution of 
comments across both single and mixed sex pairings would also be worth 
investigating. 
TABLE 5.14 
ANOVA Analysis of Study 3 
Anova table for a 2-factor Analysis of Variance on Y1: Words 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F-test P value 
Sex (A) 1 10751.254 8145.062 8.07 . 0058 
Fragment (B) 5 15926.627 14261.013 2.391 . 046 
AB 5 19047.585 1880.312 2.859 . 027 
Error 72 1332.264 3722.986 
There were no missing cells found 
AB Incidence Table on Y1: Words 
Fragment One Two Three Four Five Six Totals 
8 8 8 8 8 8 48 Female 
61.875 137.5 90.5 63.5 36.625 34.125 50.333 
6 6 6 6 6 6 36 
Male 76.5 65 65 54 35.333 118.667 73.194 
14 14 14 14 14 14 84 Total 
68.143 72.929 53.857 59.429 36.071 70.357 60.131 
If the number of words are averaged across the non-participant sample in 
terms of sex (Figure 5.2), male judges are found to provide 58% of the comments. 
There were three female to female pairs, two male to male pairs, and two mixed 
pairs of judges in this group. 
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Number 
Female% 42% 
Male% 58 % 
FIGURE 5.2 
Average Non-Participant Words for Study 3 
The proportion of comments shared by the participant mixed pairing was again 
male dominated, but the difference between the two was much less marked as can 
be seen in Figure 5.3. 
Average Words: Study 3. 
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Av 
_ 
Words: Participants 3_ 
, 
Number 
ia1e% 48 % 
e% 52% 
FIGURE 5.3 
Average Participant Words for Study 3 
Given the distribution of comments across the fragments, I think it is fair to 
say that the use of pairings must have affected the judgemental process. If the six 
fragments are ranked in terms of the number of words elicited, then the following 
order is produced: 
Table 5.15 
Rank Order of Words in the Three Studies 
Fragment 
Number 
Rank Order 
1 1 
2 2 
3 6 
4 4 
5 3 
6 5 
The pattern here seems to be different from Study 2, since Fragment 
6, for 
example, attracts the third largest number of comments. By 
having to share the 
interpretive work, it is possible that the pairs may have 
helped to minimise 
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fatigue. They were also able to share their different perceptions and 
interpretations of the fragments in a way that had not been made possible in the 
previous two studies. For these reasons alone, I suggest that future interpretive 
work with third person judges would benefit from being conducted with pairs of 
informants, rather than with individuals operating in conjunction with the 
researcher. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to provide an empirical means for exploring the 
evaluative responses of third person judges to a variety of spoken language 
episodes. Judges' responses were obtained by playing back part of a sequence of 
verbal exchange to different individuals and eliciting comments. A free response 
format was designed for this purpose. Three different studies were undertaken. 
These studies were exploratory in the sense in which the research design changed 
as I proceeded. In other words, changes were made in terms of stimulus material, 
judges and methods used in each study in the light of experience and findings 
gained from the preceding one. 
The studies involved forty two judges who produced a total of 14682 words of 
comment. The commentaries provided a substantial data base for investigating the 
scope and utility of third person interpretive work, and it is this work that I now 
want to consider. Two major questions arise from these studies: 
(1) What kinds of information are revealed by the vocabularies that were 
elicited?; 
(2) What kinds of interpretive work do the vocabularies imply? 
In order to answer these questions, judges' repertoires were inductively inspected 
for pattern. 
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Since to my knowledge there are no existing frameworks or procedures for 
investigating the nature of such data, the following chapter attempts to devise an 
appropriate analytic instrument. Because of the nature of the data, I have sought to 
devise an instrument that is flexible enough to describe the range of responses 
elicited and rigorous enough to make comparisons across and between them. The 
results of applying this instrument will then be subject to higher levels of 
predication in order to facilitate exploration of the tacit assumptions upon which 
they are based (Chapters 7-9). Assessment of findings will be gauged in terms of 
their potential contribution to the analytic process of warranting claims about talk 
in general. 
CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSING THE RESPONSE DATA 
6.0 Third Person Metalanguage 
The data for analysis in this and subsequent chapters is provided by the corpus of 
interpretive comments that were elicited under the conditions described in 
Chapter 5. These comments demonstrate the willingness and ability of third 
person judges to provide information about various communicative matters from 
outside the participation framework. Since the comments consist of utterances that 
are used for talking about instances of actual language use, they can be considered 
as a special kind of metalanguage, and thus as expressing an everyday kind of 
metalinguistic awareness. Crystal (1977: 385) defines metalinguistics as "a term 
used by some linguists for the study of language in relation to other aspects of 
cultural behaviour". The metalinguistic ability of ordinary members as explored in 
this thesis pertains to their capacity to respond to what is accomplished by 
context-dependent speech, under post hoc conditions. 
While I presume that this ability depends on the metalinguistic repertoire 
available within a given language or speech community, the actual metalinguistic 
performance of judges may have been hampered by the lack of awareness of what 
is achieved through the highly conventionalised medium of speech, and/or by the 
impact of extra-linguistic knowledge on the construction of specific speech 
events. 
Like Kreckel (1981), I also presume that the metalinguistic repertoires available 
within a given language or speech community will vary according to the 
communicative norms of the community in question, and also across different 
178 
179 
speakers or groups of speaker within those communities. Although the use of 
everyday metalanguage in different language communities would make for 
interesting cross-linguistic comparison, and could form the basis of future work, 
this chapter focuses on the nature of interpretive vocabularies elicited from 
linguistically naive native judges of English. The notion of metalanguage in this 
case, then, is perhaps most closely related to what Bloomfield (1944) refers to as 
'secondary responses' to language, where these consist of non-technical or non- 
scientific utterances based on popular lore (cf. the metalanguage used by linguists 
to describe and analyse the object language; also Isaacs and Clark (1987), who 
compare references in conversation between professional experts and ordinary 
members). It is the character of these non-scientific utterances, as applied to pre- 
selected stretches of discourse, that is considered here. 
There are long established precedents for studying what ordinary members 
have to say about language use. Hoenigswald (1966), for example, suggests that 
one of the main concerns of scholarship should be to match informants' 
descriptions with the linguistic analysis of the data. He notes: "We should not only 
be interested in (a) what goes on (language), but also (b) in how people react to 
what goes on (they are persuaded, they are put off etc. ) and in (c) what people say 
goes on (talk concerning language)" (Hoenigswald, 1966: 20). 
While my particular interest is in what people say goes on in language ('talk 
concerning language'), this interest is not precisely in the traditional folklinguistic 
sense that Bloomfield and Hoenigswald intend. As opposed to being of a more 
general type, the responses that I want to explore involve folklinguistic 
metalanguage that is derived from playback; that is, where what judges 
have to 
say is mainly, but not always exclusively, concerned with the post 
hoc description 
of recorded (stimulus) fragments. 
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I am not concerned with debating the psychological status of this 
metalanguage (see, for example, Nisbett and Wilson (1977), who discuss the 
relationship between verbal reports and ordinary members' awareness of 
perceptual and memorial processes in the context of social psychological 
experiments; also Stitch and Nichols (1992), and Goldman (1992a; 1992b), who 
debate the nature of folk psychological ascriptions and the relative merits of 
simulation theory in helping to account for them), but rather seek to develop a 
research instrument for analysing the response data. The data analysis can be 
divided into three main components or stages (cf. the procedures for doing critical 
discourse analysis advanced by Fairclough, 1989). These are: 
(1) Description of the kinds of vocabulary that judges use in their responses; 
(2) Codification of the types of information that are made salient by these 
vocabularies; 
(3) Modelling of the (post hoc) interpretation abilities that different types of 
response imply. 
The instrument is intended to be flexible enough to describe judges' comments 
in general, and rigorous enough to facilitate comparisons across and within them. 
Once established, it will be used to examine how individuals make use of 
linguistic and social knowledge in their post hoc interpretive accounts. This 
examination forms the basis of subsequent chapters, the empirical findings from 
which are used to support the thesis that studies of lay understanding and 
explanation can contribute important 'common-sense' or 'real world' insights into 
the nature of human communicative behaviour, and particularly the signalling of 
communicative goals. It also ought to help redress the widely held and 
'unflattering view of the lay person as an imperfect scientist' (Hewstone, 1983b: 
25). 
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6.1 The Descriptive Framework 
To the best of my knowledge there has been little or no work that has attempted to 
investigate response language of the kind at issue here in any systematic way (cf. 
Gumperz, 1982a; 1982b). In the absence of an established framework, I have 
developed an analytical procedure that is synthesised from a variety of 
disciplinary sources. It is this procedure which is considered next. 
6.1.1 Preparing the Data Base 
In order to facilitate description of the object data (in the form of the transcribed 
records which I detailed in the previous chapter, and which are presented as 
Appendices B, C, E, G and H), a text-processing program was developed using 
Macintosh-Hypercard. The task of writing this program was accomplished in the 
following way: 
(1) the comments of each judge were sorted into individual, MacIntosh- 
Hypercard files; 
(2) the Hypercard stack was programed to produce an alphabetical listing of 
the words used by each judge, and also the total number of words 
generated from each of the three experimental studies; 
(3) on the basis of these listings, all closed-class lexical items (i. e. auxiliary 
verbs, coordinators, determiners, prepositions and pronouns) were filtered 
out of the corpus, since they were not considered to be informationally 
% salient; 
(4) the remaining open-class lexical items were listed in terms of the number of 
unique words used by individual judges, and then tabled in descending 
order of frequency; 
(5) each item of unique (open-class) vocabulary was ascribed to its own 
lexical 
category (i. e. noun, adjective, main verb, and adverb), thus enabling the 
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provision of head-word frequencies and concordance listings for all uses of 
a particular word. 
This procedure was repeated by systematically working through the 
Hypercard stacks until each item of lexis was counted. The total number of words 
used by each judge was recorded at the head of each list, followed by the number 
of unique words, and finally the number of words that were filtered out. 
Once frequency listings for the unique words were established by 'splitting' 
the vocabularies' in this way, a second program was developed in order to 
generate concordance strings of all occasions on which selected words were used. 
Regular patterns of language use, across and within particular strings, could then 
be readily discerned by the process of 'lumping'. In the next section, a small 
number of examples are presented to show how this procedure of 'splitting' and 
then 'lumping' the vocabularies was applied in practice. 
6.1.2 Searching for Pattern 
Given the large number of unique words involved, I initially undertook to identify 
and list only those items of vocabulary that judges appeared to use in a quasi- 
technical way. The ten most frequently cited words of this kind are presented in 
Table 6.1. 
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TABLE 6.1 
The Ten Most Frequent Quasi-Technical Descriptors 
Rank Terms Total number of 
occurrences 
1 talk 98 
2 conversation(s) 82 
3 sound(s) 50 
4 voice(s) 39 
5 tone 28 
6 question(s) 22 
7 word(s) 22 
8 answer(s) 21 
9 accent(s) 15 
10 speech 14 
Concordances were generated for each of these words using the Hypercard 
program. Hence 98 concordance strings were produced for the word 'talk', 82 
strings were produced for 'conversation', 50 were produced for the word 
'sound(s)', 39 strings were produced for 'voice(s)', and so on. The strings were 
then inductively inspected for pattern, and then 'lumped' into groups. Examples 
of the groups identified in this way are listed below. These are taken from 
concordances for the words 'conversation', 'talk', and 'tone'. 
conversation 
it's like any conversation 
it's chatty conversation 
it's quite a serious conversation 
it's a peculiar conversation 
it's a toilet conversation 
it's a filling-in-space conversation 
it's not official conversation 
talk 
they talk about a range of topics 
they talk about money 
they talk about a kid's language 
they talk about previous events 
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they talk about tax 
they talk about the tax man 
tone 
she changes her tone quite often 
she changes the tone of her voice 
he changes his tone 
there was a complete change of tone 
yes and no have the same tone 
Notice that these examples typically involve a predicator and argument describing 
some state of affairs. While the details may differ, what is described in the 
comments are semantically related properties or qualities that judges have 
associated with the stimulus fragments. 
Consider, for example, the set of strings involving the word 'conversation'. 
Here a number of references are made to what are presumably conventional 
properties or qualities of named speech activities ('conversations'). These 
references are provided in the form of evaluative statements to the effect that the 
recorded fragment 'X' can be described as a particular type of conversation in two 
basic ways: (a) by comparing it to similar forms of talk ('it's like any 
conversation'), and/or (b) by contrasting it with other forms of talk that are 
distinctive (cf. the adjectives 'chatty', 'serious', 'peculiar', 'toilet' etc. ). Many 
instances of this type of statement were noted, but further inspection of the 
concordance lists also revealed that the word 'conversation' was used by judges in 
a rather different sense as the following examples show: 
the host leads the conversation 
the conversation is disjointed 
the conversation doesn't follow a logical pattern 
there are lulls in the conversation 
the conversation shifted 
Here, judges' comments seem to refer to some perceived unit of social 
action/organisation, namely, 'a conversation' (cf. Levinson, 1983: 318). 
This use of 
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the word 'conversation' leads to a different type of evaluation, since the references 
are not so much concerned with specifying the type of speech activity involved, 
but rather with how this activity has been organised or managed by its 
participants. Instances of this kind were therefore collected separately. 
Concordances for the word 'talk' reveal that it is used as a synonym for 
'conversation' in both the above senses. However, in the examples cited above it is 
used as a prepositional verb in conjunction with phrasal complements that 
provide evaluative judgements which refer to the 'subject' of interaction, or what 
is being 'talked about'. The subjects that are named in this regard include: 
a range of topics 
money 
a kid's language 
previous events 
tax 
the tax man 
Examples of this kind were, once again, collected as a distinctive set. 
However, the referential focus of judges' remarks were not always easily 
delimited. Comments involving the word 'tone' provide an interesting case in 
point. In folklinguistic terms, at least, the semantic boundaries of this word seem 
to be rather fuzzy, presumably because 'tone' is an abstract lexical item. As a 
result, one can only guess at the sense(s) in which the term is used/understood by 
different judges. It seems, for instance, that 'tone' is not only used to describe the 
linguistic behaviour of individual speakers (e. g. "she changes her tone quite often"; 
"he changes his tone"; "she changes the tone of her voice"), but also the properties 
of individual utterances (e. g. "yes and no have the same tone"), and indeed, 
properties of the discourse in general (e. g. "there was a complete change in tone"). 
Are the changes and/or properties referred to here directly concerned with 
prosodic modulations, say in voice quality or pitch? Are they attempts to evaluate 
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speaker moods, states and attitudes, or even 'keyings', in the sense of Hymes 
(1972)? Or could they in fact be referring to an admixture of all these properties? It 
is simply very difficult, if not impossible, to establish whether the term is used by 
judges in any consistent way. 
This difficulty was addressed at the next stage of analysis, that is, when the 
various patterns identified at the 'lumping' stage were used to establish an 
informal descriptive taxonomy of the types of linguistic and social information 
which judges made salient in the commentaries. In order to try and ensure a 
comprehensive system of classification, and one that could also be checked or 
replicated by another coder working independently, I adopted the following 
procedure (cf. the SP approach to coding reported in Bull and Roger, 1989: 15-18). 
6.2 Coding Procedure 
The procedure is based on characteristics systematised from the point of view of 
the third person descriptions. Different types of description were classified with 
the aid of a binary features matrix, and along dimensions that are both general and 
specific. These dimensions were to be modified or refined on a great number of 
occasions to accommodate the range of comments that judges provided. Problem 
cases, as with 'tone' above, were characterised by multiple coding. 
6.2.1 Ethnographic Categories 
In the first instance, judges' comments were subject to a general system of 
classification based on the ethnographically motivated framework proposed by 
Hymes (1972; 1974). This framework suggests that the analysis of a communicative 
event ought to begin with a description of those components or factors that are 
likely to be salient for professional observers. I was interested to discover which, if 
any, of these factors might prove salient for my naive observers. 
187 
Hymes uses the acronym SPEAKING as a mnemonic for observers who wish 
to undertake the study of culturally situated communication (Hymes, 1972: 59). 
This code word has nothing to do with the form of an eventual model or theory, 
but rather presupposes a set of descriptive questions to be answered with respect 
to particular events (e. g. 'What kind of event is it? '; 'What is it about? '; 'Who is 
taking part? '; 'What is said, and in what manner? ' etc. ). Since many of the third 
person responses are redolent of answers to questions of this type, these 
components were used to undertake initial classification of the commentaries. 
It is perhaps worth keeping in mind, as Coulthard (1977: 47) argues, that the 
components have been artificially separated for the purpose of exposition. 
Coulthard goes on to state that: 
any detailed description of a speech event must include information on all 
components and the inter-relations between them, though Hymes suggests 
that the relative importance of particular components will vary from 
community to community. (Coulthard, 1977: 47) 
From a post hoc perspective, it seems reasonable to assume that judges are 
unlikely to provide information about all the components, since they are not 
trained observers. I presume it is highly likely, however, that the relative 
importance of particular components will vary from person to person. The eight 
descriptive components enumerated by Hymes are outlined in brief as follows. 
Each component is accompanied by examples of third person comments, where 
these seem to provide the sorts of information that Hymes seeks to characterise. 
For ease of reference, the examples cited are all taken from Study 1. % 
(1) (S)etting and Scene 
Setting refers to the physical circumstances in which communication takes place, 
and scene to the cultural definition of the occasion. Descriptive questions to be 
answered about this component include: 'What kind of communicative event 
is 
188 
taking place?; 'What is it about? '; 'Why is it happening? '; 'Where and when does it 
occur? '; 'What does the setting look like? ' (cf. Saville-Troike, 1982: 139). Comments 
by judges' in this category include descriptive statements such as the following: 
Study 1 
judge 2 
it's a casual encounter 
he's just called by 
the business is to come after 
Judge 6 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
the preliminaries before getting down to the real stuff 
Judge 8 
it sounded like a school common room 
with teachers discussing things 
it's an occasion to go for coffee 
and talk while you are making it 
Judge 9 
it's a friendly discussion between two people 
in an office or at home 
it's in their tea break 
(2) (P)articipants 
Participants are those individuals who take part in communicative events as first 
or second person speaker-hearers / addressor-addressees / sender-receivers. 
Answers to the question, 'Who is involved, and in what relations? ' provide 
information about this component (cf. Saville-Troike, 1982: 141). Descriptive, 
details may be given about the indexical or personal characteristics of the 
participants as individuals, as well as their interpersonal relations. Judges' 
comments that were coded in this category include statements such as: 
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Study 1 
Judge 1 
the first person was Ian 
I recognise his manner. 
the other guy is a southerner 
RP 
Judge 2 
I don't know the second man 
the first person is Ian 
Judge 9 
they are intellectuals 
who are not disassociated 
Judge 10 
it's a conversation between two males 
Judge 13 
they know each other 
Judge 15 
they sounded cultured 
well educated 
Judge 16 
they know each other 
they are acquainted 
(3) (E)nds 
Ends refer to the conventionally recognised and expected communicative 
outcomes of an exchange. They also refer to the personal goals of the participants 
in the course of communicating. The basic descriptive question to answer about 
ends is: 'What are the participants trying to do as communicators'? Judges' 
comments that provide information about 'ends' include statements like: 
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Study 1 
Judge 2 
there is an active attempt to converge in style and attitude 
Judge 4 
one was probing for advice 
feeling his way along 
he was sounding out 
Judge 6 
the speakers are feeling their way around 
trying to establish a rapport 
Judge 12 
they didn't seem to want to go into deep detailed discussion 
they are people filling in time 
because they happen to be there 
it wasn't for a purpose 
(4) (A)ct sequence 
This component includes information about the ordering of communicative acts 
within an event. It also includes information about the form and content of what is 
said, and the relationship of what is said to the subject matter or topic at issue. 
Descriptions in this category provide answers to questions such as: 'How is the 
event organised? ', 'What was said? ', 'What did the participants talk about? ' 
Comments of this type include: 
Study 1 
Judge 3 
there is a long embarrassed pause 
a conversational lapse 
he thinks about his words 
there are gaps 
Judge 4 
they talk about a range of topics 
black holes 
how to teach, how to get money 
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Judge 5 
they are talking about Jane 
Judge 6 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
the preliminaries before getting down to the real stuff 
they move on to different things 
judge 7 
they talk about a kid's language 
they also talk about money 
and life as a student 
Judge 8 
it sounded a school common room 
with teachers discussing things 
the switch of topics is indicative of relaxation 
it's fairly well balanced 
judge 10 
the talk is informal 
come into the flat and have coffee 
student-teacher relations are discussed 
Judge 11 
there is something about life insurance 
and Christmas 
and forking out one hundred and eighty five pounds 
for something 
Judge 13 
one man is entertaining the other to coffee 
he plays the role of host 
and asks all the questions 
Judge 14 
the conversation doesn't follow a logical pattern 
it switches 
A tends to talk only when spoken to 
but there is some overlapping 
which shows that it isn't terribly formal 
Judge 16 
they talk about three subjects 
painting 
black holes 
and teaching 
they sort of linked together 
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(5) (K)ey 
Key refers to the tone, manner or spirit in which a particular message is conveyed. 
I have used it not only to includes affectual orientation, but also the lack of fit 
between what someone is saying and the key that they use in the process. 
Study 1 
Judge 1 
the other guy was not relaxed 
he was cagey 
Judge 2 
Ian operates at a flippant level 
yes marks understanding rather than agreement 
really is ambiguous 
it's not convincing 
it had shades in it 
Judge 4 
the other speaker sounder eager 
but hesitant 
it came from the way he said things 
may be his tone 
Judge 6 
the conversation is carried on in lackadaisical fashion 
the interactants are not interested in what they are saying 
to each other 
the tone is one of trying to feel each other out 
trying to establish a rapport 
Judge 7 
they are kind of modest with each other 
Judge 8 
it's not intimate 
but relaxed and friendly 
Judge 9 
it's all vaguely ironic 
one guy is slightly paternal 
but not obtrusive 
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Judge 12 
there is a mild sort of modesty 
Judge 13 
the other man sounded a little bit uneasy 
rather stilted in fact 
(6) (I)nstrumentalities 
Instrumentalities are characterised by the choice of language medium (written, 
spoken etc. ), and the forms used in their linguistic realisation (language, dialect, 
register; code etc. ). Given that the medium was held consistent, in the form of 
tape-recorded extracts, details such as the following were reported: 
Study 1 
Judge 2 
they settled into a rhythm 
there is lots of hesitancy 
uhm uh and so on 
Ian is slangy rather than colloquial 
Judge 3 
there are gaps 
and uhms 
Ian on the other hand isn't concerned about his realisations 
Judge 4 
there are plenty uhms 
I means 
and you knows 
they talk fairly lucidly 
but they still put things like that in 
Judge 5 
both talk well 
in almost complete sentences 
Judge 6 
he said bona fide person 
I didn't like it 
it has underlying assumptions 
there are symptoms of a superficial level of conversation 
tossed away remarks and the like 
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tossed away remarks and the like 
there is a lot of non-strict grammatical speech 
Judge 7 
they use words like bona fide and relationship 
and use hip language like rip-offs 
Judge 8 
they didn't choose their words in terms of formal conversation 
there is no formal language 
words like rip-offs are used 
Judge 9 
the slang makes it easy to follow 
the two people use the same language 
one of them uses a foreign accent 
it sounded more Indian than Iranian 
Judge 10 
there are polite comments 
like oh that looks nice 
Judge 12 
cliches are used 
words such as junk 
and rip-offs are used 
it's a thing people do 
(7) (N)orms of interaction and interpretation 
Interactional and interpretive norms refer to the specific behaviours and 
properties that attach to speaking. These are shared by members of the same 
speech community, but as Gumperz (1982a) points out are largely unspoken in 
everyday conversational exchange. However, evidence that such norms exist, and 
what is more can be viewed post hoc, is inherent in comments of the following 
kind: 
Study 1 
Judge 4 
it just sounded normal like any conversation 
195 
yeah yeah grunt is an indication of his interest 
most people do similar things 
Judge 6 
the whole conversation is a throwaway 
like talking about what's for tea 
and going to films 
it reminds me of other conversations I've listened to 
Judge 9 
he must have know the other guy to use an accent like that 
Judge 10 
there are polite comments 
like oh that looks nice 
Judge 13 
it's a common conversational thing 
that when people talk about money 
they talk about the tax man 
(8) (G)enre 
The final component, 'genre' refers to clearly demarcated types of utterance or 
speech event. While judges could presumably distinguish between different types 
of event vis-a-vis (lectures, interviews, sermons etc. ), they were asked to listen to 
broadly similar kinds of talk, in the form of spontaneously occurring dialogues. 
Nonetheless, they were still able to make distinctions that indicate their ability to 
differentiate between marked instances of the activity involved. Compare: 
Study 1 
Judge 3 
it sounded like a beginning of term interview 
Judge 4 
it just sounded normal like any conversation 
it wasn't like a lecture or an argument 
Judge 6 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
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Judge 7 
it's a typical opening to a conversation 
Judge 8 
it's a discussion between colleagues 
Judge 9 
it's a friendly discussion between two people 
Judge 10 
it's easy chatty conversation 
the talk is informal 
Judge 14 
it's not official conversation 
Judge 16 
it's not a conversation where they were particularly thinking 
about what was coming 
By beginning to categorise the response data in this way, I sought to derive an 
array of instances that would not only help to facilitate more detailed exploration 
of the different kinds of information that judges were able to recover post hoc, but 
which would also serve to guide hypotheses about how individuals arrived at 
their interpretations. However, one of the major shortcomings of Hymes's 
ethnographic categorisation is that it fails to make any connection between the 
information that some outside observer might provide about a communicative 
event, and how this information has been recovered. 
As Gumperz (1982a: 154ff. ) points out, the principal goal of ethnography is to 
show how social norms affect the use and distribution of communicative resources 
in speech communities, not to deal with interpretation. Since the descriptive 
categories were really developed for culturally situated work in the field, rather 
than for the kind of exploratory methods used here, these were revised and 
refined in order to accommodate the specific types of information that judges 
supplied with respect to the stimulus material. The response data was therefore 
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re-analysed not only to incorporate this information, but also to delineate the 
modes of interpretive work that were employed in the process. 
6.2.2 Descriptive Domains 
Subsequent analysis of the response data was based on a modified version of 
Hymes's ethnographic schema, which I reorganised into three macro-descriptive 
categories or domains. The domains are clearly interdependent, but help to 
distinguish between the different types of description that judges offered. These 
include descriptions about: 
(1) textual features of the fragments; 
(2) contextual features of the fragments; 
(3) supratextual features of the fragments. 
A features matrix was established to classify the different sorts of information 
that judges provided within each of these domains at various levels of abstraction. 
By taking a level-by-level approach to description, I was able to provide a much 
finer-grained analysis of the substance of judges remarks, as briefly outlined 
below. 
First, the textual domain subsumes descriptions about communicative features 
or phenomena that are encoded by participants in the process of creating and 
organising what is said (cf. Hymes's 'instrumentalities' category). These features 
are generally recognised as having surface linguistic form (cf. Labov and Fanshel, 
1977; Gumperz, 1982a; Fairclough, 1989), and can be subdivided into the 
components that are summarised in Figure 6.1. 
Gumperz (1982a, Chapter 6) refers to such features as 'contextualisation cues', 
whose function in situated interpretation is to contribute to the signalling of 
contextual presuppositions. Contextualisation cues can be realised in a number of 
198 
ways, and are based on the historically given linguistic repertoire of 
conversational participants. These repertoires are not only verbal (morphological, 
syntactic, phonological, prosodic) and nonverbal (kinesic, proxemic), but also 
sequential and cohesive (suprasentential). They are not usually talked about in 
context, and can only be studied in process and post hoc. 
Textual Descriptions 
Speech products 
Morpho-syntactic 
Lexis Phrases 
Prosodic 
Intonation Paralanguage 
Turn-taking 
Interruptive Non-Interruptive 
FIGURE 6.1 
Components of the Textual Domain 
Topic 
A 
Subject Actions 
In the absence of visual information, and therefore as one might expect, the 
third person descriptions were almost exclusively concerned with phenomena of 
the verbal and sequential kind. The response data was consequently inspected for 
two different types of vocabulary in the first instance - vocabularies that made 
direct reference to the verbal properties of speakers' utterances ('speech products') 
on the one hand, and vocabularies that made direct reference to the organising 
mechanisms or properties ('sequential products') emanating from the integration 
Sequential products 
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of speaker utterances on the other. Both these categories were then gradually 
refined to incorporate more specific types of information, the details of which are 
presented in Chapter 7. Comments about the textual domain were strikingly few 
in number. 
Second, the contextual domain subsumes descriptions that characterise what are 
often referred to as the 'extralinguistic' properties of verbal exchange. These 
properties are documented under the rubric of Hymes's categories of 'setting' and 
'participants', and as such refer to those physical-biological characteristics of 
communication which have been the subject of analysis by both sociolinguists and 
social psychologists (cf. Argyle et al., 1980). 
Within the contextual domain, the response data was first coded in terms of 
vocabularies that could be ascribed to the general categories of 'scene' and 
'participants'. These components were then gradually refined, as before, to 
incorporate more specific kinds of description. First under 'scene', information 
about 'setting' (including the 'locale' and 'time' of interaction) was distinguished 
from information about 'purpose' (whether this was 'specific' or 'non-specific'). 
Second, information about the participants was subdivided according to 
references concerning 'individuals' (including the 'individual qua individual', as 
opposed to the 'individual as a member of a social group'), and information 
concerning 'the relationship between participants' (including 'interpersonal 
relations' and 'role relations'), and so on. The main distinctions in this domain are 
summarised in Figure 6.2, which is adapted from Kreckel (1981: 17). 
% 
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Contextual Descriptions 
Scene 
Setting Purpose 
AA 
Locale Time Specific Non- 
Specific 
T_ 
_., _ 
Individual 
participants 
As As 
individuals members of 
a social 
group 
FIGURE 6.2 
Relationship 
between 
participants 
Interpersonal Role 
relations relations 
Components of the Contextual Domain 
Chapter 8 provides details of the interpretive work undertaken by judges in this 
domain. A substantial number of comments were provided in this category, but it 
was the final category, the supratextual domain, that attracted by far the greatest 
proportion of remarks. 
The supratextual domain subsumes descriptions that focus on the 
communicative process itself, including the sorts of information that are % 
documented under the remaining components in Hymes's paradigm, namely: 
'ends'; 'act sequence'; 'key'; 'genre'; and 'interactional norms'. I have re-organised 
these descriptions into two main categories, which are again subdivided for the 
purpose of exposition (see Figure 6.3). Details are presented in Chapter 9. 
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Supratextual Descriptions 
Genre 
Activities Units 
Praxis 
Strategies Key 
Metalinguistic Metapragmatic Indexical Interactional 
FIGURE 6.3 
Components of the Supratextual Domain 
The main categories and their subdivisions are: 
(1) communicative 'genre' - subcategorised into 'activity' and 'unit' references. 
These references are associated with different kinds of speech 'activity' 
characterised by verbs such as 'talking', 'chatting', and 'discussing', and 
different kinds of speech event or 'units' characterised by noun phrases 
such as 'a conversation', 'a chat'; 'a discussion' and so on; 
(2) communicative 'praxis' - subcategorised into 'strategy' and 'key' references. 
'Strategy' references describe qualities and effects that are associated with 
non-surface content; these qualities may be directly or indirectly related to 
what is actually said. The references are characterised by metalinguistic or 
regulative verb phrases such as , 'breaking in', 
'continuing'; 'cutting off', 
and metapragmatic or ostensive-inferential phrases such as 'prompting' 
'sounding out, 'probing', 'trying for rapport' for example. 
'Key' references, on the other hand, are characterised by adjectives and 
adjective phrases which evaluate the tone, manner or spirit in which the 
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exchanges took place; they include 'indexical' descriptors such as 'amused', 
'earnest', 'indignant', and interactional or message related descriptors such 
as 'ambiguous', 'non-involved', and 'superficial'. 
In sum, these categories are designed to cover responses about the types of 
interaction or event that is judged to have taken place; what is judged to have 
gone on, in terms of what has been said, or accomplished, or attempted by the 
participants; and what the tone, manner or spirit of the exchange is judged to have 
been. 
As a result of characterising the response data in terms of the three descriptive 
domains that I have identified, I was able to initiate the higher level analytic 
process that would enable me to provide a sketch model of third person 
interpretive practices. This process involved working backwards from the kinds of 
information provided in each domain, and then trying to explicate how and what 
aspects of some members' resources may have been drawn upon in order to yield 
the interpretive comments it did (cf. Agar, 1980). 
6.3 A Model of (Post Hoc) Interpretive Practice 
The model which is outlined in this section stems from what may be considered as 
a rather unusual source, at least in sociolinguistic terms. However, I am not aware 
of any other analytical framework that could serve as a research tool for 
explaining the sorts of interpretive practice judges exhibit in the language of the 
response data. The source is Hayakawa's (1990) model categorisation of the. 
linguistic means for exchanging information. 
6.3.1 Exchanging Information 
Hayakawa suggests that in order for human beings to exchange information: 
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the basic symbolic act is the report of what we have seen, heard, or felt: "It is 
raining. " " You can get those at the hardware store for $2.75. " "The solution 
contains . 02% iodine. " "The gross profits for December were $253,876.98". (Hayakawa, 1990: 23) 
What makes these acts distinctive is that they can be verified in various ways. 
Thus, the price of the item at the store may have increased and can be verified by 
checking the shelves or contacting the owners; the percentage of iodine can be 
analysed by an independent laboratory; auditors can evaluate the accuracy of the 
company's book-keeping, and so on. Put another way, reports "require that we 
state things in such a way that everybody will agree with our formulation" 
(Hayakawa, 1990: 24). Distinct from 'reports' are what Hayakawa refers to as 
'inferences' and 'judgements'. An 'inference' in Hayakawa's terms is "a statement 
about the unknown based on the known " (op. cit. ). The difference between an 
inference and a report can be demonstrated by statements of the following type - 
"Our first child is afraid of the dark"; "Our second child blushes when he tells 
lies"; "Our third child never talks to strangers". These statements do not report as 
such, they are drawn from inferences about some observable set of data. 
Inferences can of course be drawn from reports, and as a result from what has 
been observed. Hayakawa gives the example of the inferences that a competent 
mechanic might make about the condition of engine by listening to the sounds it 
makes, compared to the inferences that an amateur might make. I suggest that the 
analogy is worth considering in the light of the sorts of third person (professional 
and lay) inferencing that I discussed in Chapter 3. 
Inferences may be made, then, on the basis of a broad background of previous 
experience, or with no experience at all. What characterises them is that: "They are 
statements about matters that are nor directly known, made on the basis of what 
has been observed" (Hayakawa, 1990: 25). Hayakawa also makes the point that in 
general terms the quality of the inference is directly related to the quality of the 
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report or observation from which it stems, and from the abilities of the individual 
making the inference. 
Apart from distinguishing reports and inferences, Hayakawa also points out 
that an important difference needs to be made between 'reports' and 'judgements'. 
He defines the latter as follows. 
By judgments we shall mean expressions of the speaker's approval or 
disapproval of the occurrences, persons or objects he is describing. To say, "It 
is a wonderful car" is not a report; to say, "It has been driven 50,000 miles 
without requiring repairs" is a report. (Hayakawa, 1990: 25-26) 
Judgements thus provide some kind of evaluative element or morally based 
assessment that is additional to what has been observed. A judgement in this sense 
is also a conclusion. However, the factual basis of the conclusion need not be 
stated and may prove to be unclear. 
Given the nature of the third person accounts that were elicited, I suggest that 
the distinction that Hayakawa makes between 'reports', 'inferences' and 
'judgements' has potential for elucidating the descriptive framework presented 
here. The potential lies in the quite different kinds of interpretive mode that are 
intrinsic to the information provided in each of the descriptive domains, as I hope 
to show in the following two sub-sections. I will refer to these modes as 
'observations' and 'evaluations' respectively to distinguish them from the 
practices of actual participants. Bull and Roger (1989: 15 ff. ) discuss the usefulness 
of this kind of analytic dichotomy (vis-a-vis separating 'description' from 
'inferences') with respect to The Facial Action Coding System developed by Ekman 
and Friesan (1978). 
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6.3.2 Observations 
As far as the textual domain is concerned, the descriptive statements are 
characteristically 'report-like' in quality, in so far as they can be checked or 
verified by others. In this sense, they are not unlike 'representatives' in speech act 
theory (assertions, claims, hypotheses, descriptions, suggestions etc. ) which can 
also be generally characterised as being true or false. Thus it is possible to check 
the veracity of statements such as: 
they use words like bona fide and relationship 
there was lots of repetition 
there is lots of hesitancy 
uhm uh and so on 
there are plenty I means and you knows 
one is louder than the other 
she spoke very quickly 
her voice went up when she said however 
Presumably, the participants can be directly adjudged to either use, or not use 
the words or phrases in question, or to speak, or not speak in the manner 
described. Judges could be asked if they did notice the use of the words 'bona fide 
and relationship', or whether one speaker was 'louder' than the other, or if the 
speakers voice did go 'up' when she said 'however', and so on. However, the 
process of verifying speech behaviour in this way seems to me to be relative; it is 
very much dependent on the degree to which 'others will agree with our 
formulation'. And this formulation can only be achieved by repeatedly listening to 
speech fragments in the manner of CA procedure, which seeks to 'observe' the 
verbal conduct of ordinary members without speculating about what was 
involved. In fact I prefer the term 'observation' to 'report', since the third person 
comments are not strictly reports in the sense in which Hayakawa uses the term. 
Recall also Harvey Sacks suggestion that the activities of everyday verbal 
interaction are 'observable' by ordinary members (Sacks, 1985). 
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CA procedure is not infallible or unproblematic, however, since it ultimately 
relies on the evidence of written records; records that cannot possibly 'look to the 
eye as they sound to the ear' as Coupland (1988: 10-12) argues. He writes: "The 
notion of a 'good' transcript is problematical: there are more or less useful 
transcripts but no 'correct' and ultimately verifiable transcripts" (Coupland, 1988: 
10). Coupland also suggests that: "Linguists are likely to take refuge from such 
criticism in the technicality of their own systems - their notational accuracy and 
internal coherence" (Coupland, 1988: 11). 
The problem with transcriptions in general is that they are highly 
conventionalised and, as I noted in section 2.1.2, inevitably impose a mode of 
theorising and analysis, which in Coupland's terms is already "packaged for a 
readership acculturated to its general form" (Coupland, 1988: 11). Transcriptions 
are also by definition impressionistic (cf. Kelly and Local, 1989), but surely this 
does not diminish their importance as an analytic tool? After all, they provide the 
only practical means of inspecting the dynamic properties, of recorded speech 
events in terms of distributional and systematic regularities. In the circumstances, 
I can think of no reasonable argument for downgrading or dismissing third person 
observations about textual matters. 
Observations, then, are modelled as third person responses which yield 
information of the textual kind. They are presumably based on members' 
resources that emanate from knowledge about the systematic properties of 
language, and knowledge about how these properties are realised in actual 
language use. To the extent that these properties are observable in a post hoc sense, 
and the subject of third person comment, they can be checked against other 
observations of a similar kind. They can also be checked, or at least compared, 
against professionally transcribed records of different kinds. In other words, 
judges' observations demonstrate their capacity to act as naive discourse analysts 
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and this capacity should be taken seriously, since it can be used to complement 
rather than supplant professional analyses. It is this capacity that is explored in 
Chapter 7. 
As far as possible observations exclude evaluations, since evaluations involve 
interpretive work that is based on 'best-guessing', and this work cannot be 
checked or verified in the same way. 
6.3.3 Evaluations 
Evaluations are responses which provide both contextual and supratextual 
information. Comments of the evaluative kind often include morally based 
assessments ('judgements' in Hayakawa's terms), and consequently are broadly 
akin to 'verdictives'. Because the boundaries between them are often fuzzy, I will 
simply deal with 'judgements' and 'inferences' in the same category. 
Contextual and supratextual information can only have been imposed on the 
data fragments by non-participant judges, since the actual interactional details are 
determined within the bounds of the participation framework, and by definition 
by the participants themselves. Nonetheless, non-participant judges demonstrated 
a capacity to recover situation from text, even when the text fragments involved 
relatively few tone units. Recall comments of the following kind which were 
assigned to the descriptive category of 'scene': 
it's a casual encounter 
he's just called by 
the business is to come after 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
the preliminaries before getting down to the real thing 
sounded like a school common room 
with teachers discussing things 
it's an occasion to go for coffee and talk while you are making it 
it's in their tea break 
they are in an office or at home 
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Notice that these comments provide possible answers to the questions of where, 
when, how and why the exchange fragments took place. While it is anticipated 
that many of these answers are likely to be either inaccurate or wrong, because 
they are based on best-guessing (their accuracy can only be assessed in relation to 
contextual information provided by the participants themselves of course), they 
are nonetheless of interest here as distinct element of post hoc interpretive capacity 
- the capacity to provide evaluations of the temporal and spatial parameters of 
speech events that have not been previously seen. 
In giving information within the 'participant' category, non-participant judges 
were able to evaluate who the interlocutors were, and what they were like, in 
comments such as: 
the first person was Ian 
I recognise his manner 
the other guy is a Southerner 
RP 
they are colleagues 
not intimate but relaxed 
they seem to have a lot in common 
and know each other quite well 
Unless judges acknowledged that they recognised the participants, as was 
sometimes the case, statements of this type would again necessarily involve best- 
guessing, with all that implies in terms of judgemental accuracy. Nonetheless, 
evaluations of this type demonstrate yet another element of post hoc interpretive 
capacity - the capacity to make attributions about individuals and their 
relationships previously unknown. 
Finally, comments about supratextual characteristics of the stimulus 
fragments 
are modelled as best-guesses about what the participants were doing in 
communicative terms. These include evaluations of different types of speech 
activities and the types of interaction that ensue as a consequence. 
Compare: 
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it's like any conversation 
it's chatty conversation 
it's a peculiar conversation 
it's a toilet conversation 
it's a filling-in-space conversation 
it's not official conversation 
it's quite a serious conversation 
Comments of this kind seem to support Gumperz's claim that: "When events are 
named, such names are regularly employed in member's narrative reports in 
sentences such as 'We attended a lecture, "They were making a joke"' (Gumperz, 
1982a: 165). 
Gumperz also notes that: 
Events also serve as labels for the constellations of norms by which verbal 
behavior is evaluated, so that someone commenting on the helicopter 
announcement might say "They said it as part of a formal announcement and 
didn't mean it personally". (Gumperz, 1982a: 165) 
I suggest that members' resources must include sensitivity to such norms, and that 
investigation of third person interpretation of the kind described here provides a 
methodology for bringing them to the surface in a form that becomes researchable. 
Perhaps the most interesting types of evaluation that emerged in the response 
data, however, were those that focussed on, or made reference to various aspects 
of the content, organisation, and inferencing practices of the participants, as 
represented in the stimulus material. Much as Gumperz (1982a: 157) suggests, I 
found that: "When [members] report on actual verbal encounters, they tend to so 
by mentioning some item of content, or by referring to what people were getting 
at or were trying to do" (Gumperz, 1982a: 157). In the process of describing what 
was achieved by different interlocutors, judges made extensive use of what 
Kreckel (1981) refers to as 'metapragmatic categories' (see, this thesis, Chapter 4). 
These categories stand for communicative concepts or strategies that are expressed 
by judges in the form of verbs and verbal phrases such as 'advising'; 'prompting'; 
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`encouraging'; 'contradicting'; 'sounding out'; 'trying to establish a rapport' etc.. 
The use of these categories is explored in Chapter 9, where they are also classified 
into different types, and then compared across the sample of comments. Judges 
interpretations of 'key', as expressed by their use of adjectives and adjective 
phrases such as 'ambiguous', 'non-involved', 'not convincing', 'not fully natural' 
etc., are examined in the same way. The evaluation of these sorts of 
communicative stratagem are comparable to those provided by Gumperz's judges. 
He notes, for example: 
Some judges identify the first utterance in (2) as a factual question, others as 
a request, others again suggest that it is ambiguous. The mother's remark in 
(3) is seen by some as an order to put on boots; others feel it could be a request 
or information [and so on]. (Gumperz, 1982a: 137) 
Given the differences in interpretation here, it is important to stress that the 
main research goal behind this type of exploration is to "relate judges' 
interpretations to identifiable features of message form, to identify any resulting 
chains of inferences, not to judge the absolute truth value of particular 
assessments" (Gumperz, 1982a: 137). By investigating the interpretations that 
judges give in the supratextual domain, I hope to demonstrate something of the 
final element of post hoc interpretive capacity that is explored here - the capacity to 
recover and interpret participant goals from events previously unseen. Where 
these goals are differentially interpreted, I also want to explore the individual and 
social bases that underlie 'particular assessments'. 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined a descriptive framework for describing, coding and 
modelling the interpretive practices of ordinary members' in their role as third 
person listener judges. Figure 6.4 is an attempt to summarise the kinds of input 
and interpretive factors that have been identified within this framework. It is 
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important to note that the diagram lays no claim to psychological reality and is not 
intended to describe the actual decision processes which judges may have invoked 
in offering the comments they did. 
The relevant input to judges interpretive practices are presented in terms of 
the boxes on the left hand side of the flow chart. On the right hand side of the 
diagram, the boxes are used to represent: 
(1) the possible interpretive resources that judges might employ in the process 
of commenting on the decontextualised, stimulus fragments. These 
resources may be based on real, imagined or stereotypical practices that 
enable judges to create their own contexts for establishing who the 
participants are and what they are perceived to be doing in different types 
of exchange; 
(2) the possible interpretive modes that judges may employ to provide 
different kinds of information under experimental conditions, whether this 
is about characteristics of the texts themselves (observations), or about the 
situations or processes which they are adjudged to involve (evaluations); 
(3) the possible interpretive responses that may be provided as a result of 
verbalising the information given under (2); 
(4) the analytic mechanisms or procedures used for undertaking higher level 
interpretive work in order to describe these responses, and to model the 
capacities that they seem to imply. 
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Following Fairclough (1989), 1 have argued that these practices are generated 
through a combination of what is in the 'text' that judges have listened to and 
what is in the 'interpreter', in the sense of the different kinds of resource that 
judges bring to the interpretive process. While there is every reason to suppose 
that these practices also play an important part in everyday verbal exchange as 
Gumperz (1982a; 1982b) suggests, they seem to be have been little explored from 
the perspective of ordinary participants. Having demonstrated that it is possible to 
elicit and identify interactional phenomena and processes not normally verbalised 
by participants in talk, by modelling third person perspectives in a systematic 
way, it is time to examine these perspectives in more detail. 
This examination is pursued in the following three chapters, with particular 
reference to each of the descriptive domains that have been identified in this 
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chapter (textual, contextual, and supratextual), the different vocabularies they 
involve, and the interpretive capacities which these vocabularies imply. 
CHAPTER 7 
TEXTUAL RESPONSES 
7.0 Surface Linguistic Characterisations 
This chapter examines the nature of third person responses in the textual domain. 
These responses provide information about the encoding of surface linguistic 
forms in the stimulus fragments that judges observed directly. 
Following the model presented in the previous chapter, a set of key terms was 
identified from the quasi-technical descriptions that judges used to characterise 
particular kinds of phenomena as a result of their observations. Two kinds of 
descriptive vocabulary were found to be of salience in the commentaries. These 
were categorised as vocabularies that gave details about (a) the products of 
speaking ('speech phenomena'), and (b) the products of interacting ('sequential 
phenomena'), as manifest in the stimulus fragments. Each of these categories was 
sub-divided further in order of frequency to enable a finer grained analysis of the 
comments (see Figure 6.1). It is this analysis that is pursued in this chapter. 
7.1 Speech Products 
Observations about the products of speaking were coded on the basis of any 
references in the response data to the surface properties of participants' utterances. 
Fairclough (1989) identifies 'surface of utterance' as the first level of text 
interpretation in his critical discourse analysis. He explains that 'surface of 
utterance': 
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relates to the process by which interpreters convert strings of sounds or 
marks on paper into recognizable words, phrases and sentences. To do this 
they have to draw upon that aspect of their MR [members' resources] which is 
often referred to as their 'knowledge of the language'. (Fairclough, 1989: 143) 
In order to recover such information from the stimulus fragments, I presume that 
third person judges must have performed some type of auditory analysis on the 
speech signal that they listened to. As in the case of real time auditory processing, 
I further presume that not everything that is present in this signal can be perceived 
by individuals in the process of decoding what they hear. Indeed, it is only by 
repeated (post hoc) listening that it becomes possible to provide an orthographic 
record of what has been said in the course of some previously recorded discourse 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2). This process is dependent on a number of factors, 
and not least the quality of the recordings as I noted earlier. However, the 
perception of surface properties in the texts must also be the result of how judges 
have utilised aural and linguistic cues, such that individuals were able to suggest 
that a particular speaker had produced a particular utterance, in a particular way, 
at a particular time (cf. Bladon (1986) for a review of the auditory processes 
involved in actual speech processing). 
It is impossible to say what it is that might have caused individual judges to 
comment in precisely the way that they did, but two kinds of information must 
have been decoded in order to provide an available basis for the types of remark 
that were produced. This information presumably stems from the segmental and 
non-segmental concepts that give linguistic form to utterances (see Rost, 1990: 
Chapter 2). At the level of surface text interpretation, judges' demonstrated the 
ability to recover and report on these concepts by describing: 
(1) the use of particular words and phrases ('morpho-syntactic text features'); 
(2) the use of different modes of expression ('prosodic text features'). 
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I now want to move on to consider what it was judges had to say in both of these 
cases. 
7.1.1 Morpho-Syntactic Features 
In the case of morpho-syntactic features, the response data was inspected for any 
references to the speakers' use of particular words and phrases. Where such 
references occurred, I was able to identify a small set of nouns that were intrinsic 
to the language used in judges' descriptions. These are listed in Table 7.1 in 
descending order of number. 
TABLE 7.1 
Judges' Terms for Describing Lexis 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
word(s) 6 6 10 22 
language 5 - 2 7 
phrase(s) 2 - 1 3 
term(s) 3 - - 3 
jargon - 1 - 1 
slang - 1 - 1 
Total 16 8 13 37 
Thirty seven concordance strings were generated from this list, and examples 
of the kind of descriptions they involve are presented below. The strings are taken 
from all three studies, and include statements such as: 
Study 1 
Judge 7 
they use terms like bona fide and relationship 
Judge 8 
words like rip offs are used 
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Judge 12 
words such as junk and rip offs are used 
Study 2 
Judge 8 
there is a kind of jargon in it 
getting it knocked off 
par for the course 
and takes his cut 
Study 3 
Judge 6 
the main speaker uses words 
like shockingly and frighteningly 
From an analytic perspective, the veracity of these statements can be checked 
by inspecting the transcription records produced for each of the stimulus 
fragments. Thus in Study 1, the relevant segment of record reveals that what the 
speakers actually said was as follows. The features referred to by the judges are 
highlighted in italics. 
Record: (Study 1) 
A 
yeah eh 
it's very interesting 
but ultimately the whole thing 
depends on the social relations you strike up with students 
B 
but I mean 
really 
all you gotta do 
is convince them that you're a bona fide person 
B 
yeah 
I think that what I need to do 
is something to the colour of the paint really 
but I'm slowly covering it up 
with as much junk as I can find 
A 
and you know couple of swimming pools 
and twenty five language labs 
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and at the other end of the scale 
you get people who are really making rip-offs 
It is clear from these records that the words and phrases reportedly used are in 
fact encoded features of the exchange, and can be verified accordingly. Notice, 
however, that the statements are not always a verbatim record of what was said. 
Judge 7, for example, commented: 
Judge 7 
they use terms like bona fide and relationship 
The locution that was realised in this instance was 'social relations': 
the whole thing depends on the social relations 
you strike up with students 
Records from Studies 2 and 3, also help to confirm the veracity of the 
statements generated in this category. As Judge 8 notes in the former case, 
'knocked off'; 'par for the course', and 'takes his cut' are locutions that are realised 
by one of the speakers; namely Speaker A. What A said was: 
Record (Study 2, Extract 4) 
A 
by the time the tax man takes his cut you know 
but its all right I get about a third knocked off in tax 
which is about par for the course for a single man 
Similarly in Study 3, judge 6 reports the use of words such as 'shockingly' and 
'frighteningly'. 
Record (Study 3, Extract 1) 
C 
they started to shove 
do you know it's quite frightening 
carrying Justin 
Stamford Bridge 
where I went to see Chelsea play Leeds 
and Leeds played shockingly 
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The record shows that the second word realised in this case was not 
'frighteningly', but 'frightening': 
do you know it's quite frightening 
These differences in reporting seem rather slight, but what is worth noting is the 
occasions when this type of observation was overtly linked to contextual and 
supratextual evaluations. 
Compare, in the first instance, statements about lexical uses that are linked to 
contextual information about the participants. In the following responses, 
individuals are evaluated in terms of 'educational background', 'socio-economic 
status', and 'occupation', for example: 
Study 1 
Judge 7 
both sounded well educated 
they use terms like bona fide and relationship 
Study 2 
Pair 4 
the one who said shockingly 
was definitely posh 
Pair 5 
I love his expression of the word shockingly though 
sort of represented upper bourgeoisie middle class 
Pair 7 
I think she kind of gives herself away with however 
she's either a teacher 
or educated in someway 
In the next set of examples, links are made to supratextual information of 
different kinds (see Chapter 9). The speaker's use of 'however' is evaluated as a 
'regulative strategy' for maintaining the floor, or her turn, in the following 
responses for instance: 
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Study 3 
Pair 2 
whenever someone did interrupt her 
she just said however 
and then continued 
Pair 4 
she keeps saying however 
she's just going to listen to him 
On the other hand, the speaker's choice of particular words and phrases can also 
be interpreted in 'intentional' terms as the next comment shows. By choosing to 
refer to 'the tax man', 'Cambridge' and 'expenses', the participant in question uses 
the strategy of 'name dropping', presumably in order to 'try to impress' his 
interlocutor. 
Study 2 
Judge 6 
the other guy always seems to be name dropping 
and talks about the tax man 
Cambridge 
and expenses 
A similar strategy is also presumed on the part of a quite different speaker. 
Rather than just the words themselves, notice that 'mode of expression' or 'key' 
(see Section 9.5) is suggested here as part of the speaker's 'intent' to 'try and 
impress people with her wit': 
Study 3 
Pair 7 
again she was trying to impress people with her wit 
by her way of expressing things 
like her emphasis on the word mud and pig 
References to the 'key' of specified utterances were extremely common in the 
response data (see Section 9.5), and included evaluations such as: 
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Study 1 
Judge 6 
one speaker is Hall 
he said bona fide person 
I didn't like it 
it had underlying assumptions 
Judge 13 
he said bona fide person 
it was a serious thing about being serious 
Study 3 
Pair 3 
he said Leeds played shockingly 
like he had an interest in it 
he was quite vehement 
when he said Leeds played shockingly 
Pair 6 
there is a great bawdy laugh in the background 
when sex is mentioned 
Apart from referring to what is said, these evaluations appear to be closely related 
to prosodic features that were realised in the exchange fragments. 
7.1.2 Prosodic Features 
A wide variety of prosodic and paralinguistic contrasts were observed in the 
response data. Descriptive terms used by judges to refer to these contrasts are 
listed in Table 7.2. The nouns involved are grouped in descending order of 
number, and in lexical sets that seem to be broadly synonymous. 
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TABLE 7.2 
Judges' Terms for Describing Prosodic and Paralinguistic Contrasts 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
tone 
voice - 16 23 39 
tone 4 16 8 28 
intonation - 5 2 7 
delivery - 2 2 4 
expression - 1 3 4 
inflection - 2 2 4 
pitch - - 3 3 
stress 
emphasis - 6 6 12 
stress - 1 2 3 
pause 
pause 2 6 3 11 
speed 
speed - 3 3 6 
pace - - 1 1 
tempo - 1 - 1 
loudness 
volume - 1 - 1 
paralanguage 
laugh - 5 11 16 
Total 6 65 69 140 
Each noun was processed using Hypercard as before, and 140 concordance strings 
were generated as a result. Notice that there is far greater use of prosodic terms in 
Studies 2 and 3. This could be a result of the fact that judges were given a series of 
smaller fragments to listen to in these studies. With less contextual information 
available in each of the fragments, it is possible that judges' were able to focus 
more of their attention on prosody. Examples of the relevant strings elicited in 
each of the three studies are listed below. 
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Study 1 
Judge 14 
he was very hesitant 
a bit low 
and mumbly at times 
Judge 15 
one seemed louder than the other 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 1 
the girl is talking very quickly 
that is emphasised 
there is hesitation on got 
it's fascinating seems higher 
Judge 3 
there is a big sort of breath at the end 
she changes her tone quite often 
Judge 6 
there is a tremendous emphasis on that 
her story is slow 
and then increases in tempo 
Judge 7 
her voice goes up at the end 
and it's overemphasised 
Study 2 (Extract 5) 
Judge 1 
there is considerable variation in volume 
B is quieter than A 
Judge 3 
it's in sort of low key 
with very quiet tones 
Judge 6 
they talk very quickly 
Judge 7 
they are both giggling 
I. 
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Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 1 
she was talking quite fast 
and it got faster 
Pair 2 
her voice pitch ranged very widely 
she emphasised things 
like it had been absolutely dead 
Pair 4 
her voice seemed a bit high at the beginning 
then she started laughing 
when she was talking about the dead pig 
Pair 5 
there is a kind of lightness in her voice 
it sort of rose 
and the speed of delivery was affected as well 
Pair 6 
I thought it was a racy 
sort of exciting delivery 
fastly said 
bubbly 
Pair 7 
she uses different expression in her voice 
emphasising some things 
laughing kind of playfully 
In order to examine the nature of the comments involved here, judges' 
descriptions were charted against a professional schema (see Table 7.3). The 
schema in this case was developed by Crystal and Davy (1969; 1975). 
Judges' labels are not equivalent to those used by professional linguists in the 
sense that they are neither used consistently by different individuals, nor defined 
in a rigorous manner. Furthermore, the descriptions probably reflect conflations of 
different sets of cues, and may well overlap with categories that Crystal and Davy 
have designated as discrete. For example, the descriptor 'mumbly' may well 
include perceptions about 'loudness' and 'speed' as well as 'tension'. Nonetheless, 
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I offer the comparison because the observations are suggestive enough to warrant 
checking against a prosodic analysis of the syllables, or utterances to which they 
refer. The number of times a particular label or description occurs in the corpus of 
comments is indicated in brackets after each item. 
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TABLE 7.3 
Comparison of Professional and Lay Labels for Describing Prosodic and 
Paralinguistic Contrasts 
Crystal & Davy Labels Judges' Labels 
Tone types 
Simple fall fall(s); falling (3) 
rise rise(s); rising; rose (6) 
goes up (3) 
level flat (5) 
Complex rise-fall etc. rise and fall (1) 
up and down (1) 
Compound fall+rise etc. - 
Stress stressed emphasise; emphasised (10) 
overemphasis (1) 
tremendous emphasis (1) 
stressed (2) 
really stressed (1) 
unstressed - 
Pitch range normal - 
widened changes tone (1) 
singy-songy (1) 
a bit high (1) 
high (3) 
higher (4) 
very high (1) 
ranges very widely (1) 
incredible range (1) 
shrill (1) 
narrowed - 
monotone hardly changes (1) 
expressionless (2) 
flat in tone (1) 
monotonous rise and fall (1) 
neutral (1) 
no inflection (1) 
the same effect (1) 
the same tone (1) 
toneless (1) 
Loudness forte - 
fortissimo higher (3) 
louder (4) 
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piano a bit low (1) 
low (3) 
lower (1) 
low key (1) 
lower than usual (1) 
drops (1) 
uiet; quieter (10) 
pianissimo rather quiet (1) 
very quiet (1) 
much quieter (1) 
hardly audible (4) 
Speed clipped (syllable) - 
drawled (syllable) long (1) 
drags out her vowels (1) 
drawn out (3) 
held (syllable) - 
allegro incredible speed (1) 
terrifically speedy (1) 
racy (1) 
quite rapidly (1) 
very quickly (1) 
very fast (3) 
fastly said (1) 
faster(2) 
allegrissimo fast (2) 
quite fast (1) 
quick (2) 
quicker (1) 
increases in tempo (1) 
speeds up (1) 
lento slows down (1) 
fairly slow (1) 
slower (1) 
deliberate (1) 
lentissimo slow (4) 
more slowly (2) 
reall slow (1) 
Pause silent gap (9) 
long gap (1) 
lull (1) 
little pause (1) 
pause(s) (9) 
long pause 
voiced aahed (1) 
ahs (1) 
uhm(s) (11) 
uhmed (1) 
Tension precise (utterance) very precise (2) 
uite precise (1) 
228 
slurred (utterance) babbled (1) 
garbled (4) 
mum bling (1) 
mumbly (1) 
virtually mumbling (1) 
long kind of mumble (1) 
runs words together (1) 
slurs words (1) 
stumbles over words (1) 
Paralanguage whispery - 
breathy breath (1) 
big sort of breath (1) 
lightness (1) 
husky something stuck in throat (1) 
creaky tired (1) 
falsetto - 
resonant - 
sread - 
laugh laugh; laughter; laughing (16) 
nervous laughter (1) 
giggle giggle; giggling (4) 
tremulousness whimpering (1) 
babyish (1) 
nasal/whine talking through her nose (1) 
(not a C& D category) whining (1) 
Third person descriptions involving labels of this type could be further 
investigated by controlled experimental work that required judges to respond to 
specific questions such as: 'Did the volume change in segment x ? '; 'Did the 
speakers emphasise or stress the word y ? '; 'Was there an increase in speed in 
utterance z ?' etc.. The descriptions can also be checked against a professional 
coding scheme of the kind presented above. However, the non-segmental analysis 
of speech is rather problematic as Labov and Fanshel (1977) among others have 
noted. There is not only a lack of agreement amongst analysts about how to 
transcribe prosodic phenomena, but also in how these phenomena might 
be, 
interpreted (see Labov and Fanshel (1977: 42ff. ), and Chapter 10 of this thesis). 
Nevertheless, by examining possible co-occurrences between judges' comments 
and detailed prosodic analysis of the fragments, I suggest that one can 
begin to 
evaluate implicit connections between particular sets of cues and what 
has been 
observed by different judges. 
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Consider, for instance, the following two utterances taken from Study 2, 
Extract 2. Both utterances are realised by the same speaker. 
Utterance 1 
N 
ALSO I meanI'm I"I reckon I'm FAIRLY sick of"""' being -broke"--but 
'slurred' "rhythmic low" "'dimin slurred rhythmic"' 
\N/\N 
! if I HAD this" I GERMANY JOB" --I 'you SEE' 
I "'six hours a [WEEK] 
"rail low" 'precise' "'spiky high precise"' 
\N\\N 
NO [ADM IN ] ! NOTHING"' II mean (its) a DREAM (I can't) I whose 
'REALISATION (I can't)' 
'creak' 
Notice the co-occurrence of the features 'low' (pitch range), 'diminuendo' 
(loudness), 'rallentando' (speed), in conjunction with paralinguistic 'creak' in the 
analysis of this utterance. Now compare this analysis with the following set of 
judges' comments: 
Study 2 (Extract 2) 
Judge 1 
he is virtually mumbling 
towards the end of Germany job 
he drops his voice 
his voice goes up and down 
and is much quieter 
Judge 3 
his voice sounds dreamy 
as if he's living it 
the voice falls after each thing 
with a little pause in between 
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Judge 4 
he sounded weary 
tired 
he sounded lower than usual 
judge 6 
A seems to slur his words 
he's searching for words 
and runs words together 
Judge 7 
Ian sounded a bit pissed 
there's a lot of false starts and errors 
he's usually quite precise 
First, I think it is clear that judges are responding to particular constellations of 
prosodic cues. Changes in pitch and loudness seem to be noted especially in this 
regard. Second, these cues seem to be variously interpreted by different 
individuals. However, these interpretations are the result of evaluative 
inferencing, rather than observation, and include such disparate labels as: 
Judge 3 
dreamy 
Judge 4 
weary 
Judge 6 
searching for words 
Judge 7 
a bit pissed 
The issue of asynchronies in interpretation is taken up in Chapter 10. Similar types 
of response were also elicited with regard to the second utterance I wish to 
consider. 
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Utterance 2 
+/ \N 
I'DEAR old JANE I "y know the POSTMAN 
'laugh' "low rhythmic" 'creak' 
\N 
'stuffed the STUFF through the"" 
ýN n 
-'she came 
I RUSHING to the I kitchen n SAID' - ""GREAT-- 
'monot' "'tense husky cresc"' 
AN /\N \N 
on her [MAJESTY'S ]I 'SERVICE"" I she couldn't UNDERSTAND my 
'high ' ""lax nas alleg gliss"" 
vN 
REACTION at I ALL" 
/N /N 
she said I 'but : it's not the QUEEN 'who I takes your ! tax AWAY : is [IT]' 
'nas' 'alleg' 
Notice in this utterance that there is a change of speed from 'rallentando' to 
'allegro', an increase in loudness from 'diminuendo' to 'crescendo', and the 
gradual loss of paralinguistic 'creak'. The paralinguistic feature 'laugh' is also 
realised. Judges' comments are very detailed in a number of cases (cf. Judge 1 and 
Judge 6). They include: 
Judge 1 
he gets more fluent 
as he gets more confident 
in the bit about Jane at the end 
there's amusement in the story about Jane 
it starts off quietly 
he captures her intonation by imitating 
I doubt if the imitation is accurate 
it's his own interpretation of it 
he was trying to capture the feeling 
that OHMS is special 
he emphasises great 
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there is a gap before the end of the laugh 
it didn't follow immediately 
perhaps he felt subconsciously he should laugh 
Judge 2 
he laughs on OHMS 
there's unspoken agreement 
that this is naive and amusing 
judge 3 
it only livens up with Jane's story 
the voice rises as he starts to laugh 
it's not the Queen (intonation imitated by judge) 
Judge 4 
Ian about Jane is much more animated 
Judge 6 
in the story about Jane 
something funny happened 
it was if he had something stuck in his throat 
there is a totally different attitude at this point 
from the rest 
totally informal humour 
breaking the ice 
we are good mates 
let's have a laugh 
Judge 7 
dear old Jane 
sounds awful kind of drunk 
he really seems to be struggling with his pronunciation 
In this set of comments, changes in pitch, tempo and paralanguage (especially 
'laughter') are intimated. Compared to comments about the first utterance, the 
observations here seem to report a perceived change in the speaker's affective state 
and attitude which is marked intonationally. The prosodic analyses support this 
perception since the falling tones of the first utterance are replaced by a much 
more varied patterning of complex and compound tones in the second, as shown 
in Figure 7.1. 
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Utterance A 
1 7 1 1 - - - 1 1 - 
2 4 2 1 5 - - - 1 - 
FIGURE 7.1 
Number and Types of Tone 
It is the perceived change in the speaker's affective state and attitude that 
presumably leads the judges to respond with the following evaluations. Compare: 
Judge 1 
more confident 
judge 3 
livens up 
Judge 4 
much more animated 
Judge 6 
different attitude 
Judge 7 
awful kind of drunk 
It seems clear, on the basis of these and other examples (see Sections 9.5; 9.6, 
and Chapter 10), that non-segmental features of verbal exchange play an 
extremely important role in the interpretive process for third persons (see also 
Labov and Fanshel (1977), and Gumperz, 1982: Chapter 5). Compared to 
observations about lexical use, for example, references to prosody occur almost ten 
times as often across the corpus of comments as a whole. As a result, they also 
provide a correspondingly greater range of quasi-technical descriptors. 
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7.2 Sequential Products 
Comments about organisational features were coded on the basis of references to 
specified properties of the surface interactional structure of the fragments. These 
properties are the product of cooperative achievement between participants, and 
hence are distinct from the linguistic conventions that constitute individual 
contributions to the conversational exchanges. In order to make observations 
about such achievements, judges must have had to draw on their knowledge of 
how verbal communication is structured. As evidenced by the comments that 
were offered, this knowledge includes the capacity to recover information about 
locally managed organisations related to speaker change on the one hand, and 
overall organisations related to larger scale structures over several turns on the 
other (cf. Sacks et al., 1974; Levinson, 1983: Chapter 6). Since Conversation 
Analysts have demonstrated that the organising features of verbal exchange are 
directly observable, the veracity of comments of this type can also be checked 
against professional analyses (cf. the approaches presented in Atkinson and 
Heritage, 1984; Button and Lee, 1987; Roger and Bull, 1989). 
7.2.1 Turn Taking 
The organisations referred to by judges include comments about interactional 
phenomena that are produced by speakers in the process of determining who 
should speak and when (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). Following work in 
CA, the structure of verbal interaction is typically viewed as a more or less orderly 
exchange of speaker turns, punctuated by periods of simultaneous speech (cf. 
Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Roger and Bull, 1989). 
Simultaneous speech is seen as having a disruptive effect on the interchange of 
utterances, particularly when second person addressees are perceived as 
attempting to take the floor by violating orderly turn-taking procedures. Third 
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person judges appear to be sensitive to these procedures to the extent that a 
number of comments refer to turn-talking or transition points in the exchanges, 
and particularly instances of simultaneous speech. The effects of simultaneity are 
conventionally classified into 'interruptive' and 'non-interruptive' speech (Roger, 
1989), and this distinction was used to code the comments in this case. Tokens 
used to generate concordance strings are presented in Table 7.4. These are 
presented as before in broadly synonymous sets. A total of 47 strings were 
generated using these terms. 
TABLE 7.4 
Judges' Terms for Describing Local Organisations 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Interruptive: 
interruption - 3 8 11 
cut off - 1 1 2 
break in - - 1 1 
et in - - 1 1 
cut in - 1 - 1 
overlap 5 - 2 7 
overrun - - 1 1 
overspeak 1 - - 1 
Non-interruptive: 
pause 2 3 6 11 
gap 4 1 2 7 
lull 2 - - 2 
lapse 1 - - 1 
silence 1 - - 1 
Totals 16 9 22 47 
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1. Interruptive Speech 
Interruptive speech behaviour was reported on 25 occasions across the corpus. The 
term used by judges for describing this behaviour was virtually always 
'interruption' (11 references). However, interruptive utterances are difficult to 
classify as Roger (1989) argues. Successful and unsuccessful interruptions are 
usually distinguished as speakers compete for the floor, and at least one judge 
appears to overtly recognise this difference. He commented: 
Study 2 (Extract 4) 
Judge 5 
really oh you'll be 
is cut off 
but uhm 
is an interruption 
which doesn't quite come off 
Interrupting has also been widely used as an index of dominance in verbal 
exchange, particularly in studies of family interaction (Roger, 1989; Huls, 1989). 
Judges' comments certainly seem to indicate that by interrupting, participants 
compete for who takes the floor, and that this competition serves to limit the 
verbal contribution of others. Compare statements such as: 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 1 
there are quite a few interruptions 
she didn't want her flow to be interrupted 
she cuts him off 
every time he tried to interrupt her 
she sort of kept going 
when he starts interrupting 
Pair 2 
whenever someone did interrupt her 
she just said however 
and then continued 
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Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 1 
there are quite a few interruptions 
like however 
Pair 2 
the man kept trying to break in 
and contradict her 
Pair 7 
her husband tries to get in four times 
and is summarily dismissed 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 5 
the other one is trying to interrupt 
and he just talks straight over him 
However, I thing it would wrong to claim that interruptions per se are always an 
expression or mark of dominance. Judge 6 (Study 2, Extract 5) noted for example: 
Study 2 (Extract 5) 
Judge 6 
there are lots of interruptions 
but it's not aggressive interrupting 
The interruptions referred to here as 'non-aggressive interrupting' may simply be 
the result of 'animated', rather than 'competitive' conversational activity. 
Conversational overlap is one of the characteristics of the 'high-involvement style' 
exhibited by Tannen's (1984) New York friends (this style is also discussed by 
Fasold (1990: 71ff. ), and further in this thesis in Section 9.1.2). 
Another aspect of interruptive speech behaviour that judges referred to was 
the occurrence of 'overlapping', 'overrunning' or 'overspeaking' utterance 
sequences (9 references). Levinson (1983: 296) uses the term 'overlap' to account 
for two speakers speaking simultaneously. While overlaps are potentially 
disruptive, they may simply reflect lapses in turn-change synchrony of a kind that 
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is also common in relatively 'animated' as opposed to 'less animated' 
conversation. Thus judges comment on different degrees of overlapping; compare 
'some' versus 'lots' as exemplified in the following sets of response: 
Study 1 
Judge 4 
there is some overspeaking 
judge 9 
it's interspersed with talking over each other 
Judge 16 
there is some overlapping 
which shows that it isn't terribly formal 
Study 2 (Extract 6) 
Judge 6 
there are lots of overlaps 
which most people do most of the time in conversations 
Judge 7 
they keep talking on top of each other 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 1 
there were lots of overlapping sequences 
Pair 4 
there were a good deal of overlapping sequences 
which shows how keen they were to talk about it 
Quantitatively based investigations of the kind conducted by Huls (1989) would of 
course be required to determine the extent to which these differences are 
communicatively significant. They would also help to define the relative 
symmetries and asymmetries that can hold in verbal exchange with respect to 
participants' turn-taking and speaking rights, and hence what constitutes different 
units or types of interaction. 
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Although overlapping may not cause the participants difficulty as talk is in 
progress, it can lead to problems in post hoc interpretation because recorded 
simultaneous production can make it very difficult to recover what was actually 
said, as the following comments suggest: 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 4 
I can't tell what the others are saying 
because it is more or less her 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 3 
at one point it was impossible to say what was going on 
because they were all talking together 
While good quality data can help to ameliorate the difficulty expressed here, 
multi-party interactions are perhaps best avoided in studies of third person 
interpretation for precisely the reasons that these two judges have cited. 
2. Non-Interruptive Speech 
The corpus yielded 22 references to non-interruptive speech phenomena. 'Pause' 
(11 references) and 'gap' (7 references) were the most commonly used terms for 
this purpose, and these seem to be employed as a general cover term for various 
kinds of periods of non-speech (cf. Levinson, 1983: 299). Levinson (1983) argues 
that the absence of vocalisation in talk is differentially assigned on the basis of 
turn construction. He designates three types of non-speech including: 'gap', 'lapse' 
and 'significant or attributable silence'. The terms 'pause', 'gap', 'lapse' and 
'silence' all appear in the corpus and are used in statements such as: 
Study 1 
Judge 1 
there are a number of pauses 
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Judge 3 
there is a long pause 
a conversational lapse 
Judge 13 
there are lulls in the conversation 
gaps when nobody has anything to say 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 1 
she pauses for too long 
and gets lost 
there are long gaps 
Judge 6 
there is a pause 
and then I'm gonna ask you 
Study 2 (Extract 3) 
Judge 1 
there is a long gap after no 
B continues to speak 
probably because of the gap 
Judge 4 
he sounds as if he's not going to go on 
and then does 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 4 
he pauses 
and then repeats frightening 
just to fill in a gap in the conversation 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 1 
there are quite a lot of pauses too 
Pair 5 
she paused several times 
apparently waiting for somebody to nod 
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In order to provide some kind of objective measure of non-interrupting in talk, 
intervals between and within utterances may be timed in tenths of a second and 
then represented in parentheses during the process of transcription (cf. Atkinson 
and Heritage, 1984: x). Atkinson and Heritage also mark short untimed pauses 
within an utterance are by a dash, and untimed intervals within double 
parentheses. Analysis of pausing phenomena can emerge from close observation 
of the participants interactional behaviour (see Jefferson, 1989), and this behaviour 
can be checked against judges comments in the same way'as comments about 
prosody. 
Reported instances of non-interruptive simultaneous speech, which are often 
referred to as backchannel cues/signals or listener responses, were also noted. The 
use of verbal interjections such as 'yeah', 'mm', 'right' and so on, and non-verbal 
interjections such as 'nodding', are common organisational features of verbal 
exchange because they enable participants to continuously monitor the 
contributions of their interlocutors. (cf. Yngve, 1970; Duncan, 1973; Roger, 1989). 
Rost suggests that: "Without appropriate back-channelling, a conversation is likely 
to break down or simply stop, since the speaker is unsure that the listener is 
actively attending to and interpreting the discourse" (Rost, 1990: 100). However, 
while this may be generally true for languages such as English, there are 
exceptions in my experience; this fact is later acknowledged by Rost who points 
out that 'listenership cues' are likely to vary from culture to culture (Rost, 1990: 
101). Eye contact and nodding, for example, are often avoided in conversational 
exchange by people of Mäori ethnicity in New Zealand. Sustained eye contact in 
particular is taken to be both confrontational and rude. And unlike English, the 
absence of vocalisation is cherished, and can be maintained for long periods 
without discomfort. In short, for Mäori the act of sharing one's presence with 
others is considered to be of far greater importance than the act of sharing speech. 
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Comments about the use of back-channelling cues were provided by a manual 
search of the corpus. This approach was taken due to the fact that very few 
descriptive terms were used to refer to the behaviour involved. Instead, judges 
referred to the realisation of such cues in the following way: 
Study 1 
Judge 3 
he encourages him by saying uhm and yes all the time 
Judge 4 
he kept saying yes yes I see 
Judge 5 
it's Ian's way of jogging the conversation along 
to say yeah yeah grunt 
Judge 9 
there are also agreement noises all the way through 
Judge 12 
they seem to say yes and uhm to everything 
Judge 13 
yeah yeah all the time is a kind of prompting 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 3 
he answers with mms all the time 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 1 
there were lots of uhms 
and yeahs 
Pair 7 
the other guy's impatience came across 
in the way he kept saying mm mm 
These comments suggest that recipiency cues are viewed not only in terms of 
different strategies: 'encouraging'; 'agreeing'; 'jogging the conversation along'; 
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'prompting', but also in terms of 'indexical key', in this case the key is designated 
as'impatience'. Rost (1990: 101) points out that back-channelling itself does not 
necessarily indicate the listener is understanding the discourse at a transactional 
level, but rather tends to be used interactively to demonstrate that the listener is 
aligning with the presumed intent of the speaker. Judges' responses would appear 
to lend support to this claim. 
Another organisational feature that was identified by manual searching was 
the use of discourse markers. These include locutions such as 'well'; 'I mean' and 
'y'know' (cf. Schiffrin, 1987). Schiffrin defines such markers in both structural and 
functional terms. Structurally they are defined as "sequentially dependent 
elements which bracket units of talk" (Schiffrin, 1987: 31), and functionally in 
terms of participant and textual deixis (Schiffrin, 1987: 322-323). Very few 
observations were provided by judges in this category. These were as follows: 
Study 1 
Judge 4 
there are plenty uhms 
I means 
and you knows 
they aren't used for any particular reason 
Judge 9 
there are lots of uhms 
yeahs 
and wells 
Study 2 (Extract 3) 
Judge 1 
he uses conversational fillers 
like you know 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 1 
she's got a very high voice 
and a habit of going 
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uh you know 
she keeps doing that 
Notice that the only descriptive term that is used in this set of comments is 
'conversational filler'. Presumably, this term is intended to convey that the marker 
is semantically empty, since this also seems to be the thrust of the other additional 
comments that were provided, namely, that such locutions are 'not used for any 
particular reason' (Judge 4, Study 1), or are 'habitual' (Pair 1, Study 3). 
Recognition of regularity, order and continuity in turn-taking, and associated 
phenomena such as back-channelling and discourse markers have led to an 
extensive body of research. However, patterns of utterance sequences may be 
described in many ways, depending on the type of conversation examined and on 
the describer's interests. One of the most salient facets of sequential organisation 
for judges, and indeed one that seems to be widely used by ordinary members, is 
the notion of discourse 'topic'. I will treat references to 'topic' as a separate 
category. 
7.2.2 Topic 
From an analytic perspective, the concept of 'discourse topic' (as opposed to 
'sentence topic) has proved difficult to define, despite its status as perhaps one of 
the most obvious sites for conversation analytic research. Something of the 
obstacles facing the analyst are summarised by Atkinson and Heritage (1984). 
They note: 
Not only is topical maintenance and shift an extremely complex and subtle 
matter, but also, as Jefferson's discussion of "stepwise transition" illustrates, 
there are no simple or straightforward routes to the examination of topical 
flow. Thus "topic" may well prove to be among the most complex 
conversational phenomena to be investigated and, correspondingly, the most 
recalcitrant to systematic analysis. (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984: 165) 
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Largely because of these difficulties, and nearly ten years later, Lesser and 
Milroy (1993) report a continuing lack of progress in showing how people move in 
and out of topics in conversation. Consequently, Lesser and Milroy use the term 
'topic' in the sense of Schegloff (1979), that is, "rather loosely to refer to 'what is 
talked about' through some series of turns at talk" (Lesser. and Milroy, 1993: 204). 
This a very useful working definition, because someone coming into everyday 
conversation and wanting to know about what has been talked about would tend 
to ask: 'What are you talking about ", rather than 'What is the topic of your 
conversation? ', or 'What topic are you talking about? ', as Bublitz (1988: 19) points 
out. This suggestion seems to be supported by the response data, where the terms 
'topic' and 'subject' ('theme' is not listed at all) are seldom used about informal 
talk by ordinary members (see Table 7.5). I presume that the relative lack of use of 
these terms by judges is because they tend to be connected with more 
institutionalised types of discourse, such as panel discussions, or public lectures. 
The statements that recur throughout the response data, therefore, are mainly 
of the form in which 'talk' is either used as noun - "the talk is about y", or as a verb 
- "they talked (are talking) about x ". The word 'talk', including its cognates, is 
used by judges on 98 occasions by the way. Examples of references of this type 
include: 
Study 1 
Judge 4 
they talk about a range of topics 
black holes 
how to teach 
how to get money 
Judge 5 
they are talking about Jane 
Judge 7 
they talk about a kid's language 
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Judge 16 
they talk about three subjects 
painting 
black holes 
and teaching 
they talk about previous events 
Study 2 (Extract 5) 
Judge 5 
I don't know what they are talking about 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 3 
they talked about Stamford Bridge 
they talk about the same topic 
but not about the same thing 
one guy is talking about gates 
and the other guy is talking about a sea of bodies 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Pair 3 
she's talking about a pig dying 
because it's been eating too much 
The terms 'topic' and 'subject' tend to occur in object rather than subject position. 
Hence, 'they talk about a range of topics', 'they talk about three subjects' etc. 
However, the term 'topic' is also used by judges to describe what Bublitz 
(1988: 40ff. ) refers to as 'topical actions'. These actions describe 'what is done with 
the subject or topic by the participants'. Five main action patterns are identified by 
Bublitz. These are: 'introducing a topic'; 'changing a topic'; 'digressing from a 
topic'; 'shifting a topic'; and 'breaking off', or 'closing a topic' (Bublitz, 1988: 41). 
Since judges clearly made reference to topical actions in this sense, these were 
coded separately from references to 'topic', where the this term on its own was 
used in the sense of some unit of subject matter (see Table 7.5). 
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TABLE 7.5 
Judges' Terms for Topical Organisations and Actions 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
subject matter 
topic 8 1 1 10 
subject 1 5 2 8 
actions 
change 1 9 2 12 
switch 4 1 - 5 
move 2 5 - 7 
Total 16 21 5 42 
There was only one reference to the topical action of 'introducing a topic'. In 
Study 1, judge 3 commented: 
Study 1 
Judge 3 
Ian introduces topics he can talk about 
The action of 'topic closure' was also reported only once. This occurred in Study 2, 
Extract 2, where the 'subject' is reported 'to fizzle out'. 
Study 2 (Extract 2) 
Judge 8 
the conversation is split into two halves 
the subject fizzles out 
at the anecdote 
about the tax claim 
The remaining references involve observations about 'topic change' or 'topic 
shifts'. These are related to specific utterances or instances (cf. Bublitz's notion of 
'local topic', 1988: 35) in examples such as: 
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Study 1 
Judge 4 
there is a topic switch with 
do you want some sugar 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 5 
there is an abrupt change of subject 
Changes in topic are also related to activities that occur across a series of 
utterances (cf. Bublitz's notion of 'global topic', 1988: 35): . 
Study 1 
Judge 4 
they talk about a range of topics 
Judge 6 
they move on to different things 
Judge 12 
they switch from topic to topic 
Judge 16 
they talk about three subjects 
Study 2 (Extract 5) 
Judge 5 
the conversation moves on 
from pictures to work 
and the topic changes completely 
Bublitz argues that 'topic change' and 'topic shift' can overlap, but should be kept 
separate as far as possible since the latter "may be a more subtle and therefore 
effective means of controlling and guiding the topic and the conversation than a 
topic change" (1988: 64). Interpreting these types of action post hoc seems to me to 
be fraught with difficulty however, because the notion of 'topic' itself is so 
structurally evasive. What is talked about in terms of subject of matter, and how it 
is talked about can also be evaluated in quite different ways. Compare the 
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comments of Judge 6 and Judge 8 in Study 1, where the participants' topical 
actions are viewed as 'non-serious', on the one hand, and as 'indicative of 
relaxation' on the other. Judge 1 makes a similar statement about how the subject 
matter is treated in Study 2 (Extract 5), that is, it is treated 'semi-seriously'. 
Study 1 
Judge 6 
they don't seriously consider the topics 
under consideration 
Judge 8 
the switch of topics is indicative of relaxation 
Study 2 (Extract 5) 
Judge 1 
they only treat the subject matter semi-seriously 
The manipulation of topical actions is clearly a very important aspect of verbal 
communication, and although descriptively challenging is an area that deserves 
further attention from analysts of talk (cf. the work of Bublitz, 1988: Chapter 2). To 
introduce, change or abandon a topic is a powerful means of exerting one's 
influence on the direction of the ongoing conversation and thus push one's 
interests into the foreground. These interests may be achieved by using topic and 
topical actions to move certain facts, events, states, persons, attitudes and other 
speech subjects into the focus of the conversation. However, Bublitz (1988: 139) 
concludes from his studies that topic and topical actions are not usually 
asymmetrical or egocentric; they are the result of joint productions that help 
participants "to reach a compromise of interests, to create and maintain common 
ground, and to establish cooperation and agreement". The work of Jürgen 
Habermas is very much echoed here, and the kinds of actions mooted would 
perhaps benefit from controlled investigations of the kind advocated by social 
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psychologists who work on discourse phenomena (see, for example, the papers 
collected in Roger and Bull, 1989). 
In terms of the present perspective, the relationship between judges' 
evaluations of topical actions and the ascription of participant goals will be 
pursued further in Chapter 9. Judges' observations about 'topic' also seem to help 
characterise different kinds of interactional exchange by designating different 
kinds of content, and I suggest that this aspect of third person interpretation 
merits further investigation too (see Chapter 9). 
7.3 Summary 
In this chapter, analysis of comments in the textual domain has shown that naive 
third person judges were able to provide information about the encoding of 
surface linguistic forms, in the stimulus fragments, to varying degrees of detail. 
Judges observations were characterised on the basis of a small, but significant, 
metalinguistic vocabulary which was used to refer to particular kinds of 
phenomena. 
Apart from comparing this vocabulary against professional usage, its 
classification provides a basis for investigating interpretive capacity that are 
generated by what is in the text. Interpretations generated through a combination 
of what is in the text and what is in the interpreter. Interplay of text cues and 
members resources. Gumperz (1982a: 170) suggests that: 
by looking at systematic patterns in the relationship of perception of surface 
cues to interpretation, we can gather strong evidence for the social basis of 
contextualization conventions and for the signalling of communicative goals. 
(Gumperz, 1982a: 170) 
These patterns are explored in the following two chapters, where the interplay of 
text cues and members resources is examined with respect to contextual 
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information about the participants (Chapter 8), and supratextual information 
about genre and praxis (Chapter 9). 
CHAPTER 8 
CONTEXTUAL RESPONSES 
8.0 Situational Characteristics 
This chapter considers the kinds of interpretive comment that judges provided 
about 'situational characteristics' of the stimulus fragments. While I will refer to 
such interpretations as 'contextual', the notion of context, as used here, is intended 
in the restricted sense of the physical-biological components of communicative 
events, as opposed to the notion of 'context' or 'context of situation', which is used 
by scholars as a theoretical and a cognitive abstraction necessary for 
understanding verbal interaction. 
A variety of conceptual frameworks have emerged over the years for 
investigating 'context', and these are usefully reviewed by Giles and Coupland 
(1991). Giles and Coupland point out that: "Many approaches have recognised the 
importance of social context even to the extent of claiming that language use is 
prescribed and proscribed by the situation in which it is spoken, including the 
characteristics of the speakers involved" (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 3). Since it is 
such a huge issue, the debate about whether language is either determined by or 
as itself determines the nature of 'context' is not pursued here (see Pellowe, 1990; 
Giles and Coupland, 1991; Duranti and Goodwin, 1992 for further discussion). 
From a sociolinguistic perspective, I take it as axiomatic that language use cannot 
be adequately conceived without reference to the context in which it is encoded. In 
other words, language and situation must be viewed as conceptual autonomies 
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which are interdependent and operate simultaneously, as Giles and Coupland 
(1991) argue. 
Because their descriptive categories were closest to the types of comment that 
judges provided, I used the frameworks established by Hymes (1972; 1974), and 
thereafter developed by Brown and Fraser (1979) for coding contextual 
interpretations (see Section 6.2). The responses were subsequently categorised in 
terms of two broad statement types: 
(1) statements giving information about the physical location of the 'scene'; 
(2) statements giving information about the personal attributes or 
characteristics of the 'participants'. 
Interpretive differences in respect of this information will be taken into 
account, since there are likely to be different perceptions of what is involved for 
different individuals as Giles and Coupland (1991) point out. They note: 
different individuals may use different dimensions for construing the same 
situation. In addition, the dimensions used by different people vary in 
complexity and even when different individual do use common dimensions 
different weights may be placed upon them, and the same episode may be 
seen at the opposite poles of the same dimension. (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 
15) 
A major difference, of course, is bound to lie in the different types of 
information that are available to participant as opposed to non-participant judges. 
However, this difference is not systematically explored here, since I did not set out 
to investigate the influence of contextual determinants on third person 
interpretation per se. Something of judges' shared knowledge, organising concepts 
and practices with respect to family and outside observers interpretations of the 
same exchange is explored in the work of Kreckel (1981). Kreckel expected that 
family members would come to very similar interpretations as a group, while 
outside members would arrive at very different interpretations. However, her 
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findings produced 'unexpected results' in terms of the amount of agreement 
between outside observers as a group in their own right (Kreckel, 1981: 259). The 
problem for the analyst of course, to recall Labov and Fanshel's (1977: 351) axiom, 
is that "we can never recover all the information that the participants shared" (see 
Section 3.3). 
Detweiler (1986) argues that one should not be surprised to find that similar 
individuals, given exactly the same information, sometimes make different 
categorisation judgements. He reviews a number of approaches that have 
attempted to explain why these differences may occur, and suggests that one of 
the most promising is the idea of 'category width'. The idea of category width is 
that "the world more often than not provides a person with stimulation that does 
not clearly fit the definition, or prototype, of any one class or label" (Detweiler, 
1986: 67). This notion seems to provide an extremely plausible and powerful way 
of explaining why there should be interpretive differences across and between 
judges who have listened to the same stimulus material. 
The issue of interpretive multiplexity across and between judges is explored 
further in Chapter 10. However, as far as the provision of contextual information 
is concerned, I can only suggest that a much more substantive psycho- 
ethnographic study of different individuals and different types of judge is needed 
in order to determine the kinds of dimension and effect that Giles and Coupland 
(1991) allude to. 
8.1 The Scene 
Following the model of Brown and Fraser (1979), comments about 'scene' were 
first categorised into information about 'the setting' and information about 'the 
purpose' of the fragments. Judges' terms for referring to 'scene' are limited to just 
two nouns. These are 'situation' and 'place'. A Hypercard search using these 
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terms only produced eleven references in the corpus. Consequently, a further 
manual search was undertaken to identify other types of reference in this 
category, where these included information about the locale and time of 
interaction. 
8.2 Setting 
The majority of references about 'setting' concern the 'locale' rather than 'time' of 
interaction and occurred in Study 1. Only one of the participant judges involved in 
this study provided information about the setting, and this involved a single 
reference to when the exchange took place. Participant B commented: 
Participant B 
I can remember the situation 
it was a Saturday morning 
Non-participant references to setting in the same study were provided by eight 
judges. Ten references were identified, and these specify four different 
environments. The environments are: 
(1) the room or office of one of the participants-5 references; 
(2) the home or flat of one of the participants-3 references; 
(3) a kitchen-1 reference; 
(4) a school common room-1 reference. 
Three of the judges correctly guessed that the exchange took place in the office 
of the participant who was named, though individuals were not actually informed 
where the recordings took place. These guesses were presumably based on 
knowledge about the participant concerned, since he was widely known to 
undertake tape-recording in his room. The remaining guesses are presumably 
based on some inferred set of possible environments that judges consider as 
plausible settings for the type of exchange that took place. A salient cue in this 
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regard may have been the sound of the kettle boiling, which was noted by six of 
the sixteen judges. This cue may also have led to the only comment about the time 
of the interaction, which was described by Judge 9 as being 'in their tea break'. 
Studies 2 and 3 yielded very few comments about setting at all. Only five 
references were elicited across the six fragments used in Study 2. These occur in 
response to Extract 3, where the fragment was adjudged to have taken place in 'a 
vehicle' (Judge 4), 'a boiler room' (Judge 6), and 'a toilet' (Judge 7) respectively. 
Study 2 (Extract 3) 
Judge 4 
they were in some kind of vehicle 
Judge 6 
a boiler room 
Judge 7 
a toilet 
In Extract 6, judge 6 suggests that the fragment occurred in a 'gent's washing 
room', and also described the participants as 'washing their hands'. Since all the 
recordings were made in the same office, these guesses are incorrect. 
Only two fragments in Study 3 yielded comments about the situation. Pairs 1 
and 2 (Extract 1) said that the exchange may have taken place in a 'pub' or 'bar'. 
While Pair 7 (Extract 2) said that 'it sounds like a middle aged farmer's wife at tea 
talking to another farmer's wife'. 
Non-participant statements about setting often seem to be drawn on the basis 
of analogy; 'it's like' and 'it sounds like' are the most common usages. Since 
analogy is also widely used to describe the participants as well as their 
communicative behaviour (as we shall see in Section 8.4 below, and in Chapter 9), 
it seems likely that a general principle of analogy is an important interpretive 
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resource for third person judges. Indeed, just such a principle is suggested by Rost 
(1990) to explain listener understanding of single utterances as well as larger texts. 
This principle is paraphrased by Rost as follows: 
'I've been in a situation something like this before, so what is happening 
here will be similar to what happened before'. (Rost, 1990: 72) 
Rost (op. cit. 72-73) goes on to explain that the principle can be applied to people 
('this person usually says things like that'), to places ('that's the kind of 
conversation you often hear in places like that') and to text types ('that's what 
usually happen in happens in stories like that'). 
It would seem that by using the principle of analogy (I presume that the 
analogies can be real, imagined or stereotypical), third person non-participant 
judges can also provide descriptions of people, places and text types previously 
unseen (cf. Sacks, 1985). In other words, they are able to construct reasonable 
hypotheses or guesses about 'who is involved and what is going on in the 
exchange fragments'. While these hypotheses may be wrong, they provide 
evidence of judges' tendency and willingness to create contexts that are readily 
associated with their own communicative experience. 
The extent to which setting influences the nature of everyday speech activities 
is a moot point, and would require systematic investigation in its own right. 
Brown and Fraser note: "The physical setting in which interaction takes place 
generally has little determining power over linguistic characteristics of the speech 
used in that setting; it appears to be rare that speech choice is actually determined 
by the setting per se. " (Brown and Fraser, 1979: 44). However, while speech choice 
or style may be more a reflection of 'audience design' (Bell, 1984; 1990) than 
setting, I think it is clear from the following comments that individual affective 
states and attitudes can be influenced by situational factors. 
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In Study 1, for example, Participant 1 commented: 
Study 1 
Participant A 
I was conscious of the situation 
we were not meeting as mates 
it was very much a student supervisor chat 
Interestingly, his reported sense of the relative formality of the proceedings is 
echoed in the comments of several of the non-participating judges. Judge 10, for 
example, states that 'the situation isn't very relaxed', as does judge 16 who 
suggests that the participants 'are not quite at ease'. Participant 1 is also variously 
described as 'not relaxed' (Judge 1); 'having a complex about being a student 
(Judge 3); 'sounding eager but hesitant', and being 'uncertain' (Judge 4); 'sounding 
a little bit uneasy' and 'rather stilted' (Judge 13); and finally as 'very hesitant' and 
'passive' (Judge 14). 
I presume that these judgements emanate from interpretive work that is based 
on contextualisation conventions of various kinds. 'Uncertainty', 'hesitancy', and 
'unease' may be being attributed as a result of prosodic cues such as 'tone', 'pause' 
and 'loudness'. 'Passivity' may be marked by the participant's 'non-interruptive 
speech' patterns and the relative lack of 'overlapping sequences', and so on (see 
Chapter 7). The putative relationship between contextualisation cues of this type 
and the evaluation of some individual's discourse behaviour will be explored 
more fully in Chapter 9. 
Brown and Fraser (1979: 39) argue that one of the most important factors in 
motivating the analysis of interactional situations comes from the notion of 
communicative 'purpose', and since a number comments indicate that the 
exchanges are viewed as purposeful by third person judges, it is this notion that I 
want to consider next. 
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8.3 Purpose 
Brown and Fraser (1979) suggest that there are different levels which can be used 
to describe scopes of purpose. The first of these are designated as 'maxi-purposes', 
and it is these that are of immediate concern in this section. Maxi-purposes 
provide participants with 'a rough and ready guide through a whole series of 
different or distinguishable situations', such as 'visiting the doctor' (Brown and 
Fraser, 1979: 39ff. ). More than one situation may of course be involved in the 
process of attempting to fulfil this purpose from the point of view of a prospective 
patient. For example, one might first talk to the receptionist in the reception area, 
before moving on to the waiting area, and then finally into the doctor's room itself 
to begin the process of consultation. In this latter context, one may pursue various 
'mini-purposes', which Brown and Fraser define as 'the moment-by-moment 
changes in participants' intentions' (1979: 40). It is these moment-moment- 
changes, as perceived from outside the participation framework, that are the 
subject of discussion in Chapters 9. 
Maxi-purposes were coded on the basis of generalised statements about the 
communicative situation. These were mostly elicited in the course of Study 1, 
where there were 26 references in the response data. While there may be certain 
overarching purposes for participants in talk, these can include specific purposes 
which are not sustained across the talk as a whole. This kind of embedding of 
purpose, with larger purposes containing smaller ones, is exemplified in the 
comments of Participant 1, Study 1 who said: 
Study 1 
Participant A 
I was conscious of the situation 
we were not meeting as mates 
it was very much a student supervisor chat 
I wanted to reprocess my application 
as a research student 
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Ian was trying to make sure of my motives 
If we now consider the comments of his interlocutor, it would appear that he held 
a rather negative sense of what was considered to be going on. Participant B 
responded: 
Study 1 
Participant B 
I can remember the situation 
it was a Saturday morning 
it's all preliminary crap 
it was basically a waste of time 
Non-participant judges seem to be sensitive to both these interpretive 
positions as evidenced by the comments of judges 6 and 9 in the same study. 
Compare, for example: 
Study 1 
Judge 6 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
the preliminaries before getting down to the real stuff 
it's a way of filling in silence 
it's exploratory 
it's a linguistic shaking of hands 
Judge 9 
its not so much an interrogation 
but a chance for the younger guy to explain things 
However, four other judges considered that the exchange was perhaps rather 
more spontaneous and phatic in purpose than either of the participants had. 
intimated. The comments of these judges included: 
Study 1 
Judge 2 
it's a casual encounter 
he's just called round 
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judge 4 
it's kind of come on over 
and tell me what's going on 
and how I can help 
Judge 8 
it's an occasion to go for coffee 
and talk while you are making it 
Judge 12 
it wasn't for a purpose 
While references to this kind of situated purpose were relatively sparse in the 
remainder of the corpus, a very substantial body of comments was identified in 
which the goal-oriented nature of the interactions, in terms of mini-purposes, or 
participant 'conversational inferencing' (Gumperz, 1982a: Chapter 7), seemed to 
attract non-participant judges' attention. Before considering interpretive work 
involving evaluations of this type, that is, where the focus of judgemental 
response was concerned with what the participants were trying to achieve as 
interlocutors, I want to discuss the other major element of contextual commentary, 
wherein judges provided various kinds of information about the participants 
themselves. 
8.4 The Participants 
The basic descriptive question to answer about participants is 'Who is taking part 
in the event? ' According to Saville-Troike (1982), descriptions of this kind should 
include: 
not only observable traits, but background information on the composition 
and role-relationships within the family and other social institutions, 
distinguishing features in the life cycle, and differentiation within the group 
according to sex and social status. (Saville-Troike, 1982: 141) 
It is a well recognised facet of verbal communication that as actors in a social 
world, we interact with people by virtue of an exchange of information on many 
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different levels. In this regard, Laver (1972) suggests that: "Any given utterance 
contains not only a great deal of linguistic information but also a great deal of 
information for the listener about the characteristics of the speaker himself" 
(Laver, 1972: 189). Lyons (1977a) makes a similar point in arguing the need to 
include social and expressive information in modelling the communicative 
process, because language not only serves to express speaker intent for the 
purposes of signalling factual and propositional information, but also serves to (a) 
establish and maintain social relations, and (b) express our attitudes and 
personality. The extent and willingness of judges to provide social and expressive 
information about the participants, as a consequence of post hoc inferencing, is 
examined in this section. 
It is well established that our perception of other people is not a passive 
process. Giles and Powesland (1971) argue, for example, that: 
When we meet someone for the first time we immediately begin to make 
judgements and inferences about him on the basis of what we see and hear. 
The nature of these inferences and the significance which we attach to them 
will depend on our conscious or unconscious assumptions and beliefs. 
Whether we are aware of it or not we each have our own "implicit personality 
theories" which enable us, with varying degrees of validity, to construct 
impressions of people from whatever information about them is available. 
(Giles and Powesland, 1975: 1) 
In order to determine 'what sort of person we are dealing with', in face-to-face 
interaction, Giles and Powesland suggest that individuals make use of certain 
visual clues; the 'appearance' of the person or persons concerned, their 'facial 
expressions', gestures', and so on. Obviously, visual clues are simply not available 
in audio recordings of verbal exchange. Nevertheless, this did not appear to 
inhibit third persons from making judgements and inferences on the 
basis of the 
data fragments they listened to, many of which were of course previously unseen 
or unknown. The evaluative work that is considered in this section is certainly not 
passive either, and is often remarkable in its detail. But the clues or processes that 
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may have triggered the evaluations in question are much less transparent than the 
nature of someone's dress or aesthetic biological qualities, since judges had to 
work from verbal (textual) content alone. The process may be akin to our attempts 
to construct accurate visual portraits of individuals on the end of a telephone. I 
know from my own experience that the disparity between the image I have 
constructed and the person I eventually confront can be markedly different. 
Indeed, guesses about what someone looks like are often a source of comment, 
amusement, or embarrassment, because of their inaccuracy. 
It is the nature and quality of evaluations about the participants as 
individuals, as opposed to those used in the description of the participants as 
interlocutors, that I want to consider here. The reference vocabularies used by 
judges in this regard essentially provide what Abercrombie (1967: 6) refers to as 
'indexical information', that is, information about the personal characteristics of 
speakers. These characteristics are categorised by Laver and Trudgill (1979: 3) into 
'group markers', 'individual markers' and 'affective markers' respectively. Group 
markers are essentially social and indicate affiliation to particular regional or 
social groups. Individual markers include biological or physical characteristics. 
And affective markers involve characteristics of personality and affective state. 
This kind of information, has of course, been the subject of a great deal of 
discussion within social psychological research of the kind developed by Howard 
Giles and his associates, and the work of attribution theorists, which shows 
peoples ' willingness to infer social and personal characteristics from voice (see, 
for example, Giles and Powesland, 1975; Scherer and Giles, 1979; Giles, Robinson 
and Smith, 1980; Fraser and Scherer, 1982; Ryan and Giles, 1982, Hewstone, 1983; 
1984; Giles and St Clair, 1985; Gudykunst, 1986; Giles and Robinson, 1990). 
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Judges' comments were considered in the light of two main types of 
information provided in the response data (cf. Brown and Fraser, 1979 and 
Kreckel 1981): 
(1) information about the personal attributes of individual speakers; 
(2) information about the relational attributes that are held between speakers. 
8.5 Personal Attributes 
Brown and Fraser (1979: 50) suggest that the characteristics of individuals, as 
manifest in their speech, may be divided into those which seem to characterise the 
individual as an individual, and those which characterise the individual as a 
member of a social group. They further divide individualistic characteristics into 
those relatively stable aspects of personal identity, as opposed to temporary states 
and attitudes which evolve and change in the process of conversing. These 
temporary features are not a primary focus of this chapter, since they appear to be 
more obviously related to the interactional behaviour of the participants (see the 
discussion of 'affectual' and 'textual key' as discussed in the following chapter, 
Section 9.5). Consequently, the ability of judges to name and identify particular 
individuals is considered first, followed by discussion of characterisations that 
place these individuals as members within some social grouping. 
8.5.1 The Individual Qua Individual 
Where an individual participant was described by the judges, the references 
concerned were coded in terms of whether the person in question was said to be 
either known or recognised by name. References to stable characteristics of 
personal identity were then charted according to statements about the 'age' and 
`sex'. Although there is persistent debate as to whether personality traits are stable 
across time and consistent over situations in the same way as 'age' and 'sex', I 
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have also included judges' evaluations of 'personality' traits in this section. The 
most frequently cited marker of social identity is 'sex of speaker', and I shall 
consider this first. 
1. Sex 
Sex of speaker proved to be the most common way for judges to refer to the 
participants, with judges providing 115 explicit references using masculine and 
feminine terms (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2 below). Smith (1979: 128) notes: 
the recognition of speaker sex is not a problem, for there is obviously some 
little combination of elementary speech features that cues our recognition of 
sex before almost anything else about the speaker's social identity, except 
perhaps age. 
My data would seem to support Smith's claim, since there were 529 implicit 
references to the gender of the participants in the exchange fragments, where 
these involved the use of the various third person masculine and feminine 
pronoun forms: 
'he', 'him', 'himself'; 'his'; - 284 references 
'she'; 'her'; 'herself'; 'hers' - 245 references 
The use of pronouns in the expression of various social relations and attitudes is 
explored in some detail in Mühlhäusler and Harre (1990). 
I will turn to the issue of 'age' presently, since contrary to Smith's comment, 
there were relatively few comments about the social identity of the participants in 
this regard. Personally, I think that the attribution of age based on responses to 
tape recorded is likely to be problematic, since it is impossible to determine how 
old someone is with any degree of accuracy. Having said that, some judges did 
attempt to guess the age of particular participants beyond using broad 
comparators such as 'younger' as opposed to 'older' as we shall see. 
266 
Other references to gender are presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 below, where a 
small set of terms are used to mark identity in each case (the figures include plural 
and possessive forms). 
TABLE 8.1 
Judges' Use of Masculine Terms 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
bloke 5 14 7 26 
guy 10 9 7 26 
man 5 9 12 26 
fella 2 - 1 3 
fellow - - 1 1 
Total 22 32 28 82 
Notice, in the male set, the relatively large number of colloquial noun usages 
('bloke'; 'guy'; 'fella'), as opposed to the more restricted set of feminine terms, 
where only 3 terms were used. 
TABLE 8.2 
Judges' Use of Feminine Terms 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
woman - - 18 18 
girl - 6 2 8 
lady - 1 1 2 
Total - 7 21 28 
It is not so much the actual number of references that is at issue here, since the 
stimulus fragments were not selected on the basis of equal numbers of female and 
male participants, but rather the choice of terms themselves. The term 'girl', for 
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example, tends to be used in a negatively stereotypical way by male as opposed 
female judges. Compare the comments of the following two judges in Study 2, 
Extract 1. Judge 1, who is female, uses the term to make the observation that: 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 1 
the girl is talking very quickly 
Judge 6 (male), on the other hand, uses the term 'girl' to make the following 
judgements: 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 6 
it sounds like a girl 
who has got a crush on teacher 
there is a little girl lost sort of attitude 
It is perhaps worth comparing the nature of these comments with the 
evaluations produced by the other female judges in the same study. 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 1 
she seems to be acting in some way 
even at the end she isn't fully natural 
Judge 7 
it sounds false 
the girl sounds self-conscious 
The male judges do seem to be more inclined to make judgemental statements 
with respect to female participants as further evidenced in Study 3. Compate the 
positive comments of the female judges, with the negative ones of the males in the 
following set. 
Female Judges: Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 1 
she's a very nice lady 
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Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 2 
interesting woman wasn't she 
Male Judges: Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 2 
she was trying to put on an 'I am being recorded' voice 
Pair 5 
it sounded to me like a woman with an audience 
Pair 6 
one woman seems to be doing all the talking 
it's a very immature kind of speech 
Pair 7 
the way she uses language just doesn't ring true 
Study (Extract 4) 
Pair 6 
she seems a bit kind of dopey 
Pair 7 
she was a bit kind of woman's lib 
in that women aren't afraid of mice 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Pair 5 
it's the same dratted woman though 
have we got her all the way through 
Pair 7 
they sound like they were girls at school together 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 6 
when the woman were speaking 
they didn't know the story 
and the audience were indulgent 
whereas the men were speaking about matters 
that everyone cared about 
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This is not to say that female judges did not make any stereotypical judgements 
about the male speakers as the following comments indicate, but these are 
relatively few in number. 
Female Judges: Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 2 
they talked a lot of bland cliches 
compared to the women speakers 
Pair 3 
the laughter was very cheap 
it was a very male conversation 
Kramarae (1982) suggests that women's speech or men's speech cannot be defined 
apart from discussion of attitudes, and it may be the case that judges' comments 
need to be more systematically explored in this light. The question is whether or 
not the mere recognition of gender precludes a way of listening that is likely to 
lead to a particular assessment of the way some individual speaks or behaves in 
verbal exchange. If women's language and men's language is different, and all the 
evidence assembled to date suggests that is (Coates, 1986; Coates and Cameron, 
1988; Kramarae, 1990), then the evaluation of gender associated speech style or 
interactional behaviour in everyday verbal exchange certainly warrants further 
exploration. 
2. Naming 
The second most frequent means of describing speaker identity in the response 
data is by naming. Naming practices vary according to speaker recognition 
patterns, and the knowledge that judges have regarding different individuals. 
When individuals are referred to by personal names, judges use either first name 
alone (e. g. 'Ian'; 'Malcolm'; 'Holly'), last name alone (e. g. 'Hall'; 'the Palaces'), or 
first name plus last name (e. g. 'Neville Carson'; 'Chris Davidson'). 
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Naming in itself does not indicate the degree of familiarity that judges might 
have with respect to the individual who is named, since this information would 
have to be gleaned by direct questioning, or by requiring judges to rate familiarity 
on some pre-established scale. However, I assume that knowledge of the 
participants may very well affect not only the nature of attributions about 
individuals, but also the nature of their interactional behaviour (cf. Kreckel's 
(1981) work on family and outsider interpretations of family discourse). Where 
individuals are not named, on the other hand, it is likely that judges are not 
familiar with the individuals in question. Consequently, references to the 
participants by non-participant judges tend to be couched either in terms of 
impersonal noun phrases of the type - 'the man'; 'the girl'; 'the guy'; 'two people' 
etc. or pronominal references such as 'she'; 'he'; 'one'; 'they' as I pointed out in the 
previous section. Another common form of reference is by the designation of 
interactional roles 'the main speaker'; 'the guy who was trying to hog the 
conversation'; 'the other bloke was very quiet'; 'person A' and 'person B' etc. 
In Study 1, seven of the judges identified one of the participants by name. First 
name references were used on 16 occasions by six of the non-participant judges; 
the remaining judge identified the participant in question by his last name on 4 
occasions. Speaker recognition is presumably based on the situational and 
parametric probabilities that were applied on this occasion; the kinds of factor 
affecting speaker recognition in experimental contexts are presented in Brown 
(1979; 1980). These probabilities include the range of possible circumstances in 
which such a voice may have been heard by a judge, and/or the vocal 
characteristics that may identify a particular individual from the set of reference 
voices with which judges are familiar as a result of some kind of social contact. Six 
judges were able to identify one of the speakers by naming as follows: 
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Study 1 
Judge 1 
the first person is Ian 
Judge 2 
the first speaker is Ian 
judge 3 
I recognise Ian 
Judge 4 
Ian had control all along 
Judge 5 
it's in Ian's room 
Judge 7 
one of them is Ian 
A seventh judge also identified this speaker by name, but used his surname 
instead. Thus: 
Study 1 
Judge 6 
one speaker is Hall 
Where personal identification by naming was not provided, presumably 
because the other speaker was either not recognised or known to judges, non- 
familiar reference labels were employed. These labels came in a variety of forms. 
Judge 1, or example, identified the second speaker by place of origin ('the other 
guy is a Southerner'). Judge 2, on the other hand, referred to his sex ('I don't know 
the second man'). Judge 3 referred to sex and occupation ('the other guy may be a 
former student'), and judge 4 referred to his affective state ('the other speaker 
sounded eager but hesitant). Judge 5 used a familiar in-group marker ('he is 
talking with another bloke'), while Judge 6 stated that speaker recognition was not 
possible in this particular case ('I can't really make out one speaker'). Finally, 
Judge 7 referred to the sex and interactional behaviour of the participant in 
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question ('the other bloke has to be encouraged to talk'). Other referents included 
labels such as 'the interactants'; 'the speaker(s)', and 'the participants'. 
Where neither of the participants were named, nor presumably recognised, 
they tended to be identified in terms of both their social and discourse relations as 
follows: 
Study 1 
Judge 8 
it's a discussion between colleagues 
Judge 9 
it's a friendly discussion between two people 
Judge 10 
it's a conversation between two males 
Judge 13 
one man is entertaining the other to coffee 
The nature of these relational attributions are discussed in Section 8.3. 
Inspection of the references in Study 2 reveals that six judges were able to 
name the participants. First names were cited in the vast majority cases. These 
were: 'Ian' (48 references - six judges across all the extracts); 'Malcolm' (5 
references - Judge 7, Extract 4) and 'Keith' (4 references -Judge 1 and Judge 7, 
Extract 2). A family name ('Hall) was used by judge 6 in Study 1 on 4 occasions). 
Only two judges commented on the extent of their familiarity with the 
participants, and these occurred in relation to Extract 2. 
Study 2 (Extract 2) 
Judge 7 
I know these people so well 
Judge 8 
knowing both people makes it difficult for me 
to comment on any peculiarities 
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The comments of Judge 8 suggest that the process of third person 
interpretation may be problematic for some individuals because of their 
knowledge of those involved in the stimulus fragments. In this case, the problem 
seems to be related to the nature of the interpretive task judges were asked to 
undertake. For Judge 8, this task is presumed to be an opportunity 'to comment on 
any peculiarities'. I expected that as a result of recognising the participants, non- 
participant judges would have much to say about participant identity. However, 
there proved to be relatively few comments of this type. 
In the event that knowledge of the participants may have been skewing what 
judges had to say, the stimulus fragments for Study 3 were chosen from material 
that I considered would minimise the possibility of speaker recognition. None of 
the participants were named in Study 3 by the non-participant pairs, however, 
and hence the only information about speaker identity was provided by the 
participant judges (see Appendix G). 
The other objective measure of speaker identity is 'age'. Given the importance 
of age in terms of secular sociolinguistic research, I expected that judges' 
comments would perhaps focus on this variable as much as any other. Again this 
supposition proved to be somewhat misguided as the relative paucity of 
references to age shows. 
3. Age 
Like Helfrich (1979) I assumed that age would be an important category for. social 
interaction and organisation. Helfrich writes: 
Among other things, age is associated with the role structure in the family 
and in social groups, with the assignment of authority and status, and with 
the attribution of different levels of competence. Since a large part of social 
interaction consists of verbal communication, it is highly likely that the social 
category age is also reflected in speech behaviour. (Helfrich, 1979: 63) 
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Yet, only ten judges were to make references to age in the corpus of responses. The 
references included fourteen statements where age was either evaluated in 
chronological terms (e. g. 'eighteen'; 'middle aged'; 'early to mid-thirties'), or by 
comparatives such as 'younger'; 'older' etc. References to chronological age 
included: 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 7 
they are both in their forties I'd say 
This is an accurate evaluation in terms of the information provided by Crystal and 
Davy (1975: 19) who note that the extract used "was taken from a long 
conversation between two men ... aged around 40". 
In Study 3, Extract 2 there seems to be less certainty about the age of the 
participants. Comments included: 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 4 
I thought she was very young 
but she's not she's middle aged 
Pair 5 
I've got a picture of her early to mid thirties 
Pair 7 
an eighteen year old girl 
who has gone to work on a farm 
she's got to be about eighteen 
I think that it sounds like a middle aged farmer's wife 
Crystal and Davy (1975: 39) report that the exchange used in the stimulus 
fragment "takes place between two women in their thirties (A and B) and their 
husbands also in their thirties". Nevertheless, the same judge involved in correctly 
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identifying the age of the speakers in Study 3, Extract 1 was again able to offer an 
accurate evaluation. He said: 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 7 
I think that it's a couple in their thirties 
In the final comment of this type, the same judge was able to make a 
reasonable guess at the age of the speaker concerned; she is described by Crystal 
and Davy as being in her 'thirties'. The judge commented: 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Pair 7 
the one that commented sounded very Southern 
in her late twenties 
Accurate age guessing must be very difficult in the so called 'middle age 
range' of speakers who were recorded by Crystal and Davy. This difficulty may 
help to explain why age was sometimes judged comparatively on the basis of a 
'junior/senior' hierarchy. Compare: 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 6 
she is much younger than the person 
who she is talking to 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 4 
one seemed older than the other 
I think the older one had a more pronounced accent 
than the younger one 
These evaluations can only be checked by questioning the participants directly of 
course. 
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Whether 'age' is salient for the participants themselves is another matter. In 
this connection, it may be worth pointing out the need to distinguish between 
tasks of 'identification' from tasks of 'evaluation' in experimental work that 
involves lay attributions. Brown (1979) cites the work of Bricker and Pruzansky 
(1976) in this regard, who note: 
We classify as an identification task any in which some or all of the available 
responses denote an individual speaker. The term evaluation is applied to 
tasks that require the listener to judge the value of the stimulus-voice on some 
attribute, dimension or characteristic. The accuracy criterion intrinsic to 
identification tasks (i. e. the scorability of identifications as to correctness) 
generally does not obtain for evaluation tasks. (Brown, 1979: 729) 
The same kind of accuracy generally does not obtain for evaluations, however. 
This is because identification tasks involve reference voice patterns; evaluation 
tasks do not, since they are based on subjective measures. 
Other references to age tended to be implicitly rather than explicitly stated, for 
example, in the semantics of person deixis. Hence judges talked about 'the girl' as 
opposed to 'the man' (Judge 1, Study 2, Extract 1); 'a student' as opposed to 'a 
lecturer' (Judge 4, Study 2, Extract 1); 'a girl' as opposed to 'teacher' (judge 6, 
Study 2, Extract 1). Implicit or indirect references to age were also made in relation 
to different kinds of contextualised information, and particularly the gender and 
status of the participants. 
The following statements not only refer indirectly to age but also provide 
gender evaluations related to affectual key for example (see Section 9.5.1): 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 6 
there is a little girl lost sort of attitude 
Judge 7 
the girl sounds self conscious 
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Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 6 
it was a very immature kind of speech 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 4 
she's got a whimpering babyish sort of voice 
Judges 6 and 7 in Study 2, and Pairs 6 and 4 in Study 3, are male and female 
respectively. The most negatively stereotypical of the comments is provided by 
one of the male judges, Judge 6 (Study 2, Extract 1), who refers to 'a little girl lost 
sort of attitude'. 
Indeed, Judge 6 goes further than this and suggests that age is not the only 
salient factor here, but that there is also a status differential between the 
participants. It is notable that he also describes this differential in gender 
stereotypical terms, and with regard to the younger participant's interactional 
behaviour. 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 6 
it sounds like a girl who has a crush on teacher 
and is trying to impress 
The interaction of age with gender stereotyping is also inherent in other 
comments. Compare the following statements elicited in Study 3 (Extract 2): 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 5 
I've got a picture of her 
early to mid thirties 
with blond hair on top 
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Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 7 
an eighteen year old girl 
who has gone to work on a farm 
she's got to be about eighteen 
I think that it sounds like a middle aged farmer's wife 
The type of description offered by the female judge of Pair 5 is clearly imposed on 
the data as the judge concerned presumably tries to construct some kind of visual 
sense of who is involved. Pair 7, on the other hand, are both males who suggest 
that the participant comes from a farming environment, but belongs to a very 
different age grouping. The participant concerned is judged to be an eighteen year 
old farm girl, and a middle aged farmer's wife respectively. In fact, it is only the 
latter reference to age that is a reasonable guess, since the person concerned is 
described by Crystal and Davy (1975) as a school teacher in her thirties. 
A small number of references in the age category also seem to reflect an 
indirect cultural alignment between age and status that judges are perhaps 
picking up or are sensitive to in formulating their responses. Two judges referred 
to the speech variety of the participants in this connection. Compare: 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 4 
I think the older one 
had a more pronounced accent 
than the younger one 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Pair 7 
the one that commented sounded very Southern 
and was in her late twenties 
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Another judge commented on the effect of age and status on the sequential 
symmetry of the exchange in question. He said: 
Study 1 
Judge 9 
one guy is slightly paternal 
but not obtrusive 
he acts as a kind of springboard for the other guy 
the question-answer format 
is not so much an interrogation 
but a chance for the younger guy to explain things 
This comment seems to be echoed in Study 3, Extract 1 where Judge 4 said: 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 4 
one seemed older than the other 
and seemed more impressed by him 
Presumably, if there are effects on sequential symmetry in talk due to age and 
status, this would be reflected not only in turn-taking behaviour, but also in the 
kind of interactional strategies that are invoked by the participants. It is possible 
that it something of these effects that may have prompted judges to comment as 
follows in Study 2, Extract 2: 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
judge 4 
it's a conversation between a student and Ian 
a lecturer you know that you can talk to 
Judge 6 
it sounds like a girl who has a crush on teacher 
and is trying to impress 
Further work on age and status would be required to ascertain whether these 
evaluations were shared by others with respect to different kinds of participant 
and different kinds of talk, and of course to determine what kinds of 
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contextualisation cues might trigger judgemental responses of this nature. There is 
simply not room to undertake such an investigation here, and I now want to move 
on and consider evaluations that were made with respect to 'personality'. 
4. Personality 
The attribution of personality from voice is a highly subjective process which has 
proved difficult to research in any systematic way. Despite the volume of work in 
this area, answers to questions such as the following remain elusive. 'How are 
personality and individual difference features marked linguistically? ', 'How do 
personality dimensions mediate social evaluations of linguistic performances? ' 
'Are individual differences shaped or moulded by language input? ' (Furnham, 
1990: 73). Unfortunately, there is no clear definition of personality, nor scholarly 
agreement about its dimensions or determinants. However, established research 
has demonstrated that personality traits and psychological states affect speech 
behaviour quite strongly, and that listeners use speech markers related to these 
traits and states to infer or attribute a wide variety of speaker characteristics (see 
Scherer, 1979; Furham, 1990; Semin, 1990 for reviews of the research to date). 
Thirteen non-participant judges made evaluative comments about individual 
personalities or personality traits as a result of listening to the stimulus tapes. 
These comments suggest that judges either felt they could provide personality 
evaluations, or at least were prepared to attempt to do so. In coding the responses, 
I have excluded references to what I assume are temporary affective states and 
% attitudes in examples such as: 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 1 
he's trying to be gentle 
keeping his voice low 
he gets louder as he gets firmer 
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Study 2 (Extract 2) 
Judge 4 
he sounded weary 
tired 
he sounded lower than usual 
Judge 7 
I know these people so well 
Ian sounded a bit pissed 
Notice in the second set of comments that some knowledge of the participant 
in question is intimated, hence, 'he sounded lower than usual'; 'Ian sounded a bit 
pissed'. These comments indicate that judges have some available basis for 
comparing the states involved, in terms of how the speaker 'normally' behaves 
('he is less tired'; 'he is sober' etc. ). I presume that they are also closely related to 
some perceived constellation of prosodic cues (see Section 7.1.2), where the 
speaker manifests changes in 'loudness', 'tempo', 'tension', 'rhythmicality' and so 
on. 
Where the references concern more 'stable' personality characteristics, the 
linguistic basis of the evaluations becomes much less obvious. For example, in 
Study 1, one of the speakers is judged to be 'himself'. 
Study 1 
Judge 1 
Ian was himself 
This evaluation is presumably based on knowledge of the speaker's usual 
interactional as well as linguistic behaviour, that is, the speaker is perceived to be 
speaking and behaving in a relatively 'normal' or 'natural' way for him. I have 
little idea of how the linguistic correlates of this behaviour might be measured, 
since what may be perceived as 'normal' and 'natural' for one judge may not be 
perceived in that way by another. Compare in this respect the comments of judges 
4 and 7 above which are clearly very different in kind. 
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Furthermore, the cues that might trigger comments about particular 
personality states, where these states are essentially psychological, are equally 
difficult to ascertain. Consider the following descriptions of the other speaker in 
Study 1 who is considered 'to refer to himself in a self-effacing way' by one judge, 
and to have 'a complex about being student' by another. 
Study 1 
Judge 2 
the second bloke has a tendency to refer to himself 
in a slightly self-effacing way 
it's slightly depersonalising 
Judge 3 
the other guy has a complex about being a student 
Interestingly, the same speaker is also the subject of a number of highly negative 
comments in the context of his participation in Study 2, Extract 4 where he is 
variously described as 'pompous', 'middle class', 'abstracted', 'unpleasant', 'self- 
opinionated', and once again as having 'an inferiority complex'. 
Study 2 (Extract 4) 
Judge 1 
he is a pompous person 
and thinks of himself as middle class 
Judge 4 
the other guy is an abstracted kind of person 
Judge 6 
the one who is trying to impress is an unpleasant fellow 
he is self-opinionated 
and over self-confident 
I think he must suffer from an inferiority complex, 
Again, I can only suggest that controlled investigative work of the kind 
developed in social psychology be used as a means for exploring the basis of such 
evaluations. Apart from personality ratings themselves, judges could be required 
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to indicate and perhaps rank the importance of the various kinds of 
contextualisation cues that were identified in the previous chapter, and whether 
these were mainly of the individual production type, or the mainly interactional 
type, or an admixture of both. In other words, one might try to ascertain whether 
the judgements were based on the use of particular lexical, segmental, or non- 
segmental phenomena, and/or interactional phenomena such as interruptive or 
non-interruptive turn-taking behaviour, and so on. 
In Study 3, the evaluations about personality also tend to be rather negative, 
with the following exceptions. These are: 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 1 
she's a very nice lady 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 7 
she sounded a lot more confident 
than the woman before 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 4 
seem like solid citizens 
The criteria for these evaluations are not made explicit. They are, however, very 
different in tone from the remaining comments: 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 6 
she is a very scatty sort of person 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 7 
the bloke was reactionary but carefree 
they're not the sort of person I'd like 
I get the impression that he's not shy about anything 
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he's not shy about expressing his opinion any way 
very facile 
very platitudinous 
he is the kind of bloke who has a great theory of the 
world and human behaviour 
he's the sort of bloke who has a monologue 
rather than a conversation 
This type of comment is clearly based on highly personal judgements about the 
speaker or speakers in question, and hence cannot be ratified in any objective 
sense. 
8.5.2 The Individual as a Member of a Social Group 
A rather different type of response connected with speaker identity involves the 
attribution of social or group affiliations. These affiliations are of course much 
explored by social psychologists such as Howard Giles and his associates (see, for 
example, Giles and Powesland, 1975; Scherer and Giles, 1979; Giles, Robinson and 
Smith, 1980; Fraser and Scherer, 1982; Ryan and Giles, 1982, Giles and St Clair 
1985; Gudykunst, 1986; Giles and Robinson, 1990). 
Evaluations about the social, rather than biological, identity of the participants 
were coded according to references concerning their linguistic distinctiveness as 
speakers, including region of origin, and their educational and cultural 
background. While references were made to socio-economic groupings ('she 
sounds middle class' etc. ), I have avoided using 'class' as a descriptive category 
because of the different ways in which the term can be used and/or understood 
(see Robinson (1979); Milroy (1987: 5.3); Milroy and Milroy, 1992). 
1. Speech variety 
Participant identity in terms of regional or social speech varieties was cited in 33 
references. The labels used to nominate these varieties are presented in Table 8.3. 
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While sociolinguistics has been increasingly concerned with social variation in 
language, rather than regional variation, the study of dialects and dialect 
boundaries in Britain has of course a very long history (see, for example, Wakelin, 
1977; Chambers and Trudgill, 1980; Wells, 1982; Trudgill, 1984). 
TABLE 8.3 
Judges' Labels for Regional Accents/Origins 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Australian - - 1 1 
Bristol - - 1 1 
Geordie - 2 - 2 
Lincolnshire - - 1 1 
North - - 2 2 
Northern - - 1 1 
Northerner - - 1 1 
North Country - - 1 1 
RP 1 - 2 3 
South - 2 3 5 
Southern - 1 2 3 
Southerner 1 - 1 2 
Midlands - 1 3 4 
South Midlands - 1 - 1 
SE Midlands - 1 - 1 
Yorkshire - - 3 3 
Total 2 8 22 32 
It is perhaps because of the linguistic diversity in the British Isles that many 
lay people consider themselves to be dialect 'experts', who often take considerable 
pride in their ability to identify where other speakers come from. Indeed, the 
nature of this ability was raised on a number of occasions with one of the judges in 
Study 3, as a result of his attempts to say where particular participants came from. 
Since he was often wrong, he sought to justify his responses by commenting in the 
following way: 
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Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 7 
I'm usually quite good at spotting accents 
don't seem to be doing too well today 
may be the tape's a bit hazy 
My own conversational experience in Britain is that the question, 'Where are 
you from? ', arises quite frequently in initial encounters. This kind of linguistic 
awareness or sensitivity may help to explain why judges sought to locate different 
speakers in terms of regional origin. Fifteen different regions or regional labels 
were used by judges, the majority of which were elicited in Study 3 (22 
references). The labels themselves were mostly of the rather broad type, based on 
the widely held distinction between 'Northern' and 'Southern' varieties of British 
English. Hence comments such as: 
Study 1 
Judge 1 
the other guy is a Southerner 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 4 
I thought he was a Northerner 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 5 
I thought it was Southern 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 6 
her husband I think is from the South 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 7 
well when he said trouble 
I thought that this man's from the South 
perhaps it's somebody who was born in the North 
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but who now lives in the South 
More specific or localised evaluations of the varieties involved were also 
offered as follows. 
Study 2 (Extract 3) 
Judge 6 
Person B is a Geordie 
I was a little surprised to find that only one judge referred to the participant, who 
was a speaker of strongly accented Tyneside English, as a 'Geordie', since his 
variety was markedly different from that of his interlocutor (a generalised RP 
speaker) as Judge 6 pointed out. There is also evidence to suggest a degree of 
speech accommodation on the part of A, as the comments of judge 6 also indicate. 
Study 2 (Extract 3) 
Judge 6 
there are tremendous differences 
between the two kinds of speech 
person A 
starts to acquire some of the speech patterns 
of person B 
and there is a hint of Geordie 
and sometimes his [A's] inflection is very singy songy 
like in what even in Southampton 
It may be worth noting that judge 6 was from Aston, near Birmingham, and this 
may account for his ability to discriminate between 'South East and South 
Midlands' in his comments with respect to Study 2, Extract 4. 
Study 2 (Extract 4) 
Judge 6 
I think the accent is South East to South Midlands 
In Study 3, the following evaluations were elicited with respect to three of the 
six extracts. 
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Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 2 
one sounded as if he were from Bristol 
Pair 6 
it sounds a completely different language 
I'd try to place it as Yorkshire 
Yorkshire Lincolnshire or thereabouts 
The speakers in Extract 1 are described Crystal and Davy thus: 
B, an accountant, is from Ireland, but has been living in Berkshire for some 
years, and his accent displays a mixture of the regional characteristics of both 
these areas. C is a primary school teacher who has also lived in Berkshire for 
many years, but whose accent has remained predominantly that of his county 
of origin, Yorkshire. (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 19) 
The guesses on this occasion seem reasonable in the light of this information. 
In Study 3, it was the judge from Pair 7 who considered himself to be 'quite 
good at spotting accents', who seemed to comment most. This judge originated 
from Macclesfield in Cheshire, which may account for his willingness to make the 
following guesses about the speech varieties named; varieties that he would not 
be unfamiliar with given his background, and with which he seemed to associate 
on a number of occasions. 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 7 
she's got a very north country type accent 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 7 
it sounded pretty middle class 
Midlands 
middle of the road 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Pair 7 
the one that was hogging the conversation 
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sounded very Midlands or Northern 
The participants referred to here involved the same couples. They are described 
by Crystal and Davy as follows: "A and C are from Liverpool, B and D are from 
the Midlands, and though they live in the South of England, they display degrees 
of regional pronunciation" (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 39-40). Some discussion of the 
nature of this regionalism was undertaken by the participant judges with respect 
to B in the course of Study 3, Extract 5. Although having recognised the speaker in 
question, Participant A evaluates her variety as having a 'hint of Welsh'. This is 
further localised by Participant B as 'Liverpool North Welsh'. 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Participant A 
there was a hint of Welsh there 
wasn't there 
was there a hint of Welsh in her 
which I'd never noticed before 
Participant B 
well I don't know 
possibly 
she was um Liverpool North Welsh 
The guesses offered by the non-participant judges are presumably based on 
textual information, though no indication is given as to what this might be, apart 
from how the speakers 'sounded'. Where these associations were perhaps more 
difficult to establish in terms of locale, general labels of the 'North/South' kind 
appear to be used. 
In three instances, judges described the speech variety that is used as 'RP' 
(received pronunciation). This accent is socially marked in terms of both prestige 
and status, and can be either negatively (cf. adjectives such as 'posh' and 'fruity') 
or positively stereotyped (cf. adjectives such as 'genteel' and 'intellectual') as the 
following judges' comments from Study 3, Extracts 3 and 4 indicate: 
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Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 5 
she's got a very fruity kind of voice 
of well sort of actressy 
as if she was putting on a show 
it reminds me of JP's I've met 
when they are pronouncing sentencing on juveniles 
I get that middle class aura about it all 
Pair 6 
it's a sort of more genteel speech than the other two 
there is very little almost no dialect at all 
no inflection 
Pair 7 
this is the aspiring middle class I think 
oh I like that 
they've got traces of background 
the blokes laughing sounded a very middle class laugh 
there is intellectual status 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 1 
the woman has a very funny voice 
his accent is very contrastive 
hers sounded quite unmarked 
more RP 
posh 
Pair 6 
I think she gives herself away with however 
she's either a teacher 
or educated in someway 
again its the same middle class thing 
Notice that in the comments of Pair 6 (Study 3, Extract 3), and Pair 1 (Study 3, 
Extract 4), that the popular perception of RP as a 'neutral' or 'unmarked' variety of 
English is reiterated. The notion of a standardised way of speaking is also evident: 
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Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 6 
it's a sort of more genteel speech than the other two 
there is very little almost no dialect at all 
no inflection 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 1 
the woman has a very funny voice 
his accent is very contrastive 
hers sounded quite unmarked 
more RP 
Various social evaluations are clearly intimated in this type of comment, 
including the educational background, occupation and socio-economic status of 
the individuals involved (cf. the discussion of 'age' in 8.5.1 above). These 
assignations were coded separately under the rubric of evaluations about the 
social group characteristics of different speakers. The issue of linguistic value 
judgements about Tok Pisin, as discussed in Mühlhäusler (1982), is worth noting 
here for purposes of comparison with judges' comments about English speech 
varieties. 
2. Social characteristics 
Information about the social group characteristics attributed to individual 
speakers seems to be based on interpretive responses to at least three kinds of 
textual information (see Chapter 7). These include the participants' realisation of 
lexical, varietal, and speech style options as evidenced in the following comments 
from Study 1, which focus on the educational and occupational background of the 
speakers. 
Study 1 
Judge 3 
both participants are well educated 
292 
Judge 5 
both talk well 
in almost complete sentences 
they are pretty articulate 
Judge 6 
both sounded well educated 
they use word like bone fide and relationship 
the speakers are in the same business 
Judge 9: 
they have an intellectual background 
both speakers have the same job 
they are intellectuals 
they have teaching and education in common 
Judge 15 
they sounded cultured 
well educated 
One of the speakers was auniversity teacher and the other a graduate 
language school teacher, so the attributions in this case are very accurate. Similar 
comments of this nature were also elicited in Studies 2 and 3, where the 
association with speech style, educational background and socio-economic status 
appears to be of particular salience for the judges in question (see Giles and 
Sassoon (1983) for an empirical investigation of the effect of speaker's accent, 
social class background and message style on listeners' social judgements). The 
language school teacher in Study 1, was also a participant in Study 2, Extract 4, 
and it is worth noting that his educational background warrants similar kinds of 
comment: 
Study 2 (Extract 4) 
Judge 6 
it's an educated kind of accent 
the bloke has been through the right schools 
Socio-economic status is mentioned a number of times. Comments include: 
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Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 5 
I loved his expression of the word shockingly though 
sort of represented upper bourgeoisie middle class 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 7 
this is the aspiring middle class I think 
they've got traces of background 
the bloke's laughing sounded a very middle class laugh 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 6 
I think she gives herself away with however 
she's either a teacher 
or educated in someway 
again it's the same middle class thing 
Trying to establish the distinguishing features of the speech and writing of 
each social class in a society that could be or are used by members of that society 
to identify who belongs to that class is a very difficult exercise. Judges' comments 
indicate that ordinary members are prepared to categorise themselves as well as 
others into particular social groupings. These groupings are presumably chosen to 
fit their speech, or the speech of others with respect to the norms of a preferred or 
imposed identity. Recovering this identity post hoc raises some interesting 
questions, and not least the extent to which the way we might hear ourselves has 
influence over the kinds of judgement that we make. These judgements indicate a 
strong sensitivity to underlying class and status differentials as well as the kind of 
more individual differentials that I discussed earlier in the chapter (see Section 
8.5.1), even where such judgements may have negative connotations. An example 
of precisely this kind was produced in Study 3, Extract 2, where the female judge 
of the pairing commented: 
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Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 5 
she's got a very fruity kind of voice 
sort of actressy 
as if she was putting on a show 
it reminds me of JP's I've met 
when they are pronouncing sentencing on juveniles 
I get that middle class aura about it all 
actually it reminds me of my own voice on tape to be truthful 
it's pretty awful 
Furthermore, individual preferences may well lead to different assessments of 
social class stereotypes. Thus although the attribution 'middle class' was made on 
a number of occasions, judges did not always agree about their evaluations of the 
identity set that might be involved with respect to this label. Compare the 
following extracts of dialogue generated in the same study (Study 3) for instance. 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 5 
I get that middle class aura about it all 
I wouldn't have said that 
I thought it was Southern 
Pair 7 
this is the aspiring middle class I think 
oh I like that 
they've got traces of background 
the blokes laughing sounded a very middle class laugh 
I don't necessarily go along with you about the elitist 
quality of it 
I don't think that at all it's middle class 
but Midlands middle class 
middle of the road 
Finally in this section, I want to consider evaluations that describe 
occupational status. Where the participants were recognised, descriptions of their 
social identity would obviously emanate from existing resources of information 
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about the individuals concerned. However, from a non-participant perspective, 
social information of this or any other type, which is derived post hoc, must 
emanate from an inferential process; a process which ultimately results in some 
categorisation of the behaviour, or personal or group characteristics of the speaker 
in question. 
References to 'occupation' were coded on the basis of named speaker 
prototypes as listed in Table 8.4. Forty one reference statements were identified in 
this category and these produced thirteen occupational groups as listed (see Table 
8.4). Again the majority of references in this category (30 in total) were elicited in 
Study 3. In Extracts 1 and 6, Crystal and Davy report that the speakers include 'an 
accountant', 'a primary school teacher', and 'a university teacher'. There were no 
comments about occupation with respect to Study 1, and only Pair 6 and 7 
commented with respect to Extract 6. One of the judges from Pair 6 said: 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 6 
he seemed to be trying to project an image 
citizen 
or cinema critic 
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TABLE 8.4 
List of Named Occupations 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
banker - - 1 1 
cinema critic - - 1 1 
citizen - - 2 2 
farmer - - 3 3 
farmer's wife - - 2 2 
insurance man - - 1 1 
JP - - 1 1 
lecturer - 1 1 2 
salesman - - 1 1 
shop manager - - 1 1 
stockbroker - - 3 3 
student - 2 7 9 
teacher 4 4 6 14 
Total 4 7 30 41 
Pair 7, on the other hand made the issue of occupation a matter of some 
discussion. However, as on a number of other occasions, they found it difficult to 
agree about their assessments. 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 7 
it sounds like two bankers 
or insurance brokers 
I don't go along with the stockbroker idea 
may be they are down to earth blokes 
they didn't sound very educated 
stockbrokers tend to be Harlequins Twickenham 
we've got an insurance man at home 
who sounds just like that 
perhaps he's a salesman 
he could be a shop manager couldn't he 
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In Extracts 2 and 3, the participants are identified by Crystal and Davy as two 
husband and wife couples. The women are described as 'housewives', one of 
whom 'also does some primary school teaching'. The men, on the other hand, are 
identified as 'university teachers'. One of the judges in Pair 6 noted: 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 6 
she did talk very clearly though 
a bit like a lecturer 
The same individual was also a participant in Extracts 4 and 5, where similar 
judgements about her teaching status are also made. 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 6 
she's either a teacher 
or educated in some way 
perhaps a nature study teacher or something 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Pair 2 
she must be a teacher 
The point I wish to make about these types of evaluation, and others like 
them, is that they are elicited without requiring judges to make choices of the kind 
that are used in matched-guise studies. Such studies have been criticised on the 
grounds that observers and investigators who use this method may distort facets 
of reality through the instruments and procedures they use to collect their data. 
The danger with post hoc interpretive work, which is based on such instruments 
and procedures, is that the answers that respondents give within the categories 
established for them may not reveal how those respondents behave, how they 
think, or what they say in their everyday activities. 
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8.6 Social Network Relations 
The study of language and interpersonal relations is a complex but burgeoning 
area of research as Giles and Coupland (1991: 9) point out. Like characteristics of 
participants, these social network relations can also be analysed at an individual 
(or interpersonal) level and at a social-institutional one. For the purposes of 
exposition, I will distinguish between judges' responses which seem to be based 
on evaluations of the nature and quality of individual relations between 
participants, in terms of their knowledge and/or liking of each other, and 
responses which are based on some evaluation of their social and interactional 
roles. 
8.6.1 Individual Social Network Relations 
Descriptions of individual social network relations are based on a small set of 
terms used across the three studies as presented in Table 8.5. These terms suggest 
a cline of participant ties ranging from 'close' or 'intimate' knowledge (e. g. 
'husband and wife') relationships to 'less close' or 'distant' knowledge (e. g. 
'acquaintances'). 
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TABLE 8.5 
Judges' Use of Social Relational Terms 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
acquaintances 2 - - 2 
colleagues 1 - - 1 
friends 2 - 5 7 
mates 1 1 - 2 
neighbours - - 2 2 
pals 1 - - 1 
husband - - 2 2 
wife - - 5 5 
Total 7 1 14 22 
Judges' seemed particularly sensitive to the nature of interpersonal knowledge 
shared between the participants in Study 1, and tend to express their comments in 
terms of social distance. Compare: 
Study 1 
Judge 1 
they don't know each other very well 
they're not on intimate terms 
not bosom pals 
but acquainted 
there is a distance yet they know each other 
Judge 3 
they know each other 
but not too well 
Judge 6 
the speakers are feeling their way around 
there is a sense in which they didn't know each other 
Judge 8 
it's a discussion between colleagues 
it's not intimate 
but relaxed 
the speakers are in the same business 
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Judge 9 
they are friends 
yet its all vaguely ironic 
he must have known the other guy 
to use an accent like that 
Judge 10 
they seem to have a lot in common 
and know each other quite well 
it's a visitor visiting a friend's flat 
the situation isn't very relaxed 
Judge 12 
they are people who know each other 
Judge 13 
they know each other 
judge 16 
they know each other 
they are acquainted 
The sense of social distance, or even social awkwardness that is judged to exist 
between the participants seems to be shared by Participant A, who commented as 
follows: 
Study 1 
Participant A 
there is a role relationship 
student stroke supervisor 
it's important 
I was conscious of the situation 
we were not meeting as mates 
it was very much a student supervisor chat 
Brown and Levinson (1979: 317) argue that there seem to be two basic ways in 
which the social relationship obtaining between speaker and addressee is marked 
in speech. One is through the direct encoding of social deixis. The other is the 
particular choice of linguistic expression, governed by interactional strategies. 
Participant A seems to be sensitive to this latter possibility in explaining why the 
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situation is 'formal' from his perspective, and also what effect his sense of 
relational asymmetry had on his interactional behaviour. He commented: 
Study 1 
Participant A 
there are a few formal words 
like have a cup of coffee 
it tells you something 
about the formality of the situation 
I felt someone else was in command 
it wasn't like talking to a close friend 
where you say hey it's good to see you 
how are you doing 
let's go for a pint 
I felt I had to be more formal 
on my best linguistic behaviour 
The sense of interactional asymmetry is also shared by a number of the non- 
participant judges and are again consistent with the comments about age and 
status in this study (see Section 8.5.1). Compare, for example, the comments of 
Judge 6 who suggests that from a strategic point of view, 'the speakers are feeling 
their way around': 
Study 1 
Judge 6 
the speakers are feeling their way around 
there is a sense in which they didn't know each other 
Even where the participants are evaluated as being 'friends', there appears to be a 
caveat about the relationship, where this is expressed in terms of a certain 
ambiguity in communicative key as in the following sets of comment: % 
Study 1 
Judge 8 
it's a discussion between colleagues 
it's not intimate 
but relaxed 
the speakers are in the same business 
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judge 9 
they are friends 
yet its all vaguely ironic 
Judge 10 
it's a visitor visiting a friend's flat 
the situation isn't very relaxed 
In Study 3, judges made several other comments about the quality of 
participant relations in connection with the use of particular interactional 
strategies. For example, one judge was uncertain if the participants were friends in 
Extract 1, because of their apparent unwillingness 'to listen to each other'. She 
said: 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Pair 2 
I was wondering whether they actually knew each other 
because they didn't seem to listen to each other at all 
he also tended to speak while his friend was speaking 
The same participants were involved in Extract 6. Crystal and Davy describe their 
relationship as 'friends of long-standing'. They note: 
This extract was taken from a long conversation between two men ... aged 
around 40, at the home of one of the authors ... All three participants 
had been 
friends for years. The two men had been invited to have a drink one evening - 
a regular event - and were unaware that they had been recorded ... The 
situation was very relaxed. (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 19) 
Non-participant judges did not always agree about the familiar status of the 
speakers' relationship. Compare the comments of Pair 6 and Pair 7 below: 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 6 
they are obviously friends 
and basically agree with each other 
Pair 7 
they didn't know each other very well 
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they didn't sound like people who knew each other 
One small methodological point that may be worth raising here is the report 
that the recording of this exchange was made without the participants' 
knowledge. The authors note that when the participants were informed they had 
been recorded, 'it cost many rounds of drinks! ' (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 19). 
Participant B (Study 3) also commented on various effects that surreptitious 
recording had on the interactions. With regard to Extract 1, for example, he 
responded to his co-judge's remark that one of the participants "doesn't take an 
active part" as follows: 
Study 3 (Extract 1) 
Participant B 
well he was trying to keep out of it 
because he knows the recording's taking place 
and the other two don't 
A lack of conversational involvement on the part of two of the participants, for 
exactly the same reason, is also reported in Participant B's comments about Extract 
2. 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Participant B 
I've got the feeling that we'd set you up 
and you didn't know it was being recorded 
and were just being stool pigeons again 
In Extracts 3 and 5, one of the participants is judged to be "natural and 
unaffected" and "very natural" by this pair of judges. Participant B suggests that 
this affective state is likely in both instances because: 
Participant B 
she'd been set up and didn't realise 
Participant B 
I don't think she could have been aware 
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that she was being recorded 
I draw attention to these comments because surreptitious recording is not only 
unethical, but also possibly illegal. At the present time in New Zealand 
universities, for example, research involving human subjects has to be ratified by 
an established ethics committee before any kind of fieldwork can be undertaken. 
In Extracts 2 and 3, the conversation takes place between two married couples 
who have not seen each other for some time, and consequently have been brought 
together to be re-acquainted (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 40). Again judges' 
comments are not entirely in accord regarding the nature of the interpersonal 
relations involved in the two separate fragments. Compare the comments of Pair 7 
and Pair 2 below: 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 7. 
I think it sounded like a middle aged farmer's wife 
at tea 
talking to another farmer's wife or some friends 
Study 3 (Extract 3) 
Pair 2 
she seemed to know who she was talking to 
perhaps they were neighbours or something 
I think she knew who she was talking to quite well 
because she didn't need to explain things 
may be they weren't very close neighbours 
Finally, Extracts 4 and 5 were recorded during an informal supper party 
involving another two couples. In Study 3, Extract 4, one of the participants is 
assumed to be the 'husband' of the speaker who is named, though quite how this 
information is derived is unclear. 
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Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 7 
her husband tries to get in four times 
her husband is from the South 
In Extract 5, the participants are judged to be 'a close group' on the one hand, 
and the two women, 'girls at school together' on the other. 
Study 3 (Extract 5) 
Pair 2 
I thought it was quite a close group of people 
Pair 7 
they sound like they were girls at school together 
The nature of the relations evaluated here could be explored empirically by 
inductive inspection of the data records that one might produce. Giles and 
Coupland, for instance, report that: "Participants who like each other display 
more verbal productivity and self-disclosures but less silent pausing than those 
who are not mutually attracted" (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 9). Presumably, the 
distribution of turn taking and communicative or speaking rights in talk could be 
investigated for pattern in the same way (see Wiemann, 1985), which brings me to 
evaluations that focussed on discoursal rather than interpersonal roles. 
8.6.2 Interactional Relations 
The unrehearsed and unscripted taking of turns by interactants is what creates the 
process of verbal exchange in everyday conversation. As Merrit (1976: 317),, 
amongst others, has pointed out: 
Any property of the discourse per se is a product of the effort of ... two 
(or 
more) individuals ... Each must 
be engaged in interpreting the meaning and 
intent of the other's talk in order to decide what to say next. Even when to say 
what must often be negotiated. In a word, the discourse of dialog is inherently 
interactional in character. 
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Speaker change is the perceptible sign of turn-taking and turn-yielding as 
individuals adopt the discoursal roles of first and second person interlocutor; it 
provides the mechanism for conversational management. But how speaker change 
is achieved is also closely tied to individual perceptions of speaking rights, where 
these are associated with status and power differentials in interpersonal relations. 
Hence, when there is a relative degree of conversational balance in the distribution 
of speaking rights, the type of talk that ensues is less likely to manifest a pattern of 
'control' by one or other of the parties involved. Where there is a relative degree of 
imbalance, 'control' may be consciously or unconsciously exerted by one of the 
parties in question. 
The notion of 'control' is defined by Weimann (1985: 86) as: 
the constellation of constraints people place on one another by the 
manipulation of both interactional structure and content, which limit the 
options available subsequently to each relational partner and the relational 
system as whole ... That is, the doing or saying of something has the potential 
to prescribe or proscribe next possible actions or statements. 
While asymmetrical status and power roles are often found cross-culturally in 
address terms, and in non-verbal distancing patterns (Braun, 1988), the focus of 
third person comments tends to involve certain situational and strategic aspects of 
relational-control between speaker and addressee. A large number of comments of 
this type were elicited in Study 1, where the issue of control appears to be of 
considerable salience for both the participant and non-participant judges. Again 
this type of comment is obviously closely related to earlier references about 
asymmetrical conversational behaviour that seems to be linked to age and status 
(see Section 8.5.1). Participant 1, for instance, explained: 
Study 1 
Participant A 
there is a role relationship 
student stroke supervisor 
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we were not meeting as mates 
it was very much a student supervisor chat 
it wasn't like talking to a friend 
I felt that somebody else was in command 
It is remarkable that eight of the non-participant judges were also to provide 
comments in keeping with the spirit of this explanation. One judge describes 
Participant A as 'eager but hesitant', and suggests that his interlocutor is in 
'control'. 
Study 1 
Judge 4 
Ian had control all along 
the other speaker sounded eager 
but hesitant 
I'm conscious that he was being put at ease 
The other judges considered that Participant B was 'dominant'. This dominance is 
attributed to the situation on the one hand. Compare: 
Study 1 
Judge 7 
Ian is more dominant 
perhaps because it's in his office 
And to the different interactional roles displayed by the participants, where one is 
seen as taking the initiative as 'host', while the other is more conversationally 
reticent or 'passive'. Compare: 
Study 1 
Judge 8 
the host leads the conversation 
Judge 9 
one guy is slightly paternal 
Judge 11 
one was pretty relaxed 
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the other just tended to sit there and think 
Judge 12 
the one who initiates all the questions 
seems more dominant 
Judge 13 
he plays the role of host 
and asks all the questions 
Judge 14 
one of the participants only talked when asked to 
it sounded to me as if he were talking down to him 
though not consciously 
the other guy was passive 
it wasn't easy for him 
the more dominant one 
tends to support the other's conversation 
Two judges, however, considered the exchange to be more symmetrically 
structured. They said: 
Study 1 
Judge 9 
it's a friendly discussion between two people 
nobody is posturing 
trying to score over anybody else 
Judge 10 
they are colleagues 
the speakers are in the same business 
It would appear from these comments that both structural and non-structural 
features of talk are used to display and/or negotiate control in verbal 
communication. Apart from turn-taking, judges remarks suggest that time spent 
holding the floor and topic control are interactional phenomena which help to 
regulate conversations and establish control in relationships. Obviously, the 
relational history of the participants, the reasons for the current conversation, and 
the physical setting are important factors too. Wiemann (1985) puts forward a 
resource model to facilitate the interpretation of conversational events so that they 
. ýNý_ý; _ 
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can be seen as an integral means by which people accomplish relational goals. 
Given its importance for the communicative process, this model will be 
considered further in the discussion of participant goals which is presented in 
Chapter 9. 
8.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The comments that I have considered in this chapter provide evidence of judges 
tendency and willingness to create contextual frameworks for interpreting and/or 
making sense of what was going on in the stimulus fragments. These frameworks 
not only include the ability to recover situation from text, on the basis of events 
previously unseen, but also to attribute personal details of various kinds about the 
participants. 
Language attitude research is based on the idea that language can trigger an 
evaluative reaction, and the response data that I have considered in this chapter 
would certainly seem to support this claim. However, Giles and Coupland (1991: 
49ff. ) suggest that the area of language attitudes research has been over- 
represented by "one-off studies in widely varying cultures, sociolinguistic 
conditions, situational and procedural domains". They also suggest that to date 
these models have not been critically reviewed. Consequently, they raise five 
over-arching questions relating to issues that need to be addressed in this area. 
These include: 
(1) Are there generative mechanisms operating beyond the original 
theoretical conception of language leading to social categorization leading to 
trait influences? 
(2) Are language cues hierarchically perceived and evaluated? 
(3) Can language attitudes be organized meaningfully in terms of large-scale 
social forces? 
(4) Are there different language attitude profiles, and if so, are they a 
function of perceptions of the intergroup forces prevailing, and the nature of 
the immediate situations? 
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(5) Are language attitudes meaningfully related to other levels of analysis 
and/or forms of communicative behaviour? (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 49- 
52) 
These questions require a programme of research that is based on innovative 
developments, and Giles and Coupland suggest that this might be driven by what 
they describe as a 'discursive perspective': 
By this is meant a perspective where social meanings (and, in this case, 
language attitudes) are assumed to be inferred by means of constructivel 
interpretive processes drawing upon social actors' reservoirs of contextual and 
textual knowledge. (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 53) 
This perspective has to recognise that texts themselves can never be neutral, "they 
are interpreted and subsequent actions accounted for on the basis of pre-existing 
social schemata, " (op. cit.: 55). Hence, Giles and Coupland also suggest that a task 
for the future will be to explore the kind of cognitive responding that ensues when 
listeners process others' language performances. The work presented here is an 
attempt to respond to the spirit of this perspective. 
In this regard, something of the social identity profiles that emerge from the 
response data may provide a glimpse of how different speakers influence listener- 
judges own conceptions of themselves. But these profiles are only a part of the 
interpretive processes manifest in the commentaries, and perhaps only a small 
part at that. This is not to say that social identity is not an important facet of 
everyday verbal exchange, but rather that it may be less important in 
communicative terms than scholars have suggested to date. As Giles and 
Coupland intimate: "The relationships existing between participants, whether 
they be personal, role-based or category-based relationships, also affect verbal 
Communicative behaviour" (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 9). 
In terms of attitudes towards language users and usage, research has tended 
to promote the view of the human social animal as one who is constantly 
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evaluating self and others for purpose of social comparison (Bradac., 1990: 403). 
While the evidence considered in this chapter certainly helps to substantiate this 
claim, the social evaluation of others provides only one strand in a much more 
complex scenario. This is a scenario in which perceptual and evaluative constructs 
about social stereotypes, person prototypes., and relational and situational factors 
are inextricably linked to the interactional goals of the participants as Street and 
Cappella (1985) argue. 
Inherent in any social encounter are the interactant goals; that is, his or her 
desires, objectives and purposes for the interaction. These goals may be 
influenced by, and influence perceptual and evaluative processes which include 
perceptions of the situation,, affective responses to others, perceptions of 
others, and conceptions of self. Evaluative and attributional processes and the 
interactant"s goals mutually activate relevant cognitive-behaviour production 
operations which in turn produce behaviours presumably directed toward 
achieving the goal(s) given the salient social information. (Street and 
Cappella, 1985: 252) 
I consider the tendency and willingness of judges to comment on such goals in the 
chapter which follows. 
CHAPTER 9 
SUPRATEXTUAL RESPONSES 
9.0 Post Hoc Interpretation of Communicative Activity 
This chapter considers the third and arguably the most interesting and productive 
of the interpretive domains which were identified from the corpus of descriptive 
statements. I have called this the supratextual domain because it is designed to 
incorporate comments which describe or refer to characteristics of the stimulus 
fragments at a level of abstraction altogether different from those considered in 
Chapters 8 and 9. These characteristics extend beyond the types of surface 
linguistic and extralinguistic detail discussed there to encompass information that 
is associated with purposeful communicative activity (see the discussion of talk as 
an inferential and goal-directed process in Section 2.2ff. ). Like textual and 
contextual information, however, supratextual information is rarely articulated as 
talk is in progress, since it 'lies beneath the surface of discourse' as Stubbs (1983: 
Chapter 8) puts it. Supratextual information is nevertheless empirically 
researchable from a post hoc perspective as Gumperz has shown (1982a-1992). 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the qualities and types of information 
that judges provided in this domain, and also to use the analytic categories that 
are established as a mechanism for linking judges' interpretations to the goal- 
I 
orientation(s) of the individuals concerned. The vocabularies used by judges in 
this regard proved to be much in keeping with those identified by Gumperz, who 
states that when ordinary participants report on actual verbal encounters: "'they 
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tend to do so by mentioning some item of content, or by referring to what people 
were getting at or trying to do" (Gumperz, 1982a: 157). 
In order to provide such comments, I suggested earlier that third person 
judges must have a highly developed model of the kinds of thing that speakers 
can say, that is, they must possess inferential or metapragmatic abilities (see 
Section 3.2.3). These abilities, as applied in a post hoc sense, are explored in this 
chapter by using the framework first sketched in Section 6.2-2, where comments 
about different interactional "attitudes, goals, strategies and outcomes' were coded 
with the aid of a features matrix, and then subdivided into different types of 
descriptive statement. Two broad types of statement were identified in this way: 
(i) statements about the types of communicative activity or genre that are 
considered to have taken place; 
(ii) statements about the types of communicative praxis that are considered to be 
going on as the exchanges are in progress; 
Each of these categories, and the interpretive frames they imply, are considered in 
the sections which follow. 
9.1 References to Genre 
In the 'genre' category, judges' comments are characterised by descriptive phrases 
that seem to answer two questions about the stimulus fragments. These are: 
(i) 'What kinds of activity are taking place? '; 
(ii) 'What kinds of unit are accomplished? ' (cf. Levinson, 1979; Gumperz, 1982a). 
The distinction that is drawn here is based on Levinson (1983: 318), and involves 
vocabularies that are intrinsically related. On the one hand, the descriptors judges 
use are expressed as predicates which include meta-actions such as 'chatting'; 
'discussing'; 'story telling' etc. (cf. the activities listed by Gumperz, 1982a: 166). 
On 
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the other, they are expressed as noun phrases, which seem to suggest bounded or 
distinctive accomplishments, for example, 'a chat, 'a discussion', 'a story" etc. (cf. 
the events listed by Gumperz, 1982a: 165). Different meta-actions can of course be 
realised in different types of event or unit. Hence, the activity of 'chatting over a 
match', for example, can be part of the unit which constitutes /a discussion'. 
'discussing' can be part of the unit that constitutes 'a chat, and so on. Wardhaugh 
(1992) makes something of the same point when he suggests that: 
While particular genres seem more appropriate on certain occasions than on 
others, e. g., sermons inserted into church services, they can be independent: 
we can ask someone to stop "sermonizing'; that is, we can recognize a genre of 
sermons when an instance of it, or something closely resembling an instance, 
occurs outside its usual setting. (Wardhaugh, 1992: 247) 
However., attempts to establish the linguistic features of different kinds of 
speech event presuppose the availability of a contrastive set of features for 
determining the contextual status of particular instances of the phenomenon. Giles 
and Coupland (1991), for example, suggest that different large-scale activity types 
can be associated with different stylistic qualities. They note: 
The activity type of casual chatting ... has a more 'verbal style', evident in 
short, syntactically simple utterances, and the very frequent use of verbs, 
pronouns and adverbs. The activity type of lecturing ... is characteristically 
more nominal. (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 8) 
The problem here is not so much with describing these qualities, as work in 
both DA and CA has shown, but rather with categorising and labelling the types 
of activity that are involved. For instance,, the term 'conversation' itself is widely 
used by analysts, but is seldom clearly defined (see McGregor, 1984; Wilsorý, 1989). 
Crystal and Davy (1969: 95), for example, suggest that 'conversation' is without 
doubt the most commonly used kind of English, because it is the least 'marked' 
kind of situationally influenced English. Although a clear central area of 
distinctiveness can be defined, according to Crystal and Davy, the boundaries of 
conversational activity can be rather fuzzy since "what is intuitively labelled 
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'conversation' can blend imperceptibly into other varieties that are labelled 
differently, such as 'discussion, 'talking shop', etc. "' (Crystal and Davy, 1969: 97) 
The question that arises is whether these labels simply answer to subdivisions of 
the more general phenomenon of 'conversation", or to recognisably separate kinds 
of verbal exchange? Since there is no simple answer to this question, I tend to 
agree with Gumperz (1982a: 167) who suggests that speech activities are not 
precisely listable, but rather show certain general similarities which vary from 
instance to instance. In other words, activities such as 'chatting', "discussing' and 
'story telling' reflect "Wittgensteinian family resemblances rather than analytic 
categories" (op. cit. ). 
A framework that could be used to explore these resemblances in more detail 
is 'the model of speech as a reflection of situational representations' put forward 
by Giles and Coupland (1991: 18ff. ). The model is multidimensional and integrates 
notions of interpersonal and intergroup interactions with various subjective 
characteristics of speech situations. Hence, for example, (i) the situational 
characteristics of 'friends chatting during a coffee break" are charted alongside (ii) 
possible interpersonal relationships recognised by participants (eg. 'cooperative; 
'informal'; 'relaxed"), and (iii) potential speech patterns that are realised in the 
process (eg. 'verbal style'; 'non-standard pronunciation'; 'first name and informal 
address forms'); for full details, see Table 1.2, Giles and Coupland (1991: 19). The 
authors' caveat that "'there is as yet no empirical research following this 
conceptual framework" (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 18) seems to provide a 
valuable opportunity, because the response data gathered in the course of 
&s 
study contains descriptive phrases which are redolent of the characteristics, 
structures and patterns that are exemplified in each of the above categories. It is 
this type of response data that I want to consider in the following sections. 
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9.1.1 Activity Predicates 
When judges use predicates to describe speech activities, they do so by employing 
phrases that function as a general guide to what the participants are considered to 
be doing in terms of verbal interaction ('talking about what's for tea'; 'chatting 
over a football match; 'discussing the potential of increasing salary' etc. ). 
Gumperz (1982a: 166) cites similar examples and suggests that phrases of this type 
"imply certain expectations about thematic progression, turn-taking rules, form, 
and outcome of the interaction, as well as constraints on content". 
Inspection of the non-participant data responses which were coded in this 
category reveal that only 5 predicates were used across the sample of judges. For 
ease of reference, I have presented these in their infinitive form in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 
Activity Predicates 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
predicates 
chat - 1 1 2 
discuss 3 1 1 5 
report back - - 1 1 
talk 15 13 23 51 
tell (a joke) - - 1 1 
tell (a story) - - 11 11 
Total 19 15 37 71 
Concordance listings were generated for each predicate in turn. As can be seen 
from the table,, a total of 71 concordances were produced across the three studies, 
including: 19 references in Study 1; 15 references in Study 2; and 37 references in 
Study 3. 
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With 51 references, the most commonly cited verbal activity was "talking'. 
indeed, it occurs nearly five times more often than its nearest rival 'tell', used in 
the sense of "telling a story'. Since the use of 'talk' on its own, or for that matter 
any of the other verbs used in isolation, would provide little information (cf. 'they 
are talking'; "they are chatting, etc. ), they are usually accompanied by 
prepositional phrases that designate judges' sense of 'what is talked about', as 
Gurnperz (1982a: 166) also notes: 
the descriptive phrases we use for speech activities contain both a verb and 
a noun which suggests constraints on content. Verbs alone, or single nouns 
such as "discussion" or "lecture" are not sufficient. 
Hence, the proliferation of phrases such as: 
talking about Jane 
talking about what's for tea 
talking about the sea of bodies 
Notice, however, that when 'talk' is used in phrases which describe either the 
overall subject matter or particular topics in this way (see Section 7.2.2), it seems to 
be semantically neutral; that is,, it tends to be used in a general sense to refer to the 
activity of verbal exchange per se, rather than to some marked or specific genre 
(see Bublitz,, 1988: 21ff. for further discussion about the use of "talk' as a 
semantically neutral predicate) - In contrast, when 'talk-' is used as a noun in 
phrases such as 'shop talk'; 'man's talk'; 'coffee talk" and so on, there appear to be 
constraints on participants as well as style and content (cf. Labov and Fanshel's, 
(1977) "therapeutic discourse, and Tannen's (1984) "talk among friends"). 
Compared to the frequent use of 'talk', the predicates 'chatting, and 
'discussing' produced surprisingly few references. In the case of 'chatting, the 
activity is delimited with regard to guesses about the communicative situation. 
For example: 
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Study 2 (Extract 3) 
Judge 6 
chatting in a boiler room 
'Discussing' on the other hand is used in conjunction with noun phrases that 
identify the subject of what is "discussed' (see Bublitz, 1988: Chapter 2). In the 
examples given, the subjects suggested include: "the surroundings", 'things, and 
'the potential of increasing salary'. Compare: 
Study 1 
Judge 4 
discussing the surroundings 
Judge 8 
discussing things 
Study 2 (Extract 2) 
Judge 2 
discussing the potential of increasing their salary 
The activity of 'telling a story', on the other hand, was referred to on 11 occasions 
by non-p articip ants, and is also frequently referred to by the participant judges, 
especially with regard to the second and third extracts that were used in Study I 
A wide range of comments were also associated with this activity. These 
comments not only designate the subject matter of "the story, but also narrative 
strategies that are used in the process, including textual features and effects 
(mainly prosodic) that are associated with 'a story telling voice". Compare, for 
instance, the following references taken from Study 3 (Extract 2): 
Study 3 (Extract 2) 
Pair 1 
she got really carried away with the story 
Pair 2 
she was just telling a story 
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Pair 3 
I wouldn't say it was a straight coherent narrative 
it was caught up with emotional things 
Pair 4 
she was getting very excited as it went on 
and she gets more wrapped up in what she was saying 
the other person involved got sort of left behind 
and started listening to the story 
Pair 5 
it sounded like a nun's joke to me 
a bad holiday recollection 
Pair 6 
one woman seemed to be doing all the talking 
and the other is listening 
Pair 7 
I think she's got an audience 
and is trying to impress them with her percipience 
there is amusement 
interested amusement 
as if she's inside the situation 
I think she's seeing it from the outside 
and she's sort of reporting it back 
There is of course a substantial body of sociolinguistic and discourse research 
based on narrative analysis, much of which stems from the ideas put forward by 
Labov (1972). More recently, Schiffrin's (1987) analysis of discourse markers is 
largely based on the activity of telling stories (see, for example, Schiffrin, 1987: 14- 
17). Goodwin (1984) identifies various interactional phenomena that are invoked 
and realised by participants as they organise the telling of a story in talk. These 
iriclude: (i) specific participant roles (such as teller, addressed recipient, non- 
addressed recipient, and principal character); (ii) distinguishable components of 
the story itself; (iii) kinesic and non-kinesic orientations within different sub- 
components; (iv) participant attentional shifts and involvement. It is remarkable 
that judges' comments should be sensitive to at least some of these phenomena, as 
I think their responses demonstrate. 
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Notice, however, that there are a number of interpretive differences inherent 
in the comments. Gumperz (1982a: 160ff. ) argues that even within a culture there 
are likely to be quite different interpretations of the kind of activities that are 
carried out and signalled between interlocutors. Hence, he suggests that what one 
person would identify as 'lecturing, another might interpret as 'chatting with a 
child", and so on (I presume that Gumperz is using the term 'lecture' to refer to 
scolding a child in this instance, rather than referring to the academic activity of 
teaching). The question here is how can we be certain that our interpretation of 
what activity is being signalled from outside the participation framework is the 
same as the interlocutor has in mind? The answer is that we cannot be certain, and 
consequently care has to be taken about the interpretive claims we make. 
Nevertheless, when speech activities are named in this way, I presume that they 
serve as labels for the constellation of norms by which different kinds of verbal 
behaviour are evaluated. I now want to move on and consider the nature of these 
labels in statements where different kinds of genre were delimited by judges as 
units in their own right. 
9.1.2 Unit Names 
Gumperz (1982a: 165) writes that: 
When communicative events are named, such names are regularly 
employed in members narrative reports in sentences such as "We attended a 
lecture, " "'They were making a joke". 
A number of statements of this kind appear in the response data, and it these that 
are discussed in this section. 
A search of the corpus of responses produced 11 nouns that were used to 
describe different units of interactional activity. The nouns in question are listed in 
Table 9.2. Concordance strings were generated for each noun in turn, and the 
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resulting listings produced a total of 41 references across the three studies. 
Examples of the strings that were produced include the following, which are taken 
from the comments of non-participant judges who took part in Study 1: 
Study 1 
conversation 
it's a conversation between two males 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
it's a typical opening to a conversation 
it's easy chatty conversation 
it's not official conversation 
discussion 
it's a discussion between colleagues 
it's a friendly discussion between two people 
interview 
it sounded like a beginning of term interview 
Table 9.2 
Unit Names 
Key Terms Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
nouris 
anecdote 1 
argument 2 
chat/ conversation 1 
conversation 9 11 5 25 
discussion 2 - 3 
exchange - 1 1 
fragment 2 2 
interview 
monologUe 2 3 
narrative - 1 
story - 1 
Total 13 17 41 
These examples suggest that at least three different kinds of communicative 
unit are recognised. The units are: 
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(i) 'a conversation'; 
(ii) 'a discussion'; 
(iii) 'an interview'. 
However, within each unit it is clear that finer distinctions can be and are drawn 
by judges in order to particularise the type of exchange that is considered to be 
going on. These distinctions are provided in two ways. First, by contextual 
evaluations involving both 'the setting' and 'the participants' (cf. the interpretive 
work that is discussed in Chapter 8). Compare: 
Study 1 
judge 6 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
Judge 8 
it's a discussion between colleagues 
judge 9 
it's a friendly discussion between two people 
judge 10 
it's a conversation between two males 
Second, by making analogies with either contrasting or similar kinds of genre (see 
discussion of 'the principal of analogy" in Section 8-1). Compare: 
Study 1 
Judge 3 
it sounded like a beginning of term interview 
Judge 4 
it sounded just normal like any conversation 
it wasn't like a lecture or an argument 
Judge 6 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
the preliminaries before getting down to the real stuff 
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it reminds me other conversations I've listened to 
it"s a way of filling in silence 
its exploratory 
it's a linguistic shaking of hands 
judge 7 
it's a typical opening to a conversation 
Judge 10 
it's easy chatty conversation 
Judge 11 
it's not official conversation 
As far as the information about genre is concerned, the comments seem to 
revolve around opinions about the possible cognitive status of the situation, the 
dimensions or indices of which can be represented as a continuum (cf. the model 
proposed by Giles and Coupland (1992) as discussed in Section 9.1 above). Giles 
and Coupland, for example, suggest the following sets of interactional continua 
along which participants may operate: 
'cooperative - competitive; 'informal - formal'; "relaxed - tense', "equal - 
unequal'; 'task related - not task related. (Giles and Coupland, 1992: 19) 
By using these labels, and others like them, to construct semantic differential 
scales, more controlled interpretive work might be undertaken in order to 
compare the social and linguistic bases of different evaluations (for useful 
summaries of this type of work see Fasold, 1984: Chapter 6; Giles and Coupland, 
1992: Chapter 2). judges' comments in Study 1, for instance., suggest that some 
kind of 'formality' index is of salience in the stimulus fragment. The comments 
range from evaluations of the unit as a relatively 'informal' exchange (e. g. 'a coffee 
making interim conversation'; "easy chatty conversation'; 'not official 
conversation'; "a friendly discussion between two people') to evaluations that are 
relatively "formal' (eg. 'a discussion between colleagues', 'a beginning of term 
interview'; 'a linguistic shaking of hands'). It is noteworthy that one of the 
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participant judges (Participant A) should express his own sense of the event in 
something of these terms. He commented: 
Study 1 
Participant A 
I was conscious of the situation 
we were not meeting as mates 
it was a very much a student/ supervisor chat 
Figure 9.1 presents a typical seven point differential scale that could be used in 
follow-up work to rate the degree of 'formality' that is judged to be operant in the 
exchange fragment from both participant and non-participant perspectives. 
formal 
7654321 
Figure 9.1 
informal 
Typical Seven-Point Semantic Differential Scale 
Other salient characteristics can also be explored in the same way of course. 
For instance, judges' comments about Study 2 (Extract 4), suggest that 'phaticity' 
may be worth further analytic consideration (see Coupland, Coupland and 
Robinson (1992) for a useful discussion of this notion). Comments of this type 
included: 
Study 2 (Extract 4) 
Judge 3 
the conversation is incidental to coffee 
they are just filling in time 
Judge 6 
that wasn't a conversation 
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judge 7 
it's a filling in space conversation 
in Study 3 (Extract 6), the characteristics of 'humour' and "sex stereotypes' appear 
to be salient for judges and thus also worth further exploration. Compare: 
Study 3 (Extract 6) 
Pair 2 
they'd got together for some dirty laughs 
Pair 3 
the laughter was very cheap 
it"s a very male conversation 
Pair 6 
the whole thing is humourless 
they are trying to make an educated conversation 
Pair 7 
there definitely seemed to be a pub type thing 
pub type humour 
take the piss out of your friends 
The kind of work I am thinking of here is very much in the mould of Tannen 
(1984) where a combination of professional textual analyses and post hoc 
evaluations are used to identify a particular style of interaction. In the case of 
Tannen's data, the style is designated as one of "high-involvement' among friends 
of East European Jewish background from New York. One of the main 
characteristics of this style is what Tannen refers to as 'pacing, which includes 
interactional phenomena that are most directly related to the textual category of 
turn-taking. These phenomena include: 
(1) a faster rate of speech; 
(2) faster turn taking; 
(3) avoiding interturn pauses; 
(4) cooperative overlap; 
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(5) participatory leadership. 
A summary of this and other contextualising devices that characterise 'high 
involvement' can be found in Tannen (1984: Chapter 7). 
The range of terms that judges used to describe the activities and units named 
is quite limited however. Perhaps this is because judges were asked to listen to 
broadly similar kinds of talk, rather than an array of different styles (cf - Crystal 
and Davy, 1969; Tannen, 1984; Coupland, 1988). Presumably, the greater the range 
of interactions that are used as stimulus material, the greater the range of possible 
descriptors that one might expect to elicit. One way of expanding the types of 
interaction that judges might be asked to listen to is by widening the scope of the 
stimulus material to include events that are based on cross-cultural exchanges for 
example. Gumperz (1982a) argues that since speech activities are realised in action 
and since their identification is a function of ethnic and communicative 
background special problems arise in a modern society where people have widely 
differing communicative and cultural backgrounds (cf. Metge and Kinloch, 1978; 
Knapp et al., 1987; Davies and jupp, 1992). These problems seem to be amenable to 
exploration using the sort of approach that is developed here, because different 
interactional and interpretive issues can be identified and related to members' 
own cultural and linguistic perspectives. A programme of research which 
attended to this last issue might also serve to ameliorate the kinds of criticism 
levelled at interactional sociolinguistics by scholars such as Singh and Lele (1989), 
for example, since it would help to redress the very serious charge of ethnoýentric 
interpretive bias. 
Although there are clearly physical limits on the number of different kinds of 
talk that individuals, or pairs for that matter,, might be required to respond to on 
any single occasion, as well as physiological limits on their energy and/or 
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willingness to act as informants as I intimated in Chapter 4, judges demonstrated 
that they were not only able to evaluate and distinguish between different kinds of 
verbal exchange, but could also provide interpretations relating to the 
'communicative content' of the exchanges at different levels of abstraction. These 
interpretations involve descriptive statements which answer questions about 
'what is going on" in the exchanges from a third person perspective (cf - Fairclough, 
1989: 146-148). A striking range of vocabulary was used by judges in this regard, 
including references to specific ends, strategies and outcomes which the 
participants were said to employ or pursue or negotiate or achieve in the course of 
the exchange fragments. In other words, these responses are concerned with the 
praxis of verbal exchange as 'goal-oriented' behaviour (see Section 2.2.2). It is this 
type of response that I want to consider next. 
9.2 References to Praxis 
References to praxis were coded in terms of statements about qualities and effects 
that judges associated with different types of non-surface contribution to the 
exchange fragments (see Section 6.2). These statements appear to be based around 
two main types of vocabulary: 
(i) verb phrases that provide interpretations of 'what is going on' in the 
exchanges at the level of 'strategy' (cf. the use of phrases such as 'seeking 
reassurances'; /encourage'; /probe; 'advise'; 'try to impress'; 'Support' etc. ); 
(ii) adjective phrases that provide interpretations of 'what is going on' at the 
level of 'key' (cf. the use of phrases such as "boring; 'eamest', 'indigdant; 
'ambiguous'; 'non-involved; 'unnatural' etc. ). 
The notion of 'strategy' is understood here in the general sense used by Brown 
and Levinson (1987: 8) "in which people can be seen to be doing something before 
doing, in order to do, something else" (see Section 2.2.3 for further discussion) - 
It 
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is also the term that "has come to be a preferred explanatory heuristic for 
discourse studies" (Tracy and Coupland, 1991). Judges' comments on the use of 
'strategy' are couched in vocabularies that describe various participant attempts to 
'try to do something' and/or the effects of their 'having done something' as 
communicators (cf. the data elicited by Kreckel (1981) as reported in Section 4.2.3). 
The notion of "key' is understood in the Hymesian sense (1972; 1974). It 
includes evaluative interpretations of what the participants were considered to 
communicate as a result of the tone, manner or spirit in which the exchanges had 
taken place. judges' comments not only describe participant affectual and 
attitudinal orientations, but also different discourse or goal related effects. 
Before considering these vocabularies in detail, it is perhaps worth recalling 
that the data responses to be considered were not elicited by direct questioning, 
but rather emerged as part of a deliberate research ploy not to draw attention to 
particular features or qualities of the stimulus fragments (see Section 5.1, and 
compare the methods of Tannen, 1988). 1 make this point because of the 
significantly large number of comments that were produced in this as opposed to 
the other interpretive domains. 
9.2.1 Praxis and Goals 
References to both 'strategy' and 'key' were often associated with what was said 
by the participants at the level of locutionary content or surface form (see Chapter 
7). Hence judges not only cited the use of particular words and phrases (molpho- 
syntactic text features), the use of different modes of expression (prosodic text 
features), and the use of different organising phenomena (turn-taking and topical 
text features) in the course of their interpretive responses, but also linked these to 
evaluations of individual and/or conjoint communicative behaviour. It is the 
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nature of these links that are of particular interest in this chapter, since as 
Gurnperz (1982a: 170) argues: 
by looking at systematic patterns in the relationship of perception of surface 
cues to interpretation, we can gather strong evidence for the social basis of 
contextualization conventions and for the signalling of communicative goals. 
(Gumperz (1982a: 170) 
Apart from being able to describe and codify the qualities and types of 
reference that judges were able to provide in this respect, I have two further ends 
in mind. These are to: 
(i) evaluate the evidence for warranting claims about the goal-orientation(s) of 
interlocutor behaviour on the basis of judges' use of particular vocabularies; 
(ii) model the resources that judges must have utilised in order to be able 
provide the links and/or interpretations they did. 
Concordance strings were consequently produced for all verb and adjective 
phrases referring to praxis. Close inspection of these strings suggests that different 
tokens form the basis of judges' comments. As a result, I was able to list and 
categorise the various types of token involved. Two types of strategy token were 
identified as a result of this procedure. I have called these 'metalinguistic' tokens 
and 'metapragmatic' tokens respectively; the vocabularies concerned are 
discussed in Section 9.3 and 9.4 below. Different types of token were further 
identified in the references to 'key; these are designated as 'indexical' tokens and 
'interactional' tokens respectively, and discussion of them is presented in Section 
9.5. 
9.3 Metalinguistic Tokens 
Judges use metalinguistic tokens to describe strategies that are principally 
concerned with participant attempts to manage and regulate the exchanges. 
Goffman (1981) refers to these strategies as 'the system of constraints of talk'. 
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System constraints provide "a two-way capability for transmitting acoustically 
adequate and readily interpretable messages, feedback capabilities, turnover 
signals, preemption signals, framing capabilities, such as rekeying signals" 
Goffman (1981: 14-15). Tokens identified in the corpus of responses seem to be 
akin to the first sub-set of "interactional terms' that Labov and Fanshel (1977) use 
as part of their comprehensive discourse analysis (cf. the group of speech acts that 
Habermas (1984) calls "communicatives'). 
Four groups of 'speech actions" or 'verbal interactions' are identified by Labov 
and Fanshel, and it is the first of these that I am presently interested in (see Labov 
and Fanshel (1977: 60-65). These are designated as a set of "meta "-actions which 
are defined as follows: 
metalinguistic actions ... have to with the regulation of speech itself - They describe the behavior of the speaker when he is doing something else besides 
"taking his turn. " (Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 60) 
Three types of 'metalinguistic-action' are specified by Labov and Fanshel under 
the generic headings of 'initiate', 'continue', and 'end'. These actions are all 
reasonably transparent and relate to the behaviour of a single person. They are 
used to describe: 
(i) verbal initiatives, where some participant is the first actual speaker, or the 
speaker who begins a new topic or speech event, or who decides to 
interrupt; 
(ii) verbal continuations, where the participant is the speaker who maintains 
control of the floor or the turn slot,, or who uses repetition, or who Ofiers 
backchannel cues as a means of encouraging an interlocutor to continue; 
verbal completions, where the participant is the speaker who ends what 
they have to say, or who terminates a speech event, or who withdraws from 
an exchange by lapsing into silence. 
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The dialogic aspect of verbal exchange is characterised by Labov and Fanshel 
by a small set of terms under each of these heads, as represented in Table 9.3 
(Labov and Fanshel, 1977: 62). These terms are intended to deal with the 
sequential organisation of speaker turns along conversation analytic lines (see 
Section 7.2). Since similar lexis is used by judges in the response data that was 
collected, I have used Labov and Fanshel's table of metalinguistic verbs as a basis 
for undertaking the analysis which follows (see Appendix, I). 
Table 9.3 
Labov and Fanshel's List of Metalinguistic Terms 
initiate continue end 
interrupt respond signal completion 
redirect repeat withdraw 
reinforce 
Before pursuing this analysis, it is important to reiterate that the tokens 
provided by lay judges are not equivalent to those used by professional analysts 
(cf. the use of prosody terms by judges as reported in 7-1.2). However, they do 
seem productive enough to compare with professional analysis, and may have an 
irnportant role to play as part of the warranting process for determining 
participant goals as I suggested at the outset of the research. Weimann (1985: 85), 
for example, argues that turn taking strategies are among "'the fundamental 
resources available to interactants to establish a definition of their relationships, 
especially in terms of control distribution". The 'resource model' of turn taking 
put forward by Weimann seeks to facilitate the interpretation of conversational 
events so that they can be seen as resources by which people accomplish relational 
goals. Since this a theoretical rather than empirically derived model, evidence for 
these goals is neither sought nor provided. However, this is not to say that the 
model is without merit. I think its basic hypothesis is quite sound; turn taking 
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strategies are an important resource for accomplishing relational goals as work in 
CA has shown (cf - Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974; Atkinson and Heritage, 
1984; Button and Lee, 1987; Roger and Bull, 1989). 
The issue I want to confront is not so much the types of mechanism that are 
involved in accomplishing such goals, but rather their salience from a third person 
perspective. What strategies are seen to be employed by participants in organising 
and controlling talk, and what if anythiiýg, can they provide in the way of 
evidence about the goal-orientations of the people concerned? These questions are 
addressed in the discussion which follows, where the first stage in analysis 
involves an account of how the reference tokens judges used were listed and 
categorised. 
9.3.1 Listing and Categorising the Tokens 
The work reported in this section is based on the metalinguistic tokens derived 
frorn non-participant judges. Concordance strings were generated from these 
tokens and resulted in descriptive phrases of the following kind: 
Study 1 
judge 3 
Ian introduces topics 
he can talk about 
judge 12 
the one who initiates all the questions 
seems more dominant 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge 4 
he lets things continue 
Judge 8 
they are typically laconic replies Ian would give 
333 
Study 2 (Extract 3) 
judge 1 
he follows on from what Ian is saying 
rather than initiating anything himself 
judge 3 
he sounds as if he's going to launch into a tale 
and begins to talk about Southampton 
judge 4 
he sounds as if he's not going to go on 
and then does 
Study 2 (Extract 6) 
judge 7 
Ian has to try and keep the conversation going 
Study 3 (Extract 4) 
Pair 1 
however is reiterated 
Pair 2 
the man kept trying to break in 
and contradict her 
she just went straight on 
she just said however 
and then continued 
Pair 5 
1 guess in the middle she was just ploughing on 
Pair 7 
her husband tries to get in four times 
and is summarily dismissed 
Eighty nine tokens of this type were identified and these were categorised 
according to the three generic types of metalinguistic action defined by Labov and 
Fanshel (19 77). 1 suggest that such actions are evaluated post hoc, in so far as some 
individual is viewed as fulfilling, or at least attempting to fulfil, the participant 
role(s) of first and second person interlocutor (see Chapter 2). These roles are 
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distinguished by the ways in which individuals make use of any or all of the 
following regulative strategies: 
(i) initiate a contribution; 
(ii) continue a contribution; 
(iii) end a contribution. 
9.3.2. Initiating Contributions 
judges describe the behaviour of participants who are interpreted as making ist 
Person 'initiating contributions' by using the tokens listed in Table 9.4. For the 
sake of consistency, all tokens are presented in their infinitive form. 
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TABLE 9.4 
Tokens for Describing lst Person Initiating Contributions 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
begin to talk 1 1 
bring in 1 - - 1 
change 1 9 2 12 
initiate questions 1 - - 1 
introduce the thing 1 1 
introduce topics 1 1 
launch into - 1 1 
move 2 5 7 
provoke 1 - 1 
set out to ask - 1 1 
sidetrack - - 1 
start - 1 1 
start off - 1 2 
start the conversation 1 - 1 
start to talk 1 - 2 
switch 4 1 5 
try to get the bloke 
saying things 
- 1 1 
try to get to speak - 1 1 
try to get to talk - 1 1 
try to make 
conversation 
1 1 
Totals 15 23 5 43 
A total of 20 different 'initiating' tokens and 43 references were produced 
across the three studies. On closer inspection, it is apparent that many of these 
tokens are closely related, if not synonymous. Hence, taking the speaking 
'initiative', for example, presumably includes the first person behaviours: 'begin to 
talk'; 'introduce'; 'launch into'; and "start to talk'. The action 'initiate' also seems to 
be used by judges in the sense of goal-oriented strategies that are used to create or 
stimulate dialogue. Examples include: 'initiate questions"; -/set out to ask'; 'try to 
get the bloke saying things'; "try to get to speak'; 'try to get to talk'; 'try to make 
conversation'. The relative frequency of initiatives of this kind can of course be 
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checked against the local and global organisation of turn-taking in a fragment or 
whole episode of talk (see Section 7.2). 
The other first person strategy that judges seem to be sensitive to is the 
notion of 'redirect. In Section 7.2-2,1 discussed the notion of changes in subject 
matter or 'topical actions'. These actions involve the three most commonly cited 
initiating verbs, including "change, 'move' and "switch. The other two tokens of 
this type include "bring in' and *sidetrack'. 
I have categorised "interrupt' as a second person initiative because, one must 
presume that the primary or first person role is already taken; one can only 
'interrupt' oneself in the circumstances of a media broadcast, for example, and this 
is usually done by using third person deixis (cf. " We interrupt this bulletin to bring 
you news of the Whitbread Fleet"). In other words, this kind of initiative is what 
Bublitz (1988, Chapter 3) describes as a 'recipient action'. The 9 tokens identified in 
this category are listed Table 9.5, and these produced a total of 23 references. 
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TABLE 9.5 
Tokens for Describing 2nd Person Initiating Contributions 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
break in - 1 1 
cut off - 1 1 2 
cut in - 1 - 1 
interrupt - 3 8 11 
take over the content - 1 1 2 
talk over - 1 2 
talk through - 2 2 
try to break in - 1 1 
try to get in - 1 1 
Totals 6 16 23 
I presume that the use and extent of interrupting contributions in verbal exchange 
is a reflection of interactional spontaneity or involvement (I think of the kind of 
interaction where one friends who have not seen each other for some time meet 
and have much to share by way of "'news"'), or lack of such spontaneity or 
involvement (as in say a formal interview or between strangers on first meeting), 
or of dominance and control (where speaker rights and turns are regulated as a 
consequence of asymmetrical social roles as in a court of law). The strategic use of 
interruption has of course been extensively researched, and is also amenable to 
direct observation (see Section 7.2-1). 
9.3.3. Continuing Contributions 
Another way of dominating the turn slot is to ensure that one 'continues' in the 
role of first person rather than second person interlocutor. The strategy here seems 
to be to actively 'maintain the initiative' and hence forestall attempts to 'interrupt'. 
Taking a more passive or perhaps subordinate role, as second person interlocutor, 
may be an indication that one has less or little to say by way of verbal 
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contributions to the exchange for whatever reason this might involve. It could also 
be that one is more actively concerned to 'listen' rather than 'speak', but this is an 
issue that I will deal with under the different kinds of 'metapragmatic' strategies 
that I discuss later (see Section 9.4). 
Table 9.6 presents a list of the 26 tokens that judges used to describe strategies 
for 'continuing' or "maintaining' the role of first person interlocutor (see Wells, 
Maclure and Montgomery (1981) for a discussion of strategies for sustaining talk). 
These tokens produced a total of 41 references. 
The notion of 'continue" seems to be particularly salient for judges, since 15 of 
the 24 tokens refer to ways in which the speaker is seen to maintain control of the 
turn slot. Where such control is achieved, by the relative exclusion of the other 
party, speaking rights seem to be judged as asymmetrical. Compare for instance 
the following tokens which suggest that speaking rights are unlikely to be evenly 
shared or distributed: 
/carry on'; 'dictate; 'do all the talking; 'hog the conversation; 'hold court'; "keep 
going"; 'not prepared to give in; "not wanting flow to be interrupted"; 
'plough on'. 
However, the primary speaking role need not only presume predominance, 
since it can also be used to nurture and sustain talk. Compare strategies such as 
'letting things continue' and "trying to keep the conversation going'. How things 
I continue' are a matter for negotiation of course, and this is where the 
management of secondary speaker or second person strategies are of interaýtional 
significance. 
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TABLE 9.6 
Tokens for Describing lst Person Continuing Contributions 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
carry on - 1 1 
continue 5 1 6 
dictate - 1 1 
do all the talking - 1 1 
go on - - 1 
go straight on - 1 1 
hog the conversation - 1 1 
hold court - 1 1 
keep going - 1 1 
keep the conversation 
going 
2 - 2 
keep referring - 1 1 
keep repeating - 1 1 
keep saying 2 3 5 
let things continue - 1 - 1 
not prepared to give in - - 1 1 
not wanting flow to be 
interrupted 
- - 1 1 
pick up remarks - I - 1 
plough on - - 1 1 
produce a more 
extended answer 
- 1 - 1 
reinforce - 1 1 2 
reiterate - - 1 1 
repeat 1 - 5 6 
try to fill it all in - - 1 1 
try to get the point over - - 1 1 
try to keep the 
conversation going 
- 2 - 2 
Totals 5 12 25 42 
much smaller number of tokens is used to describe the continuing contributions 
of second person interlocutors. The tokens identified from the corpus are 
presented in Table 9.7. 
A small number of second person strategies are described which seem to 
'encourage the other person to continue" to use Labov and Fanshel's phrase (1977: 
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62). These strategies are presumably related to the kind of backchannelling 
behaviours that were discussed in 7.1, and play an important part in supporting 
and sustaining talk. Compare the use of tokens such as 'encourage the flow of 
conversation', and 'help'. Backchannel cues can also be used for purposes of 
maintaining control of course, as tokens such as 'jog the conversation along', "play 
along' and 'prompt' suggest. Notice that no references of this type were cited in 
Study 3.1 am uncertain why this should be. 
TABLE 9.7 
Tokens for Describing 2nd Person Continuing Contributions 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
encourage 3 3 
encourage the flow of 
conversation 
- 1 
follow on 2 2 
help - 1 
jog the conversation 
along 
1 - 
pick up remarks - 1 
play along 1 
prompt 1 - 1 
reply - 4 4 
just respond - 1 1 
respond automaticaRy - 1 1 
Totals 5 12 17 
9.3.4 Ending Contributions 
Contributions that are used to close or complete one's turn, the topic, or the 
discourse can be invoked in the role of either first or second person interlocutor. In 
any event, the result of ending one's contribution as a speaker is to become silent. 
The extent of a speaker's silence presumably marks the degree of 'involvement' or 
I withdrawal' from an exchange, and this withdrawal can obviously be intermittent 
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(i. e. 'paused'), sustained, or complete. Only 12 tokens of this type were recorded, 
and these are listed in Table 9.8. These tokens produced 32 references in all. 
TABLE 9.8 
Tokens for Describing 1 st or 2nd Person Ending Contributions 
Tokens Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
cut off 1 1 2 
end 8 2 10 
give in - 1 1 
loose the thread 1 - 1 
not go on - 1 - 1 
not exploring questions 1 - - 1 
not imparting 
information easily 
- 1 - 1 
not knowing what to 
say 
- 1 - 1 
not picking the 
conversation up 
- 1 - 1 
not real-ly saying 
anything 
- - 1 1 
saying as little as 
possible 
- 1 - 1 
pause 2 6 3 11 
Totals 4 20 8 32 
The most commonly cited tokens are 'end' and 'pause'. These tokens, and 
especially 'pause' are discussed in relation to the observation of surface linguistic 
forms in 7.2.1. 
9.3.5 Metalinguistic Tokens and Goal Orientation 
The verbs considered in this section provide evidence of the tendency and 
willingness of judges to describe participant strategies for initiating, maintaining 
and closing verbal communication. I suggest that these verbs are akin to those 
used by professional analysts such as Labov and Fanshel (1977) and Habermas 
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(1984) for the purpose of designating 'metalinguistic' or 'communicative' acts. 
These acts are generally viewed in terms of interactional goals that are defined by 
the analysing observer in functional terms, and are predominantly used in 
structuring discourse (see Craig, 1986). 
To the extent that judges' use similar metalinguistic tokens to describe how 
participants organise and regulate their exchanges suggests that they are sensitive 
such goals (cf. Weimann's (1985) resource model of turn taking). Indeed, the 
communicative effects of these goals are also presumably manifest in the kind of 
status and role differentials that are described by judges in their comments about 
the participants (see Section 8.4). The type of goal that seems to be at issue here are 
what Street and Capella (1985) describe as "global' or 'cross-situational' goals in 
that they are operative in most social encounters. However, judges' comments 
reveal that they are also sensitive to goals that are "situation specific' to use Street 
and Capella's term (cf. Brown and Fraser's (1979) notion of 'mini-purposes'), that 
is, "'they become individually operable given situational exigencies" (Street and 
Capella, 1985: 252). Vocabularies associated with these exigencies, and what is said 
to be communicated by the participants as a consequence, are considered in the 
following section. These vocabularies suggest third person interpretive abilities 
that (Kreckel, 1981) defines as 'metapragmatic' (see 4.2.3). 
9.4 Metapragmatic Tokens 
Judges' use metapragmatic tokens in the course of describing what Gumper Iz 
(1982a: 153) calls 'conversational inferencing', that is, "the situated or context 
bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an exchange 
assess others' intentions, and on which they base their responses"' - Recall from 
Chapter 3 of the present work that Gumperz explores this process by asking 
different third person judges 'to explain what they thought different speakers 
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were trying to convey in speaking as they did", and then "to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their verbal strategies' (Gumperz, 1982a: 31). In the responses he 
elicited, Gumperz discovered that his judges used similar types of expression (the 
speaker is still in control', 'he is playing the game" etc. ), and suggests that in so 
doing they were providing "conventionalised labels or vocabularies of motives", 
for what they recognised as "a familiar strategy or strategies" (op. cit. ). It is labels 
and vocabularies of this type, as used by the judges in this study., that I am 
concemed with here. 
9.4.1 Listing and Categorising the Tokens 
Descriptive phrases of similar kinds were coded by inspecting the corpus of 
responses as before. Examples of the 119 tokens that were identified are listed 
below from Study 1; the relevant tokens are italicised for ease of reference. 
Study I (Participants) 
Participant A 
I was trying to explain 
why I wanted to come back to University 
Ian was trying to make sure of my motives 
Participant B 
it's an attempt to convince the other bloke 
they weren't attending to each other 
he was seeking reassurances 
Study I (Non-Participants) 
Judge 2 
there is an active attempt to converge 
in style and attitude 
Judge 4 
one was probingfor advice 
feeling his way along 
he was sounding out 
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judge 6 
the speakers arefeeling their way around 
trying to establish a rapport 
judge 8 
they come to the same conclusions 
judge 9 
nobody is posturing 
trying to score over anybody else 
he gives advice 
judge 12 
there is a slight element of trying to impress 
judge 14 
he tried to put the other guy at ease 
These statements, and many other like them, describe a range of communicative 
strategies that are attributed to individual speakers (cf. 'he was sounding out; 'he 
tried to put the other guy at ease' etc. ) on the one hand, and to the products of 
conjoint interactional behaviour on the other (cf. 'they weren't attending to each 
other'; 'they come to the same conclusions' etc. ) - 
In order to try and categorise the kinds of strategy that are suggested, all the 
verb tokens were first listed separately and then sorted into sets according to 
semantic relatedness and opposition following the ethnomic procedure adopted 
by Kreckel (1981: 144ff., and discussed in Section 4.2-1). Examples of the kind of 
sets identified by Kreckel (1981: 145) include: 
agreeing 
acknowledging 
consenting 
confirming 
affirming 
accepting 
disagreeing 
objecting 
contradicting 
denying 
stating questioning 
declaring doubting 
describing disbelieving 
reporting 
predicting 
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A complete list of the 210 metapragmatic categories that Kreckel identified is 
presented in Kreckel (1981; 827-292); a subset of the verbs involved is presented in 
Appendix j of this thesis. 
In order to examine the similarities and differences between these verbs on a 
more abstract level, Kreckel develops her own analytic schema (see Kreckel, 1981: 
Chapter 11). This schema is a synthesis of various approaches to the classification 
of speech acts by four different scholars, namely Austin, Searle, Campbell and 
WUnderlich. Since Kreckel argues that a classificatory scheme can never embrace 
all possible illocutionary acts,, she restricts her own work to "face to face 
interaction of a relationship-regulating kind" (Kreckel, 1981: 185). Six basic 
elements or 'interacts' emerge from a combination of the various approaches she 
considers. These interacts are based on three pragmatic dimensions used to 
classify the verbs in question. These are: 
(1) the temporal dimension - in which participants are oriented more towards 
the future, the past, or the present., or whether the acts are temporally 
neutral; 
(ii) the social dimension - in which participants negotiate relevant or appropriate 
sequential obligations; 
(iii) the content dimension - in which the thematic centre of gravity lies. 
While this schema has the advantage of providing "a guideline for 
ethnolinguistic and sociolinguistic descriptive systems", it has the disadvantage of 
"relinquishing the intuitive evidence of classifications that link up with semantic 
analyses and take account of the elementary functions of language" as Habermas 
(1985: 322) suggests. A further limitation is that the interacts pertain to only 
illocutionary rather than perlocutionary force. The schemas put forward by Labov 
and Fanshel (1977), Leech (1983) and of course Habermas himself seem to address 
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this criticism, but of course these do not take into account the range or types of 
interpretive vocabulary that Kreckel's, or indeed my own, data involves. 
The problems of classification notwithstanding, the social-relational dimension 
that Kreckel develops seems to me to provide an extremely useful tool for 
beginning analyses of the tokens I collected. As Kreckel (1981: 189) explains, this 
dimension is largely inspired by von Wiese's (1941) theory of social relations. The 
theory is not only very simple (social relations are conceived of as processes or 
occurrences "which bring men closer together or place them further apart", 
Kreckel, 1981: 189), but also has affinities with: 
(a) the work of Howard Giles and his associates on the 'convergent" and 
'divergent' behaviours that underpin Speech Accommodation Theory (SAT), 
and its later development into Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) - 
see Giles and Coupland (1991: Chapter 3) for a useful synopsis of this work; 
(b) the model of politeness developed by Brown and Levinson (1978; 1987), and 
as applied to the illocutionary functions of politeness in speech acts by 
Leech (1983). 
Leech (1983: 104) states that at the most general level illocutionary functions 
may be classified into the four following types, according to the social goal of 
'establishing and maintaining comity'. 
(a) COMPETTrIVE: The illocutionary goal competes with the social goal; eg 
ordering, asking, demanding, begging, etc. 
(b) CONVIVIAL: The illocutionary goal coincides with the social goal; eg offering, 
inviting, greeting, thanking, congratulating. 
(C) COLLABORATWE: The illocutionary goal is indifferent to the social goal; eg 
asserting, reporting, announcing, instructing 
(d) CONFLICTWE: The illocutionary goal conflicts with the social goal; eg 
threatening, accusing, cursing, reprimanding 
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These functions seem to me to be intrinsic to the basic relational dimensions that 
are identified by Kreckel (1981: 189), with the refinement that the social goal may 
also be 'ambivalent. Three dimensions are thus proposed by Kreckel, and these 
are: 
association (= bringing interactors closer together, e. g. appeasing) 
dissociation (= placing them further apart, e. g. insulting) 
ambivalence (= where direction can go either way, e. g. defending, teasing). 
The different sets of verbs that I identified were grouped according to these 
dimensions, and then considered in the light of different types of strategic 
behaviour that judges seemed to attribute to the participants as first and second 
person interlocutors. Like Gumperz (1982a; 1982b), I assume that this behaviour is 
goal-oriented, though the complex nature of the link between goals and discourse 
is not explored here (see, Tracy and Coupland, 1990; Tracy, 1991). While a 
relatively small set of communicative goals tend to be identified by theorists, I will 
also follow the general thesis of Tracy and Coupland (1990: 2) and assume that 
these goals are inextricably intertwined and that participants will typically have 
more than one goal when they talk to others. 
Tracy and Coupland (1990: 5) point out that while the labels used by scholars 
vary; two communicator goals are repeatedly identified as basic: 
The first type of goal is the task or instrumental goal; in general, task goals 
are seen as the purpose of interaction. In addition to the 'task' however, are 
the concerns people have about how they are presenting themselves and their 
concerns for the relationship. Sometimes, this non-task goal is taken as a 
single cluster, 'the face goals of interaction'... and other times it is split in two: 
identity goals and relational goals. 
These broad typologies seem to me to accord very well with the ideas of 
Habermas (1985) which I discussed in Chapter 2 (see in particular Section 2.3-1). 
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Recall that Habermas suggests an integrated two-tiered characterisation of socially 
coordinated, communicative actions that are intrinsically goal-oriented. These are 
a system based paradigm in which individuals search for normative agreement 
and understanding, and a lifeworld paradigm that seeks the gratification of 
personal interest positions. For the purpose of discussion, I propose that judges' 
metapragmatic descriptions can be usefully subsumed under each of these 
paradigms. Hence, in the sections which follow, I consider two types of 
interpretive vocabulary: 
(i) vocabularies that describe task-oriented strategies and goals; 
(ii) vocabularies that describe non-task or face-oriented strategies and goals. 
9.4.2 Task-Oriented Strategies and Goals 
Vocabularies that describe task-oriented strategies and goals appear to be sensitive 
to the process of ostensive-inferential communication that I outlined in Section 
2.2.2. Recall that this process involves a view of communication in which 
participants produce and interpret evidence of different kinds in order to find 
relevant links. judges seem to be sensitive to this process in so far as their 
comments include statements about the strategies used by participants for 
communicative purposes. These strategies not only include what it is that first 
person participants have had to say in terms of the production of ostensive signals, 
but also how second persons have contextualised and/or responded to what has 
been said. In describing and naming these strategies, I presume that judges utilise 
linguistic and metapragmatic resources to achieve their interpretations. The' 
interpretive resources in question are presumably related to some model of 
language understanding that judges have recourse to as conversational 
participants themselves. Such a model is advanced by Rost (1990: Chapter 3). 
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Rost proposes a number of editing strategies that second persons addressees 
must employ mi order to draw appropriate inferences from what a speaker has 
said, with the presumed aim of their trying to achieve 'acceptable' or 'targeted' 
understandings. Rost (1990: 63 ) explains: 
Acceptable understanding refers to inferences drawn by a listener that are 
satisfactory to both speaker and listener. Targeted understanding refers to a 
specific interpretation that was intended by the speaker. 
Failure to achieve either of these outcomes results in 'non-understanding' or 
'misunderstanding', of course, as Rost refers to them. To be successful as listeners, 
individuals are modelled as having three different levels of interpretive ability. 
These are: 
(1) The ability to infer meaning by supplying links between lexical items. 
(2) The ability to formulate a base, or conceptual meaning that links utterances 
together. 
(3) The ability to formulate plausible intention (s) for the speaker in making an 
utterance. (Rost, 1990: 83-84) 
The following sections examine interpretive work that demonstrates how these 
abilities are utilised post hoc in order to derive 'acceptable understandings" in a 
weaker sense; that is, for third person judges to supply 'plausible interpretations' 
of communicative behaviour previously unseen. Plausible, of course, does not 
imply 'correct', but rather that the interpretations are likely to be based on some 
principle of analogy (Rost, 1990: 74), that is, akin to real, imagined or stereotypical 
instances of communicative behaviour which 'make sense' for the judge in 
question. Rost comments: 
A listener with adequate knowledge of a language and adequate experience 
with the conventions of language use (e. g. rhetorical genres) can construct an 
acceptable understanding of the discourse. However, even experienced 
listeners will regularly experience understanding problems, as not all 
understanding problems can be resolved through reliance on conventional 
linguistic knowledge. (Rost, 1990: 74) 
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In order to try and provide a more discrete account of the behaviours or 
strategies that judges described, I followed the procedure outlined in 9.4.1 above. 
Hence, I first collected together all verbs and verb groups from the corpus of 
interpretive statements, and then allocated them to sets on the basis of their 
semantic relatedness and opposition. Second, and as far as possible, I grouped 
these sets into the taxonomy of speech actions established by Labov and Fanshel 
(1977: 61). Finally, each group was analysed along the relational dimensions 
established by Kreckel (1981). 
Three main types of task-oriented tokens were identified in this way. The 
tokens evaluate and describe communicative strategies (cf. the categories and lists 
provided by Labov and Fanshel in Appendix 1) that are said to be employed by 
participants for: 
(1) representing and responding to states of affairs; 
(2) coordinating and negotiating outcomes; 
(3) initiating and responding to requests. 
1. Representing and Responding to States of Affairs 
Descriptions of how participants express states of affairs, including information 
about themselves and events, are provided by tokens that are presented in Table 
9.9. These tokens are akin to the speech actions that Labov and Fanshel (1977: 62) 
call 'representations', and are used to describe the strategies of first person 
speakers. 
Seventeen different tokens of this type were identified in the response data 
and these generated a total of 52 references. I have classified the tokens as 
relationally ambivalent, since it seems to me that the terms are semantically 
neutral for politeness. Leech (1983: 105) makes the same point about the 
-10cutionary function of Searle's 'representative' speech acts (sometimes labelled 
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as 'assertives'). The illocutionary force of representatives is to commit the speaker 
to the truth of an expressed proposition. Its perlocutionary effect is to induce the 
hearer to believe that S's representation is valid. Labov and Fanshel (1977: 62) 
argue that where the truth of the proposition cannot be assumed by the 
participants, they will act in a way that is liable to cause 'dispute'; I will return to 
tokens that seem to describe what is 'disputable' shortly. 
Table 9.9 
Tokens for Describing 1st Person Representational Strategies 
1st Person 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
comment 4 6 
describe 1 
explain 2 
express an opinion 1 
give an account 2 
give details - 2 2 4 
give ideas - 2 - 2 
give information - 1 1 
impose an opinion - - 1 1 
make free with an 
opinion 
- - 1 1 
mention 2 2 2 6 
refer 1 1 1 3 
remark 1 1 - 2 
report - - 2 2 
state - 1 1 
teH 2 - 14 16 
_try 
to make a point - - 1 1 
Total 9 12 31 52 
Apart from the consequences of reaching agreement or disagreement, as a 
result of some speaker's proposition being accepted as true, it seems that there is 
liother potential source of conflict for participants that tends not to be discussed 
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very much by speech act theorists. This is the conflict that can arise when the 
speaker does not find evidence in the listener's participation display that speaker's 
intentions are being acknowledged. I have called tokens that describe such 
acknowledgment, 'contact' strategies; that is., strategies that indicate the 
willingness and ability of second persons to continue the interaction (cf. Allwood, 
Nivre and AhIsen, 1992). The tokens concerned are presented in Table 9.10. 
Table 9.10 
Tokens for Describing 2nd Person Contact Strategies 
2nd Person 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
listen 1 3 3 
start to listen 
ignore 3 4 
totally ignore 
not going to listen 
not listening 
not listening carefully 
not quite listening 
not taking notice 
start to listen 
say as little as possible 
_. Total 5 14 19 
Contact strategies are crucial for not only establishing that ostensive signals 
have been acknowledged, but also that they are to be contextualised. Interlocutors 
can of course signal degrees of 'attentiveness' by offering kinesic and recipiency 
cues of different kinds (cf. eye contact; head nodding; backchannelling etc). Since 
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they did not have access to visual information, it is presumably recipiency cues of 
the verbal kind (see Chapter 6) that have led to evaluations of this type. 
The relative lack of references to second person associative participation 
displays is presumably because the activity of "listening' itself is taken for granted. 
Notice, however, that 13 out of the 19 references are concerned with dissociative 
strategies that result from not attending or listening. How we 'attend' to what 
someone is saying, in whatever circumstances, presumably affects the kinds of 
information that we are likely to focus on or take of note of (cf. note taking 
practices in lecturers as discussed by Rost (1990: 125ff. ) for instance ). It is also 
likely to have concomitant effects on the nature of interlocutor relations as some 
sequence of verbal exchange develops. Continuing displays of the dissociative 
kind presumably lead to relational discomfort at least., or at worst to a total 
breakdown of the communicative process. 
2. Coordinating and Negotiating Outcomes 
Listeners can of course do more than ratify a speaker's contribution and provide 
prompts for them to continue. Listeners may also shape discourse by indicating 
which parts of the discourse are to be developed. Similarly a listener can shape the 
discourse by challenging the informational content of a speaker's contribution or 
the speaker's right in making that contribution (cf. the linguistic 'feedback 
mechanisms' discussed by Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsen, 1992), and also the list of 
listener strategic responses identified by Rost, 1990: 116-117). Quite often the 
strategies that describe such contributions are not attributed to any one individual, 
but instead refer to the result of conjoint behaviour or accomplishments ('they 
weren't attending; 'the speakers were feeling their way around' etc. ) - Since this 
behaviour and/or accomplishment necessarily involves dialogic exchange, I 
have 
simPly included these in the second person category. 
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Coordination of intent., or mutual acceptance of the other party's intent is vital 
in collaborative discourse. Misunderstanding can occur when a listener does not 
understand the speaker's particular intent in making certain comments or in 
pursuing a certain line of argument or discourse (Grimshaw, 1980; Humphrys- 
Jones, 1986; Varonis and Gass, 1985). Communicative confli ct can occur when s/he 
does not accept what a speaker has said. Labov and Fanshel (1977: 62) refer to the 
kinds of act involved in such coordination as "disputables'. The frequency and 
types of token used to describe what I prefer to call coordinating and negotiative 
strategies are presented in Table 9.11. 
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Table 9.11 
Tokens for Describing 2nd Person and Conjoint Negotiative Strategies 
2ndPerson & 
Conjoint 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
accept 
agree 1 3 6 10 
come to same 
conclusions 
1 
communicate 2 
think along the same 
lines 
1 
understand 2 
contradict - - 2 2 
disagree - 1 - 1 
dismiss - - 2 2 
not communicating - 2 2 
react negatively 1 
go through a process of 
agreeing 
2 
not clashing 1 
Total 9 15 28 
The most commonly used token is 'agree' with 10 associative and 2 ambivalent 
references. Leech (1983) suggests that there is an 'agreement maxim' in talk that is 
closely tied to politeness. The maxim proposes that participants /maximise 
agreement' and 'minimise disagreement' (Leech, 1983: 132), and perhaps this is 
what judges are basing their evaluations on. "Seek agreement' is of course a major 
strategy of positive politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 112), which is used 
by 
Darticipants for claiming common ground. Brown and Levinson also mention the 
, trategy of 'token agreement, which I think the two ambivalent references may 
be 
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describing (i. e 'going through a process of agreeing", and 'not clashing'). Token 
agreement is the pretence of agreement that is used where an individual or both 
parties may 'disagree, but do not want to openly appear to do so in order to 
maintain positive face. 
3. Initiating and Responding to Requests 
Labov and Fanshel (1977: 63) suggest that: 
A very large part of discourse is concerned with requests of various kinds: 
requests for action, information, confirmation, attention or approval. 
In speech act theory, requests (sometimes included under the category of 
'directives') are taken to have the illocutionary force of attempting to get the 
hearer to do something. The intended effect on the hearer is to have them 
acknowledge S's desire. Leech (1983: 106) assigns directives to the competitive 
category of speech acts ("'the illocutionary goal competes with the social goal"), 
where negative politeness is important. However, directives such as 'invitations' 
are taken as intrinsically polite. Tokens for initiating requests or invitations are 
presented in Table 9.12. 
Only 9 tokens and 12 reference strings were produced for first person request 
strategies of the task-oriented kind. The majority of tokens fall into the ambivalent 
category, though I presume that the consequences of always being the 'requestor' 
may have an important effect on both discourse and social relationships. What is 
remarkable is the lack of any references in Study 3; there are no references of the 
second person kind either. Perhaps this pattern is simply a function of the 
kinds of 
stimulus material that was used, which involved a fairly high proportion of 
narrative rather than consultative strategies. I have included references of the 
consultative kind, that is, that suggest particular face wants and needs in the non- 
task category presented below (e. g. 'appeal'; 'ask for sympathy'; 'seek reassurance, 
etc. ). 
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Table 9.12 
Tokens for Describing 1st Person invitational Strategies 
1st Person 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
ask relevant questions 
ask a serious question 
ask a meaningless 
question 
ask a pointless question 
ask a question 
ask all the questions 
initiate questions 
set out to ask a 
question 
swap questions 
Total 9 12 
Tokens used to describe second person responses to invitational strategies are 
listed in Table 9.13. Labov and Fanshel (1977: 63) note that: 
In response to a request from A, B has three basic options: (1) he may give 
X-the information, confirmation, or whatever is requested, or he may carry out 
(perform) the action or suggestion not necessarily by speech; (2) he may put off 
the request with an accounting; or (3) he may refuse it, with or without 
accounting. % 
Judges' comments suggest that they are aware of something of all of these 
possibilities. 
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Table 9.13 
Tokens for Describing 2nd Person Responses to Invitational Strategies 
1st Person 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
give a conventional 
answer 
- 1 
provide a more 
extended answer 
- 1 
answer under duress - 1 
don't answer 1 
avoid the responsibility 
of answering 
- 1 
unwilling to answer 1 
avoid the question 1 
don't explore the 
question 
- 
don't respond 1 
answer 2 2 
not able to answer 1 
not needing an answer 1 
not wanting an answer 1 
reply 3 3 
give yes no replies 1 1 
respond 2 2 
just respond 1 
talk when asked - 
Total 2 20 22 
Where an invitation is complied with, participants are described as 
'answering'; 'responding'; or 'replying'. There are of course different types of 
answer/, /responses' and 'replies' as the tokens indicate. Hence, one may answer 
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in a positive way, or in some ambivalent or minimal way, or with some reluctance, 
or not at all as the tokens suggest. The kind of strategy that is employed in this 
regard, presumably has both interactional and relational consequences. if a 
participant only provides 'yes no replies', for instance, the discourse is likely to be 
interpreted as lacking in spontaneity (cf. judges' comments in Study 2 (Extract 3). 
On the other hand, if a participant 'only talks when asked', this presumably 
reflects a difference in relational status (cf - judges' comments in Study 1, and also 
Grimshaw, 1980). 
9.4.3 Face-Oriented Strategies and Goals 
Human social actors spend much of their time in "coopresence" either in 
attempting to manipulate the behaviour of others, or in themselves being objects 
of manipulation (Goffman, 1967). Given the fundamentally complementary 
character of social life and its matching of power with weakness, resources with 
needs, and assertiveness with acquiescence, this is not remarkable. What is 
remarkable is that attention to the behavioural repertoires employed in such 
manipulative behaviour has been, until quite recently, rather modest as Grimshaw 
(1982; 1990) points out. 
However, an integrated model of discourse and context that offers a number 
of useful concepts and hypotheses is Communicative Accommodation Theory (CAT) 
(see Coupland and Giles, 1988; Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 1991; Giles and 
Coupland,, 1991). This model allows testable predictions about communication 
strategies and their outcomes. The sociolinguistic heart of CAT focuses on 
processes of communicative attuning, adaptive and strategic moves made by the 
participants to increase and decrease social and sociolinguistic distance. The 
interpretive tokens that are assigned to these strategies by third person judges 
seem to be of two basic kinds. These describe strategies that are essentially self - 
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interested or 'egocentric' on the one hand, and strategies that are other-interested 
or /exocentric' on the other. Leech (1983) makes something of the same distinction 
in describing the putative relationship between participants in talk. He notes: "self 
will normally be identified with s, and other will typically be identified with V 
(Leech, 1983: 132). 'Other' can of course also refer to participant or non-participant 
third parties. 
1. Egocentric Strategies 
Evaluative statements that describe egocentric strategies focus on attempts by 
'self' to signal and satisfy personal wants, needs and priorities (cf. Brown and 
Levinson's (1987: 101) notion of positive politeness which involves "redress 
directed to the addressees positive face" - my italic). I have coded the strategies 
referred to by judges into two different sets. I will refer tothese as 'consulting, 
and 'status' strategies. 
Consulting strategies are categorised by Labov and Fanshel (1977) under the 
rubric of 'requests', and seem to be related to Leech's (1983: 132) sympathy maxim 
in which individuals are modelled as (a) minimising antipathy between self and 
other and (b) maximising sympathy between self and other in order to achieve 
their goals. Tokens used by judges that describe attempts by 'self' to consult in this 
way are presented in Table 9.14. The references were mainly derived in Study 2 
(Extract 1), where the speaker concerned was described by three of the judges in 
the following way: 
S 
Study 2 (Extract 1) 
Judge I 
she seems to be acting in some way 
even at the end she isn't fully natural 
Judge 6 
it sounds like a girl who has got a crush on teacher 
there is a little girl lost sort of attitude 
361 
judge 7 
it sounds false 
the girl sounds self-conscious 
These interpretations suggest that the speaker is perhaps trying to minimise a 
possible threat to face by using 'exaggerated' prosody in the way Brown and 
Levinson (1987: 104) describe. Hence, she is considered to be 'consulting'; 'seeking 
assurances'; 'asking for sympathy' and so on. The strategies are perhaps also 
indicative of the role and relational asymmetries that were ascribed to the 
participants in this particular exchange (cf. judges' comments in Section 8.5.1; and 
Grimshaw, 1980). 
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Table 9.14 
Tokens for Describing 1st Person Consulting Strategies 
1st Person 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
appeal - 2 
consult - 
plead - 
seek reassurances - 
want an answer - 
want a response - 
ask for sympathy - 
want sympathy - 
feel out 
feel the way along 
feel the way around 
probe for advice 
sound out 
want to do something 
not needing to 
communicate 
not wanting to go into 
deep detailed 
discussion 
Total 7 9 18 
Similar asymmetries were also referred to by judges in their descriptions of the 
participants in Study 1 (see Section 8.6), and may account for the ambivalent 
tokens listed in Table 9.14. The tokens suggest interpretations of "pessimistic' or 
'hedged' illocutionary force, where the speaker is considered to either assume "H 
is unlikely or willing/able to any of the acts predicated of him", or 'doesn't 
assume "H is able/willing to do any of the acts predicated of him" (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987: 136). Hence, tokens such as 'feel the way around'; 'sound out'; 
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'probe for advice' etc. seem to describe indirect or concealed strategies that are 
used by participants to 'prepare the ground'. Judge 4, for example commented: 
Study I 
judge 4 
one was probing for advice 
feeling his way along 
he want"s to do something 
but isn't sure about it 
he was sounding out 
I suggest that comments of this type appear to be sensitive to a priori goals that are 
expressed in terms of negative politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 129ff . ). 
Something of these goals are also intimated in the comments of Participant A who 
said: 
Study I 
Participant A 
I wanted to reprocess my application 
as a research student 
I was trying to explain 
why I wanted to come back to University 
Ian was trying to make sure of my motives 
While references to consulting strategies may be explained in terms of judges' 
sensitivity to positive and negative politeness, there are a set of request strategies 
that Labov and Fanshel (1977: 64) suggest operate at "'a deeper level of 
interactional significance". These include actions that either seek to 'challenge" or 
I support' interlocutor status (cf. Grimshaw, 1980). Labov and Fanshel describe 
'challenges' as "any reference (by direct assertion or more indirect reference) to a 
situation, which if true, would lower the status of the other person" (Labov and 
Fanshel (1977: 64). 'Supporting' strategies on the other hand are described "as that 
form of behavior which would reinforce or raise the status of the other person". 
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Since the latter are "other' rather than 'self-oriented', I will deal with them in the 
exocentric category. 
Only 2 references were identified which seem to describe status challenging 
strategies. The tokens concerned are listed in Table 9.15. 
Table 9.15 
Tokens for Describing 1st Person Status Challenging Strategies 
1st Person 
References 
Study I Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
moan on 
nag 
_ Total 
However, the corpus of responses provided 18 references to a third type of 
challenging strategy that is not discussed by Labov and Fanshel. I have called 
these 'status-enhancing' strategies, that is, strategies that generally refer to 
behaviour which seeks to reinforce or raise the participant's own self-esteem or 
status. Street and Cappella (1985) relate such behaviour to the goal of 'social 
control'. They note: 
Social control represents the desire to influence others in order to satisfy 
personal needs and obligations and to enhance self-image. (Street and 
Cappella, 1985: 252) % 
Tokens describing behaviour of this type are listed in Table 9.16, where the most 
frequently cited example of its type is 'try to impresst. 
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Table 9.16 
Tokens for Describing lst Person Status Enhancing Strategies 
1st Person 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
give off really high 
flown ideas 
give out what you 
want to say 
make the other person 
know where he went 
name drop 
put on a show 
try to come over as 
educated and informed 
try to come over as the 
educated opinion 
try to create an 
impression 
try to impart wisdom 
try to impress 3 
try to project an image - 
Total 5 18 
This strategy seems to be synonymous with the other tokens identified in the set, 
since I presume that the perlocutionary effect of 'giving off really high flown 
ideas' and 'name dropping', for example, is to 'impress' one's interlocutor. 
However, the actual effect of this kind of strategy may be double-edged, as the 
following comment from Study 2 suggests: 
Study 2 (Extract 4) 
Judge 6 
one is taking the impressed the role 
without genuinely being impressed 
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Although I have marked them as relationally ambivalent, the interpretive 
connotations associated with such strategies tend towards the negative rather than 
positive end of judges' evaluations. 
2. Exocentric Strategies 
Exocentric strategies are oriented towards the needs and wants others, and hence 
help to initiate, develop and maintain social-relational goals as Coupland, 
Coupland and Giles (1991: 26) argue: 
When a speaker has particular relational goals for an interaction (for 
example wanting to gain the other's approval,, wanting talk to be effective and 
efficient, or conversely, wanting to establish self, or self's social group as 
distinct from the interlocutors and his/her group, she or he will select from a 
range of sociolinguist (and non-verbal strategies) attending to or anticipating the 
recipient's own communication characteristics. 
Strategies used to support an interlocutor are described by tokens listed in Table 
9.17. Most of these tokens are of the associative kind, where the participant is 
viewed as actively attempting to collaborate with or converge towards his/her 
interlocutor in order to achieve communicative success by establishing and 
maintaining comity. In fact, participants are judged to be 'trying to do something' 
in 10 out of the 34 references in this category. Compare: 
'try to establish a rapport; 'try to establish confidentiality'; 'try to find 
something to talk about; 'try to get a routine; 'try to relax the situation'; 'try 
not to score over'. 
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Table 9.17 
Tokens for Describing Supporting Strategies 
1st Person 
References 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Tokens 
advise 2 2 4 
approve 1 - 1 
encourage 3 - 3 
help - 2 1 3 
look for a point to relax 1 - 1 2 
make an effort - 1 - I 
put at ease 2 - - 2 
support 1 1 - 2 
talk about something 
personal 
1 - - 1 
try to engage - - 1 1 
try to establish a 
rapport 
2 1 - 3 
try to establish 
confidentiality 
1 - - 1 
try to find something to 
talk about 
- 1 - 1 
try to get a routine 1 - - 1 
try to relax the 
situation 
1 - - 1 
try to rescue the 
conversation 
- 1 - I 
try not to score over 1 - - 1 
want to be sympathetic - 1 - 1 
act as stooge - 1 - 1 
play along with - 1 - 1 
put up with - 1 - 1 
take the impressed role - 1 - I 
Total 17 12 5 34 
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9.5 Key Tokens 
The other substantive group of tokens which furnishes evidence of judges 
tendency and willingness to comment on supratextual matters are those 
describing communicative 'key'. The notion of 'key' is understood in the 
Hymesian sense (1972; 1974) and includes evaluative interpretations of what the 
participants were considered to communicate as a result of the tone, manner or 
spirit in which the exchanges had taken place. 
Examples of the kinds of comment that participant and non-participant judges 
provided are listed as follows. The following statements are taken from Study 1. A 
total of 194 different tokens were identified from statements of this type. 
Study I (Participants) 
Participant B 
I can't believe it sounds good 
it sounds bloody boring 
there is something tentative and final 
about the way it comes out 
there is no genuine surprise 
it ought to be more interesting 
but isn't 
he wasn't particularly enthusiastic 
Study 1 (Non-Participants) 
Judge 1 
the other guy was not relaxed 
he was cagey 
judge 2 
Ian operates at a flippant level 
really is ambiguous 
it's not convincing it had shades 
judge 4 
the other speaker sounded eager but hesitant 
judge 6 
the interactants are not interested 
in what they are saying to each other 
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judge 7 
they are kind of modest with each other 
judge 8 
it"s not intimate but relaxed and friendly 
judge 9 
when he says it sounds good there is approval 
judge 10 
there is hurnour when they talk about tax 
judge 11 
one was pretty relaxed 
judge 12 
there is almost a mild sort of modesty 
judge 13 
the other man sounded a little bit uneasy 
judge 14 
the other guy was passive 
These statements, and others like them in Studies 2 and 3, suggest that 
different adjective tokens form the basis of judges' comments. Compare the use of 
adjectives such as "boring; 'tentative; 'final'; 'relaxed'; 'cagey'; 'flippant'; 
'ambiguous'; 'modest' and so on. By generating concordances of all the adjectives 
used in such statements, I was again able to list and categorise the various types of 
token involved. Two categories of token were established in this way: 
(1) 'indexical' tokens - adjectives used to describe participant affectual and 
attitudinal orientations (cf. 'boring; not enthusiastic; "amused', 'eamest", 
'indignant' etc. ); 
(2) 'interactional' tokens - adjectives used to describe discourse or goal related 
effects (cf. 'approval'; 'final'; 'ambiguous', "non-involved', 'superficial"; 
I unnatural' etc. ). 
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I presume that interpretations involving these vocabularies are closely related to 
observed textual features of the prosodic kind (see Section 7.1.2), where such 
features include marked variations of pitch, tempo, loudness, articulatory setting 
and timing. For a given speaker, use of marked features of this type (i. e. other than 
those the speaker usually uses) may signal to the listener that the speaker is giving 
a special attitudinal weight to the utterance. Rost (1990: 79) presents a 
configuration of some of the vocal cues that have been associated with attitudes of 
English speakers (see Figure 9.1). 
Marked vocal features 
Ps vr tMP Id vs as ap tM 
excited ext 
pompous low slow prc 
depressed rst low soft slr 
nervous rsd rpd brt tense 
shocked ext rsd rpd loud brt tense ext 
affectionate ext ext 
cold rst tense 
thoughtful slow 
sexy ext low slow soft brt slr 
angry ext rsd rpd loud tense prc 
fearful rst 
ps pitch span: extended (ext), restricted (rst), or unmarked 
vr voice range: low, raised (rsd), or unmarked 
tinp = tempo: slow, rapid (rpd), or unmarked 
Id = loudness: soft, loud, or unmarked 
vs = voice setting: breathy (brt) or unmarked 
as = articulatory setting: tense or unmarked 
ap articulatory precision: precise (prc), slurred (slr), or unmarked 
tm timing: extended (ext) or unmarked 
Figure 9.2 
Vocal Cues Associated with Speaker Attitudes 
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Prosody cues can also provide the basis for weak inferences about speaker 
meaning, and I consider these in the 'interactional' category. A wide range of 
evaluative inferences related to both types of key were drawn by the judges in 
each of the three studies, and these are considered in the sections which follow. 
9.5.1 Indexical Tokens 
A list of the adjective tokens involved in the description of indexical key are 
presented in Table 9.18. These include evaluations of participant affectual and 
attitudinal orientations. 
Table 9.18 
Tokens Describing Indexical Key 
W- 
Key Terms Study I Study 2 Study 3 Total 
acting 2 2 
angry 1 1 
animated 1 3 1 5 
bored - 5 - 5 
carefree - - 
carried away - - 
cheerful - 1 - 1 
complacent - - 1 
confident - 2 3 
disinterested - 2 - 2 
dreamy - 1 - 1 
drunk - 1 - 1 
dull - 1 - 1 
eager 1 - - 1 
earnest - 1 - 1 
effacing 1 - - 1 
embarrassed 1 2 2 5 
emotional - - 2 2 
excited - - 1 1 
fed up - I - 
1 
_flippant 
1 1 - 2 
forceful - - 1 
1 
friendly 3 3 - 6 
funny - 1 1 
2 
entle - 1 - 
1 
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impatient 2 2 
indignant 2 2 
indulgent 2 2 
inert 1 1 
Oformal 2 1 3 
interested 2 4 6 
irritable 2 2 
jaunty 1 
keen 2 2 
lackadaisical 
laconic 
liven up 
modest st 2 3 
natural 4 6 
nervous 1 
not at ease 
not bored 
not fully natural 
not entle 
not genuinely 
impressed 
not disinterested 
not interested 
not intimate 2 
not pleased 
not posturing 
not relaxed 2 
not sympathetic 2 2 
passive 1 
paternal 2 
pick up 
pissed 
platitudinous 
playful 
polite 
pretty indignant 
quiet 13 13 
relaxed 3 2 2 7 
reticent - 1 - 1 
semi-serious 1 1 
serious 2 
surprised 
su risingly serious 
sym athetic 
tired 
unhappy 
unhelpful 
weary 
Total 29 78 32 139 
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The table includes 74 different tokens, which generated a total of 139 
references. Just over half of this total were elicited in Study 2, where the stimulus 
fragments provided relatively few contextualisation cues. I presume this lack of 
context may have affected the kinds of comment judges made. However, only a 
small group of tokens produced over 5 references or more. These were in 
descending order of number: 
Table 9.19 
Most Frequent Indexical Tokens 
Tokens Number 
quiet 13 
relaxed 7 
friendly 6 
interested 6 
natural 6 
animated 5 
bored 5 
embarrassed 5 
Only one of the tokens from this group (bored') appears in Crystal's (1969) list of 
Twenty labels which he used to try and establish what range of labels native 
speakers would apply to any given intonation pattern. Crystal"s list includes the 
following labels, which were "chosen from general use" (Crystal, 1969: 297): 
excited; dismayed; haughty; puzzled; angry; amused; matter of fact; 
precise; disapproving; pleased; bored; questioning; vexed; apologetic; 
conspiratorial; worried; impatient; satisfied; grim; irritated. 
A further two items ('excited'; and 'angry' - also cited in Rost's list above) 
appeared in the response data, but these only received one reference each. The 
most obvious prosodic effect judges seem to be sensitive to is 'loudness', since 
there were 13 uses of the token 'quiet. More systematic work would have to 
be 
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undertaken, however/ in order to try and determine which other intonation 
contrasts correlate with the tokens that judges provided. The problem, of course, is 
that the interpretations are not always related to specific utterances (cf. the 
interpretive work presented in the following section and in Chapter 10), but are 
ascribed to participant attitudes in a very general way. Crystal (1969) clearly 
recognised this difficulty in his own work when he noted: 
What I consider to be the most important difficulty in the matter of the 
semantic analysis of intonation ... is the problem of which descriptive labels to 
use to refer to the attitudinal effects being signalled by the prosodic and 
paralinguistic complexes. (Crystal, 1969: 294) 
Perhaps a more fruitful line of inquiry would be to consider the labels in terms of 
strategies that are linked to impression management in talk, that is, where 
individuals are considered "'to present themselves in a socially acceptable manner 
(e. g. friendly, polite) or in ways consistent with their ideal selves (e. g. 
independent, knowledgeable)" (Street and Capella, 1985: 252). Third person 
judges could be given sets of tokens derived from studies of the kind that I have 
conducted, and then asked which of them apply to the individuals who have 
participated in the same stimulus data for instance. 
9.5.2 Interactional Tokens 
Evaluations of interactional key involve interpretive responses that describe 
different discourse or goal related effects. Table 9.20 presents the list of 99 tokens 
that were used by judges, and these generated a total of 149 references. 
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Table 9.20 
Tokens Describing Interactional Key 
Key Terms Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
adjective phrases 
accusing tone 1 
affected 2 1 3 
ambiguous 1 - - 1 
amusement - 4 2 6 
anticipation - 1 - 1 
approval 1 - - 1 
artificial - 2 3 
authentic - - 1 
casual 1 2 3 
changes mood - 1 1 
changestone - - 1 
comes out too easily - 
complacent - 
confident - 2 3 
conspiratorial tone - 1 1 
contrived - 1 1 
conversational 2 - 1 3 
cutting - 1 - 1 
despair - 1 
different attitude - 1 
disguised neutrality - 1 
disillusioned 1 - 
dramatic - - 
emotional agreement - 1 
emotionally involved - - 
emphatic - - 
enjoyment - - 
expressionless - 2 2 4 
expression - 1 1 2 
false - 2 - 2 
false modesty - 1 1 
firmer - 
- 3 3 
flat - 2 1 3 
forceful - - 1 
1 
formal 1 1 1 3 
futile - 1 1 
2 
guarded - 1 - 
hasshades 1 - - 
hesitant 2 1 - 3 
humorous 2 1 5 8 
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humourless 2 2 
intimate 2 3 
ironic 
low key 
meaningless 
_ dle class warmth _iWid 
mild sort of modesty 
mock sincerity 
neutral 
no conviction 
no emotional emphasis 
no real emotion 
no surprise 
non-committal- 
non-involved 
non-threatening 
not aggressive 
not common 
not convincing 
not fully natural 
not ringing true 
not s ontaneous 
overdone 
overemphasised 
peculiar 3 
pedantic 
personal 
pleasurable satisfaction 
put more life in 
quite involved 
racy 
restrained excitement 
revelin 
sarcastic delight 
semi-serious 
sense of wonder 
serious 
spontaneous 
stilted 
subterfuge 
superficial 1 
superfluous 
surprisingly emphatic 
tentative 
thoughtless 
throwaway 
traumatic 
uncertain 
unconscious 
underlying assumPtion 1 
understated 
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unease 3 3 
unemphatic 
unimportant 
unsaid 
unspoken agreement 
vague 
vehement 
without conviction 
Total 33 72 44 149 
Many of these references involve glossing work in which judges were able to 
cite particular utterances or topical segments and then offer their own 
interpretations of associated message effects. Examples of this type of interpretive 
work are found in each of the three exploratory studies, and include comments 
such as: 
Study I 
Participant B 
I can't believe it sounds good 
it sounds bloody boring 
there is something tentative and final 
about the way it comes out 
judge 2 
really is ambiguous 
it's not convincing 
it had shades 
Judge 6 
he said bone fide person 
I didn't like it 
it had underlying assumptions 
it was thoughtless 
a throwaway 
Hall introduces the thing by saying 
tell me about your life 
it"s non-involved 
Judge 9 
when he says it sounds good there is approval 
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judge 10 
there is humour when they talk about tax 
there are polite comments like 
oh that looks nice 
judge 13 
he said bona fide person 
it was a serious thing 
about being serious 
The veracity of such evaluations may be checked with the participants, but it 
seems to be the case that different individuals are likely to provide their own 
idiosyncratic interpretations of key, even where the same utterances are cited. 
Compare the rather negative comments of Participant B, who suggests that on 
playback the locution "it sounds good" sounds to him: 'boring"; "tentative; and 
'final'. with those of judge 9 who interprets the same locution in a positive way by 
suggesting that it signals 'approval'. In the same way, judge 6 suggests that the 
phrase "bona fide person" is "thoughtless' and 'a throwaway, while Judge 9 
considers that 'it was a serious thing about being serious'. The substantive 
differences in interpretation here presumably stem from individual and social 
differences in the interpreters themselves. 
The indeterminacy of speaker intent in single utterances and the possibility 
that speaker acts may have more than one intent, or indeed, an ambiguous intent 
is a very complex issue (see, for example, Thomas, 1983). Consequently, I intend to 
deal with the kinds of interpretive multiplexity that are reflected in judges' 
comments separately. It is this issue which forms the basis for discussion in 
Chapter 10, where the nature of lay and professional post hoc inferencing, with 
respect to the same stretches of utterance, are the subject of more detailed analysis. 
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9.6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered information that judges were able to provide 
about the stimulus fragments as goal-oriented activity. This A'supratextual' 
information not only included the types of genre that different exchanges 
involved, but also a wide range of strategies, goals and attitudes that were 
associated with both first and second person interactional praxis (cf. the list of 
listener performance strategies identified by Rost, 1990: 116-117). It is suggested as 
a result that third person judges must have a highly developed interpretive model 
of the communicative procedures and processes that participants can employ 
when language is used in this way. 
Of the three informational domains that I identified from the response data, it 
was this domain (the 'supratextual') that provided by far the largest category of 
comments. A total of 799 evaluative references were coded within the domain, 
based on a wide range of descriptive vocabulary. Presumably the more instances 
of verbal exchange that are used, and the greater the number of judges involved in 
the playback process, the more extensive this vocabulary would prove to be. 
Indeed, it seems to me that the methods which I have presented may be further 
developed in order to provide a lay lexicon and grammar of everyday 
communicative activities. This work could be used for exploring differences in the 
kinds of descriptive token that are used by women as opposed to men judges for 
example, or between individuals from different social backgrounds. It could also 
be used cross-lin uistically to compare the kinds of interpretive work that might 9 
be undertaken across and between the speakers of different languages (cf - Metge 
and Kinloch, 1978; Veronis and Gass, 1985; Knapp et al. 1987; Singh and Lele, 
1989). Are similar strategies and goals manifest in the speech activities of speakers 
)f Maori, or French or Tok Pisin? Do speakers of these languages display similar 
Ittitudes and affectual orientations? 
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While these are questions for future rather than the present research, they 
seem to be worth mooting given the extent and types of response that judges were 
able to provide about the communicative content of the stimulus fragments. The 
issue that remains to be explored in the present work is that of interpretive 
inultiplexity, and it this task that forms the basis of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 10 
THIRD PERSON RESPONSES AND INTERPRETIVE 
MUTLIPLEXITY 
10.0 Professional and Lay Responses 
This chapter synthesises and develops a subset of the material presented 
under different headings in Chapters 7,8 and 9. The material involved is 
taken from analyses of the interpretive responses produced in the course of 
Study 3. An important part of the rationale for using this material was that 
the records, provided by Crystal and Davy (1975), were accompanied by 
"clarifying remarks" (see 5.4). These records are transcribed in ordinary 
orthography with accompanying analyses of the main prosodic features. 
Where Crystal and Davy deem it appropriate,, students referring to the text 
are advised of "important prosodic effects that require elucidation in order 
to clarify what is being signalled". Another important reason for using this 
material is that 'prosody' was the most commonly observed feature in the 
textual domain, and 'key' the most commonly evaluated feature in the 
supratextual domain. 
In this chapter, I want to explore two issues emerging specifically from 
Study 3. These are: 
(a) whether the judges I used as informants would comment on the same 
or similar stretches of utterances and effects, and/or 
(b) match the interpretations of the data given by Crystal and Davy. 
Before undertaking this exploration, I shall briefly summarise the 
investigative method that was used in order to pursue this work (see 
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Section 5.4 above for a fuller account of the approach to data collection used 
in this study. ) 
10.1 Investigative Method 
In Study 3, the chosen extracts were played on different occasions to eight 
pairs of judges as outlined in Chapter 4. The idea of using pairs of 
informants,, rather than single individuals, arose because in previous work 
of this nature,, I thought it possible that my personal involvement with 
individuals might restrict what they had to say. By using pairs of 
informants, I hoped to minimise my influence as analytic observer and thus 
encourage greater spontaneity of comment. 
Each pair of informants were given the following verbal instructions: 
I am going to play you a number of short extracts of talk which have 
been tape-recorded. At the end of each extract, I will switch the machine 
off. If you have any comments to make about the extracts,, I would like 
to note them. 
If clarification of these instructions was requested, I simply explained the 
need not to prejudice the outcome of the research and further assured 
informants that any comments they made would be welcome. 
Whilst comments were noted as far as possible, tape-recordings of each 
session were also made in order to check the accuracy of what was said. 
Transcript records of each set of comments were made in ordinary 
orthography to facilitate a comparison of judges' remarks with the Crystal 
and Davy glosses. The analysis that follows is based on judges' comments for 
each extract in turn. 
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10.2 Extract 1 
The first extract is taken from Crystal and Davy (1975: 22-23). In this extract, 
Crystal and Davy note the importance for interpretation of the following 
prosodic and paralinguistic features in respect of two utterances; both 
utterances are realised by the same speaker. 
Utterance 1 
Leeds 'played SHOCKINGLY worst 'game they Tever PLAYED 
C&D commentary: Note the husky tone of voice indicative of 
disparagement. 
Utterance 2 
OOH I the sea of - Tbodies in front of you T MOVING 
I and people 
'started to PUSH I BE I HIND you I it got I quite FRIGHTENING I cos you 
couldn't have 'done 'anything you'd have been I absolutely THE\LPLESS I 
C&D commentary: Note the extra prosodic features as C gets more 
involved in his story, marked glissando movement, and increasing 
speed towards the end. 
The following comments,, in respect of these two utterances, were 
produced in the response data. 
Pair 1 
shockingly really stood out 
yeah 
it sounded really affected 
it was the way he said it 
shockingly 
In both realisations of the word "shockingly', the judge attempted an 
itation of the original. A fuller prosodic and paralinguistic analysis of the 
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utterance concerned reveals that 'shockingly' carries: (a) a wide falling 
nuclear tone, (b) receives a high booster at onset, (c) is drawled on the first 
syllable and (d) has the paralinguistic feature "husky". A comparison of the 
imitations with the model utterance is interesting in terms of the features by 
which the judges realised it. The nature of the glosses, and the fact of the 
imitation,, suggest that the co-occurrence of prosodic and paralinguistic 
features in the original utterance is intentional, that is, both in respect of the 
signalling the speaker's intentions and his determination to gain the 
attention of his audience. Notice too that one of the pairing also makes a 
bare judgement about the effect of this realisation, at least. from her own 
point of view ("it sounded really affected"). This comment may be compared 
to the remarks of the second pair of judges in respect of the second 
utterance. Pair 1, by the way, made no reference to the second utterance and 
Pair 2 made no reference to the first. 
Pair 2 
all those people 
and it got quite frightening 
didn't sound natural at all 
Perhaps this remark is responding to what C&D note as "C getting more 
involved in his story", though to what extent we could claim that the extra 
prosodic features are integral to the interpretation 'non-natural sounding' is 
problematic. However, we can speculate that since one of the judges in the 
first pairing considered that "shockingly' sounded affected and at a different 
point one of the judges from the second pairing judged that what was said 
did not sound natural, the comments offered are presumably based on the 
relative quality of these notions based on judges' own interactional 
experience, either real or imagined. 
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How judges apply the nature of this experience in making the 
evaluations that they did is not obvious, but suggests the use of some kind 
of inferencing framework which is sociolinguistic ally based. What the 
analyst considers is communicatively significant, for example, may differ 
frorn the judges' sense of what is communicatively significant because of the 
different roles that they fulfil as an 'interpreter'. The comments offered by 
Crystal and Davy must be determined, at least in part, by their sense of what 
it is to be professional linguistic analysts. What they have to say, as a result, 
is likely to be governed by their knowledge of the situation and of the 
individuals whose talk they seek to characterise. 
However, in playback, one of the analysts commented as follows: 
Study 3 (Participants) 
Judge B 
one guy almost in spite of the other 
was trying to comment factually on the game 
the other one was expressing his reactions 
to overcrowding and so on 
I also still feel that the one of them 
who's commenting emotionally on it 
although he uses one or two emotional terms 
and expressive locutions 
gets across a lot of his meaning 
by exaggerated intonation patterns 
he seems more excitable about the whole thing 
These comments are worth comparing with those of Pair 3 who seem to 
make very similar points about the emotional (key) involvement of the 
participant concerned (see Section 9.5.1). This pair also noted a difference in 
interactional behaviour between the participants. They said: 
Pair 3 
a guy who was trying to make a point kept saying 
it was really quite frightening 
it was like talking to somebody who wasn't 
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really listening 
he kept repeating things 
they're talking about Chelsea and Leeds 
he didn't sound so pleased about it 
he said Leeds played shockingly 
like he had an interest in it 
he was quite vehement about it when 
he said Leeds played shockingly 
at one point it seems that they're not talking 
about the same thing 
one guy is talking about the gates 
and the other is talking about the sea of bodies 
the second guy is quite sympathetic 
and doesn't seem to know what it is like 
the other guy has kind of experienced it all 
While these comments report in part what was actually said, they also 
involve comments that are imposed upon the data. The first member of the 
pairing suggests that "it was like talking to somebody who wasn't really 
listening". The second member guesses that the speaker had "an interest"' in 
the way in which Leeds played and whilst one of the speakers is judged to be 
quite sympathetic" to the story that is being related, he does not "seem to 
know what it was like". The speaker's interlocutor,, on the other hand, is 
sensed as having "kind of experienced it all". These attributions of speaker 
involvement are remarkable because they also seem to match the C&D 
gloss. 
C&D, for example, note "disparagement" in C's tone of voice. Compare' 
the sense of "displeasure" and emotional content,, with respect to the topic 
Of conversation, reported by the judges. Though "vehement" goes rather 
beyond the notion of "'disparagement", the adjective does suggest that the 
utterance concerned has been invested with a particular emotional stance. 
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Indeed, Cs "sense of involvement" (C&D) is clearly established for at least 
one of the judges in the pairing because he is described as "if he's kind of 
experienced it all". 
These comments may be compared with those offered by the fourth 
pairing who were both to describe the communicative effect of 'shockingly'. 
Pair 4 
he was definitely posh when he said shockingly 
I wouldn't have said that 
I thought he was a Northerner 
The nature of these comments is worth comparing with Pair 1 ("It 
sounded affected, ") and Pair 5 below ("I loved his expression of the word 
shockingly. It sort of represented upper bourgeoisie middle class"). The 
reactions of the judges here suggest a degree of sociolinguistic stereotyping 
which may relate to the backgrounds of the judges concerned (see 8.5.2). All 
three judges who remarked on the varietal "affectedness" of 'shockingly' 
came from London. Of these three, the informants from Pair 1 and Pair 4 
were both speakers of Cockney or localised London speech, whilst the 
informant from Pair 5 was an RP speaker. The second member of Pair 4, 
who contradicted the judgement offered by her partner, came from 
Southport on Merseyside. In terms of accuracy, it is the notion of 
"northerness" which comes closest to identifying the region of origin of the 
speaker. Crystal and Davy (1975: 19) inform us, "C is a primary school 
teacher, who has lived in Berkshire for many years, but whose accent has 
remained predominantly that of his county origin, Yorkshire". This 
information also gives C's occupation as primary school teacher, which 
presumably does not generally carry the stereotypes of "poshness" or indeed 
// upper bourgeoisie middle class". Since the judges who made these 
statements did not know the individual(s) concerned, the attribution of 
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non-linguistic information of this kind has to be based purely on guess 
work. The guesses, as in this case, are often wrong but indicate the 
willingness of judges to generalise about who and what the speakers are. It is 
perhaps interesting to note that the judge who attributes a negative class 
stereotype to the speaker was in fact a social worker and may have been 
reflecting her own personal /professional judgemental norms in assessing C 
as she does. 
However, despite the disagreement between the members of Pair 4, they 
do seem to concur in their assessment that there was something "'odd" 
about the realisation of 'shockingly'. Their response to the second utterance, 
'it got quite frightening', is comparable to the remarks made by Pair 2 about 
the same utterance (cf. Pair 2, "it got frightening didn't sound natural at all" 
and Pair 4, "quite frightening sounded quite artificial"). The artificiality, in 
this case, is attributed to a stylistic rather than varietal source. One 
informant from Pair 4 explained, "quite frightening actually sounded quite 
artificial, as if he was reading it rather than speaking". The notion of 
/ naturalness' was also implicit in the remarks made by Pair 5 about the 
realisation of 'shockingly'. 
Pair 5 
1 loved his expression of the word shockingly (imitated) 
it sort of represented upper bourgeoisie middle class 
yes 
it's inflected 
shockingly (imitated) 
mm 
he certainly emphasises the word 
doesn't he 
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While the speaker is judged to be marking the utterance in some fairly 
obvious way for both these judges, the markedness is not specified as being 
'disparaging' as C&D suggest. 
Indeed, Pair 5 were to further contradict the glosses offered by C&D and 
who consider that the extra prosodic markers here are indicative of 'greater 
involvement". Pair 5 said: 
Pair 5 
he was talking about a situation 
which he considered frightening 
and yet there didn't seem to be any real emotion 
This remark would seem to suggest that the set of cues marking 
"involvement" are not only to be interpreted from C&D's point of view. 
Perhaps then, C&D's gloss is based on something more than the 
interpretation of the features specified in their analysis. 
10.3 Extract 2 
The second extract was taken from Crystal and Davy (1975: 40). The utterance 
that C&D comment on is realised by Speaker A. 
OH I it was RE I VOLTING oh they were TTERRIBLE I the 
I PIGS I they 
made aI dreadful Trow in the TMORNING 
C&D commentary: Glissando pitch movement is very expressive of 
A's intense feelings here. It occurs at various places during the extract. 
Judges' comments reveal that four out of the seven pairs were to describe 
A's contribution as 'excited'. In so far as 'excitement' may be thought of as 
'intense feeling', there is general agreement with the glOss provided by the 
analysts 
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Pair 1 
there's a sense of excitement 
it gets faster as she gets carried away 
it's very animated 
While Pair 1 link this sense of "excitement' to the effect it has on the 
speaker's 'speed" of delivery, Pair 3 attribute the 'excitement' to exocentric 
strategies that are used to establish and maintain positive face (see 9.4-3). 
Pair 3 
it's the sort of tone of voice you use 
where you're trying to engage people 
you know 
you are trying to interest 
excitement in her voice made it seem 
as if it was going to be terribly amusing 
but it never really finished 
For this pair, prosody would seem to be salient in helping to signal that 
the speaker, on the one hand, is 'trying to engage' and 'trying to interest' her 
audience and that on the other, she is preparing to tell 'an amusing story'. 
Notice that the second judge is prepared to evaluate the communicative 
success of the story telling by remarking that "'it seemed as if it were going to 
be terribly amusing but it never really finished". This evaluation is 
presumably based on the judge's notion of what constitutes the successful 
telling of an 'amusing' narrative (see 9.1.1-9.1-2). 
The comments of Pair 4 and Pair 6 are comparable to those offered by 
Pair I and Pair 3 respectively. Both Pair 4 and Pair 6 remarked that the sense 
of 'excitement' was linked to a perceived increase in speed. 
Pair 4 
it's a racy sort of exciting delivery 
she sort of gabbles it out 
it's fastly said 
bubbly 
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The nature of A's delivery is, however, further evaluated by one of the 
judges from Pair 6 as "a very immature kind of speech". Indeed, her speech 
style is evaluated as "lecturing', because she is interpreted as 'trying to hard 
to interest' her audience (see 9.1.1). 
Pair 6 
it's a very immature kind of speech 
she sounded as if she was giving a lecture 
and was trying too hard to get their interest 
More detailed prosodic analysis of the utterance in question reveals that 
there is considerable speech variation to 'allegro' as well as a step up in 
pitch. The 'widened' pitch range with the feature "glissando', mentioned by 
C&D, would seem to account for the following remarks which relate to the 
extract in general. 
Pair 7 
she uses different expressions in her voice 
and emphasises some things 
she is laughing kind of playfully 
as if she is sort of excited by it 
The notion of 'playful humour" can be compared with the remarks of 
Pair 3 who said "it seemed as if it were going to be terribly amusing but it 
never really finished". Pair 5 also report 'humour, but this is related to the 
nature and quality of the speaker's voice as much as anything else (see 7.1.2). 
Pair 5 
there is a kind of lightness in her voice 
and a definite raising in pitch 
it was a very speedy delivery 
suggestive of humour 
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Again the communicative effect of these features seems to be open to 
interpretation, though judges' comments were not always evaluative. One 
judge from Pair 2, for example, simply observed: 
Pair 2 
her voice pitch ranged very widely 
The comments given for this extract indicate something of the judges' 
ability to not only describe the kind of prosodic criteria that may be of 
salience for listeners in interpreting the talk of others (cf. the vocabularies 
that are discussed in 7.1.2), but also their willingness to evaluate the 
communicative effect of the utterance. Different inferences are obviously 
likely to be made about different kinds of exchange and the nature and detail 
of comments offered would seem to be partially determined by what judges 
found to be of interest in the exchanges they listened to. We must therefore 
consider both what judges did and did not say about the extracts they 
listened to as is clear from their remarks about the third exchange in the 
series. 
10.4 Extract 3 
Extract three was taken from Crystal and Davy (1975: 41). Crystal and 
Davy comment on two utterances taken from this exchange. The first 
utterance with accompanying commentary is as follows: 
Utterance I 
Enfield's enTvironTmental STUDY 'centre 
C&D commentary: Note that B pronounces the noun phrase Enfield's 
environmental study centre with a mock refined accent, perhaps 
because she feels she has introduced a note of academic formality into 
the conversation. 
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The second utterance is realised later in the extract and is spoken by B. 
Utterance 2 
I this large slobbering PIG I was al I lowed OUT I-I into the MUD I 
C&D commentary: An expressive description, with tempo variation 
playing the main part in producing the effect (note especially the clipped 
syllable in mud). 
The 'mock refined accent' which Crystal and Davy describe is not 
referred to by the judges as such. Perhaps this is because of different regional 
norms relating to the stereotyping of particular varieties; though recall the 
comment of Pair 4 and Pair 5 about speaker A in the first extract. C&D seem 
to be suggesting that the speaker on this occasion affects a hypercorrection of 
her own variety in order to ""introduce a note of academic formality". The 
comments which were given about the speaker do not specifically mention 
the hypercorrection but they do suggest regional and class stereotypes that 
are judged to characterise her speech (see 8.5.2). 
Three pairs of judge were to attribute prestige or status to the variety. 
They were Pair 1, who came from London and Bradford (Yorkshire), Pair 6, 
who came from Banbury (Oxfordshire) and Edmonston (Nottinghamshire) 
and Pair 7, who came from London and Macclesfield (Cheshire). All of these 
judges used localised rather than RP varieties of English. Their comments 
were: 
Pair 1 
1 get that middle class aura about it 
there isn't much accent 
I'd say it was Southern 
Pair 6 
she is much more genteel in speech 
than the other two - 
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there is almost no dialect at all 
very little inflection 
Pair 7 
this is the aspiring middle class I think 
they have got quite a high status 
there are traces of background 
it sounded pretty middle class 
Midlands 
middle of the road 
they have some intellectual status 
The kind of stereotyping these comments reflect has no doubt as much 
to do with other features of the exchange (phonological, syntactic,, lexical) as 
it has to do with non-segmental features but they are no less interesting for 
that. I draw attention to the remarks of Pair 1 and Pair 6 in particular because 
of how they attempt to locate the speaker in terms of regional origin (see 
Section 8.5.2-1). The judge from Bradford comments "there isn't much 
accent". Establishing where the speaker comes from is consequently 
problematic and the judge applies the general label "Southern' in contrast to 
her own speech of 'Northern'. The other judge from Pair 6 said "there is 
very little dialect at all, very little inflection". This judge came from 
Cheshire. His perception of dialect is presumably taken as a measure of the 
fact that the speaker concerned is using a variety which he finds difficult to 
try and localise. The judge goes on to suggest that the lack of dialect can be 
accounted for at least in part by the relative lack of inflection in the voice. To 
what extent the judge is relating this perception to his own use of non- 
segmental phonology is unclear (the degree of intonational variation 
between judge and speaker were not that marked to my ears). However, the 
judge had spent the last two years of his life in Newcastle upon Tyne and it 
is possible that his judgement was based on a comparison with Tyneside 
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speech where he might have perceived much more inflectional variety than 
in the South. 
Compare now the comments of the judge from Pair 7 who characterised 
the variety as "'Midlands, middle of the road". This judgement is wrong, 
since the speaker came from Liverpool (Crystal and Davy, 1975: 39). 
However, the other participant was in fact from the Midlands. As a result, 
the judge may have assumed that they both originated from the same area, 
an area which he was not unfamiliar with, since he came from Maclesfield 
in Cheshire. 
These attempts to specify the speakers regional background seem to be 
closely related to other non-linguistic information that is provided by the 
same three pairs of judges. The speaker is judged to be 'genteel' (Pair 6) and 
'aspiring middle class', and "pretty middle class. Pair 1 suggest that the 
exchange has that 'middle class aura" about it. Regional background and 
socio-economic status are further associated with stereotypes of prestige (Pair 
7). The speakers are judged to have 'quite high status', they have 'traces of 
background', and 'some kind of intellectual status'. The social-psychological 
attitudes that may have prompted this assessment appear to be shared by the 
three pairs. The six judges involved were all University students and some 
kind of group norm may be being exhibited here. However, the extent to 
which such non-linguistic information is central to what goes on in some 
particular interaction is uncertain, and has not received as much attention. 
as that fact that British people tend to derive such information about their 
interlocutors as a natural consequence of our everyday behaviour. Speaker 
A is described by C&D as "a housewife". The other female participant was 
also "a housewife who does some primary teaching". The two male 
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participants were the spouses of the women and are both university teachers 
(see Section 8.5.2-2). 
The second utterance that C&D comment on concerns the description of 
pigs and prompts them to describe the speakers realisation as 'expressive/. 
The tempo variation which they mention was remarked upon by one judge. 
He said: 
Pair 1 
it was a bit slow 
with some bits slower than others 
Another judge described the utterances as a very dramatic presentation. This 
sense of drama was shared by one other judge, who proposed that the 
speaker was using non-linguistic cues. She commented: 
Pair 5 
I think I imagine her using her hands a lot 
when she said large pig 
I could imagine her saying how big it was 
A different interpretation was supplied by Pair 7: 
Pair 7 
again she was trying to impress people 
with her wit with her way of saying things 
like her emphasis on the words mud and pig 
This interpretation is linked to the status enhancing strategy of 'trying to 
impress' (see 9.4.3). 
10.5 Extract 4 
Extract 4 is taken from C&D (1975: 59). The commentary for this extract 
involves the use of a single word which is used twice in the exchange with 
different degrees of stress and a falling tone. 
397 
THOWEVERI 
C&D commentary "however": used to indicate a return to the main 
theme. 
The use of 'however' was remarked upon by the five out of the seven 
pairs of non-participant judges (see 7.2.1). 
Pair 1 
however receives emphatic stress 
she just dismisses his argument 
and his interruptions 
however (imitated) 
as if she wasn't going to listen to him any more 
These comments suggest that in communicative terms., the judges 
interpret the effect of "however" as an intentional strategy to 'dismiss' or 
'ignore' the speaker's interruption (see Section 9.3). It is not only that the 
speaker is held to be dismissive, but also that she seems determined to 
maintain her turn even at the expense of ignoring her interlocutors. The 
same communicative effect is suggested by Pair 2 who said: 
Pair 2 
I noticed the way she said however 
whenever somebody did interrupt her 
she just continued 
and said however 
and then just continued 
she didn't want her flow to be interrupted 
For this pair the speaker is judged to use the word 'however' as a means of 
revoking any attempt to take over her turn and also to indicate that she does 
not wish to be interrupted. In order to hold the floor she has to dismiss any 
attempt to take over the turn space. She does this by 'chopping him off at the 
knees' (Participant Judge B); 'refusing to listen' (Pair 4) and by 'refusing to be 
sidetracked' (Pair 5). 
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judge B 
the most striking thing is the way 
she cuts the other chap off 
who is her husband 
she really chops him off at the knees 
and shuts him up 
like a wittering academic 
Pair 4 
every time he tried to interrupt 
she kept going 
she kept saying however 
she is not going to listen to him 
however she says (imitated) 
Pair 5 
there again you've got this woman telling the story 
and she's not prepared to give in on the story 
despite various comments 
which could sidetrack her from the discussion 
she seems to be ignoring them 
a couple of times she just sort of talked over him 
The use of "however"' is also interpreted as a means of signalling the 
speaker's determination to continue her turn and that she will continue 
until she decides to relinquish it (see 9.3.1). Pair 3,4, and 7 commented: 
Pair 3 
earlier on where he says 
the whole place will be over run with mice 
she cuts him off with however 
every time he tried to interrupt her 
she just kept going 
her husband tries to get in a few times 
and is summarily dismissed 
The strategy 'dismiss" or 'ignore' is achieved in a number of different 
ways according to these comments. It is achieved by 'refusing' to yield the 
turn; thus the speaker can continue talking and actively rebut attempts to 
take over the turn slot. It can be achieved by 'ignoring' attempts to take over 
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the turn slot, and it can be achieved by intimating that the turn slot is not 
negotiable. The difficulty for the analyst is to decide which of these strategies 
is most likely to have led to the communicative sequence that resulted. 
Comments such as the above may help to establish which assessment is 
more likely. As analysts, we do not have to be right, but perhaps more 
circumspect in the analyses we offer. 
C&D also comment on the communicative key that is used by A later in 
the same extract. 
I'm st- I'm I being FACTUAL DAVID 
C&D commentary: Note the effect of the level tone as the second 
element of a compound tone: a 'warning' is introduced into the 
dialogue. A presumably wants to get on with the story, and not be side- 
tracked into a point of detail: the tone is one of mild irritation. 
As one of the authors, Crystal intimates that he was a participant in this 
particular exchange and reports that 'a warning' is introduced into the 
dialogue because he recognises the speakers tone from previous 
interactions. 
Both Participant judges commented on this segment as follows: 
Judge A 
it sounds as if she is being very factual 
which is what she er said to him 
that she was being absolutely factual 
Judge B 
yeah you can urn 
you can visualise the situation from 
the detail she gives 
Judge A 
mm 
400 
judge B 
which is very precise in accounting 
one particular story 
Although the speaker's attitude was not mentioned by this pairing, her 
strategic behaviour is interpreted as being strongly dissociative ('she chops 
him off at the knees; 'she shuts him up'). Presumably, it is this behaviour 
that leads to the characterisations "a battleaxe" (Participant B) and "a rather 
fearful woman to encounter" (Participant A). These comments strike me as 
being very similar in kind to those offered by one of the non-participant 
judges from Pair 5 who said: 
Pair 5 
the thing that struck me 
was the way she dictated the conversation 
she was a bit kind of women's lib 
However, rather than 'mild irritation, the non-participant judges 
tended to suggest that As attitude was more emotively marked. Compare: 
Pair 2 
she sounds indignant 
the man kept trying to break in 
and contradict her 
she kept just not listening 
and carrying on 
which is infuriating for a person 
the man had no control over her irritated burst 
The indexical key here is judged to be 'indignant, although like the 
participant evaluations the supraxtextual strategies (see Section 9.4.1) are 
clearly interpreted as dissociative ('trying to break in; 'contradict; 'not 
listening'; 'carrying on'). The consequences of these strategies for the 
exchange are that speaker's interlocutor is viewed as having "'no control 
over her irritated burst". The key of 'indignation' is also reported by Pair I 
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Pair 3 
she was very indignant with the bloke 
and keen to get on with the story 
The notion that she is "keen to get on with the story" provides evidence in 
support of C&D's claim that she is "not going to be sidetracked into a point 
of detail". 
Pair 4 use the adjectives 'excited', 'nagging', and "dogmatic' rather than 
'indignation", and the speaker is evaluated as someone who "definitely 
knows that she wants". 
Pair 4 
her voice gets more excited 
when he starts interrupting 
she sounded nagging really 
she makes it more dogmatic 
she definitely knows what she wants 
and what she wants is to get on with her story 
Pair 5 suggest that the tone stems from habit of story-telling, and that she 
treats her audience like children. 
Pair 5 
it sounds to me as if she has told the story 
several times 
it's almost as if she is telling a bedtime story 
to the children 
they are going to listen and that is that 
While Pair 6 suggest that as part of the detailed account she provides, the 
speaker is "trying to get over the point very forcefully". 
Pair 6 
she seemed to be trying to get over the point 
very forcefully 
she gives a very detailed account of what 
the mice were doing 
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What is being described in this type of comment seems to me to be directly 
associated with the speakers interactional goals (see Section 9.4). 
10.6 Extract 5 
The fifth extract was taken from Crystal and Davy (1975: 75) and involved 
the following exchange. The utterance that is glossed by C&D was realised by 
Speaker B. 
AA 
OH I but II "DO believe in FAIRIES 
C&D commentary: The louder and slower pronunciation signals the 
quotation. 
The participant pairing commented as follows: 
Participant B 
it struck me as sounding very natural 
like um natural story telling 
there's no sense that shes playing for effect 
it's all being done in a natural story-telling 
kind of way 
Participant A 
that's right 
even to when she imitates the um 
the Susie voice 
Four of the non-participant pairs also commented on the realisation of 
this utterance. Pair 1 observed the use of 'emphasis' and 'repetition'. 
Pair 1 
she was very emphatic 
when she was repeating the story 
and what the little girl said 
Pair 2, on the other hand, considered that the speaker's use of intonation 
was 'excessive', but deliberately so in order to render an imitation of a child's 
voice. 
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Pair 2 
she was excessive in her use of intonation 
she uses it mainly to imitate the child 
oh but I do she says (imitated by the judge) 
Pair 5 thought the key was 'expressive' rather than 'excessive'. 
Pair 5 
there is more expression in her voice 
when she imitates the child 
it's very expressive 
when she changes her tone 
it's not just the tone though 
it's just the way she emphasises things 
There was some disagreement about whether the speaker intended the 
imitation. Participant Judge A, for example, considered that the speaker was 
being 'natural' and 'unaffected'. 
Judge B 
it struck me as sounding very natural 
like um natural story telling 
there's no sense that she's playing for effect 
it's all being done in a natural story-telling 
Pair 6, by way of comparison, suggest that the imitation is intentional 
because it is marked stylistically. The effect of the imitation is judged as 
being 'self-indulgent'. 
Pair 6 
it's a story telling voice. 
she really loves story telling. 
she establishes an effect upon the audience 
I do believe in fairies (imitated) 
yes 
she becomes emotionally involved with it 
it"s also a very indulgent way of speaking 
she talks very indulgently about the child 
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A more detailed analysis of the utterance reveals that it is not only 
slower and louder but also makes use of wide fall rises, extra strong stress on 
do and is accompanied by the paralinguistic features 'whisper I/ 
'tremulousness' and 'giggle'. The effect of these features is judged to be 
'greater emotional involvement" and the fact that speaker is adjudged to be 
using a story telling voice. This voice is evaluated in terms of those qualities 
that are perceived to be good story telling. Individual taste and/or preference 
would seem to be the determining factor here and the speaker is evaluated 
both positively and negatively in this regard. (cf. the comments of Pair 1 and 
Pair 5 with those of Pair 2 and Pair 6). What is of salience for C&D on the 
other hand is not so much the qualities of the speaker as a story teller, but 
the fact that she uses specific features to indicate that she is now 'quoting' 
what was actually said for narrative purposes (see 
10.7 Extract 6 
The final extract judges were asked to listen to was taken from Crystal and 
Davy (1975: 78) in which C&D comment on the following utterance. 
NO I but you I KNOW what I MEAN Ii it to I ME I it's I ALWAYS been a 
con'fession of 'failure I 
C&D commentary: Note the change in speed as C tries to make a 
serious point. 
The change in speed was not noted by any of the non-particip ants. % 
However, the speaker's attempts to make a serious point drew the attention 
and comments of three pairs of judges. Pair 1 said: 
Pair 1 
having talked about beer and sex 
they go back to the argument again 
they say no but seriously 
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reinforcing the fact that Ive thought about this for years 
This comment is notable because either the judge has misheard what was 
said, the quotation does not match the actual words used/ or the judge is 
interpreting the message effect of C's locution as "now I am being serious". 
The speakers change of attitude is also linked to the change in the topic of 
conversation: 
Pair 1 
having talked about beer and sex 
they go back to the argument again. 
Pair 4 suggest that the speaker makes use of a status enhancing strategy 
('give off very high flown ideas') in order to satisfy his goal of 'achieving 
agreement' (see Section 9.4.2). 
Pair 4 
he's giving off very high flown ideas 
he wants others to agree with him 
A very similar interpretation is offered by Pair 6, but notice the speaker is 
interpreted as having achieved his goal. 
Pair 6 
he is trying to come over as the educated 
opinion on these things 
and his mates agree with him 
Given the number of possible functions of the utterance suggested here, 
the problem facing the analyst is to decide what function is most operative 
at the time of utterance. Is the speaker 'giving off high flown ideas'? Is he 
'trYing to come across as the educated opinion'? Is he 'attempting to make a 
serious point'? The fact that these possibilities arise, seems to merit serious 
consideration. Indeed, any theory of utterance interpretation has to take 
these differences in interpretation into account if the interactional and 
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communicative functions of everyday language use are to be more fully 
understood. 
10.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
By presenting the interpretive comments of third person judges and 
comparing them with the conceptualisations offered by C&D, I want to 
highlight the problem of interpretation that I introduced in Chapter 13. In 
the absence of an adequate framework for providing such' 
conceptualisations, and without other supporting evidence, it seems to me 
that the analyst will always run the risk of falsifying or simplifying the data. 
One must take great care to distinguish between participant and non- 
participant perspectives in this regard, however, as I intimated earlier (see 
3-3). 
Participants can always seek ratification of what has been said or what 
has been understood, but this possibility does not exist for third persons. In 
attributing the kinds of information that they did, it is also important to 
remember that judges' comments may only involve a low level frame 
analysis of what was believed to be going on. While the ways in which 
participant judges assess these possibilities is difficult to ascertain, the use of 
playback enables something of these possibilities to be explored from a post 
hoc perspective. 
What seems to be evident from the commentaries is that different 
interpretations about the communicative content of verbal exchange are 
quite normal. These differences partially stem from the fact that it is 
impossible to draw judges into the same interpretive framework without 
directing their attention in some artificial and predetermined way. But even 
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hen it might be argued that judges were attending to the same or similar 
retches of the fragment, different interpretations of partkular utterance 
! gments were often provided. I offer the following possible reasons as to 
hy these differences might occur. 
First, it is possible that contextualisation cues are differently ranked with 
ýspect to one another by different judges. Second, it is possible that such 
jes are differently interpreted as to their cooccurrence. Third, it is possible 
iat their communicative effects are differently 'understood'. And finally, 
iese differences in interpretation must surely be related to the individual 
rid social differences that exist between judges. The differences I have in 
tind include: 
(a) judges" familiarity with the participants used in the stimulus material; 
(b) varying regional and social norms concerning the perception and 
attribution of different stereotypes across and between judges (e. g. 
social networks, education, status, sex); 
(c) varying social and psychological histories (e. g. judges' age, sex, socio- 
economic background) 
(d) different interpretations of the investigative task, in terms of judges 
expectations about what I wanted them to say; 
(e) the relative willingness of judges to comment at all, whether on the 
basis of stereotype memory or invention; 
(f) differences in informant roles and analytic knowledge between lay and 
professional judges. 
ýere is also the possibility raised by Labov and Fanshel (1977: 46) who note: 
In our view, the lack of clarity or discreteness in the intonational 
signals is not an unfortunate limitation of this channel, but an essential 
and important aspect of it. Speakers need a form of communication that 
is deniable. 
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if "one routinely presumes on mutual understanding that doesn't quite 
exist", as Goffman (1976: 261) assumes, then great care needs to be taken in 
any kind of interpretive work that involves the study of everyday verbal 
communication. What this care involves is presumably the recognition of 
talk as an ostensive-inferential process, a process that enables participants to 
present and negotiate their social and communicative goals. Given the 
interpretive differences that I have presented in this chapter, the role of the 
listener has to be incorporated as a crucial part of this process. This role can 
only be satisfactorily explored in the context of a sociolinguistics which 
incorporates a theory of listener effect, and the kinds of interpretive 
diversity that can result. 
CHAPTER11 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
11.0 A Brief Retrospective 
The research that I have presented in this thesis has sought to investigate ordinary 
members' descriptions about what is communicated when language is used in 
everyday verbal communication. Such an investigation has required a 
methodology that is significantly different from other linguistic and sociolinguistic 
traditions which seek to investigate everyday language use, and consequently was 
based on an approach that deals directly with issues arising from the ability of 
speakers to interact. The methodology used for this purpose was based on third 
person descriptions of actual verbal encounters that were elicited in the course of 
/ playback". These descriptions were then used to generate hypotheses about the 
kinds of interpretive capacity that judges must have utilised in order to provide 
the descriptions. 
Following a general introduction, Chapter 2 began by reviewing 
contemporary developments in the study of talk which have argued for the 
recognition of verbal communication as (a) an inferential process, and (b) action- 
oriented behaviour, that is, behaviour which is purposively organised in the 
pursuit of communicative goals or ends. It is now widely accepted that human 
language is only useful or practical to the extent that it ministers to such goýls, but 
the problem for analysts is that what gets communicated cannot be recovered 
directly as language is being used, because talk is embedded in oral sequences 
that are automatic, context and time bound. 
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The methodological challenge of exploring the communicative process was 
therefore taken up in Chapter 3, where systematic investigation of third person 
interpretive capacity, and especially that of ordinary members, was called for as 
part of the investigative armoury that would-be-analysts might call upon in order 
to warrant claims about what speakers might be said to be doing as talk is in 
progress. To this end, modern electronic technology has provided a mechanism 
whereby talk can be recorded and inspected post hoc. However, although a great 
many examples of conversational exchange have been collected, transcribed and 
analysed in such a way as to provide information about the management and 
structure of verbal communication as a collaborative achievement, particularly in 
the framework of conversation analytic and social psychological approaches to the 
study of talk (see, for example, Roger and Bull, 1989), the need to model this 
achievement from an integrated sociolinguistic perspective seems to be have been 
overlooked, as the work of scholars such as John Gumperz (1982a, 1982b) and 
Coupland, Coupland and Giles (1991), for instance, have suggested. 
Since such achievement is not normally, or always readily, the subject of 
conscious recall by ordinary members, the present study has sought to investigate 
different interpretive responses to what is communicated in various 
decontextualised fragments of talk, where the responses in question have been 
elicited from different individuals, under the conditions described in Chapter 4. 
Three studies, based on the post hoc interpretive perspectives of participant 
and non-participant listener judges who took part in the research, were presented 
in Chapter 5. The data from these studies was then used to examine the nature 
and scope of judges' interpretive responses, by making the responses themselves 
the object of study. Perhaps a weaknesses of this approach is the fact that judges 
were asked to listen to fragments of decontextualised talk. This is a criticism 
levelled by Grimshaw (1990b: 590-91) who suggests that had the judges received 
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rnore information, "including contexts of text and of situation", they would have 
been able to provide "more principled reports and interpretations". I am not sure 
whether the reports would have been any more "principled, but appreciate 
Grimshaw"s point that the nature of the comments and their informational focus 
inay have differed in type and detail. 
In Chapter 6, an analytic instrument for describing and comparing the 
responses was devised. Three descriptive categories or domains were identified 
across the response data, with each containing its own distinctive vocabulary. 
These were: 
the textual domain used to categorise statements about surface linguistic 
features of the fragments that judges listened to; 
(2) the contextual domain used to characterise statements about extralinguistic 
features about the scene and the participants; 
(3) the supratextual domain used to characterise statements about 
communicative genres and practice. 
In Chapters 7,8 and 9 where the main results of the investigation are reported, 
judges' vocabularies within each of these domains was examined. On the basis of 
the information that they provide,, it was argued that individuals must resort to 
linguistic and social resources in order to make sense of communicative events 
previously seen. Chapter 10 focussed on discrepancies between analyst and 
participant interpretation. The presentation of the results in Chapters 7,8 and 9 
made use of the distinction between "observations', 'evaluations' and 
'judgements'. These distinctions were used to make comparisons across and 
between the types of interpretation provided in each domain. The results of this 
work can be illuminatingly summarised in terms of the distinction that Robinson 
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(1979) makes between "knowing how to do something' linguistically and 
'knowing that' which I discuss below. 
11.1 Knowing How and Knowing That 
The distinction between 'knowing how to' and 'knowing that' is summarised by 
(Robinson, 1979: 218) as follows: 
We can know how to do things without being able to express this 
knowledge verbally: that we know how to do something does not entail that 
we know how to talk about how we do it. Conversely, we may be able to 
represent knowledge verbally without being able to exploit it in experiment 
or in real life. We can know how without 'that' and we can know that without 
'how'. Knowing that means being able to talk accurately about a matter. 
Knowing how to means being able to achieve something through action of 
some kind. 
In order to provide the kinds of commentary that were elicited in the work which 
I conducted, it seems to me that judges demonstrated the ability to interpret the 
communicative behaviour of others on the basis of "knowing how to'. Their ability 
to talk about what they "know' clearly differs from judge to judge, and amongst 
other things is hypothesised as the product of a continuum of individual 
responsiveness to the stimulus fragments and sociolinguistic awareness of who 
was involved in them, and what these individuals might be said to be doing in 
interactional terms. 
The nature of individual responsiveness is not something that one can control 
in an experimental context, however,, unless judgement tasks are pre-established. 
Task demands can structure the behaviour of respondents as Robinson (1979: 217) 
argues. 
The answers that respondents give within the categories established 
for 
them may not reveal how those respondents behave, how they think, or what 
they say in the course of their everyday activities. 
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As far as possible, therefore I tried to avoid constraining how some individual 
might respond to the data fragments I used. The negative side of this strategy is 
that one has to accept whatever responses are given, even where these may be of 
the "I have nothing to say about this" variety. Physiological arousal and 
facilitating factors, such as current affective states and attitudes with respect to the 
experimental situation, are likely to be important elements in determining the 
nature of third person behavioural responses to the tape recordings. 
As far as sociolinguistic awareness is concerned, the nature of one's 
interactional experience, including knowledge about different kinds of participant, 
must also have influenced what judges had to say. On many occasions, judges 
clearly base their remarks on prior beliefs and schemas as'evidenced in locutions 
such as: "'it sounded like"; "it reminds me of" etc. The accuracy of their remarks is 
of course another issue (see, for example, Sillars, 1982), but I presume this must 
depend on the degree of repeated familiarity with the activity and on who the 
participants are as Kreckel (1981) suggests. While Kreckel compares family and 
outsider judgements in monitoring different aspects of the speakers verbal and 
non-verbal behaviour, the problem of post hoc interpretation remains, as I 
indicated earlier (see section 2.3). The problem is that as analysts we can never 
recover all the information that the participants shared, as Labov and Fanshel 
(1977) point out. 
Robinson argues that if we accept the usefulness of the distinction between 
knowing how to and knowing that, and if we allow ourselves the luxury of -a 
measure of philosophical innocence, it is probably safe to propose that, in the 
everyday world we experience, 'knowing how to' is ahead of 'knowing that'. One 
reason why knowing that is liable to lag, at least in lay circumstances, is that third 
persons must devise their own technical jargons for talking about matters they 
have not previously had the opportunity to describe and discuss. Not only that 
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but with respect to language and its use, the relative weights of knowing how to 
and knowing that seems to vary greatly from one level of linguistic analysis to the 
next. One might compare in this respect the kinds of vocabulary that were 
provided in the textual ("knowing that') as opposed to supratextual ('knowing 
how to) domains for example. 
The total number of textual vocabularies elicited in the course of each of the 
exploratory studies is presented in Table 11-1. Thirty nine individual tokens were 
identified in the corpus of interpretive responses and these provide a small quasi- 
technical vocabulary for describing the stimulus fragments. A total of 266 
references were generated across the different categories identified in this domain. 
Table 11.1 
Number of Textual Vocabularies 
Number of 
Individual Tokens 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Speech Products 
lexis 4 3 3 10 
prosody 2 13 13 28 
Total 6 16 16 38 
Sequential 
Products 
tum-taking 7 5 8 20 
topic 5 5 3 13 
Total 12 10 11 33 
Total 18 26 27 71 
Table 11.2 presents the total number of supratextual tokens used in each of the 
major analytic categories. There are over six times the number of tokens in this 
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domain as opposed to the textual domain. Four hundred and two individual 
tokens of the supratextual kind were identified and these produced 799 references. 
While there were relatively few tokens of the genre kind, there were a striking 
number of tokens in the praxis category. These included, 89 metalinguistic tokens, 
119 metapragmatic tokens, and 194 tokens used in the description of key. If we 
combine the metalinguistic and metapragmatic tokens under the rubric of 
'strategy', some 208 different tokens of this type were used by judges in the course 
of their evaluations. This number is comparable to the 210 metapragmatic 
categories identified by Kreckel (1981) over five different studies, whose principal 
research focus was the nature of message effects in everyday communicative acts. 
These categories are listed, as they are newly introduced in each of the studies, in 
Appendix A of her book (see Kreckel, 1981: 287-292). 
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Table 11.2 
Number of Supratextual Vocabularies 
Number of 
Individual Tokens 
Study I Study 2 Study 3 Total 
Genre 
activities 2 3 6 11 
units 4 5 7 16 
Total 6 8 13 27 
Praxis 
strategies 58 105 79 242 
key 49 101 66 216 
Total 107 206 14 458 
Total 113 214 158 485 
Compared to lay judges, experts report their interpretations of their 
observations to yield another important layer of reality. It is an important layer 
because it tends to generate a life of its own in the academic community and 
because it can impinge upon the beliefs and behaviour already referred to. Far 
from suggesting that expert frameworks be replaced, I want to propose that 
professional and lay interpretations of talk can be used to complement each other. 
In other words, accounting for 'knowing how to' and 'knowing that' may help to 
lay the foundations for a unified programme of research on human understanding 
from the perspective of ordinary members much as Gumperz (1982a) suggests. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, I propose that two future research paths might 
contribute towards the further development of such a programme. 
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11.2 Applied Concerns and Perspectives 
The first of these concerns the provision of a lexicon and grammar of everyday 
speech events based on the interpretive vocabularies of ordinary language users. 
This could be conducted with respect to a range of different types of judge and as 
many types of talk as one might hope to present. An extension of this work, for 
instance,, could be a cross-cultural study of contextualisation conventions of 
various languages as Lele and Singh (1989) seem to propose: 
Only a cross-cultural analysis of (mis) interpretations by native hearers of 
non-native speakers and non-native hearers of native speakers, and most 
importantly of how or whether these misperceptions entail the same sort of 
consequences, regardless of who is being misunderstood by whom, can help 
us understand what is involved. (Singh and Lele, 1989: 113) 
A second site is the further exploration of participant goals. The perceptions of 
judges that participants are considered to be actively attempting to achieve their 
interactional ends are highly salient in the data. Judges' comments suggest that 
the conversationalists problem is not simply one of making sense of a given chunk 
of discourse; participants must enlist others' cooperation and actively seek to 
create conversational involvement before the process of interpretation can begin. 
The need to understand this process is particularly urgent in the current political 
climate, as Coupland (1988) notes: 
There can be no clearer pragmatic context for language than the nuclear 
threat, which is directly contingent upon reading and second-guessing super 
power discourses of aggression and deterrence. The agenda for a variationist 
discourse analysis is open-ended, and that in itself will force practitioners to 
select social contexts where their analyses will be increasingly recognised as 
an explanatory resource open to the social sciences as a means of accessing 
dynamic processes in the diverse episodes of our lives. (Coupland, 
1988: 17) 
Verbal communication is the human way for human beings to 
deal with 
others, and in it we must surely find a fundamental expression of our 
humanity as 
Labov and Fanshel (1977: 361) suggest. What makes its study challenging, 
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)erplexing and engrossing is that we are all participants in the same practice. A 
3ociolinguistics that takes into account the relationship between the 
[nterpretations people give and the behaviour they exhibit as part of this practice 
can only serve to enhance our understanding of the communicative process, with 
all its richness and complexity, as this investigation has attempted to demonstrate. 
APPENDIX A 
Stimulus Fragment for Study 1 
A 
yeah 
it's all these little knickknacks 
I like them 
they're beautiful 
B 
it's it's a good office 
actually 
A 
it's not bad 
you know 
it looked a little bleak 
when you first came in 
but then I suppose 
B 
yeah 
A 
I think what I need to do is 
is something to the colour of the paint really 
B 
but I'm slowly covering it up 
with as much junk as I can find 
A 
yeah 
I like the little juvenile portraits 
they're good 
aren't they 
B 
they are 
black holes 
that black hole is good 
A 
yeah 
B 
Jane was s 
is that Jane 
eight 
I suppose she is 
yeah 
she eh 
is she was 
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she was having a lift with eh 
eh this bloke 
who had eh 
John Taylor's book 
on black holes 
A 
B 
and she said 
what"s a black hole 
what is a black hole 
and of course 
you know 
I mean 
the book is difficult enough to understand 
A 
B 
but trying to explain it 
to a kid 
A 
B 
I mean 
in a sense it's easy 
you just say it's 
something in space that has 
so much 
energy 
that it sucks everything in 
but you can't see it 
but beyond that 
that's what her notion of a black hole is like 
yeah 
tell me about this Barrat 
Barrat 
A 
well 
B 
place 
is it really as lunatic as it sounds 
A 
oh 
it's absolutely 
mad 
tyW-S 
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mm 
it's it's good fun 
I enjoy it immensely 
uhm well 
I dunno what you know about 
the English language teaching 
scene at the moment 
do you know anything about it 
B 
y mean 
A 
well 
it's still very much of a private business basis 
B 
yeah 
A 
and uhm. 
B 
the schools have to kow tow a little bit 
to Arrels 
which is the association 
of recognised language schools 
but apart from that 
they're just about free agents so 
A 
mm 
B 
at one end of the scale 
you get establishments like Wells Schools 
which are enormous great 
uhm 
fantastically run places 
which cost the earth 
B 
mm 
A 
and you have you know (coughs) 
couple of swimming pools 
and twenty five language labs 
and at the other end of the scale you get 
you get people 
who are really making rip offs 
B 
mm 
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A 
especially with foreign students 
who are getting nothing 
we lie somewhere in the middle 
pretty small place 
about a hundred students (unintelligible) 
B 
residential 
A 
no no 
just a day school 
B 
and they have to find flats 
A 
they've got some accommodation bureau eh 
B 
and where you know 
they farm students out 
that kind of thing 
A 
MM. 
(coughs) sorry about that 
and uhm. 
Barrat 
the principles 
are making a bit of money out of em 
you know 
but it's useful 
A 
and gives me enough (unintelligible) 
I was very cagey about teaching 
but eh 
B 
yeah 
A 
once I got over the first six months 
then I enjoyed it very much indeed 
B 
yeah 
eh 
look 
the little bit of this I've done 
I found it 
I mean 
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yeah 
it's very interesting 
but ultimately 
the whole thing depends on the social relations 
you strike up with students 
I mean 
I was always in one to one situations 
A 
yeah 
B 
which perhaps makes it a bit more dodgy 
but I mean 
really 
all you gotta do 
is convince them that you're a bona fide person 
and they learn anything 
A 
mm 
B 
you know 
A 
it"s all very tongue in cheek (unintelligible) 
B 
yeah 
it doesn't get you anywhere 
I mean 
it doesn't get you anywhere 
it's a kind of 
it's it's 
a total one way process really 
A 
mm (unintelligible) 
B 
you're giving out all the time 
A 
yeah 
eh 
I get home 
and I can't think about anything 
B 
mm 
A 
but gerunds 
and infinitives 
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B 
yeah 
A 
it's 
it's amusing 
B 
oh 
you teach all that stuff 
A 
I mean 
you teach them a bit of metalanguage as well A 
uhm 
B 
you say 
A 
yes 
B 
this is a gerund folks 
A 
yes 
but the accent as much as possible 
is on actually speaking 
rather than the rationale behind it 
B 
mm 
that's what they come for mostly 
it's how to talk 
A 
yeah 
B 
not how to write 
A 
yeah 
a lot of them 
you know 
have been brought up in Iran somewhere 
they say 
I've spent six years on the grammar 
you know 
and they know gerunds backwards 
but they don't how to pronounce them 
B 
yeah 
it sounds good 
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so you're not broke anyway 
A 
well I'll tell you what Ian 
I was better of when I was a student 
there's no question of that 
B 
really 
oh you'll be 
A 
by the time the tax man takes his cut 
and Cambridge is a pretty expensive place to live in anyway 
B 
oh yes 
of course 
you pay tax 
God 
A 
I lost mm 
B 
do you want some sugar 
A 
no thanks Ian 
just straight black 
God 
I spilt some of the stuff 
B 
butyou 
but you can get it back presumably 
most of it 
can you 
APPENDIX B 
Participant Comments for Study 1 
Participant A 
what I have to say is bound to be biased 
because I took part in the exchange 
there is a role relationship 
student stroke supervisor 
it's important 
I was conscious of the situation 
we were not meeting as mates 
it was very much a student supervisor chat 
we have a lot of language in common 
tails offs and that kind of thing 
for example uh dot dot dot cup of coffee 
it's all pretty formal 
up to the point I imitated the Iranian accent 
it was mid way through my career 
I wanted to reprocess my application as a research student 
I was trying to explain 
why I wanted to come back to University 
Ian was trying to make sure of my motives 
the kettle sound makes it difficult 
to recover what was said on tape 
there are a few formal words like have a cup of coffee 
it tells you something about the formality of the situation 
I felt someone else was in command 
Participant 2 
fact number one 
what I have to say is probably confusing 
since I can remember the situation 
I've got more knowledge available 
and my knowledge of the situation 
determines what I have to say about it 
it was a Saturday morning 
nothing happened in terms of seeing the bloke 
it's all preliminary crap 
the function of the talk is one simple introduction 
to the physical characteristics of space 
it's an attempt to convince the other bloke 
that there is some human background 
it enables people to talk about something 
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there is an introduction to the physical characteristics of space 
knick knacks, 
colour 
bleak 
it moves from the room to an eight year old daughter 
it moves abruptly 
there is a direct question 
which offers the equivalent chance to say something 
about other human contextualisations 
this question is interpreted as let me know what you've been up to 
what you've been doing professionally 
rather than in more general terms 
it moves the thing into a different air of formality 
it moves from me as a person to you as a person 
to you as a person 
to me as teacher 
to you as a teacher 
its an attempt to establish some sort of code 
the kettle noise is pretty bad 
and you can hear the constant hum of the strip light 
it sounds good is overtly talking about B's outline of his job 
what it really means is let's finish this off for God's sake 
and move on to something more interesting 
I don't really want to know about Cambridge 
I want to know if he enjoyed it 
I can't relieve believe it sounds good 
it sounds bloody boring 
there is something tentative and final about the way it comes out 
there is no genuine surprise 
it ought to be interesting but isn't 
it's all pretty formal 
I didn't feel very formal 
but the participants never interact 
there is a peculiar dislocation 
as if they weren't attending to each other 
my overall feeling of the conversation 
is that it wasn't worth coming in for 
he was seeking reassurances 
and yet never got into it 
he wasn't particularly enthusiastic 
it was basically a waste of time 
APPENDIX C 
Non-Participant Comments for Study 1 
judge 1 (Female) 
the kettle noise makes things a bit difficult 
the first person is Ian 
he's obviously in his room 
I recognise his manner 
there are a number of pauses 
the other guy is a Southerner 
rp 
they didn't know each other very well 
they're not on intimate terms 
not bosom pals 
but acquainted 
it's very disjointed 
they are thinking on the same lines 
much is unsaid rather than said 
they are pretty fluent 
they obviously didn't know that the tape was on 
Ian was himself 
the other guy was not relaxed 
he was cagey 
there is a distance 
yet they know each other 
Judge 2 (Male) 
a lot of it was mumbly 
one of them was sitting much nearer the tape-recorder 
it's a casual encounter 
he's just called by 
the business is to come after 
there is an increase in animation 
I don't know the second man 
the first speaker is Ian 
they settled into a rhythm 
there is lots of hesitancy uhm uh and so on 
I'm sure you wouldn't notice this multiple hesitancy 
in an ordinary conversation if you were there 
he imitates an Indian 
it sounds very natural 
Ian operates at a flippant level 
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buying life insurance policies is a comment on him 
rather than on what he says 
the whole conversation revolves around a sense of agreement 
there is an active attempt to converge in style 
and attitude 
there is a long kind of mumble 
yes marks understanding 
rather than agreement 
really is ambiguous 
it's not common 
not convincing 
it had shades in it 
the second bloke has a tendency to refer to himself in 
a slightly effacing way 
it's slightly depersonalising 
Ian is slangy 
rather than colloquial 
both have a facility for altering their speech to fit the situation 
judge 3 (Female) 
I recognise Ian 
he is making topics of conversation 
rather than being spontaneous 
the conversation does become more spontaneous though 
it sounded like a beginning of term interview 
both participants are well educated 
they know each other well 
but not too well 
there's a noise problem with the kettle 
I think the other guy may be a former student 
there is a long embarrassed pause 
a conversational lapse 
he thinks about his words 
there are gaps 
and uhms 
Ian on the other hand isn't concerned about his realisations 
the other guy has a complex about being a student 
he tends to think before he speaks 
Ian introduces topics he can talk about 
he encourages him by saying uhm and yes all the time 
Ian is more conversational in tone than the other speaker 
Judge 4 (Female) 
there are plenty uhms 
I means 
and you knows 
they aren't used for any particular reason 
they talk fairly lucidly 
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but they still put things like that in 
there is some overspeaking 
there is a topic switch with do you want some sugar 
it just sounded normal 
like any conversation 
they talk about a range of topics 
black holes 
how to teach 
how to get money 
it wasn't like a lecture or an argument 
one was probing for advice 
feeling his way along 
Ian had control all along 
he kept saying yes yes I see 
the other speaker sounded eager 
but hesitant 
it came from the way in which he said things 
may be his tone 
he wants to do something 
but isn't sure how to go about it 
he was sounding out 
I'm conscious that he was being put at ease 
especially when they were discussing the surroundings 
there is a kettle noise which made things difficult to hear 
it didn't seem to make any difference to them 
Ian is interested in what he's done 
it's kind of come on over and tell me what's going on 
what you're doing and how I can help 
judge 5 (Female) 
it's in Ian's room 
he is talking with another bloke 
they are talking about Jane 
it's a bad tape 
fuzz seems to obscure most of what they are saying 
it's all about the ethics of tuterdom 
they are pretty articulate of course 
both talk well 
in almost complete sentences 
some utterances weren't complete in grammar and syntax 
it's Ian's way of jogging the conversation along to say 
yeah yeah grunt 
it's an indication of his interest 
most people do similar things 
actually I missed half the content listening to the general 
flow of conversation 
rather than listening to what they were saying 
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judge 6 (Male) 
the conversation is carried on in lackadaisical fashion 
the interactants are not interested 
in what they are saying to each other 
they don't seriously consider the topics under consideration 
I can't really make out one speaker 
there is a lot of surface noise 
a kind of hum 
one speaker is Hall 
he said bona fide person 
I didn't like it 
it had underlying assumptions 
it was thoughtless 
a throwaway 
the whole conversation is a throwaway 
it's trivial 
like talking about what's for tea 
and going to films 
it's not so much trivial 
as unimportant 
the speakers are feeling their way around 
trying to establish a rapport 
the tone is one of trying to feel each other out 
trying to sort things out 
it's a coffee making interim conversation 
the preliminaries before getting down to the real stuff 
there is a sense in which they didn't know each other 
it reminds me of other conversations I've listened to 
it's a way of filling in silence 
they move on to different things 
it's exploratory 
it's a linguistic shaking of hands 
Hall introduces the thing by saying tell me about your life 
it's non-involved 
neither of them are terribly interested 
Hall's reaction to the blokes job is negative 
it doesn't get you anywhere 
the kettle is a problem 
but sort of fits in with the tone of the thing 
there are symptoms of a superficial level of conversation 
tossed away remarks 
and the like 
there is a lot of non-strict grammatical speech 
uhms and spaces 
the content tends to be unfinished 
and they start to talk about other things 
although Hall asks relevant questions 
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judge 7 (Female) 
one of them is Ian 
both sounded well educated 
they use terms like bone fide 
and relationship 
they talk about a kid's language 
and use hip language 
like rip offs 
they also talk about money 
and life as student 
it's a typical opening to a conversation 
they are kind of modest with each other 
Ian is more dominant 
perhaps because it's in his office 
the other bloke has to be encouraged to talk 
Judge 8 (Female) 
the background noise of the kettle covered a great 
deal of the conversation 
it's a discussion between colleagues 
it's not intimate 
but relaxed 
and friendly 
they converse colloquially 
they didn't choose their words in terms of formal conversation 
it sounded like a school common room 
with teachers discussing things 
the switch of topics is indicative of relaxation 
ordinary conversation shows no logical sequence 
it's fairly well balanced 
the host leads the conversation 
the speakers are in the same business 
they come to the same conclusions 
they sound as if they know each other 
there is no formal language 
words like rip offs are used 
it's an occasion to go for coffee 
and talk while you are making it 
Judge 9 (Male) 
it's a friendly discussion between two people 
in an office 
or at home 
it's in their tea break 
they are relaxed 
and friendly 
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trying to score over anybody else 
they have an intellectual background 
both have the same job 
they are friends 
yet it's all vaguely ironic 
one guy is slightly paternal 
but not obtrusive 
he acts as a kind of springboard for the other guy 
the humour adds to the informality 
the question-answer format is not so much an interrogation 
but a chance for the younger guy to explain things 
it's interspersed with them talking over each other 
when he says it sounds good there is approval 
he gives advice from a position of experience 
the slang makes it easy to follow 
there are also agreement noises all the way through 
which is pretty normal 
there are lots of uhms 
yeahs 
and wells 
they add to the informality 
the two people use the same language 
one of them uses a foreign accent 
it sounded more Indian than Iranian 
he must have known the other guy to use an accent like that 
they are intellectuals 
who are not disassociated 
there just isn't any surprise 
Judge 10 (Female) 
the noise is disturbing 
it's a buzzing noise 
and it gets worse 
it's a conversation between two males 
they seem to have a lot in common 
and know each other quite well 
it's easy chatty conversation 
the talk is informal 
come into the flat and have coffee 
it's a visitor visiting a friends flat 
there are polite comments like oh that looks nice 
people always start their conversations like this 
they have teaching and education in common 
student teacher relations are discussed 
there is humour when they talk about tax 
although it's quite social 
the situation isn't very relaxed 
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judge 11 (Female) 
there is a noise problem 
it's probably an electric drill 
or cement mixer 
it took place in an office 
there are juvenile pictures 
there is a door slamming 
and shuffling 
they have difficulty in describing black holes 
there seems to be a lot of background noise in the pieces I can hear 
there's something about life insurance 
and Christmas 
and forking out one hundred and eighty five pounds 
for something 
there is also something about social relations with a student 
giving out all the time and one way process sound disillusioned 
the conversation is disjointed 
they switch from topic to topic 
one was pretty relaxed 
he used uhms 
and ahs all the time 
the other tended to just sit there 
and think 
judge 12 (Female) 
there is a lot of noise 
they seem to say yes 
and uhm to everything 
the conversation moved off as if they both remembered 
what they were talking about 
advice is given 
and cliches are used 
a lot of the conversation is done without thinking about it 
it's unconscious 
and fairly casual 
the bit about black holes is brief 
and concise 
they didn't seem to want to go into deep detailed discussion 
words such as junk 
and rip offs are used 
it's a thing people do 
there is almost a mild sort of modesty 
they are people who know each other 
filling in time 
because they happen to be there 
it wasn't for a purpose 
there is a slight element of trying to impress 
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the one who initiates all the questions seems more dominant 
judge 13 (Female) 
one man is entertaining the other to coffee 
he plays the role of host 
and asks all the questions 
they know each other 
the host didn't say very much 
but really kept the conversation going 
his language was very repetitive 
he said bona fide person 
it was a serious thing about being serious 
the other man sounded a little bit uneasy 
rather stilted in fact 
it's a common conversational thing 
that when people talk about money 
they talk about the tax man 
yeah yeah all the time is a kind of prompting 
it is meant to give encouragement 
one of them imitates a foreign student 
judge 14 (Female) 
one of the participants only talked when asked to 
he was very hesitant 
a bit low 
and mumbly at times 
it was the other man who really kept the conversation going 
it sounded as if he were trying to make conversation 
but kept loosing the thread 
he tried to put the other guy at ease 
it sounded to me as if he were talking down to him 
though not consciously 
the other guy was passive 
it wasn't easy for him 
the conversation doesn't follow a logical pattern 
it switches 
the more dominant one tends to support the other's conversation 
he is talking down to him 
the kettle boiling makes it difficult to follow 
there are lulls in the conversation 
gaps when nobody has anything to say 
they are thinking about it 
it's not official conversation 
although there is a certain amount of unease 
A tends to talk only when spoken to 
but there is some overlapping 
which shows that it isn't terribly formal 
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judge 15 (Male) 
one is louder than the other 
they sounded cultured 
well educated 
judge 16 (Male) 
there are two blokes 
they talk about three subjects 
painting 
black holes 
and teaching 
they sort of linked together 
the one who was nearest the microphone 
knew he was being recorded 
he distinguished his words more 
the other seemed to jumble his words 
I couldn't tell what he was saying till he thought about it 
the kettle boiling didn't help any 
it's in the kitchen 
or home of one of the participants 
they know each other 
they are acquainted 
they talk about previous events 
there are no long gaps in the conversation 
it all ran together 
it's not a conversation 
where they were particularly thinking about what was coming 
gaps come when they didn't know what to say 
there is some change in their attitude 
they are not quite at ease 
the bit about Arrels is a bit pedantic 
it makes the other person know where he went 
I'm unsure what the other person would think about this 
there is unease when he mentions he has spilt his coffee 
so you're not broke anyway is trying to relax the situation 
trying to establish a confidentiality 
in the early bit they are looking for a point to relax 
that's why one of them mentions pictures on the walls 
to provoke a conversation 
he is trying to establish a rapport 
he brings in the family to talk about something personal 
he's trying to get a routine that he's had before 
APPENDIX D 
Stimulus Fragments for Study 2 
Extract 1 
(A= Female; B= Male) 
A 
I remember the biology teacher 
who had us once 
a young bloke 
still got very impatient 
very easily 
and he said 
once he got 
really lost his temper 
in front of the class 
and he said 
if you lot realised 
how much effort 
how many processes 
yourbody 
had to go through 
in order for you to do that 
B 
nun 
A 
you wouldn't be messing about in the way you are 
because you are all 
wasting energy 
B 
yeah 
A 
and that's what he that 
he said it in a real temper 
and it's always stuck in my mind 
cos of that 
B 
Mm 
A 
I still get that feeling 
the kind of thing you just said 
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B 
n1m 
A 
shut your eyes 
and you think of your entire body changing gear 
an 
it's fascinating 
B 
mm 
A 
ah 
can you 
answer me a question 
B 
probably not 
A 
oh 
I shouldn't think you will be 
actually 
able to 
B 
why are you going to ask me then 
A 
tut 
I'm going to ask you 
why people have to do finals 
B 
uh 
why are you gonna ask me this question 
if you don't think I can answer it 
because it's not the kind of question that anybody can answer 
B 
no 
I suppose not 
it just seems to me 
while I have a thought like that 
I think aw 
all this 
sitting in the library 
cramming things 
in order to forget them a little while after 
when there are people like that 
to think about 
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Extract 2 
(A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
also 
I mean 
I'm fairly sick of being broke 
but if I had this Germany job 
you see 
six hours a week 
no admin 
nothing 
I mean it's it's a dream 
I can't lose realisation 
I can't 
B 
and if there were no tax 
you'd then immediately be well off 
A 
yeah 
I mean 
if there were tax 
if I got myself a decent tax adviser 
I'm sure I wouldn't be wor any worse off 
B 
no no 
A 
if I could fix up the house 
that's the only problem 
if I could get somebody to rent 
B 
yeah 
A 
the house 
B 
but that was the thing which transformed all our salary 
for two years now 
that that 
A 
I don't 
I don't know how much tax we are paying now 
B 
but if you are paying about fifty 
sixty pounds a month 
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A 
I dunno 
I just got my tax 
B 
that's another saving of two hundred quid 
A 
tax claim this morning 
did you get your tax claim this morning 
B 
no 
what's that for 
A 
oh 
dear old Jane 
the postman stuffed the stuff through the 
and she came rushing into the kitchen saying 
great 
on her majesty's service 
oh God 
she didn't understand my reaction at all 
she said 
it's not the queen who 
takes your tax away is it 
B 
oh 
I must go and pee 
so that I'm in a state of preparededness 
for our squash 
A 
what's the time 
B 
it's now half past 
A 
half past 
right 
B 
so you've only got two to three minutes 
A 
right 
B 
A 
A 
are you coming via here 
B 
well shall I come back down 
A 
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Extract 3 
(A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
do you never get frightened on that job then 
B 
no 
A 
do you always work nights now 
B 
yes 
far better working on night shift 
A 
what even in Southampton 
B 
yes 
Southampton 
I worked on night shift 
A 
so you don't sleep all day do you 
B 
well 
I go to bed about uh 
seven o'clock 
A 
Mm 
B 
and I get up about two oclock 
or something like that 
you know 
but if I fancy a pint 
I get up earlier 
A 
yeah 
seven in the morning 
you sleep 
B 
yes 
till two I suppose 
A 
and you don"t go to bed again then 
B 
no 
well when you got into the library 
you know 
the time 
the switches is all time switches 
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you know 
A 
no 
what lights 
B 
yes 
all the lights is time switches 
you know 
and when you go 
A 
yeah 
B 
you don't put a switch on like this 
A 
yeah 
B 
you press a button 
A 
yeah 
B 
you press a button 
A 
ah 
then the lights go on 
B 
yeah 
Extract 4 
(A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
yeah 
a lot of them 
you know 
have been brought up in Iran somewhere 
they say 
I've spent six years on the grammar 
you know 
and they know gerunds backwards 
but they don't how to pronounce them 
B 
yeah 
it sounds good 
so you're not broke anyway 
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A 
well I'll tell you what Ian 
I was better of when I was a student 
there's no question of that 
B 
really 
oh you'll be 
A 
by the time the tax man takes his cut 
and Cambridge is a pretty expensive place to live in anyway 
B 
oh yes 
of course 
you pay tax 
God 
A 
I lost mm 
B 
do you want some sugar 
A 
no thanks Ian 
just straight black 
God 
I spilt some of the stuff 
B 
butyou 
but you can get it back presumably 
most of it 
can you 
A 
uhm well 
I didn't pay tax up to Christmas 
B 
yeah 
A 
I was getting lulled into a false sense of security 
I suppose 
putting a hundred and eighty five in my pocket every month 
B 
yeah 
A 
which felt great 
B 
yeah 
A 
and uhm 
after Christmas 
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the tax man hit me 
B 
but uhm. 
A 
and it was pretty much like 
a hundred and twenty five I suppose 
you know 
but it's all right 
I get about a third knocked off in tax 
B 
mm 
A 
which is about par for the course 
for a single man 
B 
yeah yeah 
you wanna buy some life insurance policies 
or something 
A 
yeah 
B 
and they're tax deductable 
aren't they 
A 
yes 
I'll have to think of something 
Extract 5 
(A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
must find it very disturbing that 
Jane 
B 
upsets you does it 
A 
r= 
B 
you'd really be quite pleased to get rid of it 
A 
yes 
I haven't been unreasonably leaving it on my desk 
cos I don't want to put it on the wall 
B 
you think it might get you 
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A 
yeah 
I think I'd prefer if it got you 
B 
yeah 
A 
it's that sort of facelessness that worries me 
B 
that's right 
A 
the red eye 
blue one 
B 
one arrow outline 
A 
one red eye that doesn't look forward 
it looks straight out at you 
if there is 
B 
what is it 
the evil eye of mawdor 
A 
yeah 
B 
or whatever that crap is in Lord of the Rings 
A 
yeah 
B 
I thought I'd made an anal 
did you not 
you didn't see my analysis of that appalling meeting 
did you 
A 
no 
Extract 6 
(A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
uhm 
what's what 
what are your plans then 
B 
nothing at the moment 
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A 
work 
I mean 
you know 
like are you on your way to Paris 
or 
B 
no 
May the first 
I go to Paris 
A 
or twenty five weeks holiday 
or 
B 
well 
just a couple of weeks holiday 
A 
or 
just messin around 
what are doing for the next three weeks 
B 
uh 
poking around here 
A 
yeah 
B 
I'll probably go down to London for a week 
A 
yeah 
B 
I'd like to if I could find somewhere to stay 
I could write a few letters to people who I haven't seen for years 
and try to stay with them 
A 
have you got a British lib 
uh mm 
British museum ticket 
B 
yeah 
A 
have you got a photo 
I mean 
you've gotta have a photograph 
and thing stuck on it 
B 
no 
A 
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Brian Richards told me 
uhm 
B 
may be they've changed the system now 
A 
that within the last six months 
that you 
you've 
you have to have a photo 
you have to have a new ticket 
with a photograph attached an 
you have to get one now 
B 
I think they change it for you 
if you've got a current one 
A 
yeah 
they change it for you 
B 
but you've gotta have a present day photograph 
A 
oh 
B 
that's the one I've got 
A 
oh God 
that's different 
I'll show you mine 
it's really old 
B 
I got this August last year 
A 
well I've had mine 
about ten years now I suppose 
and they just keep 
B 
yeah 
A 
scribbling on top of it 
B 
yeah 
I used to have one like that 
A 
yeah 
ah 
the old days 
B 
APPENDIX E 
Non-Participant Comments for Study 2 
Extract 1 
judge 1 (Female) 
the girl is talking very quickly 
that is emphasised 
there is hesitation on got 
and it's fascinating seems higher 
almost as if she doesn't know what to say 
it's filling in 
she seems to be acting in someway 
there is hesitation in actually 
when she asks the question she doesn't sound fully natural 
she is acting 
the man sounds more natural 
he's kind of playing along 
and helping her in the conversation up to probably not 
probably not 
is quite a conventional answer to a question of that sort 
perhaps it avoids the responsibility of fully answering 
perhaps it's embarrassment 
why do people have to do finals is almost whining 
the why is drawn out 
almost as if she's pleading 
again it's as if she doesn't actually want an answer 
but that she wants sympathy or a response from him 
she ignores his following comment 
at that point he is not gentle or sympathetic but firmer 
it's not the kind of question that anybody can answer 
he is much firmer 
and anybody is stressed 
at the beginning he's trying to be gentle 
keeping his voice low 
he gets louder as he gets firmer 
even at the end she isn't fully natural 
her intonation goes completely haywire 
and she gets lost in her own rhetoric 
cramming things is trying to get an effect 
things is drawn out 
she pauses for too long and gets lost 
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she's not sure how to react 
there is more confidence in young bloke 
she imitates the biology teacher's intonation and speech there is some kind of anger 
it's spoken for effect 
she emphasises really 
she stops imitating at you're all wasting energy 
there is amusement at the end of that section 
there are long gaps 
before can you answer me a question 
provides for a change in gear 
ah is long and drawn out 
her voice gets quieter in the middle section 
when she is asking for sympathy 
particularly in her last speech 
when she is talking more slowly 
thinking about what she is saying 
it speeds up again towards the end 
judge 2 (Male) 
it's amusing 
there is a whole burst of conversation 
and then a pause 
it comes out as almost superfluous 
she doesn't mean this is fascinating 
there is a complete change of direction 
with ah can you answer me a question 
it moves from abstract monologue to a personal level 
probably not comes out too easily 
the interest isn't really there 
if it was he would have produced a more extended answer 
it comes across as false modesty 
it doesn't indicate an unwillingness to answer 
but rather lack of interpenetration with the other person 
it's almost a gesture rather than a serious thought 
she accepts that he won't be able to answer her question 
and there is a tone of futility 
why are you gonna ask me implies why bother in the way it is put 
it indicates the pointlessness of the whole exercise 
there is definite despair in why do people have to sit finals 
there is a real sense of appeal 
to reinforce the fact that she is unhappy 
it's at the level of emotional agreement 
rather than intellectual questioning 
nobody can answer the question implies end of conversation 
he wants to avoid the question 
almost as if he's gone through it so many times 
that the question has become meaningless 
I\ 
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he offers a conversational package in his answers 
despite his unwillingness to answer 
there is an indication that he is prepared to take this seriously 
his tone indicates that he has to deal with the question 
under some duress 
judge 3 (Male) 
I didn't think much to that 
there is a question 
which seems totally unrelated to the bit before 
it sounds like the first bit was incidental 
the real question is about finals 
it's pronounced well 
she sort of sounds bored in the end section 
there is a big sort of breath at the end 
she changes her tone quite often 
he doesn't pick the conversation up 
he answers with mms all the time 
almost as if hes aware that she is going to ask the question 
judge 4 (Male) 
what struck me was the completely different way 
in which she talked about the biology teacher 
it was quicker 
more animated than the rest 
Ian made the appropriate noises 
there was a long pause after fascinating 
but one expected them to continue 
then there was a complete change in tone 
it sounded a serious question about finals 
she was seeking reassurances 
and let the question tail away 
her voice is quieter 
and more intimate 
but there is no emotional emphasis 
it's a conversation between a student and Ian 
a lecturer who you know you can talk to 
Ian is cagey 
but he lets things continue 
probably not is casual 
and guarded 
there is a difference in pace 
and animation 
Ian becomes surprisingly serious 
judge 5 (Male) 
there is an abrupt change of subject 
and I thought the guy got very impatient 
.k 
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the syntax is odd 
he doesnt answer the question 
judge 6 (Male) 
it sounds artificial 
there is a fair degree of variation in the speed at which she speaks 
the intonation is fairly artificial 
and she makes an effort to put expression into her voice 
there is a tremendous emphasis on that 
her story is slow 
and then increases in tempo 
it becomes a bit babbled 
it's fascinating seems contrived 
ah can you answer me the question 
is trying to keep the conversation going 
the ah is like a breath 
and sounds like pleasurable satisfaction 
he is much younger than the person who she is talking to 
it sounds like a girl who has got a crush on teacher 
and is trying to impress 
probably not is so expressionless and dull 
there is no incentive for her to continue talking 
he gives the impression of being bored with the whole thing 
it's a contrived casualness 
but informal 
and non-threatening 
why do you have to do finals sounds bored 
there is a pause 
and then I'm gonna ask you 
the second part is totally different 
she sets out to ask a question which she feels is pointless 
and then virtually apologises for asking it 
it's a question she doesn't need an answer for 
doesn't want an answer for 
the question is embarrassed 
there is a little girl lost sort of attitude 
it's not the answer that's important 
but just some kind of contact 
she doesn't respond to anything the bloke has said 
because he doesn't give her anything to respond to 
his probably not is very much an end of conversation gambit 
he is bored and disinterested 
and she doesn't get any help to encourage the flow of conversation 
judge 7 (Female) 
it sounds false 
the girl sounds self-conscious 
ah can you answer me a question says here I am 
_A 
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talk to me 
it's fascinating seems overdone 
her voice goes up at the end 
and it's over-emphasised 
because it's not the kind of question that anybody, can answer 
it sounded very teacher like 
it was as if he was trying to impart wisdom 
they are very precise 
and make no mistakes 
the content is pretty revolting 
I find the story about the biology teacher affected 
I guess it's difficult to judge 
on the basis of a small segment though 
judge 8 (Male) 
there is an interesting dynamic at work 
sounds as if Ian is completely inert 
more so than usual 
I don't know who the girl is 
Ian isn't concentrating 
he wants to be sympathetic 
she has a slightly rhetorical style of delivery 
there is a tinge of a affected boredom in two comments 
probably not 
and 
why are you going to ask me 
they are typically laconic replies that Ian would give 
there is something in it's fascinating 
I just can't get a visual image of the girl 
if it's just a social call 
there is a peculiar kind of flatness 
there is something odd too about 
ah can you answer me a question 
a disparity 
a lack of logic 
Extract 2 
Judge 1 (Female) 
it seems very quiet 
Ian almost doesn't want to be heard 
he is virtually mumbling 
he gets more fluent 
as he gets more confident 
in the bit about Jane at the end 
his mind doesn't really appear to be on the conversation 
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it's an effort 
and he has to fit in with the patter 
Keith seems more confident 
the speech about salary seems rather lost 
towards the end of Germany job he drops his voice 
his voice goes up and down 
and is much quieter 
Keith is tentative 
and rather quiet 
Ian follows on from his quietness 
there is amusement in the story about Jane 
it starts off quietly 
he captures her intonation by imitating 
I doubt if his imitation is accurate 
it's more like his interpretation of it 
what he is trying to capture is that ohms is special 
he emphasises great 
there is a gap before the end of the laugh 
it didn't follow immediately 
perhaps he felt subconsciously he should laugh 
the last part about squash is more relaxed 
half past is not so hesitant 
judge 2 (Male) 
I don't feel I have anything to say about this 
it's all at a very uninteresting level 
there is unspoken agreement 
that it's all rather naive 
and amusing 
two people are discussing the potential of increasing their salary 
judge 3 (Male) 
the voice rises 
and there is anticipation in if I could fix the house up 
the voice also rises in no admin 
the voice sounds dreamy 
as if he's living it 
the voice falls after each thing 
with a little pause in between 
B slows down 
you can tell he's thinking 
the rest has a kind of monotony 
it only livens up with Jane's story 
the voice rises 
as he starts to laugh 
it's not the Queen 
he says are you coming here as if he wants him to 
454 
judge 4 (Male) 
Ian about Jane is much more animated 
it's quite a serious conversation 
it doesn't actually get anywhere 
he sounded weary 
tired 
he sounded lower than usual 
judge 5 (Male) 
I thought there was a peculiar use of realisation 
judge 6 (Male) 
my first impression is that they are both distinctly inarticulate 
a tremendous number of words are left out 
the tone of the speech is conspiratorial 
one has an articulacy problem 
he always seems to be thinking about what he is saying 
there is a tremendous repetitiveness in his speech 
they seem to cue nicely enough to each other 
A seems to slur his words 
he's searching for words 
and runs words together 
he seems to be consulting the other speaker 
in the story about Jane something funny happened 
it was as if he had something stuck in his throat 
there is a totally different attitude at this point from the rest 
totally informal humour 
breaking the ice 
we are good mates 
let's have a laugh 
Judge 7 (Female) 
I know these people so well 
Ian sounded a bit pissed 
I don't suppose he was if he was about to play squash I mean 
it's a dream a realisation 
is very pretentious 
there are lots of false starts and errors 
he is usually quite precise 
Keith is avuncular 
he is there to listen to Ian 
dear old Jane sounds awful kind of drunk 
he really seems to be struggling with his pronunciation 
Keith is very business like 
and factual 
when they talked about the financial situation 
the conversation shifted to a more formal kind of thing 
455 
Judge 8 (Female) 
knowing both people makes it difficult for me 
to comment on any peculiarities 
it seems a fairly representative piece of conversation 
I'm not sure if they'd been drinking 
it has to do with the slightly florid way 
he pronounces preparedness 
the conversation is split into two halves 
the subject fizzles out at the anecdote about the tax claim 
the fact that it peters out indicates the casualness Of the thing 
they obviously know each other well 
they have no difficulty in swapping questions 
Extract 3 
judge 1 (Female) 
the guy Ian is talking to seems to be saying as little as possible 
he is not at all confident 
he follows on from what Ian is saying 
rather than initiating anything himself 
the tone of yes seems too flat 
and non committal 
no has the same effect 
the other speaker gets more fluent later in the exchange 
he talks fairly slowly 
and occasionally hesitates 
he uses conversational fillers like you know 
his tone is friendly 
but not intimate 
you know seems to be typical of his conversation 
there is a long gap after no 
B continues to speak 
probably because of the gap 
judge 2 (Male) 
the banality of non-communication 
and disinterest 
they are communicating 
in that they are exchanging words and phrases 
but their is a distance in their replies and responses 
they seem to be stuck in a rut 
they are looking for a subject 
in which they can establish a conversation 
they keep having to repeat themselves 
A asks all the questions 
'R k iii,; t resnondim-r 
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judge 3 (Male) 
sounds like Ian is trying to get the fella to talk 
the fella gives yes no replies 
when he gets going he talks about the library 
this is the interesting thing in his life 
yes and no have the same tone 
the man sounds shy 
he sounds as if he's going to launch into a tale 
and begins to talk about Southampton 
it all has the same intonation pattern 
judge 4 (Male) 
I thought they were in some kind of vehicle 
the bloke is very ungiving 
Ian tries to get the bloke saying things 
he doesn't give anything away 
it's hard to describe 
he seems to start everything with yes and no 
he sounds as if he's not going to go on 
and then does 
he's aware that there's a conversation 
and that he's making part of it 
he talks personally about himself 
the first no is reticent 
and unhelpful 
it is the toneless way in which the man speaks 
seven o'clock is much more intimate 
and had a tone in it 
none of the first segment seemed to interest him 
but he goes on to become quite different 
judge 5 (Male) 
there is something strange about it 
but I can't work it out 
it's a peculiar conversation 
there is not much continuity 
and lights seems a strange subject to continue on 
judge 6 (Male) 
it sounds like two blokes 
chatting in a boiler-room 
person B is a Geordie 
he reacts very well to the cues given by person A 
B is reliant on the other person for things to talk about 
A gives very short cues 
but they are effective 
yes and no seem to be automatic responses from the 
Geordie 
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no was very expressionless 
flat 
but not bored or disinterested 
what even in Southampton 
is very much a cue to the other speaker 
there is inflection in the voice rising 
it is a cue to give an answer 
the reply is again quick and automatic 
there are tremendous differences between the two kinds of speech 
person A starts to acquire some of the speech patterns of person B 
there is a hint of Geordie 
and sometimes his inflection is very singy songy 
like in what even in Southampton 
Judge 7 (Female) 
it sounds like a toilet conversation 
there are long pauses 
and they seem to have problems speaking to each other 
Ian is trying to get the other man to speak 
and doing it badly 
the man seems to be trying to get into some kind of natural 
rhythm of speech 
he is slow 
and deliberate 
and does not impart information easily 
he is thinking things out 
as he goes along 
Ian doesn't feed him with the appropriate things 
judge 8 (Male) 
I like that one 
Ian is trying hard to elicit information 
the man's responses are fairly sparse 
it's a bit hard going 
I know from Ian's earnest tone 
that he is trying to be interested 
trying to set up some sort of rapport 
Extract 4 
judge 1 (Female) 
it's difficult to hear 
one guy imitates a foreign accent 
God I spilt it is hardly audible 
perhaps because the guy was talking to himself 
thev seem to know each other pretty well 
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of course you pay tax seems surprised 
the background noise makes it difficult to hear 
it doesn't seem to have much effect on the speakers though 
par for the course gives some impression of the bloke 
partly because of his accent 
and partly because of his tone 
he is a pompous person 
and thinks of himself as middle class 
judge 2 (Male) 
it"s amusing 
how we can screw as much money out of people as possible 
it's a remarkable cliche 
and is trotted out thoughtlessly 
linguistically Ian makes a gesture towards the other person 
but it is stepwise 
rather than forward 
I'm relaxed in your company 
and we can chat 
one of them drops into imitation 
it's a racialist cliche 
it sounds good is an understatement 
apart from trivial things like making coffee 
A is seeking reassurances 
I can talk about this 
because you understand me 
it finishes off by stating that there must be some way 
of avoiding tax 
the whole emphasis is on money 
as opposed to teaching 
judge 3 (Male) 
it's boring 
the conversation is incidental to coffee 
they are just filling in time 
the voice rises in that sounds good 
it is sarcastic delight 
so you're not broke anyway is not sympathetic 
he's saying you're all right really 
it's got a sort of monotony 
as his voice hardly changes 
yeah is said without agreement in his voice 
judge 4 (Male) 
Ian is making coffee 
the other guy is an abstracted sort of person 
I'll tell you what is terribly conventional 
he has a managerial manner 
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that sounds good is said without conviction 
but is friendly enough 
Ian picks up the remarks of the bloke 
it's all rather casual 
I didn't like it 
Judge 5 (Male) 
really oh you'll be is cut off 
and there is no indication of what the bloke is going to say but uhm is an interruption which doesn't quite come off 
one of them seems to be putting on a foreign accent 
imitating students that he's had 
it indicates that they don't know how to pronounce 
in a sense it"s a joke 
imitation is often used to joke with 
you know foreign man dont speak properly 
there is no indication 
that the person who he speaks to finds it funny 
sounds good so you're not broke anyway is fairly meaningless 
it indicates that he doesn't want to talk shop 
Judge 6 (Male) 
that's horrible 
that wasn't a conversation 
one person was insignificant 
I could hardly hear him 
I think that the accent is South East to South Midlands 
it's an educated kind of accent 
the bloke has been through the right schools 
it's a bit puzzling 
because they seem to know each other 
but somehow have lost contact 
one is rying to impress 
and one is taking the impressed role 
without genuinely being impressed 
the one who is trying to impress is an unpleasant fellow 
he is self-opinionated 
and over self-confident 
I think he must suffer from an inferiority complex 
his imitation of an accent of someone who wasn't from the 
same educational background was vindictive 
and cutting 
the other guy is fairly run of the mill 
and doesn't seem to have the same pretensions 
the other guy always seems to be name dropping 
and talks about the tax man 
Cambridge 
and expenses 
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on one occasion the bloke who he is talking to doesn't 
finish his sentence 
he says something like oh you'll be 
he isn't bothered whether the other person cuts in or not 
he seems very used to the other speakers type 
do you want some sugar is completely neutral 
it is a disguised neutrality 
with no positive reinforcement signals 
judge 7 (Female) 
it's obvious that Ian isn't listening very carefully 
Michael is very uncertain 
Ian is more concerned with making coffee 
Michael is moaning on 
when he says you know but it"s all right he changes his tone 
it's more kind of jaunty 
he puts more life into it 
sounds good doesn't really sound as if it sounds good 
Ian is just supporting Michael 
Michael is being kind of quiet 
it's a filling in space conversation 
Michael doesn't attach much importance to it 
single man goes up 
there is a change of mood 
it's an attempt to be more kind of cheerful 
the thing actually seems to take longer than if you were actually 
a participant 
if something is isolated like that 
you expect to find something significant 
actually I find the extracts that I have listened to kind of boring 
judge 8 (Male) 
Ian definitely converges towards the man in style 
and attitude 
he assumes all the time 
a knowledge in Ian 
of what he is talking about 
it's kind of clubby 
there is a type of jargon in it 
getting it knocked off 
par for the course 
and takes his cut 
the way he talks about Iranians 
there is an assumption that he knows what he is talking about 
he is giving information 
rather than swapping ideas 
it's really boring 
461 
Extract 5 
Judge 1 (Female) 
there is considerable variation in volume 
B is quieter than A 
the air is quiet 
and thoughtful 
rather than excited 
there is amused agreement in I think I'd prefer if it got you 
B's tone almost suggests that he is putting himself in the place 
of the child 
he gives the impression of having that kind of wonder 
the conversation gets more excited after red eye 
before then they are going through a process of agreeing 
and only treat the subject matter semi-seriously 
Ian picks up though 
and begins to talk quite rapidly 
B acts as a stooge 
the laughter seems to be helping things along 
Judge 2 (Male) 
I've nothing to say about it 
it's a chat stroke conversation 
at the level of coffee talk 
what's caught you're eye 
let's talk about it 
followed by a jump in direction to move the thing on 
judge 3 (Male) 
it's in a sort of low key 
with very quiet tones 
it changes at the end 
it's very difficult to get a sense of what's going on 
judge 4 (Male) 
it's hard to follow 
a witty exchange that doesn"t quite come off 
facelessness is something that they can talk about 
it all seems aimless 
and surprisingly unemphatic 
the conversation dies 
and one of them has to try and rescue it 
judge 5 (Male) 
I don't know what they are talking about 
I may have been unreasonably leaving it on my desk is peculiar 
it might get you it might get me is a joke 
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they don't sound very serious 
it becomes progressively more amusing I suppose 
there are two people with a picture which is a painting 
it's a very natural conversation 
and there's no status between them 
there are lots of interruptions 
but its not aggressive interrupting 
I think that the two people might work together 
they talk very quickly 
and there are lots of slips of the tongue 
and words left out 
there is some friendly rivalry 
as they try to find something to talk about 
the conversation moves on from pictures to work 
and the topic changes completely 
judge 6 
there are two people with a picture which is a painting 
there is no status between them 
there are lots of interruptions 
but it's not aggressive interrupting 
I think the two people might work together 
they talk very quickly 
and there are lots of slips of the tongue 
and words left out 
there is some friendly rivalry 
as they try to find something to talk about 
the conversation moves from the picture to work 
and the conversation changes completely 
judge 7 (Female) 
it's difficult to make out what they are saying 
they are both giggling 
and looking at each other 
if you were there it might be more meaningful 
judge 8 (Male) 
that's a good one 
there were bits I didn't understand 
and I got the feeling that it was very much a fragment 
the whole thing is very strange 
and very disjointed 
it's an extreme example of people talking about something 
that is incomprehensible 
especially on tape 
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Extract 6 
judge I (Female) 
virtually inaudible 
just can't hear it 
so I've nothing to say 
judge 2 (Male) 
I don't have a great deal to say about this 
it's non-serious 
the tone indicates an easy interchange about the immediate future 
A puts up with the conversation 
there is a flippant tone about twenty five weeks holiday 
which is about all I could catch 
judge 3 (Male) 
sorry 
I can't hear much of that one 
one guy sounds interested at the beginning 
then doesn't seem to take any notice of what is said in between 
judge 4 (Male) 
it moves into quiet monologue 
Ian takes over the content of what the other man has to say 
there are lots of overlaps 
I used to have one like that is terrifically speedy 
Judge 5 (Male) 
the sound quality is very poor 
there are lots of overlaps 
which most people do most of the time in conversations 
judge 6 (Male) 
it's in a gent's washing room 
and they are washing their hands 
and talking at the same time 
the conversation is incidental 
and there is no clear point of contact between them 
holidays provides a good start 
and it's a very predictable conversation 
person A makes more effort than person B 
person B sounds as if he's got the cold 
there is tremendous switching around 
and it's all a bit vague 
judge 7 (Female) 
oh dear 
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they have quite a job to get it going don't they 
they keep talking on top of each other 
it reminds me of one of the earlier one"s I listened to 
they don't really listen to one another 
and Ian has to try and keep the conversation going 
he is trying hard 
the other bloke is very quiet 
as if he's shy of Ian 
I didn't think much to it at all 
judge 8 (Male) 
this is similar to the fourth conversation you played 
it could have been the same bloke 
I'm trying to work out what Ian would think of this bloke 
the aspect of his delivery is slightly different from the other extract 
it's almost as if he's fed up with the bloke being there 
probably he hasn't a lot in common with him 
but it's easy surface conversation on which to operate 
APPENDIX F 
Stimulus Fragments for Study 3 
Extract 1 
C 
I went to Stamford BRIDGE last year ONCE 
B 
all fifty thousand have got to get OUT though THERE 
C 
I'd never BEEN BEFORE 
COR 
COR 
the CROWDS 
OOH 
and you WONDERED 
if you were going to be trampled to DEATH 
they started to SHOVE 
do you KNOW 
it's quite FRIGHTENING 
A 
where was THIS TONY 
B 
YEAH 
C 
carrying Justin Stamford BRIDGE 
where I went to see CHELSEA 
play LEEDS 
A 
oh YES 
In 
C 
and Leeds played SHOCKINGLY 
worst game they ever PLAYED 
B 
well some of the gates might be about as WIDE as that ROOM 
as the ROOM 
MIGHTN'T they 
REALLY 
c 
OOH 
there were KIDS 
sitting on that great HOARDING 
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B 
about as wide as THAT 
and about thirty THOUSAND have to go out through THERE 
c 
COR 
B 
you KNOW 
I mean er 
A 
m 
B 
oh it's TERRIBLE 
C 
OOH 
the sea of bodies in front of you MOVING 
and people started to PUSH 
BEHIND you 
cos you couldn't have done anything you'd have been 
absolutely HELPLESS 
Extract 2 
A 
oh and one pig DIED 
because it ATE too much 
B 
ooh REALLY 
A 
OH 
it was REVOLTING 
oh they were TERRIBLE 
the PIGS 
C 
oh 
A 
they made a dreadful row in the MORNING 
when it was FEEDING time 
and ONE PIG 
it was erm a YOUNG pig 
about THAT size 
you KNOW 
m MIDDLING 
and erm it was DEAD 
and it was LYING there 
I'd never SEEN a dead pig BEFORE 
absolutely STIFF 
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B 
di the children SAW it DID they 
oh they were ENGROSSED 
you KNOW 
C 
oh YES 
it was MARVELLOUS 
A 
erm they thought this was WONDERFUL 
and erm they asked why it was DEAD 
and er the farmer apparently didn't want his wife to KNOW 
because he'd overfed them BEFORE 
and shed been FURIOUS 
and of course he was trying to keep it FROM her 
but all the KIDS 
were agog about this dead PIG 
and was telling them not to tell the farmer"s WIFE 
D 
YEAH 
A 
and all THIS 
so this pig was absolutely DEAD 
so they put it on they have a sort of smouldering HEAP 
that smoulders all the TIME 
so they went to bum the PIG 
and all the KIDS 
hanging over the GATE 
watching this PIG 
and they were very er very taken that the pig had DIED 
because it had EATEN too much 
you KNOW 
Extract 3 
B 
AH 
well we took a we took some children on a VISIT 
to er Enfield's environmental STUDY centre 
they other DAY and they have various animals around THERE 
one of WHICH 
is a PIG er PINKY 
PINKY 
PINKY 
that's RIGHT 
and all the CHILDREN 
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stood round the OUTSIDE 
C 
m 
B 
like THIS 
at the FENCE you see 
and this large slobbering PIG 
A 
YEAH 
B 
was allowed OUT 
into the MUD 
and each child was given a slice of CARROT 
you SEE 
cos they had two VISITS 
a DAY 
so twice a DAY 
this pig was FED 
by twenty slices of CARROTS 
and Pinky looked a VERY happy pig 
Extract 4 
D 
I didn't realize you'd let those things lose in the GARDEN 
no wonder we're infested by MICE 
A 
well they er it was a very cold NIGHT 
and they'd never been out BEFORE 
and I thought 
D 
well they'd been out in the GARAGE 
which wasn't a particularly WARM 
A 
and it was very DAMP 
and I thought they'd soon be DEAD 
of pneumonia if nothing ELSE 
HOWEVER 
there was the mother UNACCOUNTED for 
and one who'd escaped we'd SEEN go out 
D 
at LEAST one 
at LEAST one 
A 
one I'm st I'm being FACTUAL DAVID 
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D 
well it could have been YES 
well it could have been far MORE 
because there were 
A 
HOWEVER 
we thought it's in the GARAGE 
so then one Sunday MORNING 
David cleaned out the garage COMPLETELY 
and they're TERRIBLY clever 
we had tomatoes in there RIPENING 
wrapped up in NEWSPAPER 
each one individually WRAPPED 
and everyone that was RIPE 
that had really TURNED 
the mice had EATEN 
the m mouse or MICE 
had EATEN a little bit of 
and the ones that HADN'T turned 
they hadn't TOUCHED 
C 
m 
A 
they hadn't even nibbled at the PAPER 
Extract 5 
B 
ANYWAY 
Susie SAID 
that there was no such things as FAIRIES 
ELVES 
this that and the OTHER 
WELL 
the night she PUT her tooth under the PILLOW 
we forgot to put the MONEY there 
and take it AWAY 
we forgot all ABOUT it 
so she got UP in the MORNING 
and there's no MONEY 
Dave said well there you ARE you SEE 
YOU said 
you didn't BELIEVE in FAIRIES 
so how can you expect the fairies to come and SEE you if 
OH 
but I DO believe in FAIRIES 
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you know 
I really DO 
so Dave said well try again TONIGHT 
so that NIGHT 
thank goodness we REMEMBERED 
c 
m 
B 
so the next MORNING 
she gets UP 
all HAPPY 
oh they've BEEN 
they've BEEN 
I've got my MONEY 
and Dave said well there you ARE 
that just SHOWS 
that you i if you they hear you say you don't BELIEVE 
no MONEY 
she SAYS 
she says well I know you're only SAYING that 
because you forgot to PUT it THERE 
Extract 6 
B 
I MEAN 
CINEMA 
have b for a LONG time 
has been in TROUBLE 
I mean that's why you get all these SEX films 
it was a kind of a desperate attempt to 
C 
sh it"s a sure sign of FAILURE 
ISN'T it 
B 
YEAH 
C 
once they're sort to THAT 
REALLY 
B 
WHAT 
once you resort to SEX 
you MEAN 
C 
well it's some people resort to BEER 
NO 
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but you KNOW what I MEAN 
i it to ME 
it's ALWAYS been a confession of failure 
B&C 
YEAH 
C 
you KNOW 
tha the i it's CHEAP 
is'n it's a cheap way of I er 
B 
it's trying to get the crowds in 
C 
it's a CONFESSION 
er YEAH 
to ME 
it's a confession of a lack of a STORY 
ISN'T it 
a lack of er 
YEAH 
you KNOW 
any DEPTH REALLY 
D 
I've ALWAYS thought THIS 
with with THESE things 
APPENDIX G 
Participant Comments for Study 3 
Extract 1 
(A = Female; B= Male) 
A 
right 
three people 
one not really taking part 
and the other two 
it sounds very much like a conversation 
except that for me 
they both have their own separate thing 
that they're putting forward 
the one is very practical 
and the other one is more descriptive 
B 
yeah 
now that's that's what struck me on this listening through 
I heard you make that point to begin with 
and it wasn't until this about third time listening through 
that I noticed the discrepancy between the two 
A 
yeah yeah 
B 
that the one guy almost in spite of the other one 
was trying to comment factually on the game 
and the other one was expressing his reactions 
to overcrowding and so on 
A 
that's right 
the sea of people 
and the hordes of children 
whereas the other one 
was describing the size of the opening 
the number of people going through and 
B 
yes 
and although as I said before 
it still seems still 
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sounds to me to be like fairly genuine conversation 
between those two 
they in effect are not really talking to each other very much A 
no 
B 
so much as expressing separate attitudes 
A 
yes 
B 
to the kind of information that they're dealing with 
A 
yes 
that's right 
but I do wonder to what extent number three guy 
cause they are sort of channelling it through number three 
although he doesn't take an active part in it 
B 
no 
well he was trying to keep out of it 
because he knows the recording's taking place 
and the other two don't 
A 
yeah yeah 
I understand that 
but it does seem on listening now 
that I can sense that might be a factor that's involved 
B 
yeah 
it could be 
and I also still feel that 
the one of them who's commenting emotionally on it 
A 
yes 
B 
although he uses one or two emotional terms 
A 
B 
and expressive locutions 
gets across a lot of his meaning 
by means of exaggerated intonation patterns 
A 
yes yes 
I would agree with that 
yes he does 
I can't remember the actual words that he uses 
but I can see what you mean 
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yes he does 
he seems more excitable about the whole thing 
B 
yeah true 
A 
doesn't he 
Extract 2 
B 
well 
do you remember recording that 
A 
I don' 
B 
don't you 
well 
you could recognise yourself on it 
couldn't you 
A 
was that me 
B 
yeah 
A 
that was 
I was talking about the pig 
B 
yes 
no no 
the one saying most about the pig was Holly 
A 
oh 
B 
about the children's reaction to the pigs 
but you were 
A 
in the background 
B 
well 
in the foreground really 
I was in the background 
and you subsequently tell the tale about the pig 
at that 
the kids from Wynchmore Hill went to see 
A 
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B 
um 
where they were 
they fed him with bits of carrot 
all the kids gave him bits of carrot 
do you 
A 
yeah yeah 
B 
remember that 
A 
yes 
yes I do 
but what 
oh I didn't remember that at all 
B 
what um was your reaction to that 
A 
well my first actually 
my first reaction was thinking well 
intonation certainly is playing a part here 
because I was aware mostly of the way 
the voice was up and down 
and up and down with the excitement of it 
B 
Holly's voice 
A 
Holly's voice 
B 
yes 
it's very expressive 
isn't it 
A 
yes it is 
B 
but not only the intonation 
but almost also tremendous changes of speed 
so that at some points the speed 
A 
yes yes 
B 
is so extreme that the words 
you could only intuit if you were a native speaker, 
I think 
A 
yes 
I was also thinking of the background 
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funny 
I've forgotten all about that incident 
but I was thinking of the background 
and who else was there 
B 
yeah 
A 
and it didn't dawn on me that it was me 
but I thought I could hear 
I could recognise that there was a male 
and a sort of female who was laughing hysterically at once 
yes 
B 
all right 
that was you 
A 
mm 
yes 
well that follows. 
B 
but you didn't recognise your own voice 
A 
no I didn't 
I didn't 
B 
well that's amazing 
A 
and I didn't recognise Holly's voice 
II 
B 
no 
A 
I had no recollection that that girl was Holly 
B 
well its a long time since this was recorded 
isn't it 
A 
yes it is 
B 
way back in the mid-seventies 
and you've probably not listened to it since 
A 
no 
B 
and also 
the playback from that little tape recorder is not particularly good 
A 
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but I would have thought 
that I would have remembered the story 
B 
I would have thought so 
yes 
A 
and I I'm still trying to think now 
and I can't think what she was 
where it was that they had seen this pig 
B 
MM. 
I 
can you remember if you were aware of being recorded for that one 
A 
no I can't 
I presume we must have done it at er 
B 
is it the Palace's place 
A 
at the Palace's 
yes 
B 
yes 
I've got a feeling that urn 
that we'd set you and Holly up 
A 
aah 
wait a minute 
B 
and you didn't know you were being recorded because 
Holly's speech behaviour there is so natural and unaffected 
A 
umm 
B 
that I don't think she could have been aware of being recorded 
A 
I remember that we were set up for one thing 
and that did we do something about um 
did we do the bonfire one 
B 
yes 
but you knew about that one 
A 
that's that's what I was thinking of 
B 
but that wasn't with Holly 
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A 
who was that with 
B 
that was with that um that other girl um 
a friend of Neville Carsons I think 
A 
ah 
B 
oh 
his wife 
Neville's wife 
A 
oh 
I can't remember who it was 
B 
but this one 
I've got a feeling that we'd set you up 
and you didn't know you were being recorded 
and we were just being stool pigeons again 
and keeping quiet. 
A 
yes well 
so was Terry there as well in the room 
B 
rrum 
A 
no 
I can't remember that 
and no 
I just didn't remember recognise Holly 
and I didn't remember the story which is 
B 
well 
that's interesting 
A 
Extract 3 
B 
so that was the Pinky story 
and you say you can't remember it 
A 
I can't remember it 
no 
hlit it sounds the sort of thing that went on 
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when I was at Wynchmore College 
B 
oh yeah 
yes 
well I can remember it very well 
I can remember getting the recording 
and er 
on hearing it played it back 
I can recall very well when we first recorded it 
A 
MM 
B 
what struck you about that 
did presumably 
you would have recognised yourself on that 
even if I'd not told you that it was you 
A 
yeah well I 
there were certain clues as well 
when it was Enfield Environmental Centre obviously 
B 
yes 
but not 
not just the content 
the voice quality and so on was 
A 
rrLM 
B 
is quite distinctive 
A 
actually I'm not sure that I've ever listened to these before 
B 
maybe not 
possibly this is the first time 
A 
because er 
these recordings were made 
and I 
we never listened to them again as far as 
well I never 
B 
mm 
A 
listened to them again 
you used them 
but um. 
yes 
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would probably have clued into that one 
but I um 
I don't know 
I don't know (sigh) 
it's a long time isn't it 
B 
yeah 
A 
a lot of things have gone on since then 
B 
yeah 
what strikes me most about it 
is that almost the whole thing 
as you're talking 
you're either giggling 
or laughing through the speech 
it's a very good instance of um 
of not just a laugh occurring in a sequence like a word 
but affecting the speech of somebody 
and everybody who talks on that 
because of the funny little tale 
A 
um 
their voice is affected by a laugh all through 
A 
well we were 
I can't remember what situation we were in 
possibly we were around the table 
and had a meal or something like that 
because the way the stories were told 
seemed to have that sort of um atmosphere about them 
and presumably the children were not around 
our own children were 
B 
no 
A 
not around at that time 
so we were obviously all more relaxed 
B 
MM 
A 
and they were in bed or whatever 
they were away from us 
so that we would tell these tales 
without having to um worry about er looking after children 
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B 
yeah 
A 
and they are stories obviously sparked off by children 
aren it they 
B 
yes 
can you remember the story now you've heard it 
can you remember the event 
I mean 
it's the kind of story that could have been told dozens of times 
isn't it 
A 
well that's what I 
I mean 
B 
Pinky the happy pig 
A 
well that's the sort of thing 
I say when it would have clued me in anyway 
um because those sort of things seemed 
seemed to go on all the time 
um when I was at that particular school 
we seemed to have um 
numerous Pinkies 
or Billy the Goat 
or whatever stories that we were all involved with 
Extract 4 
B 
this story about the mice 
A 
m 
B 
well you 
presumably you've not heard that one before 
A 
no 
I hadn't 
B 
what struck you about it 
A 
well again 
it's another woman who is telling the story 
isn't it 
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B 
well again 
she gets very excited at some points 
doesn't she 
A 
yes 
speaks quickly 
B 
fairly quickly 
A 
yes 
B 
the most striking thing 
for me 
is the way she cuts the other chap off 
who is her husband 
oh 
I see 
B 
when he tries to intervene 
A 
Mm 
B 
and put the record straight or 
A 
about how she's being practical 
B 
she 
she tries to emphasise that she's telling the actual truth 
and its um 
I remember from this recording 
that there are several instances 
where she 
she really chops him off at the knee 
and shuts him up 
when he's wittering like an academic 
and she's down to earth and er yes 
I remember my comment when I first heard this was 
what a battleaxe she sounded 
A 
yes 
B 
in the way she shuts him up 
A 
yes 
she's certainly very sharp with him 
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and um 
there's something of that element 
in the way that she's telling the story because she's so very precise 
B 
yes 
A 
and she says something about the mouse 
or the mice 
B 
yes 
A 
you know 
she's very precise about it all and 
B 
yes 
A 
yes 
and the whole story that she tells 
has is sort of very logical 
isn't it 
B 
yes 
it was a very good story 
the whole of it is very funny 
and very carefully recounted 
with lots and lots of precise detail 
A 
right 
yes 
and in fact 
it sounds as if she was being factual 
which is what she er said to him 
that she was being absolutely factual 
B 
yeah 
you can um. 
you can visualise the situation from the detail she gives 
A 
B 
which is very precise in accounting one particular occurrence 
A 
right er 
and the news even to the paper story 
B 
yes 
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A 
the newspaper that they're the things were wrapped in 
so it is a very exact story 
it does sound as if she would be a rather fearful woman 
to encounter 
Extract 5 
A 
but that was Holly 
wasn't it 
B 
that was Holly 
yes 
A 
yes yes 
well again 
Holly um 
I can I can 
she's uses a wide intonation range 
doesn't she 
B 
and very wide speed range 
A 
and speed range 
and there was a hint of Welsh there 
wasn't there 
was there a hint of Welsh in her 
which I'd never noticed before 
B 
well I don't know 
possibly 
she was um 
Liverpool 
North Welsh 
A 
mm 
B 
mixture I think 
A 
mm 
B 
well I would never 
I've never noticed it 
A 
485 
and the story again is focusing again on children of course 
B 
yeah 
and very reminiscent of the previous one 
in the way she told it 
A 
yes 
B 
her manner of speech was consistent 
from one to the other 
I think I 
A 
rru, n 
that's right 
yeah 
B 
recognised. the personal idiosyncrasies 
A 
yeah 
B 
of it 
at least that's the way it strikes me 
A 
right 
yes that's true 
mm I don't 
I might have heard that one 
I don't know 
I might have heard that one before 
B 
m 
m 
A 
though I can't understand why um 
the background noise again 
I assume was some sort of social gathering 
B 
yes 
I think they had a meal 
A 
yes 
um 
the clatter of things and the laughter of the others 
but mostly it was Holly's 
the thing 
the thing that struck me mostly 
this high you know 
thp u-D and down 
486 
and uh then the speed 
B 
yeah 
A 
and 
and at some point she's almost whispering 
isn't she 
B 
mm 
yes 
she in places 
I think it's the sort of thing that um 
you'd really need to be a native speaker 
in order to know what had been said 
it was said so quickly 
and quietly 
A 
that's right 
that's right 
B 
but then it struck me as sounding very natural 
like um. natural story-telling 
so I suspect that that was another one when um 
she'd been set up and didn't realise 
A 
B 
she was being recorded 
A 
B 
because there's no sense that she's playing for effect there 
it's all being done 
A 
no 
B 
in a normal story-telling kind of way 
A 
that's right 
even to when she imitates the um the Susie voice 
mIn 
B 
yeah 
yes 
A 
yes 
that's as much as I can think of for that one 
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Extract 6 
B 
well 
those were the same two speakers who were 
who were talking about football 
A 
talking about football 
B 
along with Chris Davidson in the background 
A 
yes 
yeah 
B 
what struck you there 
A 
well er 
I think 
it must be the guy who er was going on about the um hordes 
the seer of or sea of 
B 
what was it 
the sea of people 
A 
the sea of people at the football match 
again seemed to be dominant to me in that extract 
B 
uIn 
oh 
I don't know whether I got that impression 
there 
there was a tremendous amount of overlap 
they were competing for and not turn-taking 
but competing with each other 
weren't they 
A 
yeah 
B 
and talking simultaneously 
A 
mm 
B 
no 
what struck me most of all 
about that one in particular 
I don't know whether it was any worse than the previous one 
from a linguistic point of view 
488 
it was the kind of um linguistic untidiness 
you only get in conversation 
if if it's genuinely spontaneous 
I 
I don't think they could have been aware of being recorded 
A 
and also with people who knew each other quite well 
B 
yes 
they're very relaxed 
and very familiar with each other 
so that they were not afraid to talk across each other 
A 
yes 
B 
without seeming rude 
A 
right mm 
B 
but its a tremendous mixture of bits and pieces 
broken words 
hesitations 
broken constructions 
and so forth 
A 
but all the time that one 
the one guy is trying to make his point 
isn't he 
he's trying to get his 
B 
yes 
rather as he did before 
in the football match one 
A 
yes yes yes 
B 
yeah 
A 
so that's what I meant when I said he seemed dominant 
he 
he was trying to persist 
B 
I see what you mean 
yes yes 
A 
with getting his view across 
B 
1/, Plqh 
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A 
and the other two 
seem to be um 
having a sort of jokey reaction to everything 
yeah 
yes 
E 
APPENDIX H 
Non-Participant Comments for Study 3 
Extract 1 
Pair I (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
there were lots of overlapping sequences 
B 
yes 
uhms and yeahs, 
and that sort of thing 
it was very garbled 
did you notice the way that shockingly really stood out 
A 
MM 
B 
it was the way he said it shockingly 
A 
was it in a pub somewhere 
cos it sounded like just after the match 
and they were having a drink or two 
B 
you mean because they sounded so garbled 
A 
I guess so 
Pair 2 (A = Male; B= Female) 
A 
it's like a conversation I heard between two old men 
across the bar 
B 
it didn't sound very spontaneous though 
A 
no 
guess not 
B 
there were too many cliches in it 
A 
may be they knew they were being recorded 
490 
491 
B, 
I don't think so 
they were talking too fast to be reading a script 
A 
all those people pushing 
and it got quite frightening 
didn't sound natural at all 
B 
I was wondering 
whether they actually knew each other 
because they didn*t seem to listen to each other at all 
A 
uh maybe 
one sounded as if he were from Bristol 
B 
he also tended to speak while his friend was speaking 
A 
yeah 
agreeing with him while he was talking 
Pair 3 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
it seems to be some discussion of a match 
B 
yeah 
A 
it's definitely about a football match 
they talked about Stamford Bridge 
B 
it's difficult to hear on tape 
because people are trying to get in on top of each other 
A 
a guy who was trying to make a point 
kept saying it was really quite frightening 
it was like talking to somebody who wasn't quite listening 
he just kept repeating things 
B 
the second guy seemed quite sympathetic 
but doesn't seem to know what it"s like 
the other guy has kind of experienced it all 
at one point it seems they're not really talking about 
the same thing 
they talk about the same topic 
but not about the same thing 
A 
one guy is talking about gates 
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and the other guy is talking about the sea of bodies B 
MM 
A 
when they talk about Chelsea and Leeds 
he didn't seem so pleased about it 
he said Leeds played shockingly 
like he had an interest in it 
B 
I agree 
he was quite vehement about it 
when he said Leeds played shockingly 
Pair 4 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
one seemed older than the other 
and seemed more impressed by him 
B 
yeah oh yeah 
they seemed very interested in the conversation 
and there were a good deal of overlapping sequences 
which shows how keen they were to talk about it 
A 
the one who said shockingly was definitely posh 
B 
I wouldn't say that I thought he was a Northerner 
but not a posh one 
A 
quite frightening sounded quite artificial though 
as if he were reading it rather than speaking 
B 
mm. may be 
I think the older one had a more pronounced accent 
than the younger one 
but I don't think it was artificial 
A 
he pauses 
then repeats frightening 
just to fill in a gap in the conversation 
Pair 5 (A = Male; B= Female) 
A 
I couldn't make much of that 
they seem like two interlining tracks 
that just go together occasionally 
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B 
they're both commenting on the same thing 
and they're both wanting to get their word in 
do you know what I mean James 
A 
InIn 
B 
they're talking about the same thing 
they're aware of what each other is saying 
but they don't seem to be interested 
in what the other one is saying 
A 
mm 
one voice certainly seemed louder than the other 
B 
one dominant trend 
one dominant man 
A 
they didn't seem particularly bothered about it 
he talked about a situation 
which he considered was frightening 
and yet their didn't seem to be any real emotion 
B 
I loved his expression of the word shockingly though 
sort of represented upper bourgeoisie middle class 
shocking 
A 
he emphasises the word certainly 
Pair 6 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
one 
they were talking at incredible speed 
and tend to want to get in what they want to say 
before anyone else 
it's not communicating 
so much as giving out what you want to say 
they've both got very strong accents as well 
B 
yes 
A 
very fast 
very colloquial speech 
B 
it sounded like two friends 
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who were chatting over a football match both knowing what the others opinions are 
so there is no need to communicate 
just talk 
A 
a lot of it is not so much words 
as uhm. blah blah blah sort of sounds 
there tends to be exposturation on those kinds of word 
they seem to be kind of waiting to say something 
B 
I couldn't understand the beginning 
it sounds a completely different language 
I'd try to place it as Yorkshire I think 
Yorkshire 
Lincolnshire 
or thereabouts 
A 
I didn't think that the beginning was so much garbled 
as that they were talking very fast to each other 
Pair 7 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
it seemed that the people talking to each other 
were very impatient with each other 
they're both excited 
and gabbling 
and the main speaker uses words like shockingly 
and frighteningly 
which is very effete 
shockingly didn't seem to fit in with the way he spoke 
somehow 
B 
I think he was trying to make an impression 
more than anything else 
A 
it sounded very contrived to me 
B 
they are both in their forties I'd say 
A 
quite frightening is odd 
it's also difficult to tell what they were saying 
B 
it was certainly very muddled 
A 
yeah 
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I put that down to excitement 
you put it down to the fact that 
they were trying to impress each other 
B 
perhaps they had a few drinks 
the subject they were talking about was exciting 
but I don't think they were particularly excited 
themselves 
they were trying to create an atmosphere of excitement 
A 
it's quite repetitive 
particularly the guy 
who was trying to hog the conversation 
the other guy's impatience came across 
in the way he kept saying mm mm 
I just couldn't tell what the other man said at all 
Extract 2 
Pair I (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
she's a very nice lady 
A 
she was talking quite fast 
and there was lots of repetition 
like when she said it was definitely dead 
B 
yeah 
A 
they kept talking through each other 
and kept referring to the fact that the pig really was dead 
there was excitement 
and it got faster 
she really got carried away with the story 
B 
I agree 
she really got quite animated 
I can almost see her gesticulating 
Pair 2 (A = Male; B= Female) 
B 
there"s three of them there 
A 
nah 
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it's a man and a woman 
B 
he could sort of be interviewing her 
cos her voice pitch ranged very widely 
did you get the impression 
she was trying to put on an I am being recorded voice 
A 
not really 
it seemed to me that 
she was trying to create an impression 
she dwelt on certain things in the story 
the smouldering bit 
B 
she came up with twice quickly 
and I got the idea that it was for effect 
she emphasised things 
like it had been absolutely dead 
I don't know what the situation was then 
A 
oh she was just telling a story 
B 
it's very difficult to get your ear in on this business 
Pair 3 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
she's talking about a pig dying 
because it's been eating too much 
and the farmer is trying to keep it from his wife 
B 
it's a bit unusual for those people I thought 
struck me as being a bit incongruous 
did it strike you like that 
A 
I wouldn't say it was quite a really straight coherent narrative 
it was caught up with emotional things 
she seemed to be a little bit protective towards the farmer 
somehow 
B 
it seemed to me 
as if it were going to be a terribly amusing anecdote 
but it never really finished 
like it didn't have an ending 
A 
her tone of voice was trying to fill it all in 
trying to give the whole background 
and there was this pig 
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and the farmer didn't want his wife to know 
B 
yeah 
it was that kind of voice 
where you are trying to engage people 
trying to take up their interest 
but it wasn't a terrible kind of disaster 
that this pig had died 
it was as if it was going to be really funny 
but didn't quite turn out like that 
Pair 4 (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
did you speed that one up at all 
A 
her voice seemed a bit high at the beginning 
I thought she was very young 
but she's not 
she's middle aged 
she was getting more excited as it went on 
and she gets more wrapped up in what she was saying 
then she started laughing 
when she was talking about the dead pig 
B 
I didn't hear the beginning 
but I knew they were talking about a dead pig at the end 
A 
the other person involved got sort of left behind 
and started to listen the story 
without saying anything 
B 
sorry I got a bit lost 
Pair 5 (A = Male; B= Female) 
B 
aw poor pig 
A 
I didn't feel they were communicating 
when she said poor pig 
it meant nothing to her 
A 
to me it sounded like a woman with an audience 
I've got a picture of her 
early to mid thirties 
with blond hair on top 
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B 
I suppose there is a kind of humour 
in the way she was telling it 
A 
she obviously thought it was very funny B 
rrun 
there is a kind of lightness in her voice it sort of rose 
and the speed of delivery was affected as well 
which is suggestive of humour 
A 
it sounded like a nun's joke to me 
a bad holiday recollection 
I found it banal 
and I've nothing more to say about it 
Pair 6 (A = Male; B= Male) 
B 
one woman seems to be doing all the talking 
and the other is listening 
A 
it seemed to be a very stilted passage 
like those programmes on television 
where they get two woman talking 
it was a very immature kind of speech 
B 
she did talk very clearly though 
a bit like a lecturer 
she might have been talking to people who 
didn't know anything about farming or whatever 
A 
I thought it was a racy 
sort of exciting delivery 
fastly said 
bubbly 
B 
it was much clearer than the first passage for me 
may be it was just the speech style 
but she seemed to make everything clearer 
Pair 7 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
I think that's a hypothetical story 
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an eighteen year old girl 
whose gone to work on a farm 
possibly a student 
she's got a very kind of north country type accent 
and is trying to disguise it 
with the articulation of the words 
very precise 
she's got to be about eighteen 
may be reporting back to her family 
about this experience she's had 
there's some kind of subterfuge about the whole thing 
it's not so much that she is affecting an accent 
but a mode of speaking 
she says absolutely dead 
which simply means deader than dead 
I think she's got an audience 
and wants to impress them with her percipience 
her grasp of what's happened 
and the way she uses language it just doesn't ring true 
B 
I think that it sounds like a middle aged farmer's wife 
at tea talking to another farmer's wife 
or some friends 
and trying to make a very big episode out of a 
very small incident 
obviously it wouldn't be small to them 
because its local and relevant 
she uses different expression in her voice 
emphasising some things 
laughing kind of playfully 
A 
there's a sort of mock sincerity about the whole thing 
there is amusement 
interested amusement 
as if she's inside the situation 
it may be something quite serious 
but because they are inside it 
they've been through the traumas of it 
and they can joke about it afterwards 
B 
I don't think that she's speaking from the inside 
because that sort of thing happens very often on farms 
I think she's seeing it from the outside 
and she's sort of reporting it back 
A 
but people like that don't speak about things like that 
in any sort of way 
they just kind of ignore them 
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there is a distance of somebody quite involved 
she"s sort of excited by it 
but its a very restrained kind of excitement 
B 
I think they might talk like that to the vicar 
Extract 3 
Pair 1 (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
it's quite excited 
and far more funny than the previous extracts 
but it's slow 
with some bits slower than others 
A 
sorry 
I just don't agree 
B 
why not 
A 
because it gets faster as it goes on 
and is very fast towards the end isn't it 
B 
I suppose so 
but she gets really slow in telling the story 
about feeding the carrots 
it's like she's telling it to an audience 
and trying to make contact 
by emphasising the point 
there are quite a lot of pauses too 
B 
mm 
well if thats what you think 
I suppose I'd better not argue 
Pair 2 (A = Male; B= Female) 
A 
interesting woman wasn't she 
B 
I think she had a child with her 
she's giving the child's idea of a school trip 
A 
MM 
she seemed to know who she was talking to 
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perhaps they were neighbours or something 
B 
yes 
I think she knew who she was talking too quite well because she didn't need to kind of explain things 
you know 
it wasn't like telling a joke 
she didn't seem to have to convince her audience 
how many people do you think there are 
A 
I'm not sure 
but I'd like to say what the role of that man was 
he just seemed to sit there 
and said nothing 
B 
yeah 
his laughter was polite 
A 
may be they weren't very close neighbours 
Pair 3 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
it compares with what we said about the previous extract 
B 
yeah 
A 
it was a very dramatic presentation 
when she starts off 
she says one of which was the pig 
as if he's a kind of hero 
A 
they all kept giggling at the kind of things she said 
it's a bit silly 
Pair 4 (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
I think I imagine her talking with her hands a lot 
when she said a large pig 
I could imagine her using her hands 
she stressed things in certain parts 
like when she said poking the carrot through 
A 
she sounded a bit Australian to me 
but not all through 
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she said the pig [laid] instead of the pig [leid] 
Pair 5 (Male and Female) 
B 
she's obviously got some kind of audience there 
she paused several times 
apparently waiting for somebody to nod 
or say they got the point 
A 
I liked her little laugh 
which said oh this is going to be fun 
B 
yes James 
she's got a very fruity voice reminiscent 
of well sort of actressy 
as if she was putting on a show 
it reminds me of JP's I've met 
when they are pronouncing sentences on juveniles 
just that warmth 
I get that middle class aura about it all 
A 
I wouldn't have said that 
I thought it was Southern 
B 
actually it reminds me of my own voice on tape 
to be truthful 
it's pretty awful 
A 
shall we proceed 
Pair 6 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
God 
it's hurnourless 
about bloody pigs again 
B 
sounds to me like there is a child there 
the one she spoke about 
she's got that kind of laughter in her voice 
when people talk to baby children 
A 
Jesus 
I just don't know what you can say about this 
it seemed to be more formal 
at least more formal than the previous two tracks 
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she mentions something like ncl 
it's a sort of more genteel speech than the other two 
there is very little almost no dialect at all 
no inflection 
Pair 7 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
this is the aspiring middle class I think 
B 
oh I like that 
A 
they've got high status 
there's traces of background 
the blokes laughing 
sounded a pretty middle class laugh 
again she was trying to impress people with her wit 
by her way of expressing things 
like her emphasis on the word mud 
and pig 
that's all I've got to say about it really 
B 
I don't think that it is the same people as last time 
if that's at all relevant 
I think that it's a couple in their thirties 
talking to another couple 
the wife is talking about the trip they've taken 
to one of these environmental study places 
or perhaps it's a primary school teacher 
or kindergarten teacher 
or play school teacher 
I dont necessarily go along with you about the elitist quality of it 
A 
she says [dei] twice 
B 
I don't think that at all 
A 
it's middle class 
B 
but Midlands middle class 
middle of the road 
A 
but there is intellectual status 
they are talking about something absolutely trivial 
and there is some humour about it 
the humour comes from the gap between the status 
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they have assumed 
and the thing they were talking about 
B 
I don't understand that 
A 
there was an incongruity 
between the way she was expressing things 
and the thing she was talking about 
B 
not really 
A 
here we go again 
Extract 4 
Pair I (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
it's very garbled at the beginning 
and the woman has a very funny voice 
it's the same woman again isn't it 
A 
I think so 
B 
there are quite a few interruptions 
like however 
she's got a very high voice 
and a habit of going uh you know 
she keeps doing that 
and drags out her vowels a bit 
A 
she just dismisses his argument 
as well as his interruptions 
however is reiterated 
as if she wasnt going to listen to him any more 
B 
his accent is very contrastive 
hers sounded quite unmarked 
more rp 
posh 
Pair 2 (A = Male; B= Female) 
B 
is that the same woman 
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A 
I'm not sure 
it"s a bit higher pitched all the way through 
B 
yes 
much higher pitched 
more variation in it 
she's pretty indignant 
the man kept trying to break in 
and contradict her 
she kept just not listening 
and carrying on 
which is infuriating for a person 
A 
she sounded irritable 
B 
mm 
A 
he was having no control over her irritated burst 
the second time he comes in 
he said no it wasn't that 
and contradicts what she was saying 
but she just went straight on 
she didn't want her flow to be interrupted 
she was also kind of using story telling markers 
B 
I noticed the way she said however 
whenever someone did interrupt her 
she just said however 
and then continued 
she definitely was holding court I think 
A 
very fair Id say 
Pair 3 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
that was a bit difficult to hear 
can we hear it again 
B 
yeah think we'd better 
A 
she was very indignant with the bloke 
keen to get on with her story 
earlier on 
where he says the whole place will be overrun with mice 
she cuts him off with however 
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it's really stressed 
B 
she's got a weird voice as well 
there's an incredible range of intonation 
and her voice was much too shrill to understand 
which is one of the problems I had listening to it 
Pair 4 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
she's got a sort of whimpering 
babyish sort of voice 
B 
I thought she was quite decisive really 
every time he tried to interrupt her 
she sort of kept going 
when she talks about not having let them into the garden 
she ignores him 
her voice gets more excited 
when he starts interrupting 
at the beginning they share a phrase each 
but she overtakes him by about two phrases to one 
she takes just takes over in the end 
A 
she just nagged as far as I was concerned 
I could hear her tone nag nag nag nag 
she keeps saying however 
she's not going to listen to him 
she just gets more and more dogmatic 
B 
yeah 
I suppose she definitely knows what she wants 
she sounds just like she's telling a story 
A 
she's got a very monotonous rise and fall though 
you can imagine him saying yes dear yes dear 
the voice says it all 
you don't even have to see her 
Pair 5 (A = Male; B= Female) 
B 
there again 
you've got this woman telling the story 
and she's not prepared to give in on her story 
despite various comments that could sidetrack her 
from the discussion 
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she seems to be ignoring them 
the comments are coming from the man 
A 
he's got a very accusing tone 
in the earlier bit 
sounds as if he's in a bad mood or something 
B 
sounds to me as if she's told the story several times 
it's almost as if she was telling a bed time story to the children 
and they were going to listen 
and that was that 
she just totally ignored his accusing tone 
and a couple of times 
just sort of talked over him 
A 
yeah 
I guess in the middle 
she was just ploughing on 
Pair 6 (A = Male; B= Male) 
B 
replay please 
A 
it's interesting 
the way he first tries to qualify what she's said 
whenever she opens her mouth 
well it wasn't exactly 
or it could have been he says 
she seems a bit dopey 
you know 
the kind of person who believes that mice are capable of anything 
she is a very scatty sort of person 
B 
she seemed to be trying to get the point over forcefully 
and gives a very detailed account of what the mice were doing 
A 
nun 
she's not very articulate though 
Pair 7 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
I think she kind of gives herself away with however 
she's either a teacher 
or educated in someway 
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again it"s the same middle class thing 
perhaps a nature study teacher or something 
I think I detected some traces of Yorkshire accent there 
B 
it sounds very pre-emptory 
her husband tries to get in four times 
and is summarily dismissed 
A 
her husband I think is from the South 
B 
sounds Midlands to me 
the thing that struck me most 
was the way she dictated the conversation 
she was a bit kind of woman's lib 
in that women aren't afraid of mice 
you know 
not bogged down by traditional fears 
A 
I'm usually quite good at spotting accents 
don't seem to be doing too well today 
B 
may be the tape's a bit hazy 
A 
she sounded a lot more confident than the woman before 
Extract 5 
Pair 1 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
I could hardly hear what she was saying 
because of all the ups and downs 
she was very emphatic 
when she was repeating the story 
B 
she is very good at telling stories this person 
children take to her 
she must be a teacher 
A 
there's not a lot more I have to say about it 
Pair 2 (A = Male; B= Female) 
A 
very excessive in range of intonation 
it is used mainly in mimicking the child 
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and the child's reactions 
oh but I do she says 
she seemed to be in control of the story's telling 
B 
who was she talking to there 
A 
I thought it was quite a close group of people B 
I think of all the extracts I've heard so far 
this sounded the most natural 
Pair 3 (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
I don't know what on earth that was all about 
A 
oh it's a woman acting as a narrator 
she's telling a story about a child 
and how the child reacted 
she imitates how the child sounded 
like when she said oh but I do 
there was a kind of childish surprise 
you didn't really miss very much 
Pair 4 (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
she talks very rp really 
a bit posh 
and it gets louder 
and then she suddenly starts mumbling 
you can hardly hear what she says 
there's more expression in her voice 
and she starts talking through her nose at one point 
A 
it's very expressive though 
B 
the way she changes it all the time you mean 
A 
when she changes the tone of her voice 
B 
it's not just on tone 
she emphasises things 
and her voice goes up 
I can't tell what the others are saying because its more or less her 
A 
seems like she had fairly cooperative listeners 
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from the way she's speaking 
Pair 5 (A = Male; B= Female) 
B 
struck me that they were more enjoying 
the conversation and story 
than they were in the last one 
because there seemed to be agreeing laughter 
A 
there seems to be a child there 
B 
there are bits where she seems to be talking to a child 
A 
there you are then 
B 
surely she's imitating what she said to the child 
I do believe in fairies 
there's a sort of inflection on do 
A 
it's the same dratted woman though 
have we got her all the way through 
Pair 6 (A = Male; B= Male) 
B 
it's becoming more and more difficult 
to make any distinctions between the passages 
the conversational style is very much the same 
one woman addressing the other 
A 
yeah 
B 
it's the same woman I think 
same kind of story-telling style 
she really loves story telling 
and goes into great detail 
great depth 
she seems to revel in the actual story telling itself 
and gives all the details 
she establishes an effect on the audience 
I do believe in fairies 
A 
yes 
she becomes emotionally involved with it 
but it's a very indulgent way of speaking 
she talks very indulgently about the child 
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Pair 7 (A = Male; B= Male) 
B 
they sound like they were girls at school together 
A 
the one that was hogging the conversation 
sounded very Midlands 
or Northern 
while the one that commented 
sounded very southern 
in her late twenties 
B 
it sounded quite an authentic voice 
A 
it sounded superficial to me 
Extract 6 
Pair I (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
they are talking through each other again 
agreeing 
having laughed about beer and sex 
they go back to their argument 
they say no but seriously 
reinforcing the fact that they've always thought this for years 
B 
it's much like the first extract really 
they behave towards each other in the same way 
it's the same main speaker 
Pair 2 (A = Male; B= Female) 
B 
unpleasant 
A 
unpleasant 
B 
yeah 
A 
it's kinda complacent 
they were both sure of the attitudes 
and likely responses of the other one 
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B 
yeah 
A 
they guffawed a lot together 
B 
they uhmed 
and aahed a lot too 
A 
they'd got together for some dirty laughs 
they definitely knew what the others response would be 
B 
they talked a lot of bland cliches 
compared to the woman speakers 
it was quite flat in tone 
the main thing was in where they came together 
with the other person's response 
there was no clash 
not even in tone 
A 
there's a complete lack of any depth really 
it's I've always thought this about sex 
it's cheap 
when he says you know 
and really 
it's not really saying anything 
it's appealing to the other participant 
and his knowledge 
Pair 3 (A = Female; B= Female) 
B 
a bit weird that 
this chap is saying it's a confession of failure 
and it was cheap 
the laughter was very cheap 
A 
it's a very male conversation 
at one point 
it was impossible to say what was going on 
because they were all talking together 
would you say that 
B 
yeah 
I think so 
it's much easier to hear fellas voices 
they've got a lower range 
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Pair 4 (A = Female; B= Female) 
A 
they definitely agree with each other 
and help each other along 
the bloke seems to be having difficulty restraining himself 
because he's stumbling over his words all the time 
they're probably contemporaries 
and seem very like each other 
B 
seem like solid citizens 
though I can't agree with what they are saying 
it's all very good natured 
though when they were laughing 
they sounded embarrassed 
A 
one was giving off really high flown ideas 
the others were just laughing at him 
Pair 5 (A = Male; B= Female) 
A 
I quite liked that one 
one man again making free with his opinions 
the other one is trying to interrupt 
and he just talks straight over him 
B 
about the only thing they seem to agree on is beer and sex 
I can't think what else to say about that one 
Pair 6 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
the whole thing is humourless 
there's a great bawdy laugh in the background 
when sex is mentioned 
they are obviously friends 
and basically agree with each other 
he is trying to come over as the educated opinion on things 
and his mates agree with him 
he's trying to come over as educated 
and informed on these things 
but nevertheless he can't resist a quick giggle as well 
they are all trying to make an educated conversation 
when he said I always feel this way about these things 
he seemed to be trying to project an image 
citizen 
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or cinema critic 
it"s very similar to the first tape as well 
B 
my general impression is that the men's ones 
were less coherent 
where there is more than one person whos telling'a story 
everyone joins in more 
it might be to do with the subject matter 
because when the woman were speaking 
they didn't know the story 
and the audience were indulgent 
whereas the men were speaking about matters 
that everybody cared about 
Pair 7 (A = Male; B= Male) 
A 
well 
when he said trouble 
I thought this man's from the South 
it's in lack of story too 
it's one of these hybrid things again 
B 
I agree 
it could be the first two 
who were going on about Chelsea 
A 
there definitely seemed to be a pub thing 
pub type humour 
take the piss out of your friends 
it's the same sort of thing I found appalling about the first one 
it's really effete you know 
B 
but the whole point of going to a football match is for the thrusts 
and throwings about 
the bloke was reactionary 
but carefree 
he was trying to go along with the attitude 
that some people must go along for the beer 
but I don't think 
that he was trying to impose his opinions on anybody 
or whoever was listening to him 
A 
perhaps it's somebody who was born in the North 
but who now lives in the South 
B 
it sounds like two bankers 
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trying to impress each other 
or insurance brokers 
letting out the pressure 
they didn't know each other very well 
it's I must try and impress this guy 
with the words I use 
and how I say things 
A 
I don't know if I agree with that either 
but they didn't sound like people who knew each other very well 
there's a kind of nervous laughter about the conversation 
B 
but many pub conversations are like that aren't they 
conversations between people who know each other 
are pretty well relaxed 
not like this 
A 
I don't know really 
you don't get many conversations that are that relaxed 
although this is only my personal view 
they're not the sort of person I'd like 
but I don't go along with the stock-broker idea 
you don't get many stock-brokers going along to watch Chelsea 
B 
why not 
A 
it doesn't seem right 
B 
may be they are down to earth blokes 
A 
they didn't sound very educated 
stock-brokers tend to be Harlequins Twickenham, 
B 
we've got an insurance man at home just sounds like that 
A 
yeah 
as you say he's certainly used to talking to people 
perhaps he's a salesman 
B 
I get the impression 
that he's not shy about anything 
he's not shy about expressing his opinion any way 
he could be a shop manager couldn't he 
A 
very facile 
and platitudinous 
he is the kind of bloke who has a great theory of the world 
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people resorting to sex 
and that kind of thing 
he sounds to be one of those people 
who really hog the conversation 
B 
like I said 
it's like the first conversation 
he's the sort of bloke who has a monologue 
rather than a conversation 
APPENDIX I 
List of Labov and Fanshel's (1977: 61) Speech Actions 
1. Meta-linguistic 
initiate continue end 
interrupt respond signal completion 
redirect repeat withdraw 
reinforce 
2. Representations 
A-events (in A's biography) 
A B 
give information reinforce 
express F acknowledge 
demonstrate 
refer 
D-events (disputable) 
A B A 
assert 
give evaluation 
give interpretation 
give orientation 
deny 
agree 
support 
give reinterpretation 
contradict 
support 
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3. Requests 
A B A 
request X give X acknowledge 
interrupt [carry out] reinstate 
redirect put off redirect 
retreat - 
mitigate 
refuse with account renew 
refuse with account accept 
reject 
withdraw in a huff 
4. Challenges 
A B A 
initiate continue end 
interrupt respond signal completion 
redirect repeat withdraw 
reinforce 
X= action 
information 
confirmation 
agreement 
evaluation 
interpretation 
sympathy 
F= belief 
uncertainty 
exasperation 
deference 
APPENDIX J 
List of Kreckel's Metapragmatic Verbs (Generated in Study V- 1981: 136) 
Metapragmatic Frequency Metapragmatic Frequency 
categories categories 
accusing 1 inquiring 8 
acknowledging 19 insisting 20 
agreeing 15 insulting 1 
amplifying 1 intensifying 2 
answering 2 interjecting 3 
appealing 13 joking 1 
assenting 11 justifying 10 
asserting 9 making observation 11 
attacking 2 making supposition 1 
brushing off 4 modifying 1 
challenging 22 negating 9 
clarifying 3 objecting 13 
commanding 1 observing 7 
commenting 5 ordering 3 
complaining 1 pacifying 9 
compromising 3 postulating 2 
conceding 20 predicting 2 
confirming 8 protesting 3 
contradicting 15 provoking 8 
declaring 15 qualifying 10 
defending 8 questioning 12 
demanding 2 reasoning 1 
demand. agreement 2 reasserting 5 
demand. confirmation 2 rebuffing 1 
demand. opinion 1 recapitulating 2 
demonstrating 1 regretting 1 
demurring 1 rejecting 4 
denying 12 repeating 18 
describing 2 reproaching 2 
disagreeing 13 requesting 2 
dismissing 9 requesting agreement 5 
dissenting 3 requesting attention 1 
doubting 2 requesting information 8 
emphasizing 5 requesting opinion 
4 
evading 15 responding 
7 
evoking 1 ridiculing 
2 
exclaiming 1 specifying 3 
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exemplifying 7 stating 20 
explaining 3 suggesting 3 
expressing 1 summing up 1 
expressing opinion 1 taunting 5 
generalizing I teasing 7 
giving information 4 threatening 6 
giving opinion 1 underlining 3 
giving reason 7 urging 2 
inferring 3 warning is 
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